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Storm Over Leyte: The Philippine Invasion and the Destruction of the Japanese Navy
The story of the Battle of Leyte Gulf in World War II—the greatest naval battle in history.
As Allied ships prepared for the invasion of the Philippine island of Leyte, every available warship, submarine and airplane was placed on alert while Japanese admiral Kurita Takeo stalked Admiral William F. Halsey’s unwitting American armada. It was the beginning of the epic Battle of Leyte Gulf—the greatest naval battle in history.
In Storm Over Leyte, acclaimed historian John Prados gives readers an unprecedented look at both sides of this titanic naval clash, demonstrating that, despite the Americans’ overwhelming superiority in firepower and supplies, the Japanese achieved their goal, inflicting grave damage on U.S. forces. And for the first time, readers will have access to the naval intelligence reports that influenced key strategic decisions on both sides.
Drawing upon a wealth of untapped sources—U.S. and Japanese military records, diaries, declassified intelligence reports and postwar interrogation transcripts—Prados offers up a masterful narrative of naval conflict on an epic scale.
As Allied ships prepared for the invasion of the Philippine island of Leyte, every available warship, submarine and airplane was placed on alert while Japanese admiral Kurita Takeo stalked Admiral William F. Halsey’s unwitting American armada. It was the beginning of the epic Battle of Leyte Gulf—the greatest naval battle in history.
In Storm Over Leyte, acclaimed historian John Prados gives readers an unprecedented look at both sides of this titanic naval clash, demonstrating that, despite the Americans’ overwhelming superiority in firepower and supplies, the Japanese achieved their goal, inflicting grave damage on U.S. forces. And for the first time, readers will have access to the naval intelligence reports that influenced key strategic decisions on both sides.
Drawing upon a wealth of untapped sources—U.S. and Japanese military records, diaries, declassified intelligence reports and postwar interrogation transcripts—Prados offers up a masterful narrative of naval conflict on an epic scale.
388 pages, Hardcover
First published July 5, 2016
87 people are currently reading
245 people want to read
About the author
John Prados
44 books34 followersDr. John Prados is an American historian & researcher whose primary areas of specialisation are the history of World War II, the Vietnam War, the Cold War and politico-military affairs generally. He earned his Ph.D. from Columbia University in Political Science (International Relations). Dr. Prados is a senior fellow and project director with the National Security Archive at George Washington University (Washington, D.C.).
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Displaying 1 - 28 of 28 reviews
July 24, 2016
Excellent -- with stunning new revelations about a battle I thought I had down cold. Author John Prados proves "Bull" Halsey got word about the pounding Seventh Fleet was taking *before* the famous Nimitz "The world wonders" message…from Nimitz himself, in strict violation of security regulations.
Perhaps even more startling was proof that MacArthur's pig-headedness about "I shall return" to the Philippines, instead of the Formosa invasion Ernie King favored, altered the final chapter of the war. Dugout Doug argued that holding Taiwan or the Philippines were equally capable of blockading the Japanese home islands, especially from their Borneo oil supplies. This just wasn't true; even after the Allies captured all of the Philippines (destroying Manilla, at the cost of thousands of U.S. casualties, in the process) some Japanese tanker Marus could hug the coast carrying precious petroleum. Worse, unlike Taiwan -- one continuous landmass -- the Philippines is an archipelago, requiring ferrying Allied forces from island to island, and allowing the Japanese to conduct (more limited) "Tokyo Express"-type resupply operations, similar to those that almost ejected U.S. Marines from Guadalcanal two years earlier.
The consequences of each were enormous:
"The imperfect blockade had a marked impact. War termination in the Pacific could have resulted *if* a successful blockade had made it plain to Japanese leaders and commanders that further military operations were simply not possible. Instead, Tokyo received the impression that it could continue a broken-backed war. … However, Washington did not have time for that. War weariness on the *Allied* side, the end of the war in Europe, and the impatience of leaders led to demands for near-term results, and thus pressures for action."
As a result, Leyte Gulf turned out to be the "decisive battle" the Japanese always courted. Douglas MacArthur's vision led to a "Hobson's choice [sic: actually, dilemma, a word the author correctly uses a page later] among horrific pathways". In other words, blame (or praise) MacArthur for the atomic bomb--but for the wrong reasons. When planning a decisive battle, be careful what you wish for.
Prados doesn't spare Halsey: still, as all historians admit, he acted within orders--and equally importantly, it would have been thoroughly out of character for the Bull not to "charge." Interestingly, the author is critical of Kincaid, who, if not panicked, transmitted false information about his prospects before checking the facts.
A few more tidbits, yet I spoil the read. Prados discusses three factors partially exonerating Japanese Admiral Kurita, who turned tail with total victory within his grasp. One I knew -- his major undamaged capital ships unaccountably turned *away* from pursuit to comb a torpedo spread, losing seven miles in the process. But Prados compiles evidence, if unprovable, that the less experienced Vice Admiral Ugaki made that call.
The other factors are the Kurita fleet fuel state -- near "bingo" -- and a to-this-day un-accounted for Imperial Navy "ghost message" falsely spotting Halsey's Third Fleet carriers closing in on the Gulf. No record exists of this message--but at least one other Japanese ship-driver, interrogated independent of Kurita, heard it as well. The message certainly was a mistake -- even Halsey's fast battleships, having been been decoyed North, never could have returned in time to save Kincaid's Seventh. Yet, understandably, given the effect on the outcome of the battle, someone in the Imperial Navy may well have destroyed all copies after the battle.
The Imperial Navy could have won Leyte; it nearly did:
"Despite all the mistakes, all the responsibility, all the squandering of forces, the Imperial Navy succeeded in reversing the basic strategic balance. For a moment on the morning of October 25, 1944, the unthinkable happened. In the face of every Allied advantage in intelligence, air and naval forces, technology, and raw combat power, a Japanese surface fleet of great intrinsic strength put American aircraft carriers under its guns. The development was so alarming that Admiral Chester Nimitz risked the Ultra secret to warn his frontline commanders of the enemy's feat. Courageous sailors in a handful of destroyers, escorts, expendable aircraft carriers were the ones who turned back the Japanese armada. That was huge. The biggest naval battle in history came down to a few storm-beaten ships on whom the sun never set. Their story will be told forever."
In sum, Prados's book is what "Shattered Sword" is to Midway, with the advantage of being a vastly better, less dense read, without losing the technical precision of the former.
Perhaps even more startling was proof that MacArthur's pig-headedness about "I shall return" to the Philippines, instead of the Formosa invasion Ernie King favored, altered the final chapter of the war. Dugout Doug argued that holding Taiwan or the Philippines were equally capable of blockading the Japanese home islands, especially from their Borneo oil supplies. This just wasn't true; even after the Allies captured all of the Philippines (destroying Manilla, at the cost of thousands of U.S. casualties, in the process) some Japanese tanker Marus could hug the coast carrying precious petroleum. Worse, unlike Taiwan -- one continuous landmass -- the Philippines is an archipelago, requiring ferrying Allied forces from island to island, and allowing the Japanese to conduct (more limited) "Tokyo Express"-type resupply operations, similar to those that almost ejected U.S. Marines from Guadalcanal two years earlier.
The consequences of each were enormous:
"The imperfect blockade had a marked impact. War termination in the Pacific could have resulted *if* a successful blockade had made it plain to Japanese leaders and commanders that further military operations were simply not possible. Instead, Tokyo received the impression that it could continue a broken-backed war. … However, Washington did not have time for that. War weariness on the *Allied* side, the end of the war in Europe, and the impatience of leaders led to demands for near-term results, and thus pressures for action."
As a result, Leyte Gulf turned out to be the "decisive battle" the Japanese always courted. Douglas MacArthur's vision led to a "Hobson's choice [sic: actually, dilemma, a word the author correctly uses a page later] among horrific pathways". In other words, blame (or praise) MacArthur for the atomic bomb--but for the wrong reasons. When planning a decisive battle, be careful what you wish for.
Prados doesn't spare Halsey: still, as all historians admit, he acted within orders--and equally importantly, it would have been thoroughly out of character for the Bull not to "charge." Interestingly, the author is critical of Kincaid, who, if not panicked, transmitted false information about his prospects before checking the facts.
A few more tidbits, yet I spoil the read. Prados discusses three factors partially exonerating Japanese Admiral Kurita, who turned tail with total victory within his grasp. One I knew -- his major undamaged capital ships unaccountably turned *away* from pursuit to comb a torpedo spread, losing seven miles in the process. But Prados compiles evidence, if unprovable, that the less experienced Vice Admiral Ugaki made that call.
The other factors are the Kurita fleet fuel state -- near "bingo" -- and a to-this-day un-accounted for Imperial Navy "ghost message" falsely spotting Halsey's Third Fleet carriers closing in on the Gulf. No record exists of this message--but at least one other Japanese ship-driver, interrogated independent of Kurita, heard it as well. The message certainly was a mistake -- even Halsey's fast battleships, having been been decoyed North, never could have returned in time to save Kincaid's Seventh. Yet, understandably, given the effect on the outcome of the battle, someone in the Imperial Navy may well have destroyed all copies after the battle.
The Imperial Navy could have won Leyte; it nearly did:
"Despite all the mistakes, all the responsibility, all the squandering of forces, the Imperial Navy succeeded in reversing the basic strategic balance. For a moment on the morning of October 25, 1944, the unthinkable happened. In the face of every Allied advantage in intelligence, air and naval forces, technology, and raw combat power, a Japanese surface fleet of great intrinsic strength put American aircraft carriers under its guns. The development was so alarming that Admiral Chester Nimitz risked the Ultra secret to warn his frontline commanders of the enemy's feat. Courageous sailors in a handful of destroyers, escorts, expendable aircraft carriers were the ones who turned back the Japanese armada. That was huge. The biggest naval battle in history came down to a few storm-beaten ships on whom the sun never set. Their story will be told forever."
In sum, Prados's book is what "Shattered Sword" is to Midway, with the advantage of being a vastly better, less dense read, without losing the technical precision of the former.
July 22, 2016
In the entire history of naval warfare, there has never been a battle as large as the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Fought between the juggernaut U.S. Navy and the desperate Imperial Japanese Navy in October, 1944, this battle saw the last attempt by the Japanese to inflict a crushing blow upon the Allies and swing the tides of war back into their favor.
John Prados does a wonderful job of setting up the scene for this titanic clash, providing lots of information and detail on the planning which went into the battle, the forces involved, and the commanders calling the shots. He sheds light on the key role the Allied intelligence services played in deciphering Japanese plans and movements, as well as how key decisions in crucial moments came to play a major part in the outcome. Much has been written about the battle from an American standpoint, and this book helps balance things a bit by providing a good look at the Japanese viewpoint. Even though the Japanese faced long odds, they still felt a major victory could stem the Allied tide heading towards their shores. Prados examines the Japanese commanders, forces and decisions in great detail, thus helping the reader understand they hows and whys of their actions. He doesn't go into as much detail on the Allied (predominantly American) side, possibly because so much has previously been written from their viewpoint.
Now, in a battle of this magnitude, decisions are made which don't always work out for the best. There's an old adage that no plan ever survives an encounter with the enemy, and this certainly applies in many aspects of the battle. While others have found fault in the decisions or indecision of both American and Japanese commanders, Prados examines things carefully and puts forth interesting and thought-provoking evidence which shows the decisions (or lack thereof) were actually not as bad as some have claimed, or else were simply the inevitable result of the mindset and training of those involved.
Overall, a really excellent book which is heavier on the strategy and decisions involved than the actual combat, but that doesn't mean you shouldn't read it. Having read several books on the battle, I was pleased to learn much more about the Japanese side of things, as well as how much the role of intelligence gathering played in the planning and outcome.
Pick this one up--you won't be disappointed.
John Prados does a wonderful job of setting up the scene for this titanic clash, providing lots of information and detail on the planning which went into the battle, the forces involved, and the commanders calling the shots. He sheds light on the key role the Allied intelligence services played in deciphering Japanese plans and movements, as well as how key decisions in crucial moments came to play a major part in the outcome. Much has been written about the battle from an American standpoint, and this book helps balance things a bit by providing a good look at the Japanese viewpoint. Even though the Japanese faced long odds, they still felt a major victory could stem the Allied tide heading towards their shores. Prados examines the Japanese commanders, forces and decisions in great detail, thus helping the reader understand they hows and whys of their actions. He doesn't go into as much detail on the Allied (predominantly American) side, possibly because so much has previously been written from their viewpoint.
Now, in a battle of this magnitude, decisions are made which don't always work out for the best. There's an old adage that no plan ever survives an encounter with the enemy, and this certainly applies in many aspects of the battle. While others have found fault in the decisions or indecision of both American and Japanese commanders, Prados examines things carefully and puts forth interesting and thought-provoking evidence which shows the decisions (or lack thereof) were actually not as bad as some have claimed, or else were simply the inevitable result of the mindset and training of those involved.
Overall, a really excellent book which is heavier on the strategy and decisions involved than the actual combat, but that doesn't mean you shouldn't read it. Having read several books on the battle, I was pleased to learn much more about the Japanese side of things, as well as how much the role of intelligence gathering played in the planning and outcome.
Pick this one up--you won't be disappointed.
August 1, 2017
The author's most famous for his Combined Fleet Decoded, and account of how US intelligence was able to break various Japanese codes (naval and others) and use that information in planning the war against Japan. He's gone on to become a popularizing "historian," and this is his latest effort. As with his
Islands of Destiny
, an account of the Solomons campaign, he has a tendency to overdo the intelligence aspect of the topic in question (though that fault is less evident here).
Prados is an example of the sort of writer who thinks the term "historian" is reserved for those with academic credentials, so he refers to certain writers as "historian X," implicitly suggesting that he isn't one himself (no academic historian singles out historians as historians). I always find this quirk annoying. In any event, the book has very much an 'ipse dixit' presentation. That is, the narrative is presented for the most part without any indication of there being any dispute over what 'really happened' (though he does occasionally allude to conflicting interpretations). There are general notes in the back, but these too don't go into much detail. In particular, there is only one footnote in the text (p. 250), which refers very allusively to the argument about what exactly happened to the two Japanese battleships in the Surigao Strait, the Fuso and the Yamashiro. After mentioning that Samuel Elliott Morrison (official historian of the US Navy) got the breaking apart of the Fuso wrong, Prados simply indicates that unnamed others continue to confuse the two ships. In the actual text of the book, there is no indication that anybody thinks anything other than the narrative that the Prados presents. Yet, clearly some do. Who exactly confuses the two ships and why? What evidence is there for the fates of them? Why did some people think that the Fuso split in two and the two halves floated as burning wrecks? The pertinent reference is actually listed vaguely in the endnote to p. 170 (which refers to much different content). Prados is presumably relying on Anthony Tully's Battle of the Surigao Straight (an online version of his arguments for what happened to the two ships can be found on the visually childish looking Combined Fleet website).
The book is of course about the interconnected naval battles that resulted from the Japanese attempt to repulse the American landings on the Philippines. (The title is a bit bizarre. The battle was in the waters around Leyte Gulf, not over it.) On October 23, 1944, the Japanese still had a high-seas fleet worthy of the name. Three days later they no longer did. The book is mostly an investigation of how the Japanese navy's plan had such a disastrous outcome from their point of view.
The book is at its best in setting out the strategic situation in the first few chapters. That is, instead of being merely a tactical analysis of the ship actions (though it has that too), it attempts to analyze Japanese planning in terms of the overall situation (both the military situation, like the previous defeat of the Combined Fleet at the earlier Battle of the Philippines Sea, and the strategic one in terms of Japan's loss of oil supplies due to the action of US submarines and the recent capture or isolation by the US of various Japanese strongholds).
The basic idea is that the Japanese determined that the best course of action would be to husband all forces, air and naval, till the US intentions were clear and then hit them with everything available in a last-ditch effort to at least slow down the US juggernaught with an eye to securing a settlement of the war short of complete annihilation. This plan was then screwed up when US admiral Halsey went on a rampage around Taiwan in early October and the Japanese reacted by throwing all their air resources at him (instead of ignoring Halsey and conserving their aircraft and pilots, as war games had suggested they should do). The outcome was the annihilation of the Japanese air strength. The result is that once Combined Fleet was set in motion against the American landing on Leyte later that month, they would go into battle without any air cover. (Of course, if the Japanese air forces were destroyed in dealing just with Halsey, it's hard to see what use they would have been in practice giving cover to the naval forces, since then the American airpower would have been even stronger.)
The author's main analytical framework is the idea that both the US and the Japanese commanders both suffered from the notion that their main mission was to attack the other side's naval forces (especially aircraft carriers) rather than attack the other side's troop ships (or defend one's own). This thesis is generated by the two main controversies of the naval campaign, namely Kurita's decision at the Samar battle to turn away from pressing on with his attack in order to sink US troop ships on the morning of October 25, a possibility made available to him by Halsey's decision (and the second source of controversy) to head after the Japanese carriers with his own carriers and battleships, which left the US position in Leyte Gulf exposed to the Japanese attack.
For what it's worth, I've never really understood the problem with Halsey's decision. The question is not what eventually transpired but what the situation was when he headed after the Japanese carriers. At the time, it seemed clear that the Japanese naval forces were in disarray, so what else was he supposed to do? It's not his fault that after turning back on his way to the Philippines Kurita returned to his original direction towards the Philippines. (And Prados' discussion of what Kurita was up to isn't very satisfying. There's some suggestion that he was turning away in the face of the enemy as a ruse like that of Hipper at Jutland in 1916. This seems to be retrospective justification, and it's still opaque to me why Kurita gave the initial order to turn around and why he soon changed his mind.)
As for Kurita's decision to turn away at the actual battle on the morning of October 25, there is much discussion of the various explanations Kurita gave subsequently, but the outcome is inconclusive.
The book is very much oriented towards the Japanese side. As someone who's had a long-standing interest in the Japanese navy, this was pleasant reading. In terms of the overall narrative, it was less than satisfying. The US side does get taken into consideration, but mainly in terms of overall strategic planning. The US perspective is very much downplayed in the tactical sense. In particular, the heroic defense of the US light carriers by their destroyers that threw Kurita's force into chaos and led (at least in part) to his bizarre decision to turn away is hardly given any prominence at all. The only US ship whose actions are described in any detail is the destroyer Johnston, and this only for the PC reason that her commander was a Navajo. Other ships like the Hermann and Hoel are hardly mentioned at all. This is in stark contrast to the loving detail given to the Japanese major units (though their destroyers aren't given much attention, either). The bravery in the face is vastly superior odds shown by the US ships is given a great disservice here. (For the potential drama of the US action, see Hornfischer's The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors .)
For all the attention given to the Japanese planning, the actual details of what they were attempting to achieve in their multi-prong attack on the Philippines isn't presented clearly at all. The discussion of the subsidiary Japanese attempt to transit the Surigao Strait after the destruction of the two battleships is confusing. Particularly confusing from a narrative point of view is the decision to describe Halsey's chase of the carriers and the ensuing controversy before the Japanese attack on Samar that was allowed by it. If you already know the story, it's not so bad, but in terms of the discussion here, the consequences elsewhere of Halsey's decision have to be treated before the situation at Samar has been relayed, which makes for a certain amount of confusion in the narrative in that the reader needs to be apprised of events not yet mentioned. The reason for this is that Prados wants to act as if the really crucial element of the story was the surprise of the Japanese turning up in Samar and being in a position to attack the US transports if things had turned out differently. But as the author makes clear, there were only 30 transports left by this point and nothing of any permanent consequence would have resulted if the Japanese had in fact manage to keep going and sink them (which seems unlikely even if Kurita hadn't decided to turn away).
And in terms of the interpretation of that plan, the author has clearly developed a pronounced aversion to Admiral Ugaki, whose surviving diary is a major source. Ugaki had a jaundiced view of a lot of what was going on in the navy, and in particular wasn't too keen on Kurita, upon whom he cast much of the blame for the failure of the Japanese attack. Since Prados seems to want to salvage Kurita's reputation, he needs to discount Ugaki's views. In addition, one of the big Japanese mistakes at Samar was when two battleships (including the flagship Yamato, on board of which were both Kurita and Ugaki) turned port rather than starboard to avoid torpedoes, thus diverting them from the line of attack at a crucial moment. Who exactly gave the order is open to question, but Prados opts for Ugaki, mainly, it seems, because he doesn't like him.
As a final point, the book (like Destiny) is written in a colloquial style that I find very annoying. It's full of vulgarisms that sound like the writing aimed at ten-year-olds ca. 1970, with words like "shellacking" and "creamed" (in the sense of "beat soundly"), and even the appalling "skull session". The author's command of esoteric vocabulary is sometimes shaky (for instance, some fancy words are given incorrect constructions). Perhaps the intended audience is thought to enjoy this sort of writing, but I don't.
Anyway, for all these complaints it's a readable enough account, and it's particularly enlightening for those interested in Japanese thinking. You just have to ignore the author's overall analysis (everybody was caught in the "strike the carriers" frame of mind and this is the key to understanding the way things played out), which doesn't seem very plausible.
Prados is an example of the sort of writer who thinks the term "historian" is reserved for those with academic credentials, so he refers to certain writers as "historian X," implicitly suggesting that he isn't one himself (no academic historian singles out historians as historians). I always find this quirk annoying. In any event, the book has very much an 'ipse dixit' presentation. That is, the narrative is presented for the most part without any indication of there being any dispute over what 'really happened' (though he does occasionally allude to conflicting interpretations). There are general notes in the back, but these too don't go into much detail. In particular, there is only one footnote in the text (p. 250), which refers very allusively to the argument about what exactly happened to the two Japanese battleships in the Surigao Strait, the Fuso and the Yamashiro. After mentioning that Samuel Elliott Morrison (official historian of the US Navy) got the breaking apart of the Fuso wrong, Prados simply indicates that unnamed others continue to confuse the two ships. In the actual text of the book, there is no indication that anybody thinks anything other than the narrative that the Prados presents. Yet, clearly some do. Who exactly confuses the two ships and why? What evidence is there for the fates of them? Why did some people think that the Fuso split in two and the two halves floated as burning wrecks? The pertinent reference is actually listed vaguely in the endnote to p. 170 (which refers to much different content). Prados is presumably relying on Anthony Tully's Battle of the Surigao Straight (an online version of his arguments for what happened to the two ships can be found on the visually childish looking Combined Fleet website).
The book is of course about the interconnected naval battles that resulted from the Japanese attempt to repulse the American landings on the Philippines. (The title is a bit bizarre. The battle was in the waters around Leyte Gulf, not over it.) On October 23, 1944, the Japanese still had a high-seas fleet worthy of the name. Three days later they no longer did. The book is mostly an investigation of how the Japanese navy's plan had such a disastrous outcome from their point of view.
The book is at its best in setting out the strategic situation in the first few chapters. That is, instead of being merely a tactical analysis of the ship actions (though it has that too), it attempts to analyze Japanese planning in terms of the overall situation (both the military situation, like the previous defeat of the Combined Fleet at the earlier Battle of the Philippines Sea, and the strategic one in terms of Japan's loss of oil supplies due to the action of US submarines and the recent capture or isolation by the US of various Japanese strongholds).
The basic idea is that the Japanese determined that the best course of action would be to husband all forces, air and naval, till the US intentions were clear and then hit them with everything available in a last-ditch effort to at least slow down the US juggernaught with an eye to securing a settlement of the war short of complete annihilation. This plan was then screwed up when US admiral Halsey went on a rampage around Taiwan in early October and the Japanese reacted by throwing all their air resources at him (instead of ignoring Halsey and conserving their aircraft and pilots, as war games had suggested they should do). The outcome was the annihilation of the Japanese air strength. The result is that once Combined Fleet was set in motion against the American landing on Leyte later that month, they would go into battle without any air cover. (Of course, if the Japanese air forces were destroyed in dealing just with Halsey, it's hard to see what use they would have been in practice giving cover to the naval forces, since then the American airpower would have been even stronger.)
The author's main analytical framework is the idea that both the US and the Japanese commanders both suffered from the notion that their main mission was to attack the other side's naval forces (especially aircraft carriers) rather than attack the other side's troop ships (or defend one's own). This thesis is generated by the two main controversies of the naval campaign, namely Kurita's decision at the Samar battle to turn away from pressing on with his attack in order to sink US troop ships on the morning of October 25, a possibility made available to him by Halsey's decision (and the second source of controversy) to head after the Japanese carriers with his own carriers and battleships, which left the US position in Leyte Gulf exposed to the Japanese attack.
For what it's worth, I've never really understood the problem with Halsey's decision. The question is not what eventually transpired but what the situation was when he headed after the Japanese carriers. At the time, it seemed clear that the Japanese naval forces were in disarray, so what else was he supposed to do? It's not his fault that after turning back on his way to the Philippines Kurita returned to his original direction towards the Philippines. (And Prados' discussion of what Kurita was up to isn't very satisfying. There's some suggestion that he was turning away in the face of the enemy as a ruse like that of Hipper at Jutland in 1916. This seems to be retrospective justification, and it's still opaque to me why Kurita gave the initial order to turn around and why he soon changed his mind.)
As for Kurita's decision to turn away at the actual battle on the morning of October 25, there is much discussion of the various explanations Kurita gave subsequently, but the outcome is inconclusive.
The book is very much oriented towards the Japanese side. As someone who's had a long-standing interest in the Japanese navy, this was pleasant reading. In terms of the overall narrative, it was less than satisfying. The US side does get taken into consideration, but mainly in terms of overall strategic planning. The US perspective is very much downplayed in the tactical sense. In particular, the heroic defense of the US light carriers by their destroyers that threw Kurita's force into chaos and led (at least in part) to his bizarre decision to turn away is hardly given any prominence at all. The only US ship whose actions are described in any detail is the destroyer Johnston, and this only for the PC reason that her commander was a Navajo. Other ships like the Hermann and Hoel are hardly mentioned at all. This is in stark contrast to the loving detail given to the Japanese major units (though their destroyers aren't given much attention, either). The bravery in the face is vastly superior odds shown by the US ships is given a great disservice here. (For the potential drama of the US action, see Hornfischer's The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors .)
For all the attention given to the Japanese planning, the actual details of what they were attempting to achieve in their multi-prong attack on the Philippines isn't presented clearly at all. The discussion of the subsidiary Japanese attempt to transit the Surigao Strait after the destruction of the two battleships is confusing. Particularly confusing from a narrative point of view is the decision to describe Halsey's chase of the carriers and the ensuing controversy before the Japanese attack on Samar that was allowed by it. If you already know the story, it's not so bad, but in terms of the discussion here, the consequences elsewhere of Halsey's decision have to be treated before the situation at Samar has been relayed, which makes for a certain amount of confusion in the narrative in that the reader needs to be apprised of events not yet mentioned. The reason for this is that Prados wants to act as if the really crucial element of the story was the surprise of the Japanese turning up in Samar and being in a position to attack the US transports if things had turned out differently. But as the author makes clear, there were only 30 transports left by this point and nothing of any permanent consequence would have resulted if the Japanese had in fact manage to keep going and sink them (which seems unlikely even if Kurita hadn't decided to turn away).
And in terms of the interpretation of that plan, the author has clearly developed a pronounced aversion to Admiral Ugaki, whose surviving diary is a major source. Ugaki had a jaundiced view of a lot of what was going on in the navy, and in particular wasn't too keen on Kurita, upon whom he cast much of the blame for the failure of the Japanese attack. Since Prados seems to want to salvage Kurita's reputation, he needs to discount Ugaki's views. In addition, one of the big Japanese mistakes at Samar was when two battleships (including the flagship Yamato, on board of which were both Kurita and Ugaki) turned port rather than starboard to avoid torpedoes, thus diverting them from the line of attack at a crucial moment. Who exactly gave the order is open to question, but Prados opts for Ugaki, mainly, it seems, because he doesn't like him.
As a final point, the book (like Destiny) is written in a colloquial style that I find very annoying. It's full of vulgarisms that sound like the writing aimed at ten-year-olds ca. 1970, with words like "shellacking" and "creamed" (in the sense of "beat soundly"), and even the appalling "skull session". The author's command of esoteric vocabulary is sometimes shaky (for instance, some fancy words are given incorrect constructions). Perhaps the intended audience is thought to enjoy this sort of writing, but I don't.
Anyway, for all these complaints it's a readable enough account, and it's particularly enlightening for those interested in Japanese thinking. You just have to ignore the author's overall analysis (everybody was caught in the "strike the carriers" frame of mind and this is the key to understanding the way things played out), which doesn't seem very plausible.
November 4, 2016
Disappointing. For the first 80 pages the author seems intent on naming every Japanese/American personnel involved in the action, however peripherally. Many are never mentioned again. Parts of the action are contextually incomprehensible, even for a naval battle. The maps are either useless or lack detail. The battle detail is impressive, but not clear.
August 4, 2023
Note: This is my review published in the October 2016 edition of Naval History Magazine
John Prados introduces Storm Over Leyte, his fine account of the 2nd Battle of the Philippine Sea, by asserting that the July 1944 Pearl Harbor meeting of FDR, MacArthur and Nimitz “set up the most momentous military headache of the Pacific War.” The headache—“using the atomic bomb on Japan versus invading the Japanese Home islands”—lays at the core of Prados’s thesis: “the Pearl harbor conference and the Philippine campaign that started at Leyte Gulf led directly to that horrible dilemma.”
Reviewing any book about the Battle of Leyte Gulf (its more familiar moniker) creates its own peril, even for a reviewer who has written one. That said, while Prados crafts a robust case —that conquest of Taiwan would have exerted a tighter stranglehold on Japan than conquest of the Philippines, thus avoiding Hobbesian choices—I found it intriguing but not entirely convincing. My own sense, built from reading, researching and writing, is that Japanese intransigence, combined with America’s dread of invasion and the atomic bomb’s availability, made the outcome inevitable.
Still, Storm Over Leyte has considerable value, not least because of Prados’s unparalleled ability to apply groundbreaking research on military intelligence to standard military history. For decades this decisive component remained in the shadows. Unearthing it still brings new insight to a global conflict now seven decades past. A complementary outcome is the profiling of lesser-known operatives from the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA) and its cohort the Fleet Radio Unit Pacific (FRUPAC). Prados also—and fittingly—takes note of the “Boulder Boys,” the Japanese-fluent language officers graduating from the University of Colorado at Boulder. All the operatives had much to sift through. As Prados notes, Japanese documents captured in the Marianas could be measured by the ton.
Prados similarly leverages research to present a clear delineation of how Japan’s “Sho Go”—“Victory Plan”—came together, then fell apart.
Essentially, Sho Go contained four contingencies. Sho 1: invasion of Philippines (which planners recognized as most likely); Sho 2: Taiwan; Sho 3: Central Japan; and Sho 4: Northern Japan. All Japan’s high-level commanders seemed agreed that air, land and sea forces had to be marshaled and coordinated in order for Sho to succeed.
Then, in August 1944, came a fundamental question: Should Sho primarily target America’s transports or its combatants? Three years before, off Savo Island during the first stage of the struggle for Guadalcanal, Mikawa Gunichi had gone for the combatants instead of the transports. Japanese strategists’ 20-20 hindsight regarded this as a grave mistake. Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) was now thinking less victoriously and more politically, leaving them convinced that destroying transports was most likely to prolong the war to a negotiated conclusion. The problem, according to Prados, was that IJN “had been designed and trained to sink an enemy fleet.” (125) This dog, in other words, would hunt.
In early October, IGHQ best-laid plans began to fall apart. October 10th U.S. Navy carrier strikes at Okinawa triggered what Prados terms “air-only-Sho.” This, says Prados, is central to understanding what happened at Leyte Gulf. On-scene commanders were splitting resources: air for “Taiwan Sho,” surface for “Philippines Sho.” After disastrous Taiwan air battles, Japan “no longer possessed an integrated, multidimensional weapon.” Bottom line: “the depleted air arm left the Imperial Navy’s surface fleet naked before the enemy.”
If the IJN was an inveterate hunter, so was William Halsey. Facing three alternatives as battle loomed---stay and guard San Bernardino with all his forces; detach battleships to guard San Bernardino and take his carriers north; go after Ozawa with all three carriers groups. The third option, Halsey argued, “preserved my fleet’s integrity, it left the initiative with me, and promised the greatest possibility of surprise.” And so, when the Bull pulled the trigger it was: “Mick [his chief of staff Robert Carney], start the north.”
In essence, argues Prados, both sides made the same mistake for the same reason. IJN instincts to attack fleets instead of invasion forces countered IGHQ’s strategic preferences. And Halsey left San Bernardino unguarded because he wanted his forces intact while he went after the carriers, in his thinking the main threat.
With this stage set, Prados constructs battle narratives that are fluid, dramatic and engaging, among the very best I’ve ever read. And they flow so well, I think, because he constructs such a solid pre-battle foundation. (One tiny quibble: Writing about the Action off Samar, Prados laments: “the CVEs were equipped largely with older-model Wildcats, but they did their best.” Not entirely so. CVE Wildcat aviators I interviewed for The Last Epic Naval Battle extolled the fighting features and resiliency of the FM Wildcat models--produced by GM--they flew.)
Prados wraps Storm Over Leyte by revisiting his argument that conquering the Philippines made for an “imperfect blockade.” “War termination in the Pacific could have resulted if a successful had made it plain to Japanese leaders and commanders that further military operations were simply not possible.”
Perhaps, but it seems to me, the essence of Leyte Gulf’s history, comes in Storm Over Leyte‘s final paragraph. [A] Japanese surface…put American aircraft carriers under its guns. Courageous sailors… turned back the Japanese armada. The biggest naval battle in history came down to a few storm-beaten ships on whom the sun never set.”
John Prados introduces Storm Over Leyte, his fine account of the 2nd Battle of the Philippine Sea, by asserting that the July 1944 Pearl Harbor meeting of FDR, MacArthur and Nimitz “set up the most momentous military headache of the Pacific War.” The headache—“using the atomic bomb on Japan versus invading the Japanese Home islands”—lays at the core of Prados’s thesis: “the Pearl harbor conference and the Philippine campaign that started at Leyte Gulf led directly to that horrible dilemma.”
Reviewing any book about the Battle of Leyte Gulf (its more familiar moniker) creates its own peril, even for a reviewer who has written one. That said, while Prados crafts a robust case —that conquest of Taiwan would have exerted a tighter stranglehold on Japan than conquest of the Philippines, thus avoiding Hobbesian choices—I found it intriguing but not entirely convincing. My own sense, built from reading, researching and writing, is that Japanese intransigence, combined with America’s dread of invasion and the atomic bomb’s availability, made the outcome inevitable.
Still, Storm Over Leyte has considerable value, not least because of Prados’s unparalleled ability to apply groundbreaking research on military intelligence to standard military history. For decades this decisive component remained in the shadows. Unearthing it still brings new insight to a global conflict now seven decades past. A complementary outcome is the profiling of lesser-known operatives from the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA) and its cohort the Fleet Radio Unit Pacific (FRUPAC). Prados also—and fittingly—takes note of the “Boulder Boys,” the Japanese-fluent language officers graduating from the University of Colorado at Boulder. All the operatives had much to sift through. As Prados notes, Japanese documents captured in the Marianas could be measured by the ton.
Prados similarly leverages research to present a clear delineation of how Japan’s “Sho Go”—“Victory Plan”—came together, then fell apart.
Essentially, Sho Go contained four contingencies. Sho 1: invasion of Philippines (which planners recognized as most likely); Sho 2: Taiwan; Sho 3: Central Japan; and Sho 4: Northern Japan. All Japan’s high-level commanders seemed agreed that air, land and sea forces had to be marshaled and coordinated in order for Sho to succeed.
Then, in August 1944, came a fundamental question: Should Sho primarily target America’s transports or its combatants? Three years before, off Savo Island during the first stage of the struggle for Guadalcanal, Mikawa Gunichi had gone for the combatants instead of the transports. Japanese strategists’ 20-20 hindsight regarded this as a grave mistake. Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) was now thinking less victoriously and more politically, leaving them convinced that destroying transports was most likely to prolong the war to a negotiated conclusion. The problem, according to Prados, was that IJN “had been designed and trained to sink an enemy fleet.” (125) This dog, in other words, would hunt.
In early October, IGHQ best-laid plans began to fall apart. October 10th U.S. Navy carrier strikes at Okinawa triggered what Prados terms “air-only-Sho.” This, says Prados, is central to understanding what happened at Leyte Gulf. On-scene commanders were splitting resources: air for “Taiwan Sho,” surface for “Philippines Sho.” After disastrous Taiwan air battles, Japan “no longer possessed an integrated, multidimensional weapon.” Bottom line: “the depleted air arm left the Imperial Navy’s surface fleet naked before the enemy.”
If the IJN was an inveterate hunter, so was William Halsey. Facing three alternatives as battle loomed---stay and guard San Bernardino with all his forces; detach battleships to guard San Bernardino and take his carriers north; go after Ozawa with all three carriers groups. The third option, Halsey argued, “preserved my fleet’s integrity, it left the initiative with me, and promised the greatest possibility of surprise.” And so, when the Bull pulled the trigger it was: “Mick [his chief of staff Robert Carney], start the north.”
In essence, argues Prados, both sides made the same mistake for the same reason. IJN instincts to attack fleets instead of invasion forces countered IGHQ’s strategic preferences. And Halsey left San Bernardino unguarded because he wanted his forces intact while he went after the carriers, in his thinking the main threat.
With this stage set, Prados constructs battle narratives that are fluid, dramatic and engaging, among the very best I’ve ever read. And they flow so well, I think, because he constructs such a solid pre-battle foundation. (One tiny quibble: Writing about the Action off Samar, Prados laments: “the CVEs were equipped largely with older-model Wildcats, but they did their best.” Not entirely so. CVE Wildcat aviators I interviewed for The Last Epic Naval Battle extolled the fighting features and resiliency of the FM Wildcat models--produced by GM--they flew.)
Prados wraps Storm Over Leyte by revisiting his argument that conquering the Philippines made for an “imperfect blockade.” “War termination in the Pacific could have resulted if a successful had made it plain to Japanese leaders and commanders that further military operations were simply not possible.”
Perhaps, but it seems to me, the essence of Leyte Gulf’s history, comes in Storm Over Leyte‘s final paragraph. [A] Japanese surface…put American aircraft carriers under its guns. Courageous sailors… turned back the Japanese armada. The biggest naval battle in history came down to a few storm-beaten ships on whom the sun never set.”
October 19, 2016
A lot of detail and characters....good book but I found it challenging to keep things straight as action seemed to bounce around....I feel I would need to reread and map out both the characters/ships and their geographic positions as the action unfolded...micro mapping did little for me...broader maps would have helped keeping things in perspective
February 10, 2017
The last half of the book, describing the actual battle is more interesting than the first half which dwells on events and discussions leading up to the battle.
October 29, 2021
Less a history than a passionate retelling more suited to a popular TV documentary.
I started to have my doubts about this book from the title. The Philippine Invasion? The Philippine invasion of what? Oh, the invasion of the Philippines!
That doubt continued as I read the author's claims in the Introduction. How different and unique his approach to the Battle of Leyte was, drawing on 'new sources' that were never identified. That's the role of a Foreword by someone notable. If the author rather than someone else is talking up a book, you've got to wonder.
Right from the start I found the author's writing style annoying. I persevered but I really didn't like this book. He's all over the place with dates and locations. His analysis is value-laden and full of judgement. He attributes thoughts and feelings to people - what they must have been thinking about an event - but it's never clear if this is drawn from the individual's memoirs or diary, an interview or whether it's just the author projecting his views. He overuses colloquialisms and euphemisms, talking about tin can (destroyers), tin fish (torpedos), battlewagons (battleships) and skull sessions (command conferences). He's overfamiliar, constantly referring to individuals by nicknames.
The book is packed with information, but I found the way it was presented problematic. There was so much information about each commander in the text that it interrupted the narrative. A better approach would have been to put all that career information in a footnote/endnote of an annex of biographies. The first hundred or so pages involved the introduction of person after person for no apparent purpose; it seemed more like the author simply demonstrating how much he knew!
The narrative was difficult to follow at times, especially the campaigns and battles before Leyte. I often had to refer to other sources to understand what was going on.
Referencing is problematic. There aren't any notes in the text. By chance I came across a notes section at the end of the book with page references, but no references on the actual page. Very odd.
The battle maps are ok, but could have been bigger and ideally a few more would have been good.
Annexes of the different fleets, orders of battle and commanders would have been useful for such a large and complicated event as the four battles which collectively make up the Battle of Leyte.
I started to have my doubts about this book from the title. The Philippine Invasion? The Philippine invasion of what? Oh, the invasion of the Philippines!
That doubt continued as I read the author's claims in the Introduction. How different and unique his approach to the Battle of Leyte was, drawing on 'new sources' that were never identified. That's the role of a Foreword by someone notable. If the author rather than someone else is talking up a book, you've got to wonder.
Right from the start I found the author's writing style annoying. I persevered but I really didn't like this book. He's all over the place with dates and locations. His analysis is value-laden and full of judgement. He attributes thoughts and feelings to people - what they must have been thinking about an event - but it's never clear if this is drawn from the individual's memoirs or diary, an interview or whether it's just the author projecting his views. He overuses colloquialisms and euphemisms, talking about tin can (destroyers), tin fish (torpedos), battlewagons (battleships) and skull sessions (command conferences). He's overfamiliar, constantly referring to individuals by nicknames.
The book is packed with information, but I found the way it was presented problematic. There was so much information about each commander in the text that it interrupted the narrative. A better approach would have been to put all that career information in a footnote/endnote of an annex of biographies. The first hundred or so pages involved the introduction of person after person for no apparent purpose; it seemed more like the author simply demonstrating how much he knew!
The narrative was difficult to follow at times, especially the campaigns and battles before Leyte. I often had to refer to other sources to understand what was going on.
Referencing is problematic. There aren't any notes in the text. By chance I came across a notes section at the end of the book with page references, but no references on the actual page. Very odd.
The battle maps are ok, but could have been bigger and ideally a few more would have been good.
Annexes of the different fleets, orders of battle and commanders would have been useful for such a large and complicated event as the four battles which collectively make up the Battle of Leyte.
March 21, 2025
A sparkling, and at times for me, confusing retelling of the 'greatest sea battle in history'. The Japanese roll the dice on a complicated plan to enable them to destroy American landing forces at Leyte in the Philippines. Creating and putting at sea a decoy of sufficient size to fool Admiral Halsey into turning his forces to attacking it, thus leaving Leyte vulnerable to attack by other Imperial Japanese naval units. The gamble was intricate and complex, as seems to have been the Japanese penchant in strategic thinking, and it almost came off. With great skill, Dr. Prados in this detailed work, builds up the tension, elucidates the strategy and evaluates the outcome. I admit to needing more help with maps, consistency in referring to various units, individual ships (e.g. Admiral so and so of fleet such and such in ship this or that) as at times I had to keep going back to work out who commanded what ship (Battleship, Carrier or Destroyer) and other such details. More astute editing (rare in publishing these days), better maps, detailed glossary (e.g. a jeep carrier - what is that? Oh I see, it's a lightly built escort carrier) including a cast of characters with basic information. All of those things would have improved the readability of this work but at significant greater cost to the publisher and eventually, the reader. Perhaps the usual readership pf this kind of book is well versed in the arcana of military descriptions. Nonetheless, this book should be read by anyone interested in military history and the psychology of command. Australian readers should find it especially relevant, given what is presently taking place in the Eastern Pacific and the risk of yet another major naval war. The not so pacific Pacific. Very Good.
May 31, 2018
A great follow up to the Solomons campaign by the same author has the benefit of many previous works on the invasion of the Philippines and the battle of Leyte Gulf to draw from. Focus on intelligence (Ultra) and the Japanese Sho Plan and it’s disjointed application (air separate from naval forces instead of together) give a great overview of the factors involved as well as critiquing the actions of Admirals on both sides. A great read - enjoyed it more than Islands of Destiny.
April 8, 2020
I read the book because I knew little about Pacific naval battles in the Pacific, especially those that affected the Philippine Islands. The author set the importance of the American’s strategy in the first and last chapters. Throughout the book he shifted view points between the American and Japanese commanders which I found helpful to understand the different philosophies and actions of both nations.
May 13, 2017
A brisk retelling of the naval battles during the landings on Leyte. The prose is a bit florid: torpedoes "smacked" into a ship. Little discussion of the land battle and not much new in terms of a story already told many times. Readers should probably turn to Samuel Eliot Morison's authoritative account instead.
October 8, 2017
A good book about the end of the Japanese fleet
Politics. Decisions good and bad, both tactical and strategic, made on both sides are only part of the illuminating text contained therein. A good book for anyone interested in the Pacific part of world war 2.
Politics. Decisions good and bad, both tactical and strategic, made on both sides are only part of the illuminating text contained therein. A good book for anyone interested in the Pacific part of world war 2.
August 3, 2018
Interesting topic, but the author's writing style made it difficult to follow. He seemed to jump around in the sequence of events and often went off on tangents with minutia that didn't really seem to add much to the material or understanding of the topic.
December 28, 2018
A good historical accounting of the American liberation of the Philippines from the Japanese and the events leading up to the invasion. This is a very good account of World War II in the Pacific Theater at the upper levels of government and command.
July 15, 2022
Great retelling that provides important context and analysis to the battle. It brings a deeper understanding of what happened that cannot come from a simple retelling of the events during that time period
May 10, 2017
Good read on the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
February 13, 2018
Especially enjoyed this book as it contained a great deal of data regarding the Japanese sides of the battles and delved into how the decisions and mistakes may have been made. A worthwhile read.
May 24, 2018
Newer view of the battle of Leyte Gulf.
January 17, 2021
Extremely well written.
Suffers from lack of situational maps and poorly diagramed outlines of surface actions.
Suffers from lack of situational maps and poorly diagramed outlines of surface actions.
October 14, 2023
Good facts and acceptably organized but confusing when put together. Too much slang usage from the author made the narrative confusing
May 3, 2020
The best and most comprehensive book about this battle, that I have ever read.
August 20, 2016
"Storm Over Leyte" eBook was published in 2016 and was written by John Prados (http://johnprados.com/). Mr. Prados has published more than a dozen books.
I received a galley of this novel for review through https://www.netgalley.com. I categorize this novel as ‘PG’ because it contains scenes of Violence. This is the non-fiction account of the battle between Japan and the United States in the Leyte Gulf )https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_...). This naval conflict occurred in the fall of 1944 and is considered to be one of the most significant naval battles in history.
This account is full of the details - names, dates and numbers - that you would expect in a history. It also includes many small stories relating personal events to personnel on both sides of the conflict. The use of intelligence and declassified military documents gives a greater scope in this story, providing insight to both sides in the conflict.
I enjoyed the nearly 13 hours I spent reading this 397 page book. I have read other accounts of this battle, but this is by far the most detailed. It is interesting to see how both sides had their failures and their triumphs. As often the case for a non-fiction book, this was not the most exciting read, though the description of the battle was engaging and read well. The internal politics of both militaries certainly affected the outcome of the battle, though I do think that the Japanese had more of an issue with this. While the cover is not bad, I think something more interesting could have been chosen. I give this book a 4 out of 5.
Further book reviews I have written can be accessed at https://johnpurvis.wordpress.com/blog/.
I received a galley of this novel for review through https://www.netgalley.com. I categorize this novel as ‘PG’ because it contains scenes of Violence. This is the non-fiction account of the battle between Japan and the United States in the Leyte Gulf )https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_...). This naval conflict occurred in the fall of 1944 and is considered to be one of the most significant naval battles in history.
This account is full of the details - names, dates and numbers - that you would expect in a history. It also includes many small stories relating personal events to personnel on both sides of the conflict. The use of intelligence and declassified military documents gives a greater scope in this story, providing insight to both sides in the conflict.
I enjoyed the nearly 13 hours I spent reading this 397 page book. I have read other accounts of this battle, but this is by far the most detailed. It is interesting to see how both sides had their failures and their triumphs. As often the case for a non-fiction book, this was not the most exciting read, though the description of the battle was engaging and read well. The internal politics of both militaries certainly affected the outcome of the battle, though I do think that the Japanese had more of an issue with this. While the cover is not bad, I think something more interesting could have been chosen. I give this book a 4 out of 5.
Further book reviews I have written can be accessed at https://johnpurvis.wordpress.com/blog/.
February 10, 2017
This book follows the events and battles that led up to and culminated in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Told from both perspectives, American and Japanese, it discusses objectives and strategy. The author also gives good bios of the main people involved and how their personalities effected their actions and thusly events.
Technology was also important as the use of radar not only helped locate each other but also directed gunfire of the ships. The author did not forget the rank and file sailors and pilots, giving some of their stories attention.
The author also relates the errors made by various commanders that effected the battle, not negatively and positive.
Technology was also important as the use of radar not only helped locate each other but also directed gunfire of the ships. The author did not forget the rank and file sailors and pilots, giving some of their stories attention.
The author also relates the errors made by various commanders that effected the battle, not negatively and positive.
August 31, 2016
An interesting, well-written book, however, I don't think it provided that much new in the way of conclusions about the battle. There were a few things I learned that I did not know, but they were minor for the most part.
I was surprised that Prados did not make any reference to the tragedy of Taffy 3 with regard to so many sailors who were not rescued in a timely fashion. This is a part of the story which should be told. He also made a mistake in referring to Halsey as a fleet admiral, which he did not become until December of 1945.
The author's conjectures about Kurita's turn-away and "Halsey's Run" revealed little that others have not discussed unfortunately. Perhaps he is right in comparing the motives of the two admirals, their need to get the 'fighting' ships, however that would seem to forget the element of common sense, especially for Halsey who had an overabundance of ships at his disposal.
Prados was certainly right though in his last two sentences: "The biggest naval battle in history came down to a few storm-beaten ships on whom the sun never set. Their story will be told forever." We can only hope that he is right since those brave men who sacrificed all are the true story.
I was surprised that Prados did not make any reference to the tragedy of Taffy 3 with regard to so many sailors who were not rescued in a timely fashion. This is a part of the story which should be told. He also made a mistake in referring to Halsey as a fleet admiral, which he did not become until December of 1945.
The author's conjectures about Kurita's turn-away and "Halsey's Run" revealed little that others have not discussed unfortunately. Perhaps he is right in comparing the motives of the two admirals, their need to get the 'fighting' ships, however that would seem to forget the element of common sense, especially for Halsey who had an overabundance of ships at his disposal.
Prados was certainly right though in his last two sentences: "The biggest naval battle in history came down to a few storm-beaten ships on whom the sun never set. Their story will be told forever." We can only hope that he is right since those brave men who sacrificed all are the true story.
August 28, 2016
Highly technical analysis of the battle of Leyte Gulf.
July 4, 2022
5 ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️- Excellent - Highly Recommended
4 ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️ - A good, solid read
3 ⭐️⭐️⭐️ - An okay read
2 ⭐️⭐️ - Meh
1 ⭐️ - Not my cup of tea
4 ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️ - A good, solid read
3 ⭐️⭐️⭐️ - An okay read
2 ⭐️⭐️ - Meh
1 ⭐️ - Not my cup of tea
July 28, 2016
This was a very good book! Look for my review in America in WWII magazine soon.
Displaying 1 - 28 of 28 reviews