Blood Year: The Unraveling of Western Counterterrorism

by David Kilcullen

2014 has the potential to go down as a crucial year in modern world history. A resurgent and bellicose Russia took over Crimea and fueled a civil war in Eastern Ukraine. Post-Saddam Iraq, in many respects a creature of the United States because of the war that began in 2003, lost a third of its territory to an army of hyper-violent millennialists. The peace process in Israel seemed to completely collapse. Finally, after coalescing in Syria as a territorial entity, the Islamic State swept into northern Iraq and through northeastern Syria, attracting legions of recruits from Europe and the Middle East. In short, the post-Cold War security order that the US had constructed after 1991 seemed to be coming apart at the seams.
David Kilcullen was one of the architects of America's strategy in the late phases of the second Gulf War, and also spent time in Afghanistan and other hotspots. In Blood Year, he provides a wide-angle view of the current situation in the Middle East and analyzes how America and the West ended up in such dire circumstances. Whereas in 2008 it appeared that the U.S. might pull a modest stalemate from the jaws of defeat in Iraq, six years later the situation had reversed. After America pulled out of Iraq completely in 2011, the Shi'ite president cut Sunnis out of the power structure and allowed Iranian influence to grow. And from the debris of Assad's Syria arose an extremist Sunni organization even more radical than Al Qaeda. Unlike Al Qaeda, ISIS was intent on establishing its own state, and within a remarkably short time they did. Interestingly, Kilcullen highlights how embittered former Iraqi Ba'athist military officers were key contributors to ISIS's military successes.
Kilcullen lays much of the blame on Bush's initial decision to invade Iraq (which had negative secondary effects in Afghanistan), but also takes Obama to task for simply withdrawing and adopting a "leading from behind" strategy. As events have proven, Kilcullen contends, withdrawal was a fundamentally misguided plan. The U.S. had uncorked the genie, and it had a responsibility to at least attempt to keep it under control. Instead, the U.S. is at a point where administration officials state that the losses of Ramadi and Palmyra are manageable setbacks. Kilcullen argues that the U.S. needs to re-engage in the region, whether it wants to or not, because it is largely responsible for the situation that is now unfolding. Blood Year is an essential read for anyone interested in understanding not only why the region that the U.S. invaded a dozen years ago has collapsed into utter chaos, but also what it can do to alleviate the grim situation.

Genres: Military Fiction, History, Nonfiction, War, Terrorism, Middle East, Politics

312 pages, Hardcover

First published May 1, 2015

Reviews

[Murtaza · Rating 3 out of 5]

Kilcullen is an Australian expert on counterinsurgency who helped the U.S. try and salvage the Iraq War, a conflict that he shows no hesitance denouncing as the worst strategic error since Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet Union in WW2 (he compares the two scenarios quite compellingly in fact). The "Blood Year" of the title refers to 2014-2015, when ISIS began its rampage through Iraq and Syria and undid whatever fleeting gains the U.S. had made in staunching the bleeding that their invasion had initiated.

Some of the interesting points in here are his description of al Qaeda's operational model, showing how they twist specifically local grievances and try to combine them into one global struggle, despite the often divergent interests of the parties involved. ISIS does something similar with its Wilayat model, and Kilcullen's description of leaderless resistance and the distinction between remote radicalization and paramilitary underground activity (ISIS uses both) is useful. I also didn't realize how closely related the collapse of postwar Libya was to the Anas al-Libi raid, which was quite disturbing.

The book starts to come off the hinges a bit near the end, unfortunately. Although Kilcullen does a very good job of describing the problem of radical Islamist terrorism and the horrific decisions that helped grow it into a global phenomenon, the Iraq War chief among them, he is extremely vague about recommendations other than to say there will be a "long war", which anyone can see now. He seems to advocate some kind of Marshall Plan that he doesn't describe in much detail. He is hard on both Obama and Bush, describing Obama's policies as an overcorrection to Bush, which I think is appropriate. But he never even briefly succeeds in enunciating the specifics of what he'd prefer going forward.

The last pages feel very hurried and are not up to the standard of the beginning, which is quite gripping. Kilcullen also has an annoying proclivity for name dropping and ending every chapter with some permutation of "but the worst was yet to come, which gets pretty tiring by the fourth time.

Despite these criticisms, I learned a lot from this book and respect the author as a serious intellectual on the subject of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. While this title was a lot about ISIS, I plan to read his other books in the near future for more insights on the war on terror generally. This one contains many analytical gems even for people who follow the topic closely.

[Randal White · Rating 5 out of 5]

An incredible, timely book. Kilcullen was a major participant in the formation of strategies used in our wars in the Middle East/Africa. He readily acknowledges the mistakes that "we" made; by concentrating on the theory of "disaggregation" (mainly going after the leaders of Al Qaeda, it was assumed that it would break up the group into smaller entities, which local the local government could deal with, but in reality it just dispersed the group to other areas and allowed them to start up new groups, including ISIS).
That our practices, such as "extraordinary rendition", undermined our standing as the "good guys", drove a wedge between us and the locals, and made it very hard to pressure other regimes into encouraging human rights (do as we say, not as we do). By shifting our focus from terrorism to Iraq, we alienated allies; and after our reasons for the invasion were proven falsehoods, it made it hard for others to trust our "intelligence". How (Rumsfeld) insistence on using the minimum force in Iraq was a disaster, our disarming of the Iraqi army and the Ba'athists created a large, potentially useful group into enemies (who ended up forming future terrorist organizations). Kilcullen goes so far as to likening "Bush's decision to invade Iraq to Hitler's invasion of Russia". By taking our eye off the Taliban and placing it on Iraq, it allowed them to form anew. How our actions worried Iran that "they were next", and pushed Iran into defending themselves through striving for nuclear weapons, and keeping Iraq and Afghanistan unstable (to keep us busy and not give us time/material to extend into Iran). How our actions and threats, unfollowed and disregarded when pushed (the use of chemical weapons in Syria would be a "game changer", and then we did nothing) encouraged regimes like Syria to conclude they had nothing to fear from us. How ISIS had evolved their strategies again an again, while we are stuck fighting them with old strategies and failed to adapt. How our timidity in the fight has opened the door to Russia to step-in and take over. How Obama's strategy of "retrenchment" (choosing to "leave" the war instead of ending it) has failed. How we cannot just choose to disengage and avoid the fight because we are tired (isolationist theory), because society today is so interconnected with travel, trade and interaction with the world.
Kilcullen's answer is that the solution is not simple, we have to admit that we messed up (the invasion of Iraq, our addiction to killing terrorist leaders to solve the problem, our withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, opportunism in Libya, and passivity in dealing with Syria), and that until our strategy changes, these disasters will continue.
There is just so, so much information in this book, it will make your head spin. And wonder what in the world we should do, is there even a solution to the problem. Even so, the book is fascinating, extremely well written and documented, and flows very well. I highly encourage you to give it a try.

[Eric Burke · Rating 4 out of 5]

A succinct, if depressing, overview of the collapse of the War on Terror and subsequent rise of ISIS across the "Blood Year" of 2014. Kilcullen, a brilliant thinker, spreads the blame for the ongoing strategic catastrophe equally across nearly every party involved in containing and combatting ISIS.

In sum, Kilcullen argues that Bush's 2003 Iraq invasion destroyed regional partnerships and eventually laid the groundwork necessary for the birth of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). A counter-terror strategy tending toward the "disaggregation" of global AQ (and associated) networks post-2005 produced what he terms an "atomized threat" perfectly in-tune with contemporaneous technological advances and the rise of social media. These advances enabled "remote radicalization and leaderless resistance to an unprecedented degree" (228), with the consequences made most painfully obvious through the lonewolf-style attacks across the West in 2015-16. Obama's decision to prematurely (in Kilcullen's estimation) leave Iraq gave AQI/ISIS the opportunity to rebound from near catastrophic losses sustained during the Surge, and the assassination of bin Laden wounded AQ's capacity to capitalize on the Arab Spring of 2011 just as ISIS came into its own. "Complacency and hubris after bin Laden's death, along with vacillation in the face of the colossal tragedy of the Syrian War," he asserts, "created the basis for a conflict that's now consuming the Middle East and drawing regional and global powers into a hugely dangerous, and still escalating conflict" (228).

[A wonderful summary of Kilcullen's overall argument is made on p. 228; the final chapter and epilogue providing much if not all of his analytical policy advice.]

While Kilcullen offers several potential options for Western policymakers, he is careful to emphasize that it might in fact be too late for any of them to have any realistic chance at total success. Acceptance of past failures and resolve to see the thing through to the end rest at the heart of all his suggestions. Most importantly, Kilcullen stresses that "character and will" in the West (and its regional allies) is of tremendous import in what is likely to seem a "forever war" against Islamic radicalism. "The harsh reality is that you can't fight without fighting," Kilcullen explains (232). Precision drone strikes and "light footprint" operations are unlikely to solve what is rapidly evolving into an "age of conflict." But if the book proves anything, it's that fighting without a larger sense of what such fighting is meant to achieve can cause far more problems than it's worth. Grand tactics are just as important as grand strategy. No action should be taken without first taking into consideration the enemy's capacity for adaptation and tactical flexibility. Nor should one embark on a military adventure without first deciding upon what the endgame will (or even should) look like.

Still, there is a war -- a big one, and denying that fact or throwing a pity-party because of just how badly we wish there wasn't one isn't a recipe for ending it. In the end, it takes work to achieve victory. Work doesn't necessarily mean killing, or bombing, or conquering. But it also doesn't mean leaving or avoiding. These are the hard questions, after all.

Excellent and engaging read, well worth your time.

[Tyler · Rating 3 out of 5]

I don't usually review books I've read , but putting this out there - there's misinformation in this book presented as fact . Anwar al-awlaki did not radicalize Nidal Hasan through emails like the author states on p.56. Hasans emails to Awlaki went mostly unignored , and Awlaki only came out in praise of him after the shooting . The FBI released all the emails between Awlaki & Hasan, so this information is easy to find. It seems the fact checkers at Oxford Press missed this obvious error .

Otherwise, not a bad book, though gets bogged down by somewhat dry , academic writing in the second half.

[Marks54 · Rating 4 out of 5]

(Revised below in critique) David Kilcullen has written a very good book on the rise of ISIS as a military force and the failure of Western counterinsurgency in the period following the success of the surge in Iraq. He focuses the book around the breakout of ISIS as a major force in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere over 2014 and 2015. He provides a detailed account of the rise of ISIS following the near extinction of AQI during the surge and provides the context of the contributing factors leading to the growth of ISIS, including the US drawdown from Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arab Spring, the US/NATO intervention in Libya, the Syrian civil war, the refugee crisis, and the increasing involvement of Russia inn the region.

Kilcullen is the perfect person to write this book. He is a soldier, a scholar, and has direct experience with all of the participants in western counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan (and other places). He is also a wonderful writer. I first encountered his work in "The Reluctant Terrorist" and have read some of his articles as well. There are few individuals who can match his talents on these sorts of topics.

His account of the rise of ISIS as a successful, disciplined, and highly innovative combat force is masterful and is not matched by anything I have read elsewhere. To people not directly involved with the military, the sudden rise of ISIS came out of the blue and was difficult to comprehend, especially after it became the focus of political rhetoric in the US elections. Another strength of the book is Kilcullen's explanation and evaluation of western counter-terrorist strategy as it evolved in the fight against groups like AQI during the surge. The is the best account I have read of the "strategy" behind the "global war on terror" that made sense as a strategy both in terms of its success in Iraq and its failure against ISIS.

Kilcullen's evaluation of counter-terrorism strategy depends in turn on his evaluation of the overall strategy behind the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Here, like most everyone else by now, he is scathing regarding the Iraq invasion and more forgiving about the Afghan war. The criticism is striking, especially when he compares the US combination of the two wars with the two front war faced by Germany once the invasion of Russia stalled in 1942. I get his intuition and appreciate how the counter-insurgency strategy had to be understood in terms of the poor situation the US and its allies faced in Iraq. The scale of the Russo-German war was huge, however, and one wonders about how far to drive the analogy with WWII.

Kilcullen also tries to be nonpartisan in his critique. The most cutting critique is for the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, coupled with the lack of attention to follow-up, debathification, and the demobilization of the army. These initial missteps are what made the war go so wrong with such long lasting consequences. Kilcullen is also highly critical of Obama's decisions, but for different reasons. In particular, he is critical of the decision to withdraw from Iraq without considering the political consequences and without a proper exit agreement concerning forces. He is also critical of the indecisive US policies around the Libyan intervention, which sent conflicting signals to other actors and ended up grossly destabilizing the country while getting little of value in return. Also warranting critique was the failure to follow-up on the "line in the sand" concerning the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war. This empowered the Syrian government, demoralized the moderates, and made it clear around the region that there were few incentives to ally with the US.

I was a bit disappointed with his discussion of what to do going forward (as of early 2016). For someone who so strongly focuses on strategy and tactics, he seems to push the more macro political basis for an extended war effort as critical. The US pulled out because remaining in was no longer politically palatable. If that is true, one wonders why he spends such time on paths forward that are not likely to be pursued. A strategy of cooperation with Russia, however problematic, would also have serious political issues in the US, although these did not get the same attention. The book is not about macro-politics, so why condition your concluding recommendations on them? There is also a tension in counter-insurgency strategies like the Iraq surge and was not well discussed. It is reasonable to claim that the US drew down its forces too soon and failed to follow up on the limited but real successes of the surge. However, these types of strategies strike me as always assuming that at some point decision making in turned over to the host government. The strategy, even if done perfectly, cannot control what the government chooses to do of its own accord once US forces have left. There can be failure even if the strategy is flawlessly executed. The only way out is to stay an an occupier indefinitely (which is politically infeasible) or novel invade in the first place (which may be intellectually satisfying - or not - but whic is useful from a policy/strategy perspective).

It is also very interesting that Kilcullen stopped when he did. His recommendations in many ways seem certain to be anathema to the new American administration. He is definitely not someone who would see "American First" and isolation as viable responses to ISIS. It will be worthwhile following his reactions to terrorism strategy under the new administration.

[Maria · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kilcullen, an Australian counterterrorism expert, writes about the bloody year of 2014-2015 and how it was linked to American's overreaction to the 9/11 attacks under Bush and to the under-reaction to terrorism under Obama.

Why I started this book: Kilcullen, is an academic with boots on the ground experience, combining theory and practice. Always a fascinating read. For example, he compared the invasion of Iraq by Bush to the invasion of Russia by Hitler. Both were wars of choice, started in the midst of wars with other nations. Two front wars rarely end in victory.

Why I finished it: Equally harsh on Bush and Obama, he called for long term solutions that require boots on the ground, fighting. And having opened Pandora's box, we can't just walk away hoping that our drones can fix the problem.

[Paul · Rating 5 out of 5]

Well written and expertly analysed look at the absolute cluster the West has created in the Middle East.

Two of his quotes are memorable and unfortunately true:

If Bush was reckless in running into war too quick, Obama was feckless in pulling out too quick.

Policy-makers need to ask themselves, “Am I ready to put flesh against steel—to kill their people and lose ours—in order to win?” If the answer is No, then we shouldn’t get into these conflicts at all....The Islamic State understands that; so do the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Do we?

Anyone who wants a better understanding of what the hell we’ve done in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, and the mess we have caused should read this book.

[Holly Morrow]

Totally depressing and also required reading if you want to understand what is happening in the Middle East, and with the American counter-terror effort. “Blood Year” refers to 2015, when basically everything fell apart in the Western fight against terrorism – when ISIS overran large parts of Iraq and Syria, and radicalized locals staged attacks in Paris and elsewhere.

Kilcullen – an Australian soldier/scholar who became an important part of American war strategy post 9/11 – is a very effective writer and analyst. He comes across as entirely dispassionate, in the sense that he is willing to admit his own error (he had a large part in the US effort in Iraq and Afghanistan), and he is equally scathing about the Bush administration’s failures (the initial decision to invade Iraq and the fallacy that we could control the post-war situation with a light footprint), and the Obama’s administration’s failures (premature withdrawal from Iraq, unwillingness to recognize the threat posed by ISIS, and the Syria redline debacle). None of these arguments are new, but he places them in a very coherent narrative and has no axe to grind. I’m sure some people who are subject matter experts will disagree with him on his specific diagnoses or prognoses – this is one man’s view - but he does not seem to strike a false note in terms of an honest effort to come to grips with what has gone wrong and how we might possibly think about fixing it.

My one criticism of the book is that it is very heavy on jargon and DOD-speak. I worked in government and national security, and still occasionally found it a slog through the various military acronyms, place names from Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, Arabic terms, terrorist group factions, and the like. I think the “lay” reader might find it hard going. Which is a shame because his analysis is methodical and crystal clear and, though I am not a subject matter expert, strikes me as extremely important.

I finished this book with a heavy heart. It is almost hard to wrap your head around the scale of the disaster that has unfolded in the Middle East. As seems to be a pattern, I found myself crying on the commuter train – this time over the gruesome torture and beheading of the 83 year old director of antiquities at Palmyra by ISIS. The level of brutality and human suffering described by Kilcullen in this book is staggering, and the fact that the US – by both our action and inaction – is so much to blame for it is truly heartbreaking.

[Will · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really, this book from Kilcullen is a summary of his views on the changes in counterinsurgency/counterterrorist strategy in the era post-Iraq surge in 2007, right up to ISIS seizing huge swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq in 2014. He criticizes firstly the Bush administration for invading Iraq, and for doing so in a "light frootprint" approach that couldn't provide security or combat the insurgency. Although the Surge - in which he played an active role - was successful in his eyes, he criticizes the drawdown by the Obama administration which led to a vaccum of power in parts of Iraq. He further criticizes the Iraqi administration under Maliki, and its over-reliance on increasing Shia power at the expense of Sunni, and therefore adding to Sunni grievances in Iraq which ISIS was able to take advantage of. Not my favourite of Kilcullen's books, since it reads more like a report than an innovative analysis, but still a must read for people actively following these events as they unfold.

[James · Rating 5 out of 5]

Outstanding, as have been LtCol. Kilcullen's other books - his analysis is incisive, nonpartisan, and organized. His prose is crisp and to the point, with occasional memorable phrases; for example, he characterizes G.W. Bush and Obama as, respectively, reckless and feckless. The author's long experience in counterinsurgency warfare and the tremendous amount of thought he's given the subject give his evaluations solid credibility.
His final look at the subject is pessimistic but not hopeless - as he sees it, the effectiveness of the developed world's counterterrorism campaign(s) from here on depend on how willing and able our leaders and societies are to accept uncomfortable realities, such as the facts that counterterrorism and counterinsurgency wars are never quick and can't be fought on the cheap in terms of lives or resources.
Strongly recommended.

[Lynda · Rating 5 out of 5]

Kilcullen has now released a full-length book of the same name as his "Blood Year" Quarterly Essay. I picked both up in the bookshop, flipped through, and decided that my commitment was essay length. Quarterly Essays come in at about 25 000 words. I found the whole thing compelling; the impact of military policy was very rationally explained, appropriately referenced and qualified, and horrific at times. I looked up the "letters to the editor" from the next Quarterly Essay and it is clear that Kilcullen has the respect, if not the total agreement, of other key participants. I'm thinking I now need to read the whole book but I might give myself a brief respite first. If only the civilians caught in the conflict could do the same. I'm also going to pause to give money to refugee relief because in the circumstances of Iraq and Syria I would be fleeing too.

[Nick Lloyd · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kilcullen is not at his best here, but the book still has a lot to offer. Venturing out of his comfort zone of guerrilla warfare to examine Grand Strategy, Kilcullen does an admirable job for the most part recounting the last three years of ISIL's rise, and the Western response to it. He falls into the policy groupthink trap in regards to the "red line" debate of 2013, claiming it showed weakness on behalf of the United States, emboldening Vladimir Putin (forgetting, it seems, Putin's invasion of Georgia in 2008). Still, his analysis is strong and his conclusions are watertight, if somewhat vague. Worth the read.

[Morgan Brickley · Rating 5 out of 5]

Mindblowing. Listened on Audible. Read by the author in his aussie accent. Incredible detail on the failures and successes and painfully gained wisdom over the last decade of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Written before the latest series of ISIS attacks but it was clear that Iraq et al was not going to be fixed easily.

[Joseph Stieb · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interesting read on modern counterterrorism and the pivotal period between 2014-2016 when things fell apart in Iraq and Syria. I think DK is right to point out this period as a crucial one in the GWOT. In this period, we saw the rise of ISIS, the internationalization of the Syrian War, the acceleration of the Russian challenge to US power, and the US return to war in Iraq and Syria. You also had the destabilization of European politics, with refugee flows and terrorist attacks prompting a right wing nationalist revival. DK had a front row seat for all of this, and he mixes high level strategic and political analysis with personal experience to make for an efficient and critical narrative.

The core concept of this book was aggregation v disaggregation in the GWOT. Aggregation is what AQ wanted originally: to link many Islamist struggles against "apostate" regimes like Egypt or Saudi Arabia into a grand struggle against the "far enemy," the United States, seen as teh greatest threat to Islam and the puppet master of the "near enemy" regimes. DK and many other CT strategists at the start of the GWOT wanted a strategy of disaggregation, or discrediting the AQ narrative by keeping each of these conflicts disconnected from each other and dealing with them individually rather than one grand struggle that would play into clash of civs narratives. DK convincingly argues that the IRaq War played right into AQ's hands by aggregating global radical struggles into a united front, radicalizing people all over the world, and setting the stage for hte rise of AQI and eventually its successor, the ISlamic state. He shows that while the US managed eventually to tamp down the violence in Iraq, it and its allies never managed to solve the underlying political/sectarian roots of that violence, which meant that once US forces were out and its leverage reduced in Iraq, the Maliki government returned to sectarian oppression and the Islamic State rose to challenge them, taking advantage of the

DK is a little harsh on Obama in my opinion, but he leverages some good critiques. Obama really had no choice but to leave Iraq, but there's no doubt he downplayed the ISIS threat as it emerged and frequently issued threats he had no intention of backing up. He never should have issued the red line threat in the first place, but I'm glad he didn't follow through. DK argues that 2013 was the golden opportunity to support the moderate opposition in Syria. I find this dubious: the US would have had to vet the opposition (which takes time), decide what level of risk to take in giving them the weaponry they needed to win (but, if history shows correctly, would eventually wind up in extremist hands), and then decide whether to step in to help the opposition once they ran into trouble in fighting the regime (Bay of pigs, anyone). I'm not as convinced as DK that this opposition was actually moderate (what that means in the ME context can be quite different from what we mean) or that more effective fighting by the opposition would have either defeated the regime or forced it to a negotiated settlement that would force Assad from office. Assad was never going to leave; he would destroy the country rather than step down, and his powerful backers in Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah would make sure he didn't lose. Overall, Obama miscalculated tactically and rhetorically but avoided doing anything truly stupid and harmful to US interests, and the blowback against US society has been relatively manageable. He always asked his more interventionist advisers "what's next" when it came to things like backing the opposition in Syria, and they could never come up with good answers. Obama understood that if he aided the oppo with serious weaponry he would then be expected to intervene to help them avoid extermination, and who knows what would have happened after that: Iraq War Part II? Proxy war with Russia? All bad scenarios.

I quibble with DK on areas like that, but overall this is an informative and interesting read. DK is great at packaging useful strategic concepts for his readers, and he's also a good storyteller. Good read for those interested in the last decade of counterterrorism and foreign policy.

[Tobias · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kilcullen knows his stuff. This is an excellent history of events from 2001 until c. 2015, looking at Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria (predominantly). It is a depressing litany of failings, almost always on the political and geo-political levels. Kilcullen rightly points out that, almost without exception, in every single contact at the tactical level, Western forces win; we haven't been operating against peer, or even near-peer enemies, therefore the 'successes' are not unexpected. However, the point is more that we win the battle, but always seem to be losing the war. This is the key takeaway from this compelling analysis; the civilian decision-makers always seem to get things wrong.

Kilcullen is keen to point out that he is non-partisan, with no allegiance to any one party. Notably, as an Australian in US government service (a rare thing indeed) he has none of the enduring tribal affiliations that one would normally associate with a US civil servant; nor, critically, the political baggage. I dispute, however, his assertion of neutrality, on the basis that I think he doth protest a smidgeon too much. Irrespective, it is interesting to have my views of Bush and Obama challenged; Bush clearly much more competent behind closed doors than he ever appeared to be in public; Obama clearly a supreme statesman, but with questionable judgment about military decisions. This doesn't make Obama unique, but it does take some of the veneer off his legacy.

Others have commented that Kilcullen is hugely and enduringly critical without ever offering much of a solution. I think this rather misses the point; firstly, this is a history, with good, detailed analysis thrown in. Second, the solutions are written throuhout the text, essentially "don't do this again!". Sadly, we are doomed to never learn the lessons of our past, and are equally doomed to repeat our failures.

Kilcullen has an almost messianic reputation in certain circles, primarily for stating what is often the extremely obvious - the key point that he does it first , which sets him apart from many other commentators. This book is different, in that he is repeating what he has already often said, and echoing others at the same time. Nonetheless it is a worthy read and should add to your overall understanding of a vital area of study.

[Jimmy · Rating 5 out of 5]

I read this book because it entered the Army Chief of Staff reading list last year.

The author, David Kilcullen, begins by discussing his qualifications and more importantly, declares his biases or specifically, the lack thereof. Kilcullen is an Australian and acknowledges that he is not registered to vote in the United States nor does he affiliate with any particular party's politics. Books like this often seem politicized so it was refreshing for the author to be so candid. In Blood Year, he is highly critical of both the Bush and Obama presidencies and decisions they made that led to the rise of ISIS and the instability in the Middle East. His criticism does not seem biased, nor does his praise, sparse as it is.  Without a doubt, this makes the book much more credible. It absolutely impacted my understanding of the U.S. counterterrorism policy but also helped enlighten me to the way that others perceive it.  Blood Year gave me a much better and more concrete understanding of opinions that I do not share.  As the issue itself is political in nature, I won't discuss it thoroughly as this is not the forum and I am a government employee.  I will say that, read with an open mind and desire to learn, this book will probably change a perspective or two, regardless of your own affiliation.  At the very least, it will make you seek more information.

Another great aspect of the book is that Kilcullen does not become mired in the ancillary while at the same time not skipping the significant. Many books on the Global War on Terror focus on the anecdotal and miss the bigger picture. Kilcullen is able to discuss the higher level impacts and decisions while using his personal experience at the lower levels to supplement his narrative.

The baseline of the book though is not just a criticism of the failures of US policy.  It also offers means to solve the problems created by previous poor decision making.  Kilcullen examines policies, both in the U.S. and abroad, that have been discussed and explains the impact such policies might have.  

[Jeff · Rating 5 out of 5]

Outside of the evening news, I paid little attention to the doings of ISIS. After finishing this book, I have a new appreciation for them as a threat. LTC Kilcullen provides a clear and concise narrative of their political and military achievements in 2014-2015. It's amazing how they grew from QAI to a state player in the middle east by capitalizing on the US invasion and withdrawal from Iraq, the Arab spring, and the weaknesses of the Syrian & Iraqi governments. They are truly a learning organization. To fully defeat them, we need to start thinking beyond our guns.

[SR Bolton · Rating 5 out of 5]

Kilcullen’s solid assessment of the state of western counterterrorism approaches and the unimagined evolution of the threat over the last 5 years is backed up by field research and good historical analysis. It’s a good example of a scholarly effort made accessible to practitioners & policy makers. Also very engaging, my fastest read of the year.

[Matthew Ennevor · Rating 5 out of 5]

Man the middle east needs a reset button.

[Jerome · Rating 4 out of 5]

Written a couple years ago, but excellent primer on US ME strategy and missteps in the past decade. Anything by David Kilcullen is worth the read

[John Lathers · Rating 4 out of 5]

A thoughtful, knowlegeable analysis of U.S. and international counterterrorism efforts, placing Iraq within a detailed global strategic perspective.

[Colt · Rating 2 out of 5]

Seems just like a dude that wanted to write a book to make money. Some good thoughts but overall not worth the time.

[Yannick M · Rating 4 out of 5]

A bit dated.

[Strick · Rating 5 out of 5]

Another excellent book

[Austin Wesley · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent analysis of our failed policy in the middle east and how it led to the rise and proliferation of ISIS.

[Andrew Tollemache · Rating 4 out of 5]

David Kilcullen is one prolific writer on COIN and counter-terrorisism. In "BloodYear" KIlcullen makes the case that 2014 was the year the fraying successes, such as they were, in GWOT really came apart. Citing the Russian take over of the Crimean, ISIS's momentous success across Syria and Iraq coupled to the never ending Syrian Civil War, KIlcullen sees the glimmers of success that the West was having getting Islamic terrorism under control as being no more. On top of this the Western effort to tame Afghanistan, while never really doing all that well, was greatly crippled by the above events too.
A revived Russia greatly altered the power balance in the Middle East and curtailed the US's ability to have almost carte blanche over what it could do in the region. ISIS upended whatever progress one could cite in the region and exposed the Iraqi govt as a clusterf*&k.
Kilcullen hated the Iraq invasion and agrees it made this chaos possible, but he also thinks the Obama admin's desire to GTFO of Iraq made them blind to the risks leaving entailed. Leaving the region is not to be confused with having fixed the region. The late Bush admin efforts to Surge and get serious about the Iraq insurgency created a window of time to get to peaceful solutions. That window was largely squandeered. Obama gave Maliki enough latitude to make a litany of poor and destructive policy changes

[Tim Rose · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book was an awesome account of what the title calls the unraveling of western counterterrorism as evidenced by the rise of ISIS. David Kilcullen does not have any bias except toward the truth. He leaves no party or politician unaccountable for what has happened to give rise to the violence and terror caused by the so called Islamic State. Kilcullen has brilliant insight, sharp analysis and he draws on a wide range of knowledge and experience to highlight his points. He also has a robust knowledge of history and can put history in the context of current events to discuss the merits of our current strategy while also suggesting other strategic approaches to solve this conflict. I can't recommend this book more highly. One could explore the resources and notes referenced in this book and spend months trying to read all of the material the David Kilcullen consolidated into one thoughtful and at times provocative book.

[J.G. Cully · Rating 5 out of 5]

A detailed, informed and at times brutally honest review of the last few years of war with Islamic State but also of the last decade of counter terrorism since 9/11. The author writes with authority on the subject and demonstrates his ability not to over burden the reader with needless detail. Instead, he gets right to the point and reveals the exact state of play and the evolution of current circumstances. A very intelligent assessment and a must read for those who want to know the truth of current affairs, instead of the media or political spin that so often clouds the facts.

[Michael Shoemake · Rating 3 out of 5]

A very informative read, though it's hurt at times by Kilcullen's brief detours into assigning blame. The book would be better if these passages were either omitted or expanded considerably so as to properly explore (and presumably reject) the most charitable explanations for the choices made by members of the executive branch. This is, however, a minor issue; the vast majority of the book is quite good.

[Jwduke · Rating 5 out of 5]

I read every book the author writes and watch ever recorded lecture he gives. If you are wondering about how we got to where we are in the Mideast, then this book is for you.

The author first writes his main points, then provides supporting detail for them in an easy to read manner. The author does not shy away from his past mistakes or off the mark predictions, and even makes some more.

A must read for the military.