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Political Political Theory: Essays on Institutions
Political institutions are the main subject of political theory or they ought to be. Making the case with his trademark forcefulness and intellectual aplomb, Jeremy Waldron argues in favor of reorienting the theory of politics toward the institutions and institutional principles of modern democracy and the mechanisms through which democratic ideals are achieved.
Too many political theorists are preoccupied with analyzing the nature and importance of justice, liberty, and equality, at the cost of ignoring the governmental institutions needed to achieve them. By contrast, political scientists have kept institutions in view, but they deploy a meager set of value-conceptions in evaluating them. Reflecting on an array of issues about constitutional structure, Waldron considers the uses and abuses of diverse institutions and traditions, from separation of powers and bicameralism to judicial review of legislation, the principle of loyal opposition, the nature of representation, political accountability, and the rule of law. He refines his well-known argument about the undemocratic character of judicial review, providing a capacious perspective on the proper role of courts in a constitutional democracy, and he offers an illuminating critique of the contrasting political philosophies of Hannah Arendt and Isaiah Berlin.
Even if political theorists remain fixated on expounding the philosophical foundations of democracy, they need to complement their work with a firmer grasp of the structures through which democracy is realized. This is what political political theory means: theory addressing itself to the way political institutions frame political disagreements and orchestrate resolutions to our disputes over social ideals.
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Too many political theorists are preoccupied with analyzing the nature and importance of justice, liberty, and equality, at the cost of ignoring the governmental institutions needed to achieve them. By contrast, political scientists have kept institutions in view, but they deploy a meager set of value-conceptions in evaluating them. Reflecting on an array of issues about constitutional structure, Waldron considers the uses and abuses of diverse institutions and traditions, from separation of powers and bicameralism to judicial review of legislation, the principle of loyal opposition, the nature of representation, political accountability, and the rule of law. He refines his well-known argument about the undemocratic character of judicial review, providing a capacious perspective on the proper role of courts in a constitutional democracy, and he offers an illuminating critique of the contrasting political philosophies of Hannah Arendt and Isaiah Berlin.
Even if political theorists remain fixated on expounding the philosophical foundations of democracy, they need to complement their work with a firmer grasp of the structures through which democracy is realized. This is what political political theory means: theory addressing itself to the way political institutions frame political disagreements and orchestrate resolutions to our disputes over social ideals.
"
- GenresPoliticsPhilosophy
416 pages, Hardcover
Published March 7, 2016
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
August 4, 2021
If political theory concerns itself with three questions "(1) the individual virtues that good governance requires, (2) the political institutions that are needed in a good society composed of humans rather than angels, or (3) the ends and ideals that a good society should be seeking to promote" (p.3) then Waldron thinks that political philosophy since Rawls has focussed to much on the third question at the expense of the first two questions. This book discusses the second question - the question about political institutions. The main idea of the book is the legitimacy of the legislature. Waldron's general favour towards the legislature over the judiciary will be familiar with reader familiar with Waldron's critique of judicial review of legislation. He contends that the judiciary generally has no legitimate contribution to make in terms of determining whether legislation is consistent with a Bill of Rights. But Waldron also thinks that the separation of the legislature from the executive arm of government is an important part of its legitimacy and its contribution to the rule of law. Chapter 7 brings together some of the key ideas discussed throughout the book. Waldron explains how certain "procedural principles of legislation" as performed by the legislature, give legislation its legitimacy. These principles "concern the processes by which laws should be enacted, the question of who should participate in those processes, the spirit in which they should participate, and the various forms of care that should be taken with a process this important." (149)
Chapter 9 'The core of the case against judicial review' is perhaps the books most important chapter. The encroachment of the judiciary is an increasing problem in many countries and this chapter puts defenders of the judiciary on the back foot. The next chapter, Chapter 10, 'Five to Four: why do bare majorities Rule on Courts' is the most fun chapter. There, Waldron makes a mockery of those who contend that the judiciary is a counter-majoritarian institution. I didn't much enjoy the final two chapter on Berlin and Arendt but I don't like biography at the best of time and I was probably getting tired of Waldron's line of argument which is always a issue with a book of essays that collect the writings of an author on a unified topic.
I have recently reread Joseph Heath's excellent book 'The Machinery of Government" where he makes a case for the legitimacy of the executive based not on its democratic legitimacy (c.f. the legislature) but its capacity and capability for solving problems. I have found reading Waldron alongside Heath extremely fruitful. The centrality of classical liberalism for thinking about the modern state is prominent in both works.
Chapter 9 'The core of the case against judicial review' is perhaps the books most important chapter. The encroachment of the judiciary is an increasing problem in many countries and this chapter puts defenders of the judiciary on the back foot. The next chapter, Chapter 10, 'Five to Four: why do bare majorities Rule on Courts' is the most fun chapter. There, Waldron makes a mockery of those who contend that the judiciary is a counter-majoritarian institution. I didn't much enjoy the final two chapter on Berlin and Arendt but I don't like biography at the best of time and I was probably getting tired of Waldron's line of argument which is always a issue with a book of essays that collect the writings of an author on a unified topic.
I have recently reread Joseph Heath's excellent book 'The Machinery of Government" where he makes a case for the legitimacy of the executive based not on its democratic legitimacy (c.f. the legislature) but its capacity and capability for solving problems. I have found reading Waldron alongside Heath extremely fruitful. The centrality of classical liberalism for thinking about the modern state is prominent in both works.
September 2, 2024
Chapters:
1. Political political theory
The book centers on institutions, like parliaments, separation of powers, judicial review, accountability, etc. not on the more often discussed philosophy of justice or abstract political theory.
2. Constitutionalism: a skeptical view
About the different meanings of "constitutionalism", if constitutions must be written, or why are they useful, etc.
3. Separation of powers and the rule of law
A dissection of what we mean by this. The separation of functions, the dispersal of power, checks and balances, bicameralism, federalism.
4. Bicameralism and the separation of powers
Why it's a good idea to have an Upper and Lower House and how can they be constructed.
5. The principle of loyal opposition
The role of the opposition in a democracy. To what exactly must the opposition be loyal to? The king? The nation? The rules of the game? The constitution? The essence of the constitution?
6. Representative lawmaking
What makes legislation, that is, lawmaking by a legislative assembly (not by judges or by the executive) attractive?
7. Principles of legislation
He proposes seven principles that concern procedure.
8. Accountability and insolence
The author distinguishes between "forensic" accountability and "agent" accountability. The second one "denotes the duty owed by an agent to his principal, whereby the principal may demand from the agent an account of the work that the agent has been doing in the principal's name or on the principal's behalf". The chapter is an examination of this concept in a political context, and its basis in transparency.
9. The core of the case against judicial review
Probably the most important chapter. He attacks the idea that the judges must have the power to strike down laws generally.
10. Five to four: why do bare majorities rule on courts
An attack of the idea that judicial review is a contra-majoritarian institution. Judges also disagree, and they use a majority rule when they do, but they have disadvantages that legislative assemblies do not have.
11. Isaiah Berlin's neglect of Enlightenment constitutionalism.
A scathing critique of Berlin, and a passionate defense of the Enlightment thinkers that came up with the ideas of constitutional democracy and saw the government as a complicated machine that had to be well designed to work well and last for a long time.
12. The constitutional politics of Hannah Arendt
A rescue of the thinking about institutions by Arendt, quite interesting.
The text is impressively clear given the very abstract concepts it has to deal with. Two very important concepts that I liked:
1. People disagree on profound philosophical questions about rights. Even if it sounds paradoxical, the best place to resolve this issues is in parliaments, not in constitutional courts (judges disagree too).
2. An anti-universalist thought by Hannah Arendt: the state is not suited for unlimited growth because the genuine consent at its base cannot be strechted indefinitely. I think this is false, but it interested me.
1. Political political theory
The book centers on institutions, like parliaments, separation of powers, judicial review, accountability, etc. not on the more often discussed philosophy of justice or abstract political theory.
2. Constitutionalism: a skeptical view
About the different meanings of "constitutionalism", if constitutions must be written, or why are they useful, etc.
3. Separation of powers and the rule of law
A dissection of what we mean by this. The separation of functions, the dispersal of power, checks and balances, bicameralism, federalism.
4. Bicameralism and the separation of powers
Why it's a good idea to have an Upper and Lower House and how can they be constructed.
5. The principle of loyal opposition
The role of the opposition in a democracy. To what exactly must the opposition be loyal to? The king? The nation? The rules of the game? The constitution? The essence of the constitution?
6. Representative lawmaking
What makes legislation, that is, lawmaking by a legislative assembly (not by judges or by the executive) attractive?
7. Principles of legislation
He proposes seven principles that concern procedure.
8. Accountability and insolence
The author distinguishes between "forensic" accountability and "agent" accountability. The second one "denotes the duty owed by an agent to his principal, whereby the principal may demand from the agent an account of the work that the agent has been doing in the principal's name or on the principal's behalf". The chapter is an examination of this concept in a political context, and its basis in transparency.
9. The core of the case against judicial review
Probably the most important chapter. He attacks the idea that the judges must have the power to strike down laws generally.
10. Five to four: why do bare majorities rule on courts
An attack of the idea that judicial review is a contra-majoritarian institution. Judges also disagree, and they use a majority rule when they do, but they have disadvantages that legislative assemblies do not have.
11. Isaiah Berlin's neglect of Enlightenment constitutionalism.
A scathing critique of Berlin, and a passionate defense of the Enlightment thinkers that came up with the ideas of constitutional democracy and saw the government as a complicated machine that had to be well designed to work well and last for a long time.
12. The constitutional politics of Hannah Arendt
A rescue of the thinking about institutions by Arendt, quite interesting.
The text is impressively clear given the very abstract concepts it has to deal with. Two very important concepts that I liked:
1. People disagree on profound philosophical questions about rights. Even if it sounds paradoxical, the best place to resolve this issues is in parliaments, not in constitutional courts (judges disagree too).
2. An anti-universalist thought by Hannah Arendt: the state is not suited for unlimited growth because the genuine consent at its base cannot be strechted indefinitely. I think this is false, but it interested me.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews