(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Он пока лишь затеивал спор, спор
Неуверенно и не спеша,
Словно капельки пота из пор,
Из-под кожи сочилась душа.
Только начал дуэль на ковре,
Еле-еле, едва приступил.
Лишь чуть-чуть осмотрелся в игре,
И судья еще счет не открыл.
Очень хорошая книга, которая в отличной форме показывает мировоззрение Алексея Навального. Для тех, кому было лень читать его политические статьи, эта книга предлагает текст, построенный в виде диалога. Конечно, помимо Навального в книге присутствует и Michnik с которым Навальный и ведёт диалог. Но мне кажется, такой подход был выбран верно, т.к. текст приобретает более живой и понятный вид (в отличие от типичного программного текста). Что ж, Навальный ещё раз продемонстрировал, что он был самым адекватным российским политиком. Конечно, мы не знает, как бы повёл себя Навальный, если бы стал главой государства, но то, что он говорил, вполне соответствуют либеральному адекватному взгляду. Поэтому не удивительно, что Навальный был единственным политиком, от внесистемной оппозиции которого поддерживали сотни тысяч людей, а если бы в России была бы демократия, то, скорее всего и миллионы.
Я начну с очень важной для меня темы - ельцинского правления - ибо именно в этой книге мы встречаем оценку, данную Навальным в отношении и Ельцина и его режима, что доказывает тот факт, что фильм "Предатели", это, прежде всего, мнение самого Навального.
I have to admit, over the past few years I’ve re-evaluated the events of the late 80s and early 90s. Back then I was a massive fan of Yeltsin’s, but Gorbachev seems a far more appealing figure to me now. I understand what scenarios he could’ve put into effect – anything from bloodshed to stratospheric personal enrichment. He could’ve done everything Putin’s doing now but didn’t. He was detested by the whole country then, communists and liberals alike.
<...>
What makes Walęsa radically different from Yeltsin, though, is that while Walęsa was the new man on the block, Yeltsin was a descendant of the old elite, who then turned against it – and won. The radical renewal of the elite we witnessed in Poland never happened in Russia.
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It’s to none other than Chubais, I believe, that we owe the existence of Putinism. He and others like him have perverted the meaning of the words “liberalism” and “democracy.” It’s because of them that these words are now being used to stigmatise democratic opposition. And this “liberal democrat” is now running a state-owned corporation while explaining to me that Putin and state ownership are good things.
<...>
Gaidar and Chubais are completely different people. Gaidar’s a liberal and Chubais isn’t. He’s just a hypocrite.
Точно такая же позиция у Навального и по отношению к выборам 1996 года, когда и произошёл главный автократический поворот страны - страна отказалась от главного демократического принципа, принципа сменяемости власти.
Perhaps we needed to have gone through the same thing as Eastern Europe did – the return to power of the Communists in one form or another. Then the pendulum swung once again, and they gave way to others. There’s nothing threatening about alternations of power.
<...>
In 1993 and 1996 we were told that, were it not for Yeltsin, the red-browns [communists-fascists] would be taking power, waging repression against the people and starting wars aimed at the restoration of the Soviet empire. And what do we have on our hands now? We didn’t let the red-browns storm parliament and destroy the elections, but the imperial wars began anyway. I therefore think it’s crucial for the Russian opposition to re-evaluate the events of 1993 and 1996
Олигархия как главная угроза демократии, так же поднимается Навальным и он так же очень точно отмечает начертания решения этой проблемы.
You want to go into gas or oil? Be my guest. But you can’t go into oil and into the media at the same time.
Тема, конечно, огромная и Навальный не пытается дать комплексный ответ. Однако он правильно указывает на то, что после того как олигархи задаром получили огромные куски собственности, они купили на эти деньги СМИ, управляя которыми они пытались секьюритизировать свои приобретения и как результат, избрание тех политиков, которые бы не стали ставить под вопрос эту самую приватизацию.
В книге так же можно встретить позицию Навального по националистическому вопросу, которая вся сводится к двум тезисам. Во-первых, принятие квот для приёма мигрантов и во-вторых, вывод мигрантов из теневой экономики, в которой они пребывают и сегодня.
if we filtered the stream of incomers through a visa regime, migrants would be forced to get work permits and take out medical insurance. And then they’d be able to count on legal and medical assistance if they needed it.
Последнее что я бы хотел отметить, это последняя глава об украинском вопросе. Навальный с Michnik правильно отмечают, что чем дольше длится украино-российский кризис, тем радикальней будут приходящие в этих странах политики.
And Russia’s currently doing everything to bring that notional Ukrainian Zhirinovsky to power. As long as the armed conflict continues, Russophobia and an anti-Russian stance will be popular among voters. And the larger-scale the conflict, the more popular they’ll become.
Так же он проясняет свою позицию по Крыму, с которой полностью солидаризируется Michnik. Вот что говорит Michnik
I think the only correct way to resolve the Crimea issue is to hold a referendum under international supervision. And I’d even admit the possibility of such a referendum in the Donbas. If they want to join Russia, let them do so. If they want independence, they can have that too.
На что Навальный отвечает:
But we must understand that the problem of Crimea is of a political rather than legal character. And it cannot be solved purely by legal means. More than two million Russian passports have been issued to Crimea’s residents, you can’t cancel them just like that. So the only thing we can do is to annul the results of the farce of March 2014 and hold a fair and transparent referendum under international supervision. And accept the results, whatever they may be.
Чтобы понять, почему ни один российский политик не передаст Крым нынешней Украине, давайте представим, что это случилось. Крым, который не то что не хочет слышать украинскую речь, но даже украинскую культуру знать не хочет, переходит обратно в нынешнюю Украину, которая заявляет, что будет выжигать коленом железом всё, что связано с Россией и русскими. Что происходит в таком случаи? Украина навязывает украинизацию жителям Крыма, ибо не может позволить, чтобы в её составе был в прямом смысле русский анклав. Что делают в ответ на это крымчане? Вариантов много, особенно учитывая наличие пророссийских активистов. К примеру, могут перекрыть дорогу на материковую Украину или как-то ещё бойкотировать действия Киева. Далее что делает правительство Украины в таком случаи? Ответ ясен - начинают АТО против Крыма. Ну, а дальше война, даже если Украина будет в этот момент в НАТО. Если любой человек просто подумает о том, как может существовать русский Крым в составе нынешней Украины, тот поймёт, что передать Крым Украине можно только тогда, когда в самой Украине будем комфортно и не страшно жить русским, что в Украине не будет никаких дискриминационных законов. В таком случаи, теоретически можно представить возвращение Крыма без перспективы очередного военного конфликта. Всё остальное настолько взрывоопасно, по обе стороны границы, что нет такого политика, кто бы осмелился бы на такой шаг (именно политика, а не общественного деятеля, писателя и журналиста от которого решение данного вопроса не зависит).
Что же получается, русский либерал ломается на украинском вопросе? Безусловно. Так же как любой американский либерал ломается на мексиканском или канадском вопросе, а немецкий либерал ломается на австрийском или французском вопросе. Чтобы понять, почему эта фраза является демагогией, нужно представить её в более чётком виде: любой российский политик заканчивается на границе с Украиной.
It is a very good book that shows Alexei Navalny's worldview in an excellent form. For those who were too lazy to read his political articles, this book offers a text built in the form of a dialog. Of course, in addition to Navalny, the book also features Michnik, with whom Navalny talks. But it seems to me that this approach was chosen correctly, as the text acquires a more lively and understandable appearance (unlike a typical program text). Well, Navalny once again demonstrated that he was the most adequate Russian politician. Of course, we don't know how Navalny would behave if he became head of state, but what he said was quite consistent with the liberal adequate view. So it is not surprising that Navalny was the only politician from the non-systemic opposition who was supported by hundreds of thousands of people, and if Russia were a democracy, probably millions more.
I will start with a very important topic for me - Yeltsin's rule - because it is in this book that we find Navalny's assessment of both Yeltsin and his regime, which proves the fact that the movie “Traitors” is first and foremost Navalny's own opinion.
I have to admit, over the past few years I’ve re-evaluated the events of the late 80s and early 90s. Back then I was a massive fan of Yeltsin’s, but Gorbachev seems a far more appealing figure to me now. I understand what scenarios he could’ve put into effect – anything from bloodshed to stratospheric personal enrichment. He could’ve done everything Putin’s doing now but didn’t. He was detested by the whole country then, communists and liberals alike.
<...>
What makes Walęsa radically different from Yeltsin, though, is that while Walęsa was the new man on the block, Yeltsin was a descendant of the old elite, who then turned against it – and won. The radical renewal of the elite we witnessed in Poland never happened in Russia.
<...>
It’s to none other than Chubais, I believe, that we owe the existence of Putinism. He and others like him have perverted the meaning of the words “liberalism” and “democracy.” It’s because of them that these words are now being used to stigmatise democratic opposition. And this “liberal democrat” is now running a state-owned corporation while explaining to me that Putin and state ownership are good things.
<...>
Gaidar and Chubais are completely different people. Gaidar’s a liberal and Chubais isn’t. He’s just a hypocrite.
Navalny has exactly the same position with regard to the 1996 elections when the country's main autocratic turnaround took place - the country abandoned the main democratic principle, the principle of succession of power.
Perhaps we needed to have gone through the same thing as Eastern Europe did – the return to power of the Communists in one form or another. Then the pendulum swung once again, and they gave way to others. There’s nothing threatening about alternations of power.
<...>
In 1993 and 1996 we were told that, were it not for Yeltsin, the red-browns [communists-fascists] would be taking power, waging repression against the people and starting wars aimed at the restoration of the Soviet empire. And what do we have on our hands now? We didn’t let the red-browns storm parliament and destroy the elections, but the imperial wars began anyway. I therefore think it’s crucial for the Russian opposition to re-evaluate the events of 1993 and 1996.
Oligarchy as the main threat to democracy is also raised by Navalny, and he also very accurately points out the outlines of a solution to this problem.
You want to go into gas or oil? Be my guest. But you can’t go into oil and into the media at the same time.
The topic is, of course, huge, and Navalny does not attempt to give a comprehensive answer. However, he correctly points out that after the oligarchs got huge chunks of property for nothing, they used the money to buy the media, managing which they tried to securitize their acquisitions and, as a result, the election of politicians who would not question this very privatization.
The book also contains Navalny's position on the nationalist issue, which boils down to two theses. Firstly, the adoption of quotas for the reception of migrants and secondly, the withdrawal of migrants from the shadow economy, in which they remain today.
if we filtered the stream of incomers through a visa regime, migrants would be forced to get work permits and take out medical insurance. And then they’d be able to count on legal and medical assistance if they needed it.
The last thing I would like to point out is the last chapter on the Ukrainian issue. Navalny and Michnik correctly point out that the longer the Ukrainian-Russian crisis lasts, the more radical the politicians who come to these countries will become.
And Russia’s currently doing everything to bring that notional Ukrainian Zhirinovsky to power. As long as the armed conflict continues, Russophobia and an anti-Russian stance will be popular among voters. And the larger-scale the conflict, the more popular they’ll become.
He also clarifies his position on Crimea, with which Michnik is in full solidarity. Here is what Michnik says
I think the only correct way to resolve the Crimea issue is to hold a referendum under international supervision. And I’d even admit the possibility of such a referendum in the Donbas. If they want to join Russia, let them do so. If they want independence, they can have that too.
To which Navalny replies:
But we must understand that the problem of Crimea is of a political rather than legal character. And it cannot be solved purely by legal means. More than two million Russian passports have been issued to Crimea’s residents, you can’t cancel them just like that. So the only thing we can do is to annul the results of the farce of March 2014 and hold a fair and transparent referendum under international supervision. And accept the results, whatever they may be.
To understand why no Russian politician would give Crimea to the current Ukraine, let's imagine that it happened. Crimea, which not only doesn't want to hear the Ukrainian language but doesn't even want to know Ukrainian culture, is being transferred back to the current Ukraine, which says it will destroy everything related to Russia and Russians. What happens in such cases? Ukraine is imposing Ukrainianization on the inhabitants of Crimea because it cannot afford to have a Russian enclave in its composition. What are the Crimeans doing in response to this? There are many options, especially given the presence of pro-Russian activists. For example, they may block the road to mainland Ukraine or boycott Kiev's actions in some other way. Further, what does the government of Ukraine do in such a case? The answer is clear - they start an ATO against Crimea. Well, and then war, even if Ukraine will be in NATO at that moment. If any person simply thinks about how Russian Crimea can exist within the current Ukraine, he or she will realize that Crimea can be handed over to Ukraine only when Russians will be comfortable and not afraid to live in Ukraine itself, when there will be no discriminatory laws in Ukraine. In such a case, it is theoretically possible to imagine the return of Crimea without the prospect of another military conflict. Everything else is so explosive on both sides of the border that no politician would dare to take such a step (a politician, not a public figure, writer, or journalist, on whom the solution to this issue does not depend).
So what do we get, a Russian liberal breaks down on the Ukrainian issue? Absolutely. Just as any American liberal breaks down on the Mexican or Canadian issue and any German liberal breaks down on the Austrian or French issue. To understand why this phrase is demagoguery, we need to visualize it more clearly: any Russian politician ends up at the border with Ukraine.