Questions of the form 'What is it to possess a given concept?' arise in almost every area of philosophy. Such questions are central and pivotal, and answers to them must draw upon a general theory of concepts and thought contents.
This book offers a new philosophical theory of thought contents and of their possession of truth conditions. The author applies his substantive theory to different types of content: observational contents, contents involving universal and existential quantification, contents concerning inaccessible regions of space and time. He then examines the impact of his theory on current disputes about realism and about the relations between thought and language. In the final section, he argues that an adequate epistemology must draw on a substantive theory of content, outlining an account of knowledge which incorporates rationality requirements derived from the nature of contents.
This book is a philosophical investigation with important implications for issues at the centre of modern philosophy of language and mind. It will also be of interest to those working in other disciplines which use content-involving notions, such as cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence