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308 pages, Hardcover
First published June 6, 1995
"I had come to believe that the espionage business, as carried out by the CIA and a few other American agencies, was and is a self-serving sham, carried out by careerist bureaucrats who have managed to deceive several generations of American policy makers and the public about both the necessity and the value of their work. There is and has been no rational need for thousands of case officers and tens of thousands of case agents working around the world, primarily in and against friendly countries. The information our vast espionage network acquires at considerable human and ethical cost is generally insignificant or irrelevant to our policy makers' needs. Our espionage establishment differs hardly at all from many other federal bureaucracies, having transformed itself into a self-serving interest group, immeasurably aided by secrecy. Now that the Cold War is over and the Communist tyrannies largely done for, our country still awaits a real national debate on the means and ends - and costs - of our national security policies. To the extent that public discussions of my case can move from government-inspired hypocrisy and hysteria to help even indirectly to fuel such a debate, I welcome and support it."There is no attempt in the book to fully grapple with any of these trenchant criticisms. Instead, most of the book is a chronicle of how supposedly stupid. But this speech doesn't sound this stupid. It reminds me of Kaczynski: a morally deranged person some of whose criticisms may have been right.
Most people at the CIA have ordinary talents and ordinary problems. They suffered from midlife crises, drank too much, sometimes shirked hard tasks, and silently nursed grudges. Only on occasion did their work rise to the level of espionage fiction."Some of this incompetence is farcical, CIA/FBI agents as Keystone Cops. Agents miss clues that seem glaringly obvious in retrospect. The two agencies constantly fight over petty issues and hide things from each other out of spite. But of course all this is also tragic. Six years after this book was published, these exact same issues - inter-agency competition and incompetence - would allow 19 Al-Qaeda operatives to perpetrate the 9/11 attacks. Indeed, it's remarkable how many sections of this book foreshadow 9/11. The authors discuss the CIA withholding information from the FBI, as noted, but there's also several references to the CIA's support for the Mujahideen in the USSR's war in Afghanistan, as well as references to the 1993 attack on the WTC.