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War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft
Today, nations increasingly carry out geopolitical combat through economic means. Policies governing everything from trade and investment to energy and exchange rates are wielded as tools to win diplomatic allies, punish adversaries, and coerce those in between. Not so in the United States, however. America still too often reaches for the gun over the purse to advance its interests abroad. The result is a playing field sharply tilting against the United States.
In a cogent analysis of why the United States is losing ground as a world power and what it can do to reverse the trend, War by Other Means describes the statecraft of geoeconomics: the use of economic instruments to achieve geopolitical goals. Geoeconomics has long been a lever of America’s foreign policy. But factors ranging from U.S. bureaucratic politics to theories separating economics from foreign policy leave America ill prepared for this new era of geoeconomic contest, while rising powers, especially China, are adapting rapidly. The rules-based system Americans set in place after World War II benefited the United States for decades, but now, as the system frays and global competitors take advantage, America is uniquely self-constrained. Its geoeconomic policies are hampered by neglect and resistance, leaving the United States overly reliant on traditional military force.
Drawing on immense scholarship and government experience, Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris show that if America’s policies are left uncorrected, the price in American blood and treasure will only grow. What geoeconomic warfare requires is a new vision of U.S. statecraft.
In a cogent analysis of why the United States is losing ground as a world power and what it can do to reverse the trend, War by Other Means describes the statecraft of geoeconomics: the use of economic instruments to achieve geopolitical goals. Geoeconomics has long been a lever of America’s foreign policy. But factors ranging from U.S. bureaucratic politics to theories separating economics from foreign policy leave America ill prepared for this new era of geoeconomic contest, while rising powers, especially China, are adapting rapidly. The rules-based system Americans set in place after World War II benefited the United States for decades, but now, as the system frays and global competitors take advantage, America is uniquely self-constrained. Its geoeconomic policies are hampered by neglect and resistance, leaving the United States overly reliant on traditional military force.
Drawing on immense scholarship and government experience, Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris show that if America’s policies are left uncorrected, the price in American blood and treasure will only grow. What geoeconomic warfare requires is a new vision of U.S. statecraft.
376 pages, Hardcover
First published April 11, 2016
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1981 people want to read
About the author
Robert D. Blackwill
28 books14 followersRobert D. Blackwill is Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.
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Displaying 1 - 27 of 27 reviews
July 16, 2017
I approached this book as someone who has worked in and now teaches international security who wants more information about how states are using economic tools to achieve strategic ends. Ultimately, I got what I wanted out of this book and with some caveats below, would recommend it.
Looking around the world Blackwill and Harris argue that major actors are increasingly using economic leverage and not military force to achieve state ends. Yet, frustratingly, the United States continues to think of solutions to problems primarily in military and not economic terms. As such, this book is an argument for “geoeconomics” or “the systematic use of economic instruments to accomplish geopolitical objectives.” They note that while the US founding fathers eagerly embraced economic statecraft and that it was a feature of US foreign policy for most of US history, it has begun to wane. They attribute this to a number of factors that had emerged by the late 1970s: an increasing unwillingness to subvert profit for state interests – partially due to the emergence of capitalism as a moral virtue that could not be violated by state interference, rising domestic economic insecurity, and a rise in Cold War tensions seen as requiring military and not economic solutions (something also emphasized by 9/11). Therefore, while states such as China and Russia use economic leverage to achieve their ends, the US remains unwilling to do so well.
Blackwill and Harris identify seven tools of geoeconomics: trade policy, investment policy, economic and financial sanctions, cyber, aid, financial and monetary policy, energy and commodities. In chapter three they go in detail as to how other states are currently using these instruments to achieve their ends. Chapter four and five detail, specifically, how China is using them to slowly undermine US global leadership and to achieve its own ends.
This framework is very useful for thinking about how major powers use their strengths to achieve geopolitical goals beyond military force. Indeed, given how much we hear about the need for a military response to a rising China or cyber threats, it is interesting to approach these problems from a non-military perspective (while noting that military force will still obviously be needed.) In this sense, the book is useful. It is clearly written and they authors make their points and policy prescriptions easy to follow.
However, there are four things that American and non-American readers should know if they are going to pick “War By Other Means” up:
First, sadly, this book is written for a world that no longer exists. US foreign policy is in complete disarray at best and global leaders are beginning to recognize that the willingness of the United States to maintain its mantle of global leadership is on the wane. The 2016 election made that clear and Americans voted in a man with a strictly anti-global agenda. They will not go away in 2020 – Trumpism will not end with Trump.
This means many of the prescriptions put out there are largely moot: The authors praise Secretary Clinton’s paper on a geoeconomic strategy for the US (unsurprising as it was actually written by one of the authors (Harris) https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary...) But the idea that the US would be able to conduct such a strategy under Trump is now unthinkable. Rather than challenging US leadership rivals, the US is willingly withdrawing. Trump has left the TPP, TTIP and may withdraw from more. Trump’s crude transactional view of the world means that the necessity to offer US support for certain geopolitical ends is basically non-existent. Increasingly, other countries increasingly see China as the next major global leader – whatever new challenge this many bring. The authors hardly could have predicted this, of course, but it made for a depressing read to remember the world that was.
Second, unlike the last book I read on this topic, “Chinese Economic Statecraft”, the authors treat China as a “lump” entity that acts in unity. This largely reflects the kind of “realist” program the authors are advocating – the geoeconomic strategies of countries (except the United States!) are seen as directed from the top, without much nuance, not unlike a billiard ball. However, we know that Chinese SOEs and Chinese leadership do not always agree – and sometimes SOEs act in ways that can harm long-term Chinese goals. More nuance here would have lessened this sometimes cartoonish view of China. (Although to be fair, this was not the central aim of the book.)
Third this book is directed at a certain kind of American reader (ie: Council on Foreign Relations member). This isn’t a bad thing – but it does restrict the usefulness that non-Americans will get from it. For example, while Canadian readers will get much out of the diagnosis of the problems that the authors identify (the willingness of international actors to subvert economic ends to state interest and challenges for recognizing and deal with it) the solutions are all directed towards the United States. Again, I do not think this is entirely a bad thing, but non-American readers should go in realizing this. The subtitle “Geoeconomics and Statecraft” should read “Geoeconomics and American Statecraft”.
Finally, while we’re on the topic, it’s interesting to note how little attention Canada gets in the book. We are the United States second largest trading partner (20%+, representing 35 states) and a major source of energy, and an ideological ally (at least pre-Trump). https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/am... There is a suggestion that NAFTA should be updated and revitalized but no real plan on how to do this. The emphasis in the book is almost entirely on how to deal with rivals and not empower or work with allies, other than the now sans-US TPP (or TPP-11).
Overall, however, I did learn from this book and I am actively considering using the chapter on the history of US geoeconomics in my International Security class. It’s a fast read and although it can sometimes be repetitive, the authors have made it very clear about what their key points and policy prescriptions are.
Looking around the world Blackwill and Harris argue that major actors are increasingly using economic leverage and not military force to achieve state ends. Yet, frustratingly, the United States continues to think of solutions to problems primarily in military and not economic terms. As such, this book is an argument for “geoeconomics” or “the systematic use of economic instruments to accomplish geopolitical objectives.” They note that while the US founding fathers eagerly embraced economic statecraft and that it was a feature of US foreign policy for most of US history, it has begun to wane. They attribute this to a number of factors that had emerged by the late 1970s: an increasing unwillingness to subvert profit for state interests – partially due to the emergence of capitalism as a moral virtue that could not be violated by state interference, rising domestic economic insecurity, and a rise in Cold War tensions seen as requiring military and not economic solutions (something also emphasized by 9/11). Therefore, while states such as China and Russia use economic leverage to achieve their ends, the US remains unwilling to do so well.
Blackwill and Harris identify seven tools of geoeconomics: trade policy, investment policy, economic and financial sanctions, cyber, aid, financial and monetary policy, energy and commodities. In chapter three they go in detail as to how other states are currently using these instruments to achieve their ends. Chapter four and five detail, specifically, how China is using them to slowly undermine US global leadership and to achieve its own ends.
This framework is very useful for thinking about how major powers use their strengths to achieve geopolitical goals beyond military force. Indeed, given how much we hear about the need for a military response to a rising China or cyber threats, it is interesting to approach these problems from a non-military perspective (while noting that military force will still obviously be needed.) In this sense, the book is useful. It is clearly written and they authors make their points and policy prescriptions easy to follow.
However, there are four things that American and non-American readers should know if they are going to pick “War By Other Means” up:
First, sadly, this book is written for a world that no longer exists. US foreign policy is in complete disarray at best and global leaders are beginning to recognize that the willingness of the United States to maintain its mantle of global leadership is on the wane. The 2016 election made that clear and Americans voted in a man with a strictly anti-global agenda. They will not go away in 2020 – Trumpism will not end with Trump.
This means many of the prescriptions put out there are largely moot: The authors praise Secretary Clinton’s paper on a geoeconomic strategy for the US (unsurprising as it was actually written by one of the authors (Harris) https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary...) But the idea that the US would be able to conduct such a strategy under Trump is now unthinkable. Rather than challenging US leadership rivals, the US is willingly withdrawing. Trump has left the TPP, TTIP and may withdraw from more. Trump’s crude transactional view of the world means that the necessity to offer US support for certain geopolitical ends is basically non-existent. Increasingly, other countries increasingly see China as the next major global leader – whatever new challenge this many bring. The authors hardly could have predicted this, of course, but it made for a depressing read to remember the world that was.
Second, unlike the last book I read on this topic, “Chinese Economic Statecraft”, the authors treat China as a “lump” entity that acts in unity. This largely reflects the kind of “realist” program the authors are advocating – the geoeconomic strategies of countries (except the United States!) are seen as directed from the top, without much nuance, not unlike a billiard ball. However, we know that Chinese SOEs and Chinese leadership do not always agree – and sometimes SOEs act in ways that can harm long-term Chinese goals. More nuance here would have lessened this sometimes cartoonish view of China. (Although to be fair, this was not the central aim of the book.)
Third this book is directed at a certain kind of American reader (ie: Council on Foreign Relations member). This isn’t a bad thing – but it does restrict the usefulness that non-Americans will get from it. For example, while Canadian readers will get much out of the diagnosis of the problems that the authors identify (the willingness of international actors to subvert economic ends to state interest and challenges for recognizing and deal with it) the solutions are all directed towards the United States. Again, I do not think this is entirely a bad thing, but non-American readers should go in realizing this. The subtitle “Geoeconomics and Statecraft” should read “Geoeconomics and American Statecraft”.
Finally, while we’re on the topic, it’s interesting to note how little attention Canada gets in the book. We are the United States second largest trading partner (20%+, representing 35 states) and a major source of energy, and an ideological ally (at least pre-Trump). https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/am... There is a suggestion that NAFTA should be updated and revitalized but no real plan on how to do this. The emphasis in the book is almost entirely on how to deal with rivals and not empower or work with allies, other than the now sans-US TPP (or TPP-11).
Overall, however, I did learn from this book and I am actively considering using the chapter on the history of US geoeconomics in my International Security class. It’s a fast read and although it can sometimes be repetitive, the authors have made it very clear about what their key points and policy prescriptions are.
December 28, 2019
Target audience :
Congressional committees
SES in DOD, DOS
The arguments presented read like motivational prompts to decision-makers rather than a compelling description of a "new normal". The appeal to bring back economic statecraft is tinged with Cold War inferences that are out of sync with the interdependent properties of the post-Cold War global economic landscape. The threats implied are simultaneously specific and vague, leading to the sense that the authors are relying on confirmation bias and/or nascent fear rather than a response to a clear, linear threat. The title then is click-bait for sales, but the content is clearly not for the general audience beyond the Beltway.
Bottom line: if you aren't in a policy circle, find a summary/solicited review and read chapter 9 in full.
Henry Farrell, et al's paper, "Weaponized Interdependence" is the better read. It delivers clarity, objectivity, and a view from without that highlights salient factors in the dual-purpose use of networks built under liberal institutional principles.
Congressional committees
SES in DOD, DOS
The arguments presented read like motivational prompts to decision-makers rather than a compelling description of a "new normal". The appeal to bring back economic statecraft is tinged with Cold War inferences that are out of sync with the interdependent properties of the post-Cold War global economic landscape. The threats implied are simultaneously specific and vague, leading to the sense that the authors are relying on confirmation bias and/or nascent fear rather than a response to a clear, linear threat. The title then is click-bait for sales, but the content is clearly not for the general audience beyond the Beltway.
Bottom line: if you aren't in a policy circle, find a summary/solicited review and read chapter 9 in full.
Henry Farrell, et al's paper, "Weaponized Interdependence" is the better read. It delivers clarity, objectivity, and a view from without that highlights salient factors in the dual-purpose use of networks built under liberal institutional principles.
March 5, 2018
In the introduction to this book the authors identify the biggest challenge for the US if it is to flex more geoeconomic muscle. America is the champion of the rules-based international order, which forswears the type of arbitrariness relied upon by Russia and China in their pursuit of geoeconomic leverage. So how can the US respond to these adversaries in kind, without undermining the international order which it has maintained - at great benefit to itself - for the last seventy years?
Unfortunately the book doesn’t really get around to answering this question. Instead the authors go into great detail about Chinese geoeconomic practices, then complain that US policymakers aren’t even engaging with options to respond on the same level, having decided a couple of decades ago that economics must be practiced according to its own logic and not subjected to external (and therefore distortionary) factors like foreign policy objectives.
I don’t know whether that’s a fair critique or not - I’m not American. But I thought the book would have been much stronger if it had grappled in more detail with how the US can practice geoeconomics while remaining loyal to the principles of the liberal international order.
Unfortunately the book doesn’t really get around to answering this question. Instead the authors go into great detail about Chinese geoeconomic practices, then complain that US policymakers aren’t even engaging with options to respond on the same level, having decided a couple of decades ago that economics must be practiced according to its own logic and not subjected to external (and therefore distortionary) factors like foreign policy objectives.
I don’t know whether that’s a fair critique or not - I’m not American. But I thought the book would have been much stronger if it had grappled in more detail with how the US can practice geoeconomics while remaining loyal to the principles of the liberal international order.
January 2, 2017
This book is a solid addition to the volume of economic policy literature. Blackwill and Harris provide a dense appeal for a greater role for the use of economic measures to advance foreign policy objectives, a term Blackwill and Harris term "geoeconomics". The first item to note is that the title is misleading. Only rarely do Blackwill and Harris talk about geoeconomics as a tool of war. Rather, they provide a survey of how Russia and China use economic measures as foreign policy tools, and then provide recommendations on how the United States could--and should--incorporate more economic measures as means to advance foreign policy goals rather than focus (almost) exclusively on military means to achieve foreign policy ends. Those who pick up this book anticipating how Washington could use geoeconomics in an actual war may be disappointed, though.
This book is dense, and the authors assume a solid knowledge of both the United States policymaking process as well as a general understanding of a host of economic issues, organizations, and markets. Blackwill and Harris end the book with numerous recommendations for ways for the United States to implement the use of geoeconomics, although some of these recommendations are, by their own measure, very hard to implement given the differing incentives of Congress and the White House in economic decisionmaking. Regardless, this book provides plenty of food for thought to anyone involved in geopolitics. I hope to see further papers by Blackwill and Harris that dive deeper into recommended tactics, as well as comparative studies, such as why the policies they appear to advocate for use against Iran would be effective while similar policies levied against North Korea appear to not have had the intended outcome.
This book is dense, and the authors assume a solid knowledge of both the United States policymaking process as well as a general understanding of a host of economic issues, organizations, and markets. Blackwill and Harris end the book with numerous recommendations for ways for the United States to implement the use of geoeconomics, although some of these recommendations are, by their own measure, very hard to implement given the differing incentives of Congress and the White House in economic decisionmaking. Regardless, this book provides plenty of food for thought to anyone involved in geopolitics. I hope to see further papers by Blackwill and Harris that dive deeper into recommended tactics, as well as comparative studies, such as why the policies they appear to advocate for use against Iran would be effective while similar policies levied against North Korea appear to not have had the intended outcome.
October 1, 2016
Blackwill outlines a pressing case for re-evaluating and updating the American foreign relations toolkit. New geopolitical realities and increasingly challenging powers such as China and Russia represent a critical threat to American national interests in Eurasia and Asia. They, and other challengers to American global primacy, have become adept at projecting power by means other than military, primarily through geoeconomics. American statesmen were once adepts at using both military and geoeconomic tools to project, reinforce, and promote the American interest. Unfortunately, a philosophical shift and American domestic politics have both cause US policy makers to sour on the potential of geoeconomics. Meanwhile, through state capitalist and neo-mercantilist policies, the challengers to a liberal, democratic, capitalists order have developed geoeconomic tools that do not play by rule-based paradigms. If the US is to continue lead the international order, it must re-adopt geoeconomic strategies, re-assess the prevalence of military based strategies, and reaffirm and more aggressively pursue the national interest.
April 21, 2020
The title harkens back to Clausewitz, Diplomacy by other means. And for the most part the authors limit their purview to economics as a direct diplomatic tool. Like Nye who argued that economic power played a level in the 3D chessboard, economic power is important to geoeconomics.
However, they move away from the soft power carrot-on-a-Hill influence of economic power to their definition of geoeconomics which is intentionally using economic tools and power for specific diplomatic goals: Sanctions against bad behavior; loan guarantees for good behavior etc.
It’s all fine and dandy. But like everything else coached in exclusively realism comes off as lazy and all things for all people.
The number one issue with their analysis is that they largely gloss over the 40 year movement in the US to divorce economics from policy. One cannot use the market as a tool if one constantly has neoliberals who find government involvement anathema to economic freedom.
The number two issue is the 20 prescriptions they offer. Nevermind that 20 is an insane number... but they have them confused. The last one is to have geoeconomics studied in university. Such a movement requires years of infiltration by policy wonks. New wonks would be the ones who bring geoeconomics to the table, this should be #1.
The other side is the lack of cohesion in the prescriptions. #12 is to increase the energy (is fracking) revolution to use energy in the US favor. #13 is to meet the climate change challenge by working ameliorating climate change as a goal of geoeconomics. Wait...what? You can’t support fracking and hope to reduce climate change.
Overall the book starts interesting but then loses steam largely in its own simplistic realist perspective. Indeed if you only have a hammer, all problems look like nails. This book tell you to add more things to the toolbox. It just might not be the most adept at using your new wrench in the real world.
However, they move away from the soft power carrot-on-a-Hill influence of economic power to their definition of geoeconomics which is intentionally using economic tools and power for specific diplomatic goals: Sanctions against bad behavior; loan guarantees for good behavior etc.
It’s all fine and dandy. But like everything else coached in exclusively realism comes off as lazy and all things for all people.
The number one issue with their analysis is that they largely gloss over the 40 year movement in the US to divorce economics from policy. One cannot use the market as a tool if one constantly has neoliberals who find government involvement anathema to economic freedom.
The number two issue is the 20 prescriptions they offer. Nevermind that 20 is an insane number... but they have them confused. The last one is to have geoeconomics studied in university. Such a movement requires years of infiltration by policy wonks. New wonks would be the ones who bring geoeconomics to the table, this should be #1.
The other side is the lack of cohesion in the prescriptions. #12 is to increase the energy (is fracking) revolution to use energy in the US favor. #13 is to meet the climate change challenge by working ameliorating climate change as a goal of geoeconomics. Wait...what? You can’t support fracking and hope to reduce climate change.
Overall the book starts interesting but then loses steam largely in its own simplistic realist perspective. Indeed if you only have a hammer, all problems look like nails. This book tell you to add more things to the toolbox. It just might not be the most adept at using your new wrench in the real world.
November 20, 2018
The authors mesh geopolitics and economics in a useful, practical way that is never too heady. Their concept of geoeconomics seems to be a much more timely framework for understanding state aggression than more traditional models of geopolitics might be, although their geoeconomics is itself not a top-down framework like, say, defensive or offensive realism. A great book for those wanting to learn a way to interpret daily international news, which today almost always exists in an economic context and with economic vocabulary.
August 25, 2018
Geoeconomics is the use of economic tools to achieve geopolitical advantages. A major part of this book talks about the geoeconomics of China and the US. However, it also briefly talks about the geoeconomics of Russia, the Gulf states, India, E.U, Iran and Israel.
December 11, 2019
I found this book made me angry at times. Not at the authors; but at the world we live in.
The position taken by the authors is not new to me, nor do I find it's positions particularly controversial; namely that hegemonic state actors use power (financial, political, or military) to get what they want. This was always the case from any material reading of history. I also don't find it particularly controversial to state that as hegemonic power shifts, so does the relative leverage afforded by economic tools in the toolbox of state.
Money has been a hidden lever since it's invention, and it continues to be so used to this day. It is perhaps more honest to say that the illusion of normative international institutions (WTO, UN, WB, IMF) that characterized the mid-20th century have been exposed for what they are - tools to be used by their primary controlling parties. I would also challenge the view that the US has been complacent on this front; Iran and Cuba still feel the brunt of their economic sanctions. This book was a long walk to some simple truths.
The position taken by the authors is not new to me, nor do I find it's positions particularly controversial; namely that hegemonic state actors use power (financial, political, or military) to get what they want. This was always the case from any material reading of history. I also don't find it particularly controversial to state that as hegemonic power shifts, so does the relative leverage afforded by economic tools in the toolbox of state.
Money has been a hidden lever since it's invention, and it continues to be so used to this day. It is perhaps more honest to say that the illusion of normative international institutions (WTO, UN, WB, IMF) that characterized the mid-20th century have been exposed for what they are - tools to be used by their primary controlling parties. I would also challenge the view that the US has been complacent on this front; Iran and Cuba still feel the brunt of their economic sanctions. This book was a long walk to some simple truths.
September 25, 2018
When we think of traditional instruments of power—diplomatic, information, military and economic—it’s often the military we think while giving short shrift to the others. Yet in a multipolar world of rising powers, and although the US arguably exercises the strongest military muscle, it’s economic—specifically geoeconomic muscle—is uniquely positioned in currency and potential to outpace all competitions. At least that’s the thesis, and a compelling one at that, which Blackwill and Harris bring to the conversation. Drawing on extensive government experience and strong scholarship, they make a compelling case of strong US geoeconomy supported by other strong instruments. A great read needed in times such as these.
June 4, 2025
The book was quite interesting, however not without issues.
For starters, it was repeating itself at various points. I would have expected greater clarity from a former ambassador. The book would benefit from being structured into chapters explaining the thesis / concepts, and those focusing on specific case studies. While it does this somewhat, it should follow this structure explicitly. Alternatively, it could be significantly shorter and it would still make its point
Secondly, the edition I’ve got (ISBN 978-0-674-97979-6) had type setting that made it not pleasant to read. But this is no fault of the author.
Overall it was an interesting read and had a strong thesis, albeit it with some issues.
For starters, it was repeating itself at various points. I would have expected greater clarity from a former ambassador. The book would benefit from being structured into chapters explaining the thesis / concepts, and those focusing on specific case studies. While it does this somewhat, it should follow this structure explicitly. Alternatively, it could be significantly shorter and it would still make its point
Secondly, the edition I’ve got (ISBN 978-0-674-97979-6) had type setting that made it not pleasant to read. But this is no fault of the author.
Overall it was an interesting read and had a strong thesis, albeit it with some issues.
December 22, 2025
I learned a lot from this book despite it not being the most accessible text, which was likely driven mostly by the complexity of the subject. The geoeconomic means were often discussed absent clear explanations of the geopolitical ends trying to be achieved, which added to the confusion at times. But this book holds up remarkably well despite being a decade old, as I think many of the principles are timeless.
December 16, 2019
Very interesting overview of geoeconomic instruments and how modern nations use them. In addition, the last chapter or two goes over recommendations on what the US should do in terms of its geoeconomic strategy.
March 18, 2023
Thought-provoking explorations of the alternative means through which modern warfare is exploiting technology and economic instruments to subjugate international opponents. A chilling and often daunting read.
August 4, 2025
This was not my cup of tea. Very dense & intense. All good materials, but the book itself in 2025, had some good points, although the main focus on China is still somewhat relevant. Although I felt it was not as relevant as it could have been after COVID & the Trump economy.
July 7, 2019
An enlightening view on Geoeconomics that balances conceptualisation, history and practical examples of the phenomenon.
September 29, 2019
Serious book
November 21, 2019
If hadn't got a chance to pick this book, I wouldn't sure get the different picture of geo politics that prevail around the world. Thanks Robert!
January 9, 2020
Worth of information and insight. But starting in the middle it become dry since there’s a lot of jargon and repetitions.
June 17, 2020
In a world increasingly driven by economic power, the authors' analysis merits careful consideration!
April 8, 2022
DIME
Great snap shot of how nations leverage economic advantage / power to shape the world. Well researched and plenty of references. Even offers up a way ahead with 21 actions.
Great snap shot of how nations leverage economic advantage / power to shape the world. Well researched and plenty of references. Even offers up a way ahead with 21 actions.
April 6, 2023
Fantastic summary of geo-economic warfare. This book is a great read and very well reasoned.
Recommended.
Recommended.
May 15, 2025
Good introduction to the concept of geoeconomics
December 30, 2016
I will start out with a disclaimer that I am not the best person in the world to provide a review of a book regarding geoeconomics, but I will provide my observations, however pedestrian and uninformed they may be!
From the final chapter of the book: America’s problem today is that after many decades of being preoccupied with the security dimension of American foreign policy, Washington instinctively reaches for the military instrument when often it is largely or entirely irrelevant or inappropriate to the external challenge at hand.
'War by Other Means' proposes that the United States is not using all of the tools at its disposal in order to protect its interests around the globe, especially those of the economic variety. The author contends that the U.S. used to be quite adept at geoeconomics, but over the last 50+ years we have lost the touch. Consider the Louisiana Purchase, which doubled the size of the U.S. by buying the land from France; all done without firing a shot. Consider how the U.S. strong armed the British during the Suez Crisis by threatening to instigate the collapse of the British Pound. These were masterful uses of geoeconomics by the U.S.
However, during the 1960s and into the present, the U.S. has put its trust almost exclusively in political-military instruments while its geopolitical skills have atrophied to the point where sanctions is near the extent of our repertoire.
Consider, on the other hand, how the Chinese are presently using geoeconomics to punish (or reward) its neighbors. If a country recognizes Taiwanese sovereignty, it faces the loss of Chinese trade opportunities. If the Philippines gets out of line, its bananas, for example, are likely to rot on the pier.
The Russians are also masterful implementers of geoeconomics. They are ever ready to turn off the gas and oil spigots to parts of Europe that act contrary to the Kremlin's desires.
Although there were many aspects of the book that I struggled to get through (I am by no means an economist), it did get me to think about geoeconomics and how the U.S. would be benefitted by a more nuanced approach than just pushing the 'sanctions' button. The next-to-last chapter in the book has 20 recommendations from the author that would help put the U.S. in a better place.
The book provides many good real-world examples of how geoeconomics has been employed in the distant past and in recent memory.
Here is a link to a video of the author giving an address on his book to the Naval War College in June 2016. The first 40 minutes is the author providing a synopsis of his book. He covers many of the main points and would be a good overview if you chose not to read the book. (The final 20 minutes of the hour-long video is Q&A).
https://youtu.be/jEq9FPzoUTM
From the final chapter of the book: America’s problem today is that after many decades of being preoccupied with the security dimension of American foreign policy, Washington instinctively reaches for the military instrument when often it is largely or entirely irrelevant or inappropriate to the external challenge at hand.
'War by Other Means' proposes that the United States is not using all of the tools at its disposal in order to protect its interests around the globe, especially those of the economic variety. The author contends that the U.S. used to be quite adept at geoeconomics, but over the last 50+ years we have lost the touch. Consider the Louisiana Purchase, which doubled the size of the U.S. by buying the land from France; all done without firing a shot. Consider how the U.S. strong armed the British during the Suez Crisis by threatening to instigate the collapse of the British Pound. These were masterful uses of geoeconomics by the U.S.
However, during the 1960s and into the present, the U.S. has put its trust almost exclusively in political-military instruments while its geopolitical skills have atrophied to the point where sanctions is near the extent of our repertoire.
Consider, on the other hand, how the Chinese are presently using geoeconomics to punish (or reward) its neighbors. If a country recognizes Taiwanese sovereignty, it faces the loss of Chinese trade opportunities. If the Philippines gets out of line, its bananas, for example, are likely to rot on the pier.
The Russians are also masterful implementers of geoeconomics. They are ever ready to turn off the gas and oil spigots to parts of Europe that act contrary to the Kremlin's desires.
Although there were many aspects of the book that I struggled to get through (I am by no means an economist), it did get me to think about geoeconomics and how the U.S. would be benefitted by a more nuanced approach than just pushing the 'sanctions' button. The next-to-last chapter in the book has 20 recommendations from the author that would help put the U.S. in a better place.
The book provides many good real-world examples of how geoeconomics has been employed in the distant past and in recent memory.
Here is a link to a video of the author giving an address on his book to the Naval War College in June 2016. The first 40 minutes is the author providing a synopsis of his book. He covers many of the main points and would be a good overview if you chose not to read the book. (The final 20 minutes of the hour-long video is Q&A).
https://youtu.be/jEq9FPzoUTM
October 4, 2017
"Of the many mistaken distinctions between mercantilism and liberalism, however, the one that most hinders clear thinking about geoeconomics surfaces around the question of whether 'subservience of the economy to the state and its interests' differentiates the two doctrines. ... For early liberal economists ... a tendency to assume congruence across economic and political interests meant they seldom found themselves forced to choose between them." (quoting Robert Gilpin in Baldwin's "Economic Statecraft", 31)
"Today, seven economic tools are, at least in theory, suited to geopolitical application: trade policy, investment policy, economic and financial sanctions, cyber, aid, financial and monetary policy, and energy and commodities." (49)
"Forty years ago, 90 percent of all cross-border flows were trade-based; in 2014, 90 percent were financial." (53)
"Rather than obliging the Soviets [and their desire to develop their oil and gas industry in the early 1960s] and selling large quantities of piping, the United States orchestrated concerted opposition through COCOM[], through NATO, and via bilateral avenues with countries such as Japan. Exasperated, Khrushchev reportedly burst out to his advisors, 'Who the hell do these capitalists think they are, to believe that they can go around and not act like capitalists?'" (167)
"Today, seven economic tools are, at least in theory, suited to geopolitical application: trade policy, investment policy, economic and financial sanctions, cyber, aid, financial and monetary policy, and energy and commodities." (49)
"Forty years ago, 90 percent of all cross-border flows were trade-based; in 2014, 90 percent were financial." (53)
"Rather than obliging the Soviets [and their desire to develop their oil and gas industry in the early 1960s] and selling large quantities of piping, the United States orchestrated concerted opposition through COCOM[], through NATO, and via bilateral avenues with countries such as Japan. Exasperated, Khrushchev reportedly burst out to his advisors, 'Who the hell do these capitalists think they are, to believe that they can go around and not act like capitalists?'" (167)
January 28, 2017
An excellent overview of the use of economic means in the pursuit of geopolitical ends. The authors are recognized experts on international economic policy, but take care to heavily cite sources throughout.
My one complaint is that the end notes sometimes contained interesting notes and sometimes were simple citations, forcing the reader to flip back and forth to get a full commentary on issues by the authors.
My one complaint is that the end notes sometimes contained interesting notes and sometimes were simple citations, forcing the reader to flip back and forth to get a full commentary on issues by the authors.
January 30, 2017
Central thesis is the US despite having the most powerful economy on earth, too often reaches for the gun instead of the purse in pursue of grand strategy or the lack of it. It discusses in detail what China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have employed geo-economic tools in various forms in pursuit of national interests. Last but not least, it explain how, not what to think about geo-economics.
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