The End of the Cold War

by Robert Service

The dismantling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the spread of Perestroika throughout the former Soviet bloc was a sea change in world history and two years later resulted in the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

In The End of the Cold War , acclaimed Russian historian Robert Service examines precisely how that change came about. Drawing on a vast and largely untapped range of sources, he builds a picture of the two men who spearheaded the breakthrough: Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, and Mikhail Gorbachev, last General Secretary of the Soviet Union and first and last President of the USSR. He also analyses the role of influential players not only in America and the USSR, but throughout Eastern and Western Europe, and focuses especially on Pope John Paul II, Lech Watesa and Vaclav Havel.

Authoritative, compelling and meticulously researched, this is political history at its best.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Russia, Politics, Russian History, European History, War

562 pages, Hardcover

First published November 10, 2015

About the author

This author is the British historian of modern Russia. For the British-Canadian writer of Yukon poetry, see Robert W. Service.

Robert Service is a British academic and historian of modern Russia and the Soviet Union. He is a professor of Russian history at the University of Oxford and a Fellow at St. Antony's College, Oxford.

He is the author of the highly acclaimed Lenin: A Biography, A History of Twentieth - Century Russia, Russia: Experiment with a People and Stalin: A Biography, as well as many other books on Russia's past and present. He wrote a marvelous book on communism titled Comrades Communism A World History (International Bestseller). He is married with four children.

Reviews

[Anthony · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Experiment Ends

Robert Service’s The End of the Cold War, 1985-1991 is excellent. It is a highly readable and easy to follow study of how the super powers the USSR and USA worked together in order to avert Armageddon. This period of history is usually outside of my remit, falling to a more modern era than I am used to. However as I am highly interested in Russian history, I found this essential reading

Service’s writing style is clear and concise. The work flows and feels constantly relevant. The subject matter at no point felt dry, boring or tedious as I had expected to in places. I also learnt a tremendous amount of history here. The work, effort and will of Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev (amongst others) to meet and come to agreements on how to resolve these issues is astounding. Service also explains the cause was a noble and relatively selfish one, done for the right reasons.

The End of the Cold War, 1985-1991 has may strengths, but I have to say one of the main ones lies in Robert Service’s impressive use of archival material and his balanced approach. Drawing from both Soviet and American sources, Service reconstructs the internal debates and decisions on each side of the Iron Curtain, allowing readers to see how fragile and uncertain the late Cold War years truly were. His portrayal of key figures, particularly Mikhail Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan, George Shultz and Eduard Shevardnadze highlights the importance of personality and diplomacy in shaping history. Service avoids the triumphalist tone that characterizes some Western accounts, instead presenting the end of the Cold War as a complex, negotiated process rather than a one-sided victory. His writing style also makes a dense historical topic remarkably readable, keeping the narrative engaging without sacrificing scholarly detail.

However, The End of the Cold War, 1985-1991 is not without its weaknesses. While Service excels at recounting the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of events the meetings, summits, and negotiations he is sometimes less persuasive when addressing the deeper ‘why’ behind the Soviet collapse. Broader social, cultural, and economic factors receive less attention compared to the political and diplomatic narrative. Some readers may also find the level of detail overwhelming; the book’s extensive cast of political figures and its meticulous documentation of bureaucratic struggles can make it demanding for those not already familiar with the period. Additionally, Service gives relatively little attention to grassroots movements, public opinion, or civil society in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which also played crucial roles in bringing the Cold War to an end.

Despite these limitations, the book’s significance is undeniable. The End of the Cold War, 1985-1991 stands as one of the most authoritative accounts of the period from 1985 to 1991, providing an invaluable resource for students of history, international relations, and political science. It challenges simplified narratives by emphasizing the mutual efforts and delicate diplomacy that brought about the peaceful conclusion of decades of hostility. Moreover, Service’s analysis offers lessons for understanding present-day relations between Russia and the West, reminding readers of the fragility of international order and the importance of leadership in moments of global uncertainty. In this sense, the book not only illuminates the past but also provides insights into the continuing legacy of the Cold War world.

There are a number of reasons why the Cold War came to an end, including the nationalist movements in the USSR, such as in Poland, Lithuania or Romania. A desire amongst Germans for reunification. The collapse of Soviet economy or the failure of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However the most influential is the desire to end the nuclear arms race, safeguard human life and create a world peace. How they overcame all of the intricate difficulties and saw through this to the end is played out here. The End of the Cold War, 1985-1991 is well worth the read and anyone interested in the Russian Revolution must read this book to understand how the Marxist experiment finally died and was cast into the history books.

[Stefan Mitev · Rating 3 out of 5]

Доскоро знаех съвсем малко за края на Студената война и реформите в СССР, известни като "перестройка". В края на осемдесетте години съм бил прекалено малък, за да осъзная значимостта на историческите промени.

Бързам да се похваля, че закупих книгата с твърди корици за по-малко от десет лева с включена доставка. Робърт Сървис е историк съветолог (каква дума само) към Оксфордския университет, автор на биографични книги за Ленин и Сталин. Получих добри отзиви за творчеството му, но честно казано "Краят на Студената война ме разочарова". Първата част е посветена на безкрайните срещи на високо ниво, посветени на темите разоръжаване и унищожаване на ядрени оръжия. Основните действащи лица са президентът Роналд Рейгън, държавният секретар Джордж Шулц, генералният секретар на ЦК на КПСС Михаил Горбачов и външният министър Едуард Шеверднадзе. Политиците са в постоянна схватка за надмощие при преговорите, като всеки търси по-големи отстъпки от отсрещната страна. На падането на комунистическите режими в Източна Европа е отделено много малко внимание. Дори Берлинската стена и обединението на Германия са разгледани твърде откъслечно.

Накратко, трябва да знаете, че още в началото на осемдесетте години комунистическите страни са изправени пред финансов колапс и разчитат на внос за изхранване на населението. Огромен процент от БВП на СССР е отделян за ядрени оръжия и войски, готови всеки момент да окупират разбунтувалите се страни. Горбачов осъзнава, че плановата икономика е неконкурентноспособна и не може да задоволи най-елементарни нужди на населението. Перестройката е извършена на фона на огромна съпротива от други комунистически апаратчици, които подмолни се борят за власт. Рухването на СССР се случва по мирен път, без военни действия - факт, който малко хора са очаквали. Последиците ги усещаме и до днес.

[Nooilforpacifists · Rating 5 out of 5]

Unsurprising: Ronald Reagan's huge role in ending the Cold War (and, after he left office, the Soviet Union itself). Reagan charmed the birds out of the trees at every summit meeting, much to the shock of the Russians who had expected an anti-communist war-monger. Instead, Reagan pressed for a total nuclear disarmament that horrified most of his aides--but that would occur only after deployment of the SDI missile defense system. And either Secretary of State George Schultz, or someone close to him, spent a lot of time with the author, Robert Service--Schultz comes off well (although I happen to think correctly so).

Surprising: Margret Thatcher was off-stage and often wrong-footed. In addition to her well known aversion to a united Germany, she became distrustful of Gorby once she became Prime Minister, though (oddly) she liked him when they first met before that. Thatcher, in this accounting, was a bit Churchillian in trying to insist on a greater role for Britain than history or economics justified.

Interesting: Gorby was winging it the whole way. He knew reform was needed; he could see the Soviets could save billions via cutting their defense budgets--and if they could force America to reciprocate, so much the better. But, beyond that, he had no grasp of economics and little idea of foreign policy. He never could figure out whether SDI ("Star Wars") was a serious notion -- it was for Reagan -- or just a gambit to force the Soviets into bankruptcy, possibly to be traded for some major politico-military concession. (Answer: it worked, didn't it?) Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, or someone close to him, talked to the author--Shevardnadze comes off well (the power behind the foreign policy throne), but I have no idea whether that's real or bias.

Added 1/11/16

Startling: The Soviets had no idea how how to read Western societies--when all they had to do was buy a copy of the New York, or London, Times. The CIA was slightly better, predicting (by the middle of Reagan's term) that the USSR was going bankrupt -- so time was on the West's side. And indeed, by the late 1980s, Gorby was pleading with every Western leader for loans or credits that would forestall a Soviet revolt from below. Except for grain sales, Reagan and George H.W. Bush consistently refused, further wreaking Gorby's bargaining position.

Who Started It: The Soviet military caused the collapse by installing intermediate nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe. Western Europe suddenly could be radioactive craters in 15 minutes--turning Western European leaders into the biggest fans of planting U.S. Pershing missiles on their own territory (fearing the U.S. might be unwilling to launch its own weapons merely to defend London, Berlin, etc.). This was a serious strategic and public relations error--the Soviets upped their own defense budget, and were seen as the aggressors.

Cloud-Cuckoo Land: After German Unification, Gorby was under the delusion that he remained under control of the rest of the Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet Socialist Republics that constituted the USSR. Then the Warsaw Pact swiftly was dissolved. And after a massacre to attempt to retain the Baltic Republics -- over which Georgian-born Shevardnadze resigned -- plebiscites began springing up across the land. Following an abortive coup against Gorby, Ukraine voted overwhelmingly to leave the Union. That's when Yeltsin made his move--as President of the Russian SSR (by far the largest) he simply recognized all the independence votes. Meaning there was no USSR, and Gorby suddenly had no job; he (ironically) resigned from the atheist, Communist state on Christmas Day 1991.


The October Revolution lasted less than 75 years. This book addresses only arms reduction and the break-up of the Soviet Union. The lessons for Putin briefly are mentioned in the afterword.

[Pauly · Rating 3 out of 5]

If you landed on Earth today and read this book, you'd think the cold war was negotiated away by Gorbachev and Reagan. There is plenty of detail of top level summits and the policy arguments behind them, but the ordinary people rarely are mentioned, including the dissident groups that brought much pressure on the Soviet state. If you wish to learn about the inner workings of the Gorbachev Politburo or the Reagan administration, this book is enlightening, but it is not an all-round history of the cold war.

[Joseph Stieb · Rating 3 out of 5]

I think certain people would enjoy this book as long as they know what they are getting into. This is a very top-down, diplomacy-centered history of the end of the Cold War. It does an excellent job explaining the evolution of the Soviet-US relationship throughout the 1980's. The tracking of diplomacy is meticulous, and the short chapters helped me a lot in keeping track of complex negotiations around arms control and other issues. The conclusion is also quite good. However, if you don't have a pretty strong stomach for diplomatic history or if you were expecting other aspects of the Cold War to be discussed in depth (third world, peripheral conflicts, Eastern European revolts, domestic politics of the USSR and US) you will probably find this book to be a long slog, as I did from time to time.

I wanted to address an interesting claim service makes at the end of this book. He calls the end of the Cold War an achievement that we should all be grateful for. Great power rivalry and a host of other problems still bedevil the world, but the nose-to-nose showdown of the US and the USSR, an equal rival in many respects, is gone. Also gone is the Cold War-level possibility of nuclear war. I like this concept of the Cold War's ending as an achievement. On the Soviet side, Gorbachev (and some others before him) recognized that the USSR's domestic economic problems couldn't be solved in a system where the USSR was constantly geared for war with the US, spending itself into oblivion while the US and other nations raced ahead in technology and wealth. Gorbachev wound up dooming the very nation he sought to save, which turned out to be held together mainly by coercion rather than consent. But his efforts to lessen international tension kickstarted the process by which the US and the USSR built trust and reduced arms. For his part, Reagan showed remarkable flexibility in shifting from a Cold War hard line to seizing the opportunity to reduce nuclear tension (a heartfelt goal of Reagan's) and build a constructive relationship with a declining foe. The US found towards the end of the decade that it could demand almost anything from the weakened USSR, including ultimately the reunification of Germany under the democratic aegis. When you think about all the ways the Cold War could have ended, it's hard to think of it working out more peacefully than this story. That's a testament to Reagan, Schultz, Shevardnadze, Gorbachev, Bush, and untold millions of people in the Eastern Bloc.

[G · Rating 2 out of 5]

Robert Service's The End of the Cold War: 1985-1991 is an exhaustive high-level diplomatic history of U.S. and Soviet relations during the final years of the Cold War to the extent that it really should have been titled The End of the Cold War: A History of U.S.-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1985-1991. This is not a book, which discusses the collapse of the various individual communist regimes in the Central Eastern Europe and the Baltic States in great detail. Grassroots political movements in the Soviet Union and abroad are also given scant examination. Instead, Service's narrative history is heavy on the minutiae of conferences and summits accrued via archival sources, but surprisingly light on pure historical analysis.

For example, Service brings up information from communiques and meetings highlighting how factors, such as a lack of commercial goods, misadventures in Afghanistan and crippling debt had brought the Soviet Union to the brink of collapse. However, he does not often breakdown these issues and place them within a broader context, particularly as Gorbachev's reforms begin to rapidly outpace his intentions.

Service does opt to occasionally show the fractured relationships between the Soviet leadership and its Eastern Bloc partners. And unlike other Cold War histories, Service has to be commended for at least making reference to the change in fortunes in the Soviet Union's Baltic states, with the author primarily pinpointing activities in Lithuania. Nevertheless, the book continually returns to U.S. diplomatic pressures being placed on an increasingly desperate Soviet leadership.

As a result, one could be mistaken after finishing this book that the Cold War ended primarily as the result of missile reduction negotiations between Gorbachev/Shevardnadze and Reagan/Schultz. By the time Service gets around to 1989, the various democratic revolutions are glossed over rather quickly in order to return to the interpersonal relationships and interactions between the major players of Service's book.

Ultimately, the book becomes weighed down by its repetitive and unrelenting focus on the inner workings of diplomatic relations through numerous consultations and conversations, while overlooking an analysis of the ordinary people affected by the policies emanating from these conferences.

[Denise · Rating 4 out of 5]

A detailed examination of what went on in high level politics in the US and USSR during the final years of the Cold War. An interesting read all in all, though (unsurprisingly, given the subject matter) a fairly dry one.

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

Having read a number of books on the end of the USSR and the dissolution of the Iron Curtain it is striking how useless the U.S. intelligence community was in providing proper assessments of the state of the Soviet Union and the intentions of their leaders. Robert Gates, in particular, comes off as being wrong quite often. No wonder he ended up serving in the administrations of both the GOP and Democrats for decades.

[Kent Say · Rating 3 out of 5]

Rich factual overview, but very light on synthesis. I found the book informative but not insightful. I think the story described in the book is largely conventional. The author does not clearly state what new material things he brought to the table through new access to archives.

What follows are mostly my own takes from reading the book. A book summary would have been a pile of facts. Take what follows with a grain of salt as I know little of this history (I was a teenager in a foreign country at the time). This was a big turning point in history with important implications for current day Russia, so I thought it was worth reading.

Most of the events were driven by events in the Soviet Union (though the book spends much time on the US). The US played a role mostly in how it reacted to events that led to it and after. It had a major impact, and a bad handling could have led to a much worse outcome, but the US was not driving the change. I don't know whether the author would agree with this conclusion. I am more confident he would with what follows.

My take on what happened:

Gorbachev accurately perceived a number of the key issues either before or soon after coming to power:

Economic: The soviet economic system had failed... standards of living were low and stagnant. It needed change. Prior leaders largely ignored this reality. Keeping its people in the dark about living conditions in the west made it impossible for the Soviet Union to benefit from trade in goods and ideas. The military race with the US was eating up increasing shares of the economy further depressing living standards. 20% of the economy was eaten by the military budget. Foreign adventures such as the war in Afghanistan and support to others like Cuba further added to the burden. Trade restrictions further lowered technology transfers. Short-term economic strains were further increased by the drop in oil prices in the mid 1980s. The Soviet Union was importing a lot of grain. There seemed to be based on the descriptions in the book meaningful balance of payment pressures (trade), so there were cute short-term economic squeezes as well. I wish the economics had been covered better.

Military: (obvious) Both the US and Russia had massive nuclear stockpiles that could destroy the world. Relations with the US were at a low, and there had been a few too many close calls. That had to change.

Political: The Soviet system was not transparent, democratic, or effective. Even senior leaders had little access to quality information. Decision making was not effective. It was hard to challenge authority.

Gorbachev seemed to miss one key problem (my synthesis not the authors). Countries that were members of the Warsaw pact (i.e.Poland, etc), and member states of the Soviet Union were only being held together through fear of Soviet power (and invasions like the ones in Hungary and Czechoslovakia decades earlier). These countries were led by domestic elites that were often harsh and unpopular. These countries were also experiencing very challenging economic conditions that also created risks to the status-quo.

Gorbachev's plan to deal with these problems included:

Some economic reforms. The book did not discuss these in any detail, but they clearly seemed to have accomplished little (they were inadequate at any rate). He may have done more were it not for political opposition, but it is unclear whether there was ever a good realistic plan.

Thawing relationships with the West. This would help reduce the risks of nuclear war while reducing budget strains. As discussed below this was successful in reducing strains but reaching agreements took years... not soon enough to help economically. Reduced support to communism globally including Eastern European countries.

Economic reforms including freer information (allowing people to emigrate, allowing more outside info in, etc), allowing increased democratic processes (covered only modestly), more self-rule in other countries, etc.

The end result was a great success in ending the cold war and a great economic disaster with political implications that continue to this day.

As the author noted at the end, Gorbachev succeed in reducing cold war tensions with the West. The economic pressures on the Soviet Union could have lead to a much messier outcome including war, and it is due to Gorbachev and to a lesser extent Reagan that it did not.

However, Gorbachev clearly lost control of domestic political and economic conditions leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union (a good thing from my perspective, but not Gorbachev's goal) and a massive economic depression that ultimately led to nationalism and Putin. Hard to know whether a better outcome was possible either through more aggressive reforms or help from the west. Once it became clear that the Soviet Union would not interfere military in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union collapsed rapidly.

At the end of the day Gorbachev seems to be a nice chap but fell short as a leader. He wanted to improve the economic lot of his people, increase their political freedom including democracy, while avoiding war or world destruction. He wanted communism reformed, and seemed essentially to be a socialist at heart. He saw problems with the Western model and was not looking for full integration with the West. He completely failed however to visualize the fact that a democratic Soviet Union was likely a contraction as most people's given a choice would leave it. He also did the not implement effective economic reforms (possibly politically impossible). Politically he clearly lost control both of Soviet politics and of the Soviet Union more broadly.

US:

As seen above I think I can largely describe the story without reference to the US. Reagan appeared to have played a constructive role. He came to office as a cold warrior. There is probably something to the idea that the Soviets felt compelled to keep up with the war spending because of fears of falling behind which may have accelerated the economic problems described above. Reagan, however broke with prior presidents in appearing to legitimately despite mutually assured destruction policy. His desire to build a laser shield in space seems to have been true, not just a tactical ploy to drive the Soviets to spend more money on defense and go bust. He wanted to rid the world of nuclear weapons over time while reducing their stockpiles. Reagan appears to have played a tit-for-tat strategy (my take, not the authors) where he was willing to react to positive gestures from the Soviets with positive gestures of his own while reacting to hostility with hostility. He worked effective with Gorbachev to improve relations and to move towards agreements that were ultimately signed with Bush. There was little actually accomplished in terms of arms reductions etc where he was in office, but with both Reagan and Gorbachev liked in the opposite super-powers it probably made things easier for Gorbachev. President Bush approach was colder early on, where he mostly asked for time to reconsider where he was. US politicians and policy makers were torn between increasing economic pressure and risking a coup in Russia or helping Gorbachev.

[Jackson Peplow · Rating 4 out of 5]

While the title may be have been a premature declaration as current events have shown, the manner in which the confrontation between the USSR and USA ended had a complex impact on world politics whose implications haunt the modern world. It seems largely forgotten that the Cold War ended essentially because of the will of two visionaries, Gorbachev and Reagan, and that it was a negotiated settlement. Service does a thorough job portraying the details of policy making and discussion within and between the Soviet and American administrations, though at times he devolves into stilted prose i.e. 'X said the this. Y said that the Hungarians were in extreme debt to western banks. Z believed it was time to negotiate.' Service also gives an overview about how Gorbachev's attempts at reform spiraled out of control and the Bush administration failed to realize how fragile the Soviet Union was in 1990 and 91, leading to the catastrophe that was the Soviet collapse. While the end of the communist order was called the greatest bloodless revolution in history, this remains very recent history, and the full picture (that may challenge that statement) is still coming into view with the fullness of time. Overall a valuable and illuminating read.

[David Lowther · Rating 5 out of 5]

Robert Service has put a monumental amount of effort in producing this definitive account of the end of the Cold War. The book is absolutely full to bursting of primary sources about which the author makes few comments and leaves readers to draw their own conclusions.

There are good guys; Reagan, Gorbachev etc. and bad guys, the US and Soviet hawks. We learn so much about the likes of Margaret Thatcher, Francois Mitterrand, Helmut Kohl and so on. The danger which Gorbachev brought on himself from his own compatriots as he moves closer and closer to first Reagan and then Bush is both thrilling and chilling.

To a large extent the two sides did come closer together and brought about the end of the Cold War and a substantial reduction in nuclear weapons and for this we must be forever grateful. This brilliant book is a must read for all who wish to understand the stunning events of 1985 - 1991.

David Lowther. Author of The Blue Pencil, Liberating Belsen, Two Families at War and The Summer of '39, all published by Sacristy Press.

[Tanel Joon · Rating 4 out of 5]

A meticulous telling of how the Cold War was drawn to a close by the leaders of the superpowers. The book focusses on the actions and interplay between Gorbachov, Shevarnadze, Reagan, Shultz and later Bush with bringing change into the relations of the great powers that finalised in the end of the Cold War and as a side effect dissolution of the the USSR.

The author has employs good humour and even though some of the events seem to be repeating the process of change and negotiation is a for patient minds.

[David Highton · Rating 4 out of 5]

A pretty comprehensive account of the Gorbachev/Reagan and Gorbachev/Bush relationships, followed by the reunification of Germany, the end of the Warsaw Pact and of the Soviet Union. This book gives a very clear picture of the pressures Gorbachev was under between the traditionalist hardliners, the military and Yeltsin and the radicals at the other end of the spectrum.

[Gustavo · Rating 5 out of 5]

Robert Service's The End of the Cold War is a gripping, fascinating book. Having lived myself in East Berlin from 1987 till 1990 I have all ways wondered how the momentous collapse of soviet communism (which at the time felt so unexpected) really came about. In this regard Robert Service's book gives great insights, being the most comprehensive and up to date account of the End of the Cold War today.
Delving mainly from Soviet and American sources the author manages to give a privileged inside view of how events unfolded, as the elite and leadership of the Soviet Union and the U.S. (as well as that of Western and Eastern Europe) engaged in a process of radical reforms set forth mainly by Gorbachëv and his closest entourage (Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze and senior adviser Alexander Yakovlev, the “Godfather of Glasnost”). It recounts how great decisions, dramatic situations, and difficult negotiations took place.
Being rather long (500 pages) and so full of details, I guess I would recommend the book for those really interested in this period of history (so maybe this would not be for the casual reader). While bearing the author's dry prose, one will undoubtedly feel rewarded by truck-loads of great research and information. Events, anecdotes, and details uncovered will in all likely hood surprise and amaze many.
Inevitably some actors in the story will seem to shine in a better light than others. For example Helmut Kohl surprisingly stands out as a brilliant politician who immediately sensed the opportunity for German reunification, and so ruthlessly took the initiative to carry it through even against the will of all the main Western and Soviet leaders. Margaret Thatcher, on the other hand, is portrayed true to her atherosclerotic conservatist self: ever distrustful, ever hugely egocentric, embracing nuclear deterrence and scolding Reagan for giving away too much. In the end she dismally failed in trying to convince Gorbachëv to assume the cost of formally opposing German reunification.
Many other interesting characters appear in this story: Ceausescu the satrap, Honecker the “arsehole” (according to Gorbachëv), and Jaruzelski, the eternal plan B to a Soviet invasion of Poland. I particularly loved Jaruzelski's frankness as he told Miterrand in 1988 “Either I condemn my people to live under the Soviet boot or else I try and gain what I can from the situation as it is. Are you in the West ready to make war for the sake of Poland? No. Well, there's no other course than the one I'm following”.
In the end the unscaffolding of world nuclear confrontation was in part due to Reagan and to a greater extent thanks to Gorbachëv. From this book the first one surprises the reader by his apparent sincere desire to rid the world of all nuclear weapons – very much unlike his successor George Bush (which makes one wonder what would have happened if Reagan could have had a hypothetical “third term”). Reagan innocently (and probably not so seriously) also pondered privately on the possibility of sharing SDI technology with the soviets. On the other hand Gorbachëv stands out as an idealist, someone who somehow never seemed to understand the real basis of communist power (political and economic repression). Thanks to him we now know that democratizing during a process of reform can be a dangerous thing. As he naively wrecked the Soviet Union, it becomes clearer why Putin detests him. I particularly felt sorry for Gorbachëv, especially in the end, as he desperately (and humiliatingly) begged the West for financial aid, while Bush simply stood idly by, letting the soviet economy bleed white as the federation started to fall apart to pieces.
Alexis de Toqueville once said that reform is the most dangerous time in the life of a state. This story, masterfully reconstructed by Robert Service, is a great testimony of that wisdom. Gorbachëv might have failed in saving communism from itself, but in the end he did (with a little help from Reagan) make an all out nuclear war less likely. For that we are all indebted to him.
Yes, a great story, highly recommended.

[Liviu · Rating 5 out of 5]

very good book about the the turbulent 1980-1992 period; not a revisionist history that denies the evil that was the Soviet Union or the greatness of the Western leaders that stood up to it in its last days (Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher and Pope John Paul II first and foremost); highly recomended

[Stephen Harrison · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was a great book on the end of the Cold War if you like looking at the details of international relations. Service has done monumental research in a lot of archives and brings them together into a detailed story of how policy was made in various capitals, mainly Washington and Moscow. He digs deep into personal interactions within and between governments to give a more personal account of the era. As he does that, he still keeps everything within the framework and political environment in which both powers were working. For the Americans, it was Reagan, and for a bit Bush, being constrained by allies interests and political pressure from Congress, especially the right wing of his own party. The Soviets, on the other hand, were constrained by an incredibly inefficient economy which was difficult to change because of the Communist Party's dogmatic dedication to Marxism. Leaders prior to Gorbachev, including Andropov, had seen the problems but had no solutions. To exacerbate that, the invasion of Afghanistan had put severe pressure on Soviet finances. In the end, that is what brought the Soviets down. Their economy collapsed under the weight state control while the state lost its capacity to artificially support it. Perestroika and Glasnost accelerated the process, but by Brezhnev's death in 1982, the country was already in critical condition with no treatment in sight.

I have read a fair bit about the Cold War and specifically how/why it ended when it did. Service doesn't venture too far from other things I have read, but he does provide a lot of texture to the story by looking at individual exchanges behind the scenes. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the Cold War or international relations overall, with the caveat that you are happy going through a lot of specifics, because he has a lot.

Here are some of the specifics that I took away:

1. His biggest story is that this was an economic competition that the United States was already winning big win Reagan took office. Even with stagflation of the 1970s, the U.S. economy was much more vibrant and efficient. Brezhnev's neglect of the economy, caused by his innate conservatism, left his successors with a basket case from which it was hard to recover.

2. The context of the story is arms control, which Reagan wanted to minimize the risk of nuclear war, but Gorbachev needed because the arms race was unaffordable for the Soviets. Throughout the 80s, actual negotiations between the two was almost entirely about arms controls, at least at the top levels. Both wanted to reduce nuclear stockpiles but Reagan's SDI program was a major sticking point. He viewed it as common sense to want to defend against nuclear attack and couldn't understand why the Soviets viewed it as an offensive weapon. Reagan apparently didn't understand that the Soviets assumed that if SDI provided sufficient protection from nuclear attack, there would be no deterrance that would prevent the United States from attacking with its own nuclear weapons. The issue of SDI, despite it having enormous technology issues to overcome, prevented any major agreements until the 1990s.

3. Several other issues affected their relations, even if they weren't directly about the Cold War. The Chernobyl meltdown was embarrassing for the Soviets and the fallout made Gorbachev more determined to prevent nuclear war. The Iran-Contra Scandal undermined Reagan, but not much in international relations.

4. Reagan knew that the Soviet economy was weak but no one realized, including Gorbachev, new how desperate it was until right at the end of Reagan's second term. Reagan wanted to put pressure on Gorbachev to get him to reform the Soviet system, but was also looking for ways to help him, fearing that a coup against him would put in someone worse. No one was thinking in terms of the Soviet Union collapsing until it did.

5. The fall of the Berlin Wall comes as almost an afterthought in the story, taking very little time to discuss, even though a lot of people consider it the pivotal event. For Service, it appears to be more symptomatic of much larger problems in Warsaw Pact economies as well a demonstrating the severely reduced Soviet capacity to help them. The coup against Gorbachev felt almost inevitable, although Service doesn't say it that way, because Glasnost and Perestroika were not showing any benefits at that point. When it finally happened, the only surprising thing was that the Russia people stood up to it and caused it to fail.

[Yoda · Rating 4 out of 5]

Primarily an Examination of WHAT happened during this time but not WHY it happened

This book examines its topic in a very academic and dry manner but considering that its author is a Professor of History who has written extensively on the history of the Soviet Union and the publisher is Public Affairs this should not come as a surprise. The book is written for this type of audience. It is academic and meticulously researched. The author, knowledgeable in a number of languages (including Russian), has made extensive use of archives and primarily research sources in those languages. This is the book's most positive aspect.

However, the book also has serious weaknesses. The most important of these, by far, is that the book lacks the requisite in-depth discussion and analysis of WHY things happened. The book's emphasis is primarily a narrative of WHAT happened. The analysis of important factors contributing to what happened is touched upon, just touching the surface, but there is not the in-depth analysis that should have been included. For example, there is a too short mention of the fact that the Soviet Union's deteriorating economic condition played a role in what happened during the 1985-1991 period but there is neither an analysis of this economic deterioration nor the implications on the resulting impacts. With respect to the US's excluding grain from exports to the US the only too short explanation is that it was needed for political reasons (i.e., to support the GOP's electoral prospects). However, the realty was that the grain exporting states were facing serious economic conditions themselves. There was massive out migration of people from these states at the time for example as well as de-industrialization. Etc., etc., etc.

The book also has a few other problems. One is that the book presents both Gorbachev and Reagan in an hagiographical manner. Another is that too much of the book (a good fifth to quarter of the book's text) is dedicated to arms-control talks. This would be of interest to a specialist in that field but not to anyone outside of it. A third weakness, another serious one, is that the book lacks a serious and in-depth analysis on the internal dynamics that lead to the collapse of the Eastern European regimes. Again, the book discusses WHAT happened but not WHY it happened (or at least in the depth that should have been provided).

In short, the book is worthy of a 3.5-star rating.

[Adrian · Rating 5 out of 5]

While Robert Service is a Historian, rather than an International Relations Scholar, Service is entirely adept at providing a scholarly insight into this rather unexpected period of events that ended with a conclusion few would have predicted from the standpoint of the 1980s.
While this subject has been touched upon in previous works by Service, including Comrades: A World History of Communism, and his comprehensive history of Modern Russia, here Service puts the entire period under the microscope for all to be revealed.
While touching on the economic and social realities of the time, the vast bulk of the work concerns the diplomatic interactions between the USA and the USSR, and as such, this could be considered a study of diplomacy, but shorn of any international relations analyses. In many ways, it reads like a political thriller, and one develops a very strong connection for the real-life characters in the unfolding drama.
Service provides what he is best known for, a work filled with important, relevant, and groundbreaking information, in a highly readable package. As such, this book is essential reading for all international relations enthusiasts and historians.
Service reveals no noticeable biases, and rather than getting an account that posits either the credit or the blame upon this party, or that party, what one actually gets is what matters, the facts, and the accounts, all within a very readable and very enjoyable package.
Once again, Robert Service has delivered, and The End of the Cold War comes highly recommended, perhaps as the benchmark work on this time period.

[Heath · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very detailed exam of the end of the Cold War. Short chapters help keep it from being burdensome. The thesis of the book is that years of economic isolation and military spending made the USSR in need of radical change in the early 1980s. Gorbachev stepped in to make economic changes but to do so he needed breathing room from military expenditure. Recognizing this, Reagan and the United States applied pressure in the form of increased military expenditure that the USSR could not keep up with. While Gorbachev was successful in getting both countries to back down in military, his economic reforms backfired. The freedoms he initiated gave the Eastern European countries and the USSR states the push to become independent. A domino effect then began which took down the whole USSR.

The author shows a lot of respect to Reagan, Gorbachev, and eventually to Bush. He is dismissive of other world leaders (particularly Thatcher) who he viewed as side players and not real influences on the events that occurred.

Overall I enjoyed the book. I have not found a lot of good histories concentrated on this era of the Cold War, beyond biographies of the individual players. It shows a good perspective from both sides and was fairly even-handed.

[Jim Milway · Rating 4 out of 5]

A thorough review of the final years of the Cold War - or more accurately the meltdown of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. There's much debate on how much credit Reagan should get for ending the Cold War and for me this book raises the importance of Gorbachev. Other Soviet leaders might have tried to match Reagan in spending on the military and not have engaged the US in diplomacy. But the empire was rotting and that traditional approach would not likely have worked.

I think Gorbachev sincerely wanted peace and also saw that there was no future in the way the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc were being governed. So he brought forward perestroika under the illusion that reform was possible without shedding the essence of their approach. But as soon as he started dropping the repressive from of governance, the whole structure came down like a house of cards. While his instincts were right he was very naive.

The book gives much insight into the proceedings of the Soviet government and the troubles Gorbachev had in holding things together as their system imploded. It also shows the conflicts of the hawks and doves in the Reagan and Bush administrations.

[Mingyin · Rating 5 out of 5]

It is very interesting to read many books about the final years of USSR and build a very comprehensive view on what had really happend there. This book is the third one I have read after the Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire and The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union and I recommend everyone who is interested in the USSR demise topic to read them all. This book focus on the foreign policy sphere of Gorbachev and showed the readers how USSR's chronic economic problems forced the leadership to reconcile with the US and how the internal contradiction within the communist system and Gorbachev himself blocked every possible way of the most important reform.

[Ross · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an excellent book detailing the end of the Soviet Union. It is very detailed and probably will only appeal to readers with a major interest in modern political history.
The USSR First Secretary Michael Gorbachov came into power as a reformer because the Soviet coalition was clearly going bankrupt. His solution was to end the arms race and transform the Soviet into a democratic socialist state was 180 degrees from China's solution, which was to transform to a free market fascist state. Of course China was right in the sense of what works, and we now have Russia as a free market fascist state as well.
So now we have the huge issue for the future of our free market democracy of the West versus the free market fascism of the East, and the potential return of the cold war.

[Philip Chaston · Rating 3 out of 5]

Although well-versed on elite interaction between the US and the USSR from the early 80s to 1991, the focus on political and personal interaction lacks the power of an explanatory narrative. Sure, the Ronnie-Gorby show is a good yarn with its stresses and strains, and the story focused on how uncertain these treaties were. Yet, as time wears on, the political, economic and social pressures on the Soviet leadership crowd in though they seem to be born from some generalised narrative of collapse. And at the end, we have a rushed feel to the whole house of cards.

A good narrative on how, but insufficient in understanding why.

[Al Lock · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent, comprehensive book. Superb research. If you want a detailed account of how the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union dissolved from the point of view of the negotiators of the various treaties (START, etc.) of the time related to nuclear weapons, this is the book. Detailed with extensive research from both sides of the wall, and also incorporating the impact of economic pressures as well as nationalism in the Soviet Union. It also illustrates very well how both sides never really understood each other. Highly recommended.

[Avesta · Rating 3 out of 5]

Mixed feelings - not the best book I've read by Service. Certainly enjoyable for most of it, as it goes quite in-depth into Reagan - just the thing I was looking for in understanding anti-Reagan sentiment in the DDR.
What was particularly great though, was the fact that he didn't focus mainly on 1989-1991 like I had thought he would (since for many, 1985-1988 is not a very interesting part), but he also paid quite a lot of attention to the Chernenko and early Gorbachev years.

[Dominic Carrillo · Rating 4 out of 5]

If you want a detailed, play-by-play of the top Soviet and American leaders in these final years of the Cold War, this is your book. Service is an authority and his unbiased, retelling of history is so objective is becomes boring. He focuses mainly on politicians and leaders such as Reagan, Schultz, Bush, Baker, Gorbachev, and Shevardnadze, so this is a top down history. A healthy amount of personal interest or necessity is a prerequisite to reading this 500 pager.

[Al Berry · Rating 3 out of 5]

The first 2/3rds is really mundane just back and forth over missile reduction talks between the powers, Lacking in narrative for the most part but a few interesting things, such as a Romanian general going to the soviet embassy trying to get permission from Gorbachev to coup Ceaceascu.

Final 1/3rd is excellent. Regan, Kohl Gorbachev were the visionaries, Thatcher and Bush were not.

[Eoghan Fallon · Rating 5 out of 5]

Brilliant, a real page turner. The level of detail is great but is very readable. A fascinating account of a momentous 6 year period that effectively ended the Cold War and for better or for worse a liberalising Soviet Union.

[K · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very interesting read on the high level interaction between the US and Soviet governments. Illuminating on the differing approaches by Reagan and Bush during their terms. The detail on the breaking down of their assumptions of the Soviet leadership was great.

[Penelope · Rating 5 out of 5]

Eye opening richly detailed even handed story of how we didn't blow the world up. Opened the door for me to look into more background books on the Soviet leaders and American political wrangling for more military power. A great book.