تكوينية الوعي الإنساني والديني : من دروس فلسفة الدين لهيجل

by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, أبي يعرب المرزوقي (ترجمة)

يقبل فكر هيجل ككل فكر ذي نسقية فلسفية الرد إلى مسار تكويني يحاكي مسار العقل الإنساني العيني والكلي، العقل بجميع أبعاده المتشاجنة والتي توجد دائماً معا ولكن بغلبة أحدها محدداً لطبيعة المزيج الروحي والعقلي والذوقي الجمالي والخلقي السياسي. وهذا المسار يؤطره إبداعان بأولهما كانت البداية وبالثاني كانت الغاية بمعنييها نهاية ومقصداً. وحتى البداية ذاتها فإنها قد كانت بعد مسار من جنس ما آلت إليه الغاية, لأن فكر هيجل لم يصل إلى ظاهراتية الروح إلا في مسار كان لفكره الديني فيه الدور الأول. فلكأن مسار فكره دار دورة كاملة ليعود إلى البداية في الغاية عودة من تجهز لإتمام ما كان مجرد حدوس في محاولات هيجل الأولى، وجلّها ذات نفس ديني فأصبح فلسفة تامة العمارة المنطقية وحتى البلاغية.

فأما كتاب البداية فهو ظاهراتية الروح. وأما كتاب الغاية فهو الدروس في فلسفة الدين. ويملأ هذا الإطار بين البداية والغاية ما كان غير مذكور في الكتابين رغم كونه لحمتهما وسداهما فيصبح صريحاً في عنواني الكتابين اللذين يطبق فيهما مضمون الكتابين المؤطرين. إنهما تاريخ الفلسفة وفلسفة التاريخ. فهما كتابان يبرهنان تعييناً على حصول هذا المسار في ظاهر الوجود (فلسفة التاريخ) وفي باطنه (تاريخ الفلسفة)، دون أن يكون الظاهر والباطن قابلين لفصل أحدهما عن الآخر.

لكن القلب من عمله الفكري وزبدته هو منطقه الذي هو ميتافيزيقاه وثولوجاه في آن. فهو يلخص الحبكة المفهومية لوجوه فلسفته الأربعة: بداية (الظاهرياتية) وغاية (فلسفة الدين) وتعيناً في ظاهر الوجود الإنساني الإلهي (فلسفة التاريخ) أو في باطنه (تاريخ الفلسفة). أما باقي أعمال هيجل فهي إما عرض مدرسي للتدريس مثل الموسوعة في صيغها المتوالية أو استثمار لنتائج هذه الأعمال في السياسة والأخلاق والتربية، أو في خصومات عامة أو أكاديمية للدفاع عنها أو لمناقشة غيره بها.

Genres: Philosophy, Religion, German Literature

475 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1832

About the author

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) was a German philosopher and one of the founding figures of German Idealism. Influenced by Kant's transcendental idealism and Rousseau's politics, Hegel formulated an elaborate system of historical development of ethics, government, and religion through the dialectical unfolding of the Absolute. Hegel was one of the most well-known historicist philosopher, and his thought presaged continental philosophy, including postmodernism. His system was inverted into a materialist ideology by Karl Marx, originally a member of the Young Hegelian faction.

Reviews

[hayatem · Rating 4 out of 5]

الانسان بالنسبة لهيجل جذور ممتدة من الباطن الى اللامتناهي- من الوجود في اللاواعي الى الوجود بالفعل الواعي- وكما يذكر هو : إن الانسان متناه، وهو كائن لذاته وهي الخاصة الأساسية كون الإنسان وعياً بالذات-والإنسان يكون لذاته غاية ذاتية ويكون وعيه حراً في الإله.
وكما يذكر فرويد كل مؤمن/فرد يعتقد بأن الله "الإله" خلق العالم على صورة ولادته هو.

*المنهج الذي اتبعه هيغل في شرح مفهوم الدين كان مبنياً على تقويم التجارب السابقة انطلاقاً من مقارنتها بالمسيحية غاية لتطورها- المترجم - بتصرف.

قام بدراسة الفكر الأسطوري التاريخي- الديني والشعبي وعليه خلق تصوره حول تكوينية الوعي الانساني والديني للأفراد. حيث لعبت الأسطورة دور الوسيط بين (الحدث الطبيعي والنص القدسي والفلسفي .) وكما يذكر بأن الفلسفة اهتمت في بداياتها ب- تحليل الأساطير ورموزها بهدف أن" تستخلص من مجموعها معنى للعالم وللخلق وللوجود البشري لغاية حماية كيانه الاجتماعي ."

إن مفهوم الدين في بعض أطيافه المذهبية المتعددة تطور من المنظور العيني للشيء ( الطبعانية) الاله صورة /جزء منه -الى المنظور الكلي -السمو على الذات- من المماهاة مع المتناهي الى التوحد أو التناهي مع اللامتناهي .

-استعرض هيغل المفهوم الديني كشكل من أشكال الوعي الذاتي بين قطبي الواحديّة والتعدديّة.
كما أسرف في تفسير :( خاصية تناقض الوعي الجوهري بالذات، قبالة الوعي بالذات المتناهي والروح الجوهري، مقابل الروح المتناهي.)

كما كان من الملاحظ والجليّ تأثر هيغل بإرث الفكر الأخلاقي لفيلسوف ألمانيا الكبير "كانط" ( في تمييزه بين العقل الأداتي النفعي والعقل الأخلاقي العملي الذي يقوم على مبدأ الكلية والشمولية أي أهلية السلوك البشري للتعميم.) -و مايتعلق بالأخص -بعالم الأشياء بذاتها أي الشيء الغير ظاهر أو المدرك والذي يعرّفه كانط ب- "النومين" وهو ما يسميه الشيء في ذاته.

في نظرته/ تصوره لمفهوم الدين الإسلامي أبدى تأثراً بنهج - المتكلمين- الأشاعرة والمعتزلة.

هنا ملخص لأهم الأفكار الواردة/ الضمنية في معرض الكتاب من وجهة نظري:

- جوهر مفهوم هيغل للإغتراب -اغتراب الذات / اغتراب العبودية.

-الثيولوجيا وفلسفة الدين

-إشكالية العلاقة بين الذات والإله

-فلسفة العلاقة بين الذات والموضوع.

-مفهوم الدين كثيمة فكرية- إنسانية ذات منطلق فردي أو كإشكالية فلسفية.

- جدلية التثليث.


هيغل مفكر سوسيولوجي أخلاقي عظيم سواءً اتفقت أم اختلفت.

[شفيق · Rating 2 out of 5]

هيجل عظيم جداً لكني مازلت امامي الكثير لألمام فكره الواسع

[mohab samir · Rating 3 out of 5]

يتناول هيجل الدين من جانبيه الجانب الأول هو الجانب الروحى للدين .اى جانبه الباطن الذى يجعل من وجوده الموضوعى ضرورى ضرورةً مطلقة .
اما الجانب الثانى فهو جانبه الموضوعى حيث يبدأ بتناول الدين بما هو كذلك فى وجوده الواقعى .
والدين فى ذاته كحقيقة روحية كلية يدفع ذاته بطريقة جدلية ليهب نفسه الوجود الواقعى فينشطر الى وجوده الجزئى اى وجود هذا الدين أو ذاك والذى بدوره يتجلى فى الوجود الواقعى فى الزمان والمكان فى صورة الشخص الفردى الحى .
وبذلك يقر هيجل بوجود الحياة الدينية فى الروح الكلية وفى كل روح جزئى اى فى روح هذا الشعب أو ذاك وكذلك فى كل روح فردى لكل شخصية فردية مهما بلغت هذه النفس من السوء .
والبحث عن علاقة الدين -بما هو روح وواقع - بكل ما له وجود واقعى وروحى اى بكل ما يحيط بالانسان من الخارج كالدولة وعلاقات الافراد بالاشياء وببعضهم البعض وكل ما يتعلق به من الباطن كالنية والحب والاخلاق والحاجة الذاتية لحل تناقضات الحياة بشكل عام .
نقول ان البحث عن علاقة الدين بحياة الانسان بشكل عام هى دعوة للتفلسف ونظراً لضرورة الدين فان هذه الدعوة واجبة لكل روح تسعى الى حريتها وخلاصها .
ولا يرى هيجل فرقاً بين الفلسفة والدين من حيث المضمون الرئيس لكلاهما وهو معرفة المطلق واللامتناهى وعلاقته بكل ما هو متناهى . ثم كذلك علاقة الافراد بعضهم ببعض اى مجال الاخلاق.

ثم ينطلق هيجل لبحث مدى التقارب والاختلاف بين الفلسفة والدين بشكل عام والدين الوضعى بشكل خاص . لينتقل من هذا الموضوع الى البحث عن نقطة انطلاق فلسفة الدين . والتى تتطلب ان تسبقها عملية نقد للعقل وتحديد قدراته ومداها وما يتضمنه بالاساس وما يمكنه معرفته وما يستعصى عليه وهو ما كان قد بدأه هيوم وكانط وأكمله هيجل ليوضح كيف ان الانسان كروح وعقل يوجد لذاته وهو يتلقى المعرفة بالكلى لا بالمباشرة المجردة وانما بالتوسط بينه وبين المباشر ويرتقى بهذه المعرفة الى معرفة كليه او معرفة بما هو كلى بتهذيبها من كل عرضيه .
وبالتالى يتضح امكانية المعرفة بالله عن طريق العقل وهى ايضا معرفة متوسطه -بالتأمل والتفكير فى كل ما يحيط بالانسان من الخارج وما يجول فى باطن نفسه - لا بالمباشرة او الشعور الذاتى الغامض .
كذلك يحدد هيجل علاقة فلسفة الدين بنسق الفلسفة ككل . وبالمفاهيم المحددة للوعى الدينى .
وينتقل لبحث مدى اهمية التناول التاريخى للعقائد من حيث الدراسة والنقد .
ليبدأ بعد ذلك تقسيم موضوع البحث وهو فلسفة الدين ويتناول منه هنا مسألة العبادة كمحوٍ للإختلاف بين الجزئى والكلى . ويختم الكتاب برأيه فى مسألة دين الوحى وهو يرى الوحى كتجلى للروح التى تتطور بنفسها ولابد لتطورها من الظهور فى صورة حية . كما يلزم ظهورها وتجليها وإستمراريتها ان تكون قادرة على التطور .

[Никола Будић · Rating 4 out of 5]

Прејак осећај кад разумеш Хегела хахахаххахаха
Шалу на страну, лепо, јасно, не толико тешким језиком, систематично и критички приказан развој филозофије до краја космолошког периода у Грчкој. (Закључно са атомистима и Анаксагором)

[Lorena Francisca · Rating 4 out of 5]

leí algunos capítulos en los que Hegel aborda con profundidad los aspectos relacionados con el espíritu sublime y su presencia en el mundo.

[عبد الرحمن]

برضو مفهمتش حاجه منه

[Wafaa Farouk · Rating 3 out of 5]

أعتقد أن علاقتي بفلسفة هيجل قد تحسنت ، لكنه تحسن لا يمكنني حتى الأن من كتابة مراجعة لأحد مؤلفاته
أذا تمكنت في يوم من الأيام من ذلك سأكون سعيدة جدا
هذه السطور لأتذكر أمنية لا أحب أن تكون بعيدة

[Tim · Rating 5 out of 5]

Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion are an analysis of the essence of religion and Christianity as an Archetype of Self-Consciousness. To be human is to contextualize experience into a 'Gestalt'; a unified consistent narrative that binds itself unto itself. Philosophical development is an answer to the Imperative of Dasein- to authentically "Be" as a continuum to the Delphic Oracle's command to Know Thyself. Religion is to Hegel "the self-awareness of the absolute spirit" and a "knowledge of the Essence". It is the dialectal rhythm that unites the Many to the One in a perfectly self-aware Uniform Plurality (gleichförmige Pluralität). It is essentially the same as Philosophy, since "Scholastic philosophy has been essentially theology" For the same philosophemes run through both Theology and Philosophy, and are instantiated in the individual through relationship with the living Spirit.

Philosophy needs Faith and vice versa, and Theology cannot exist apart from Philosophy. He writes “The object of religion, like philosophy, is eternal truth in its objectivity itself, God and nothing but God and the explication of God” and later: "In philosophy, which is theology, the only work is to show the reason of religion". Even though Hegel is not known for being an Ethicist, he does point out that Philosophy is critical to be able to be loving, or act well towards others: "Another famous commandment: Love thy neighbor as thyself… is concerned with separating evil from a person and inflicting good on him. For this purpose it is necessary to distinguish what is evil in him, what is good against this evil, and what is his good in general; that is, I must love him with understanding; for unexamined love will harm him, perhaps more than hatred..."

In his lectures on religion, he describes the "Natural Religions" first, which begin with a desire for distinction from the Natural. Sorcery develops from this "unfree freedom so that the individual self-consciousness knows itself to be higher than natural things, and this knowledge is at first unmediated." Magic is "the oldest way of religion, the wildest, crudest form", which is merely man's attempt at direct power over the natural threats. Moving from Animism and Pantheism through polytheism up to the more advanced religions such as Hinduism, and then Tibetan Buddhism, he switches into the more abstracted natural religions of "the religion of light" (Zoroastrianism) and "the religions of pain" (Phoenician and Near-eastern Religions), into "the religions of the Enigma" (Egyptian, Mithraic and Greek Mythology). These are all the "Natural Religions''. The "Particular Religions" which are above these are the various Greco-Roman systems that span the "religions of beauty" all the way up to the "religions of reason". Upon Roman rationality, The Absolute/ Revealed Religion is developed: "Absolute religion is the revealed religion, the religion that has itself as its content, its fulfillment. This is the completed religion, the religion that is the being of the spirit for itself, the religion in which it has become itself objectively, the Christian religion." The God-Man represents Reason finding its apotheosis, for "Faith is the calm, pure consciousness of the Spirit as a Being".

He is primarily concerned with the essence of Religion-Philosophy, not so much the content, but does analyze various specific verses and teachings, from Hamartiology to Soteriology. Quite a bit of his philosophic discussion is within Epistemology (or Gnosiology as Eastern Orthodox Theology calls it), and he oscillates between Aristotelian and Platonic conceptions, with particular criticism of Cartesianism “If nature is only Matter, not subject-object, no such scientific construction of it remains possible, for which the cognizing and the cognized must be one... the supersensible is not the appearance.. but rather is itself a Real reality” (PS § 147). He criticizes this Medieval development which found its way into German idealism, from Jakob Böhme, the first of the German Idealists, all the way up to Kant, who dominated the philosophic landscape in Hegel's day. Kant likewise emphasized Ontologic, physio-theological proof of God's existence over the medieval Cosmo-Theological, Materialist apologetic, criticizing the ideological continuum from Anselm through all modern-day protestant apologists, who are all Cosmo-Theological and largely Aristotelean. This is an odd break from Hegel's normal dialectal view of historical ideological progression- he writes that the shift that Anselm made to external, cosmological arguments for the existence of God was a mistake that eventually will correct itself: "The cosmological proof has the ontological proof as to its basis; by promising us to lead a new footpath, it brings us back, after a slight detour, to the old one, which it did not want to acknowledge and which we are supposed to have left for its sake." Perhaps this is Hegel's best summary of OntoTheology: "The real attestation of the Divinity of Christ is the witness of one's own Spirit- not Miracles; for only Spirit recognizes Spirit."

Philosophy and Faith: The Futurism within Enlightenment-infused Evangelicalism

Hegel received a lot of flack from theologians over his work as they did towards philosophy in general, and in his Lectures on religion, he defends Philosophy writ large from these detractors: "Even the theologians, who are still only at home when in vanity, have dared to accuse philosophy of its destructive tendency, theologians who no longer possess anything of the substance that could be destroyed... Those who resent philosophy for thinking-religion do not know what they are asking... this is the outward appearance of humility, but true humility consists in sinking the mind into truth."

The irony here is that Hegelianism- and German Idealism as a whole- has deeply shaped modern non-denominational Christianity. 19th century German Theologians began replacing Typological Exegesis of scripture with a Hegelian model (as well as a Kantian Analytic model), so Hegelian Dialectics are simultaneously a Hermeneutical and Eschatological model. And you see how seamlessly he oscillates between interpreting scripture and interpreting history- even modern history. So while these Lutheran theologians criticized understanding philosophy, Protestant Theology was being influenced by it, whether they like it or not. By the time Hegel died in Berlin, John Nelson Darby was developing a new Exegetical model in America, which is rooted in the Kantian idea of Progressive revelatory history, which now dominates nearly all forms of low-church Protestantism. The various forms of Covenant theology, which contradicted the Ancient Typological model used by all Christians throughout all time before Calvin's invention of it in the late 16th century, have been largely replaced by the new various forms of Darby's Dispensationalism, which are continuing to devolve. And in all of these, the delusion that they are “biblical” and not philosophic movements of Tradition persists:

The Fathers of the Church essentially understood that the premise of their theology is Religion with a thinking, understanding consciousness. The Christian Church owes the first beginnings of the content of Christian doctrine to their philosophical education... but this is not examined.. Yes, this has happened [denial of the origins of their beliefs] not only on the side of the Enlightenment but even on the side of the more pious theologians.

The nuances of the Trinity were introduced into Christian doctrine by the Alexandrian school, by the Neo-Platonists, the latter being a component of the former... yet that doctrine is the fundamental determination of the Christian religion.

Hegel was a Protestant Apologist, writing extensively against Catholicism, so his criticism of Sola Scriptura is naturally interesting. Reading it in the context of all of his lectures on Religion over the years, it seems to me to stem from his encounters with Protestant clergy- all of whom thought their interpretation of the Bible is "obvious" and immutable, unable to see that they are interpreting it through the lens of tradition just as much as any Roman Catholic does. Philosophy, then, they attacked because it threatened this illusion- this fantasy of Sola Scriptura- which is the lie their whole Weltbild relies upon. He writes:

In the Protestant Church, the Bible was the essential basis of the doctrine... it was thought that exegesis was only to take up the thoughts of the Bible. But in fact, the intellect had established its views and thoughts beforehand, and then it was seen how the words of Scripture could be explained according to them... Because this exegesis consults reason, it has come about that a so-called theology of reason has come into being, which is opposed to that doctrinal concept of the church, partly by itself, partly by that which it opposes. Here, exegesis takes over the written word, interprets it, and pretends to assert only the understanding of the word, to want to remain faithful to it... But whether the Bible is taken as a basis of Doctrine as an excuse or with genuine seriousness, the nature of interpretive explanation implies that pre-conceived concepts assert themselves in the process of interpretation... It is true that the meaning of the word is to be indicated, but to indicate the meaning is to draw the meaning out into consciousness, into the imagination, and the imagination determined in a different way then asserts itself in the presentation of what the meaning is supposed to be. Even in the representation of a philosophical system already developed in itself, e.g. of Plato or Aristotle, it is the case that the representations turn out differently according to the already determined mode of a conception of those who undertake them. From Scripture, therefore, the most opposite opinions have been exegetically proved by theology, and thus this so-called Holy Scripture has been turned into a disguise for heterodoxy. All heresies have invoked the Scriptures.

In other words, Meta-cognitive assumptions proceed the perception of reality writ large, to include any interpretation of any text. Hegel is not saying Sola Scriptura is wrong; he's saying it's an illusion; it can't exist in actuality, only in theory. The metaphysical presumptions of sola scriptura are medieval Catholic in origin; making Protestantism a further abstraction of Catholicism, not a repudiation of it. "Thinking Biblically" is a self-deceptive Tautology, because ironically, it is itself a pre-conceived external presuppositional dogma, i.e, a Tradition. It's tradition that deceives itself into thinking it's not tradition- refusing to acknowledge what it is. It is the exact same type of circular logic of "only Sith talk in absolutes". An epistemological hallucination.

The doctrine of the church was established before the canonization of the Bible; and as the Bible is itself a product of tradition not separate from it, so the correct question is not "What is Biblical?", but "what is the correct tradition?" Hegel levels the accusation that Philosophy is condemned or ignored due to the pride of believing oneself to be a 'little god' with no influences on one's cognition, capable of correct interpretation. Sola scriptura theoretically is adherence to Revelation, but is in practice merely intellectualized Pride; a cover for asserting one's personal beliefs as Revelation.

The relationship between Tradition and Scripture is to Hegel a Gordian knot. Hegel encountered the Thought-Ending Cliché of "where is this in the bible'' as often as it is used today, which is a tool to maintain the illusion of this Tautology- this mirage of traditionlessness. He recognizes the folly of the reformation's idea that an individual or group could interpret the bible outside of tradition but recognizes the need to break off from the Magisterium. He recognizes that the Cosmo-Theological views of the Reformation were founded in Medieval thought, particularly the new model of Substitutionary Atonement (relying on Jerome's mistranslation of hilastērion into Latin as Propitiation instead of Expiation) created by Anselm: "first found in Christianity by Anselm of Canterbury: it is then found in all later philosophers: Cartesius, Leibnitz, Wolff." He seems to view philosophical "meta-cognitive" development as the solution to these problems inherent in the foundations of reactionary Protestant thought. Unfortunately, this hasn't happened at all. This anti-Intellectual, Futuristic, and deracinated interpretation of the Bible has been further codified in Premillennialism and Dispensationalism, which did not fully exist in Protestantism in Hegel's day. There were only a handful of Protestant Denominations while Hegel was publishing, but now there are over 30,000 active schisms and counting, and they are becoming increasingly divorced from reason. The Radical Reformation now has erased the Core Reformation. This Myth that one can be a "traditionless" Christian has only accelerated, as many now refuse to even identify with a denomination, which only accelerates the demise of Protestantism. History has rather proven Hegel’s point.

And on a personal note, I've seen this exact same anti-intellectual phenomenon my whole life in Evangelical circles, when fellow Christians become uncomfortable when I start talking about the Quran, Bhagavad Gita, various Philosophers like Nietzsche, etc. They become suspicious of me when they know I regularly read the Quran and such. You can see them physically tense up when you start talking about the broader philosophical continuums which run across religions- for example how "Satan" is the Aramaic version of the Egyptian serpent-god of Chaos, Sēt, and the Logos is a development from the Mesopotamian deity Marduk, who could "speak magic words" in the act of Creation. I receive offended, confused and suspicious reactions. Meta-cognitive and comparative Knowledge is somehow perceived as a threat in Futuristic fundamentalist circles. Ironically, a friend made this same comment about how much Hegel & the German Idealists I read- why read these types of thinkers, he asked? This uncomfortable relationship that Protestants have towards philosophy (and other ideologies- anything that seems to contradict their fragile emotional narrative-Christianity) persists today, as the origins of this attitude (the "traditionlessness" of the heresy of Futurism- the assumption that Revelation is historically Suri Generis) continues to persist. But, for example, one cannot begin to understand the Logos in a Judeo-Christian context without going back to pre-Christian Greek rationality. The authors of the New Testament assume readers are steeped in Greek philosophy.

I've never experienced this Anti-Intellectualism when talking to Catholic or Orthodox Christians- only low-church ("non-denominational") Protestants. It is not odd for an Orthodox Christian to have read the Quran and to know what they believe in relation to it, but it's unheard of for an Evangelical to be seriously educated on other religions. My theory here is that this is due to both Sola Scriptura and Fide, which implies that one should not wrestle with God, but all that is needed is to "accept Jesus into your heart" (whatever that means), or give mere intellectual assent to a set of axiomatic presuppositions to be "saved" in a legalistic exchange. There is always an inevitable, automatic, functional Antinominalism in Protestantism, even if the superstructure technically denies this doctrine, it is always practiced in the shadow. Hegel specifically identifies the Tautological misunderstanding of scripture being separate from tradition within Sola Scriptura as the problem. He thinks this generates the militant Anti-Intellectualism in these types of "non-denominational" churches; because having never seriously grappled with what they believe, asking serious questions, or understanding Christian doctrines in historical context is a threat to their fragile bumper-sticker faith. Hence, Thought-Ending Clichés are utilized to label those who ask real questions as "arrogant" or the like. A wall of whimsical, emotional platitudes is built to keep a real fidelity to the truth at bay. This dynamic characterizes the Evangelical-Reformed relationship just as much as the Evangelical-Orthodox relationship. Thought-Ending Clichés surrounding Sola Scriptura are convenient ways to dismiss intellectual challenges, maintain emotional homeostasis, and prevent self-introspection. Evangelicals take a page from ostriches and keep their head firmly in the proverbial sand. They categorically refuse to read things that might ruffle their intellectual feathers.

This willful ignorance even goes down to simple identity: phrases like "I'm not Protestant, I'm simply Christian" or "I don't follow any denomination, I'm just a Bible-Believing Christian" or "I'm just a follower of Jesus, I'm not religious" make anyone with more than two brain cells roll their eyes. Evangelicals refuse to even identify as Evangelicals. This semi-Nestorian ahistorical Futurism is stronger today than it was in Hegel's time. The Nestorianism intrinsic in the Iconoclastic heresy is playing itself out to the full de-evolution of Christianity into Self-Help Theism. It was nascent in the German Lutheranism Hegel dealt with, but now it's universal in the Protestant world to the point they don't even acknowledge what they are. Futurism is the water they swim in. But this de-evolution is the final stage in the death of a religion.

Hegelian Welt
1. Jenaer Schriften/ Jena Writings (1801-1806):
https://bit.ly/3NMLSY7
2. Phänomenologie des Geistes/ The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807):
https://bit.ly/3vkt5tI
3. Wissenschaft der logik/ The Science of Logic (1812)
https://bit.ly/3oS0fwo
4. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse/ Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817)
https://bit.ly/3awanWC
5. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts/ Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1820)
https://bit.ly/3v4V80f
6. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Lectures on the Philosophy of world-history (1770–1831)
https://bit.ly/3w6GBBP
7. Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik/ Lectures on Aesthetics (1818 -1829)
https://bit.ly/38V7VJj
8. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion/ Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (1821-1831): https://bit.ly/3yInPo7
9. Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie/ Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1805-1831): https://bit.ly/3LqoRYs

[Steven H · Rating 5 out of 5]

THE FIRST VOLUME OF HEGEL’S LECTURES ON THIS TOPIC

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) was a German Idealist philosopher, who was very influential on later Philosophy of History, Philosophy of Religion, and even Existentialism [e.g., Sartre's Being and Nothingness].

The modern Preface notes, “[Hegel’s] four lecture series---1821,1824, 1827, 1831---[will] be separated and published as autonomous units… Hegel’s conception and execution of the lectures differed so significantly on each of the occasions he delivered them that it was impossible to conflate materials from different years into a editorially constructed text… without destroying the structural integrity of the lectures and thus emasculating the textual context in terms of which valid interpretative judgments could be rendered.” (Pg. xiii) The Editorial Introduction explains, “Hegel lectured frequently on a broad range of themes… But it was only after some twenty years, in the summer of 1821 … that Hegel lectured for the first time on the philosophy of religion---lectures that he was to repeat on three occasions… but which he himself never published.” (Pg. 1)

Hegel begins his original lecture manuscript with the statement, “The object of these lectures is the philosophy of religion, which in general has the same purpose as the earlier type of metaphysical science, which was called ‘theologia naturalis.’ This term included everything that could be known of source other than reason. The object of religion itself is the highest, the absolute, that which is absolutely true or the truth itself. This is the religion of which all the riddles of the world, all contradictions of thought, are resolved, and all griefs are healed, the region of eternal truth and eternal peace, of absolute satisfaction, of truth itself.” (Pg. 83)

He states, “Since God is in this way the principle and goal, the truth of each and every deed, initiative, and effort, all persons have therefore a consciousness of God, or of the absolute substance, as the truth of everything and so also of themselves, of everything that they are and do. They regard this occupation, the knowing and feeling of God as their higher life, as their true dignity, as the Sunday of their lives… In this intuition and feeling, we are not concerned with ourselves, with our interests, our vanity, our pride of knowledge and of conduct, but only with the content of it---proclaiming the honor of God and manifesting HIS glory. This is the universal intuition, sensation, consciousness---or what you will---of RELIGION. To investigate and become cognizant of its nature is the aim of these lectures.” (Pg. 85-86)

He observes, “What the Christian religion … proclaims as the supreme, the absolute commandment, ‘Ye shall know God,’ is now accounted mere folly... This lofty demand is an empty sound to the wisdom of our time, which has made of God an infinite phantom, far removed from our consciousness, and which likewise has reduced human cognition to a vain phantom of finitude… I declare such a point of view and such a result to be directly opposed to the whole nature of the Christian religion, according to which we should know God COGNITIVELY, God’s nature and essence, and should esteem this cognition above all else.” (Pg. 87-88)

He states, “Philosophy of religion demonstrates … the reconciliation of the heart with religious cognition, of the absolutely substantial feeling with intelligence. This is the need of the philosophy of religion, the necessity of philosophy in general… In the Christian religion this need for the reconciliation of the two sides is more directly present perhaps than in the other religions…” (Pg. 104-105)

He concludes the manuscript, “The consummate religion is the one in which the concept has returned to itself, the one in which the absolute idea---God as spirit in the form of truth and revealedness---is an object for consciousness. The earlier religions---in which the determinateness of the concept is deficient, being poorer and more abstract---are determinate religions, which constitute the stages of transition for the concept of religion on the way to its consummation. The Christian religion will disclose itself to us to be the absolute religion…” (Pg. 111-112)

In the 1824 lectures, he explains, “In philosophy the supreme being is called the absolute or the idea, and it is superfluous to go back any further… the absolute is not merely [an ‘thing’]… for it is not so completely abstract; but what we call the ABSOLUTE and the IDEA is still not for that reason synonymous with what we call God.” (Pg. 117)

He rejects “rational theology” which relies on critical biblical exegesis: “where interpretation is not mere explanation of the words but discussion of the content and elucidation of the sense, it must introduce its own thoughts into the word that forms the basis of the faith. There can only be mere interpretation of words when all that happens is that one word is replaced by another with the same scope. If interpretation is ELUCIDATION, then other categories of thought are bound up with it. A development of the word is a progression to further thoughts. Bible commentaries do not so much acquaint us with the content of scripture as with the mode of thought of their age.” (Pg 122-123)

He suggests, “God is thus grasped as what he is for himself within himself; God the Father makes himself an object for himself (the Son); then… God remains the undivided essence … and in this differentiation of himself loves himself, i.e., remains identical with himself---this is God as Spirit… we must grasp God with this very definition, which exists in the church in this childlike mode of representation as the relationship between father and son---a representation that is not yet a matter of the concept. Thus it is just this definition of God by the church as a Trinity that is the concrete determination and nature of God as spirit; and spirit is an empty word if it is not grasped in this determination.” (Pg. 126-127)

He states, “Here in the philosophy of religion it is more precisely God, or reason in principle, that is the object. God is essentially rational, is rationality that is alive and, as spirit, is in and for itself. When we philosophize about religion, we are in fact investigating reason, intelligence, and cognition…” (Pg. 139)

In the 1827 lectures, he states, “The object of religion, like that of philosophy, is the eternal truth, God and nothing but God and the explication of God. Philosophy is only explicating ITSELF when it explicates religion, and when it explicates itself it is explicating religion… Thus religion and philosophy coincide in one. In fact philosophy is itself the service of God, as is religion. But each of them… is the service of God in a way peculiar to it… They differ in the peculiar character of their service to God.” (Pg. 152-153) Later, he adds, “Religion is for everyone… philosophy … is not for everyone.” (Pg. 180)

He explains, “In its concept religion is the relation of the subject, of the subjective consciousness, to God, who is spirit… Spirit is conscious, and that of which it is conscious is the true, essential spirit. True spirit IS its essence, not the essence of an other. To this extent religion is forthwith explicitly IDEA, and the concept of religion is the concept of this idea…. If we call the concept ‘spirit,’ then the reality of the concept is consciousness. Spirit as concept, universal spirit, realizes itself in the consciousness that is itself spiritual, the consciousness for which alone spirit can be. Religion is therefore spirit that realizes itself in consciousness.” (Pg. 178)

In his lecture manuscript, he states, “Spirit is… essentially consciousness: that which is in it as sensibility, how consciousness is subjectively determined, must be an object for it; i.e., it must be conscious of it, know it… Thus God is to be known, cognized by consciousness as an object, not in external fashion but intuited spiritually.” (Pg. 191) Later, he adds, “God and religion exist in and through THOUGHT—simply and solely in and for thought. And even though religious sensation may subsequently take up this object again and the relationship to is as feeling, the undifferentiated unity is just the unity of thought with itself.” (Pg. 208)

He says, “When objective truth occurs for me, I have emptied myself of myself… and at the same time have laid hold of this truth as my own. I have identified myself, my abstract ego, with it, and have maintained my self-consciousness in it, but as pure and passionless. This relation is called FAITH… Faith if the same as what religious sensibility is, namely, the absolute identity of the content with me… The church and Luther knew quite well what they meant by faith. They did not say that one is saved by… sensibility, conviction, love, but that one is saved by faith.” (Pg. 243)

In the later lectures of 1824, he asserts, “feeling is what human beings have in common with the animals; it is the animal, sensuous form. So when … God is pointed to in feeling, this is the very worst way in which such a content can be posited or demonstrated. God IS essentially in thought… We do indeed have feelings of right, freedom, ethics, and we have religious feelings, but feeling is the worst form in which content of this kind is posited.” (Pg. 273) He observes, “For THINKING is the source, the very ground upon which God, or the universal in general, IS: the universal is in thought, ONLY in thought, and for thought. This thinking, spirit in its freedom, supplies the content of truth, the concrete deity, and delivers it to sensibility…” (Pg. 312)

He summarizes, “The simple concept that we have established is the self-consciousness of absolute spirit, its self-consciousness of being for itself as spirit. FOR ITSELF it is spirit… Spirit IS spirit and nature… hence it is the unity of itself and an other… The concept of God, then, is the concept of the idea…” (Pg. 325) He adds, “God is essentially consciousness, essentially self-consciousness.” (Pg. 335)

The 1831 lectures begin with the statement, “The state is the genuine mode of actuality; in it the genuinely ethical will comes to actuality, and spirit lives in its genuineness. Religion is divine knowledge, the knowledge that human beings have of God and of themselves in God. this is the divine wisdom and the field of absolute truth. But there is a second wisdom, the wisdom of the world… Universally speaking, religion and the foundation of the state are one and the same…” (Pg. 451-452)

This is definitely a “scholarly” edition; the footnotes on a given page are frequently longer than the text on the page. The sequential presentation of the various sets of lectures makes Hegel’s change and development very clear. This will be “must reading” for anyone who wants to seriously study Hegel’s ideas on religion.