The Islamic State has stunned the world with its savagery, destructiveness, and military and recruiting successes. What explains the rise of ISIS and what does it portend for the future of the Middle East? In this book, one of the world's leading authorities on political Islam and jihadism sheds new light on these questions as he provides a unique history of the rise and growth of ISIS. Moving beyond journalistic accounts, Fawaz Gerges provides a clear and compelling account of the deeper conditions that fuel ISIS.
The book describes how ISIS emerged in the chaos of Iraq following the 2003 U.S. invasion, how the group was strengthened by the suppression of the Arab Spring and by the war in Syria, and how ISIS seized leadership of the jihadist movement from Al Qaeda. Part of a militant Sunni revival, ISIS claims its goals are to resurrect a caliphate and rid "Islamic lands" of all Shia and other minorities. In contrast to Al Qaeda, ISIS initially focused on the "near enemy"--Shia, the Iraqi and Syrian regimes, and secular, pro-western states in the Middle East. But in a tactical shift ISIS has now taken responsibility for spectacular attacks in Europe and other places beyond the Middle East, making it clear that the group is increasingly interested in targeting the "far enemy" as well. Ultimately, the book shows how decades of dictatorship, poverty, and rising sectarianism in the Middle East, exacerbated by foreign intervention, led to the rise of ISIS--and why addressing those problems is the only way to ensure its end.
An authoritative introduction to arguably the most important conflict in the world today, this is an essential book for anyone seeking a deeper understanding of the social turmoil and political violence ravaging the Arab-Islamic world.
A lot of solid information in here, but very dry and academic. If you only have time for one ISIS book, Black Flags (Warrick) is a far superior (read: readable) introduction to the story of ISIS. This one seemed like it may have been rushed into publication a few drafts early. Pretty messy structurally, a lot of repetition, topics changing tack mid-paragraph, etc etc. It did go a little more in-depth into a few topics like Julani's al-Nusra group in Syria and Maliki's time as PM of Iraq, which Black Flags kind of glossed over. So it has that going for it at least. Probably a good idea to read wide on a controversial subject like this to get the whole picture.
ISIS: A History is a strongly sourced, objective account of the rise, personnel, and characteristics of the world's most infamous terrorist group. It's also a poorly edited mass that requires a lot of prior knowledge of the field, and could use at least two more passes to find some actual structure.
Gerges investigates the continuity and change between ISIS and previous Jihadi groups, like Al Qaeda in Iraq. ISIS focuses on the "near enemy" of Shiites and insufficiently devout Sunnis instead of the "far enemy" of the US and the Israel. Thanks to a complete collapse in State authority caused by the Syrian Civil War and Iraq's corrupt and sectarian government, ISIS expanded from a hunted band to a Caliphate dominating millions of people in a medieval nightmare. Gerges and his graduate assistants do the best possible job tracing the rise of ISIS's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi from the propaganda, but the man is still largely a cipher.
Gerges describes ISIS as theocratic plagiarists, making little advancement to Salafi-Jihadist thinking, but he doesn't really explain what that thinking is, or the importance of establishing of the Caliphate in the kind of utopian Muslim thinking that characterizes Jihad. From a conventional polisci perspective, it's true that ISIS provides basic government services (water, sewage, schools, police, etc) in areas that Iraq and Syria have abandoned, but the same could be said of the Taliban, and the Taliban hasn't attracted tens of thousands of foreign fighters, or routed professional armies. Gerges claims that ex-Baathist officers in the upper ranks contributed to ISIS taking Mosul, but I need more evidence for strategic thinking from the people who brought you the Iraq-Iran War.
Obviously, there's a lot about ISIS that is simply unknowable to the West, because of their tendency to behead journalists and other outsiders. But I found Graeme Wood's 2015 article in The Atlantic a much more coherent introduction to the organization, that if less detailed, is far more revealing.
ISIS: A History which was interesting enough but covered in another book I got through Defeating Isis, Nance, didn't have alot on tactics or battle systems employed anyway good enough for overall names and dates of prominent leaders, and settings and background from Isis more academic in its leanings so was fairly heavy going in parts. Anyway learnt more about the whole messy affair motives stands out surely something is missing but that's it for now.
This book is about 7 years old as of this writing. At that time ISIS was on the rise. I have not followed what has happened to ISIS since that time, but this book has done a real good job of following the history and chaotic leadership of the organization. This book is straightforward and avoids sensationalism. Very helpful.
"At the zenith of its power in 2001, the membership of bin Laden’s Al Qaeda was around one thousand fighters. In contrast, Baghdadi had a mini-army of between thirty thousand and one hundred thousand members controlling a de facto state roughly the size of the United Kingdom. By becoming the major beneficiary of the breakdown of state institutions in the Fertile Crescent, IS, together with like-minded Al Qaeda factions, was able to hijack people’s calls for freedom, justice, and dignity and turn popular as well as intellectual opinions against the Arab Spring uprisings."
This wasn't the easiest read: not so much the subject matter - Gerges avoids any gratutious descriptions of violence - but because the book has a semi-thematic, semi-chronological organising structure, which I found difficult to follow, and because it is a little ranty at times. I mean, you can forgive anyone being a bit ranty about ISIS, don't get me wrong. This is fundamentally (heh) a depressing story of two nations degenerating into repression and violence. The book was substantially written before 2017, and then recently updated since the military defeats of ISIS. The new material is primarily in the introduction and the lengthy epilogue, and there are some strange inconsistencies as a result (Abu Bakr al Baghdadi's tense jumps around). But Gerges' analysis holds up, so mostly it works. This analysis is largely that ISIS' distinguishing features were its willingness to use violence against Muslims, it's oppositional focus on the Shi'a, its attempts to form a Caliphate - even without state power - and the use of flamboyant cruelty, such as beheadings. It's success was a combination of these things - the idealism of the Caliphate mixed with a ruthless willingness to murder/eliminate all internal opponents or ideological alternatives - combined with a focus on recruiting working and destitute Sunni peoples. He argues that many in Syria and Mosul supported ISIS simply because they fixed power and water, and established civil services when these had been long abandoned. This wasn't necessarily what I expected from accounts I've read of survivors from Raqqa and other occupied cities, which have indicated that terror was ever-present living under ISIS, but experiences change over time, so this may have been more so in the early days. Or the other issue may be that most of what I have read is written by women, and women are remarkably absent from this narrative. Gerges rarely - quite possibly never - mentions gender. But the reality is that ISIS fighters, who make up the bulk of the supporters he discusses, were overwhelmingly male, and the women who joined ISIS had very different experiences. This felt like a big gap in the book, and I would suggest that readers think of supplementing this with Azedah Moaveni's Guest House for Young Widows, for example. But despite those complaints, this is a thorough look at ISIS and the personalities who created and maintained it, and is particularly strong in examining the relationship between Al Qaida and ISIS.
the first is that ISIS can be seen as an extension of AQI, which was itself a creature of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and its aftermath. By destroying state institutions, the invasion reinforced popular divisions along ethnic and religious rather than national lines, creating an environment that was particularly favorable for the implantation and expansion of groups such as AQI and ISIS. Second, the fragmentation of the post Sadam Hussein political establishment and its incapacity to articulate policies that emphasized the country's national identity further nourished inter-communal distrust, thus deepening and widening and Sunni-Shia divide. Thirdly, the breakdown of state institutions in Syria and the country's descent into a full flown war is a significant factor in the revitalization of ISIS. Finally, ISIS could not have consolidated the gains it made with the Syrian war without the derailment of the Arab Spring uprisings and the consequent spreading fires in neighboring Arab countries.
The US-led invation and occupation of Iraq in 2003, cobined with the subsequent social turmoil and prolonged and costly armed resistance, led to the dismantling of state institutions and the establishment of a political system based on muhasasa, or the distribution of the spoils of power along communal, ethnic, and tribal lines.
ISIS thrives among poor, disenfranchised Sunni communities, including those in the Fallujah, Tikrit and Anbar regions in Iraq; the al-Raqqa province and Deir al-Zour in Syria; Akkar, Tripoli, and the Bekka Valley in Lebanon; and Maan and Zarqa in Jordan. The lower-class background of ISIS's combatants explains why the organization justifies its actions as a defense of the poor and disfranchised as well as why it targets areas with natural and raw resources.
The 2003 US led invasion and occupation of Iraq caused a rupture in an already fractured Iraqi society. America's destruction of Iraqi institutions, particularly its dismantling of the army and the Baathist ruling party, unleashed a fierce power struggle, mainly along sectarian lines, creating fissures in society.
US was aware of Maliki's rising authoritarianism but continued to publicly support him. The document describes Maliki as paranoid and outlines how his decisions and policies produced increasing centralization of power in the hands of an inner circle of Shia Islamist at the expense of the formal chain of command. It even goes as far as to warn that Maliki was following in the footsteps of Hussin.
Of all the factors fueling ISIS's resurgence, the inability of the coalition and the Iraqi political establishment to put forward an inclusive national project and rebuild the political landscape tops the list. Rather than moving away from the political authoritarianism and cult of personality that epitomized the Hussin years, the political class that inherited the spoils failed to end factionalism and social fragmentation. Even those Iraqis who cooperated with the US forces and the Iraqi government against AQI were aligned along sectarian lines.
The rule elite didn't take a series measure to fill the vacuum left by de-Bathification, particularly in terms of redefining the identity of the new Iraq. Within this vacuum of ideas and social chaos, which intensified because of the dismantling of Iraq's security institutions and armed resistance, there hardly existed a nationalist vision to replace the old regime's, no unifying symbol that would galvanize Iraqis as a whole.
Initially, the large-scale popular uprising in Syria was socially and politically driven, originating in rural areas -like Dara'a - that were hit hard by years of drought and a decade of neo-liberal policies that siphoned resources away from the pressed agrarian sector toward the tertiary sector.
From the late 1980s until the outbreak of the revolutionary uprising in 2011, the Syrian regime forged capital networks that allied business elites from the country's large cities with state officials, thus transforming the country, in a twenty-year period, from a state-controlled to a capitalist economy characterized by cronyism.
sectarianism is the fuel that has powered the ISIS surge. Fundamentally, ISIS utilizes identity as the driving force for the movement and its expansion, expressed through a narrow-minded and intolerant Salafi-jihadist ideology.
This entails addressing legitimate Sunni grievances through the reconstruction of the state based on the rule of law, citizenship, and inclusiveness, not sect, ethnicity and tribe.
A decent, mostly up-to-date (2016) book about ISIS - its origins, its future, its internal challenges and its tenuous place on the world stage. I was pleasantly surprised by the author's fairly confident scepticism about the violent jihadist organisation's lasting impact - usually you get a pretty grim, ambiguous and worrying picture from those more informed about them. All the same, this was not a good as I'd hoped it would be. To be honest, I found a lot of it kind of dry and, with all the crazy yet similar-sounding names of key individuals and their labyrinthine connections, I lost track of what the hell was going on. Gerges also kind of got on my nerves by using certain cliches and expressions way too much - for some reason, he always, always quotes the "hearts and minds" slogan to the point that I was left scratching my head. To be honest, most historians or geopolitical commentators use that particular "Bushism" sparingly, and almost always ironically. It was used earnestly, again and again, by this guy. It's a small pet peeve, but there were other things - cliched expressions or figures of speech - he deployed excessively too.
Not a bad book, of course. I still liked it fine. But I'd hesitate to really recommend it as I'm sure there are better, more enjoyable books out there. If "enjoyable" is the right term to use when you're talking about these lunatics.
Generally, this is a very good book to read if you are interested in learning about the history and rise of ISIS away from catchy headlines and dubious website articles. Gerges knows his stuff--he provides a rich and detailed account of key characters and movements in ISIS' history while also acknowledging where the facts can be shaky. My criticism of this book is that it perhaps spends too much time on the personal examination of each key character (like Zarqawi), which can be tiresome and may give the impression that the entire development of ISIS fell completely on their shoulders. However, these personal insights to people like Zarqawi and Baghdadi provide useful knowledge if you have only ever heard of their names floating around the Internet. Putting a story and a face to those names gives historical context.
Fawaz Gerges makes so many interesting and strong arguments about ISIS in this book. But wow! His writing style and structure are terrible. Unlike some of the ratings on this book that I’ve read, I didn’t find the writing in book to be overly academic or inaccessible. Rather, Gerges crams too many arguments and fails to go into enough depth in this work. He often repeats his specific arguments, especially in the introduction. I can only imagine how much better this book would be as ‘a history’ if he had a better editor and wrote an expanded version (800+ pages).
A Definitive Account of the Ultimate Terror Regime
The Middle East lies decimated by concurrent wars spanning four decades. The list is long: the Soviet-Afghan travesty, the Iran-Iraq War, civil war in Lebanon, the Gulf War, the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Yemen, the Syrian crisis, and the ever-volatile Israeli-Palestinian conflict. All of these catastrophes combined to create a black hole in the region, sucking the life from villages, cities, nation-states, and economies. The result is a geopolitical quagmire spanning thousands of square miles. In this history of violence’s wake, the jihadi-terror group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) rose and conquered on a scale not seen since World War II. Who are these people? Why are they wreaking such havoc? What happens next?
Political scholar Fawaz A. Gerges takes bold and timely maneuvers to dissect these and other questions in his 2016 ISIS: A History. The book documents the origins and motivations of nihilistic 21st-century crusaders. Gerges skillfully covers the complex strands of their roots, rise, ideology, leaders, and tireless quest for the blood of so-called infidels. The author knows that if we are to successfully counter this powerful dark force, our “challenge is to provide hope to the millions...who called for justice, freedom...while simultaneously convincing them that there are nonviolent options” delivering positive change. “Until we do,” Gerges concedes, “the menace...will remain a problem for the Arab-Islamic world and for the international community.” With ISIS: A History, Gerges is providing a vital step toward completing that challenge.
Indeed, and the motives of ISIS are unambiguous. Theirs is a world painted in black and white, where “you’re either with us, or you’re dead” is the unspoken battle cry. Fittingly, Gerges begins with two chapters detailing the birth of ISIS ideology and the growth of its leaders. He portrays the Salafi-jihadist movement as one that enforces a “narrow, strict, and obsolete textualist reading of Islamic doctrine.” Their guiding principles incorporate the belligerent rules of seventh-century Arabia into a 21st-century, geopolitical, and technological paradox.
Gerges writes with an urgency so sharp and driving, some readers may become numb by the fourth and fifth chapters.The numbness is not a yawning kind, but one wrought by shock and repulsion. The chapters diligently explain the intricacies of jihadi-leader infighting, culminating in what amounts to a civil war within civil wars. Leaders like Al Qaeda's Zarqawi give way to incrementally more brutal and extreme sociopaths, as found in ISIS’s current chief dictator Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi. The discussion of Al Qaeda Central and ISIS leadership evolution, and power-plays within ideological extremities, is so compellingly composed readers may forget they are being subjected to the analytics of the most terrifying humans in modern history.
An excellent example of the author’s deft writing style comes in chapter five, “Baathists and ISIS Jihadists,” where former Iraqi soldiers caution the author against hasty judgment and simplification of a complex ordeal: “The story is familiar: America’s invasion and occupation of Iraq and its swift disbanding of the military turned patriotic and proud army officers to armed resistance and underground subversion. Years of prolonged fighting and incarceration in US-run prisons radicalized some these officers” and led them to ISIS.
Building on this account, Gerges’ major theme begins to solidify, and it encompasses much more than disgruntled army officers. Al Qaeda Central, and soon to follow, ISIS, were able to capitalize on the utter despair of Sunni groups in war-torn Iraq and Syria. The dissolution of institutions and livelihoods, massive unemployment, large youth populations, and the near-shredding of social fabrics in the two nations created ripe conditions for ISIS recruitment. Gerges sees these conditions rooted in the morass of the 2003 US-led invasion and its aftermath; and the Assad regime’s horrific pursuit of its opposition. As Gerges summarizes later in the book, “ISIS offers these unemployed, alienated, disenfranchised, and religiously confused Muslims, a higher cause to fight for and a more promising life under the self-proclaimed caliphate.”
Gerges’ most invested argument comes in chapter seven, “Misappropriating the Arab Spring Uprisings.” The author’s lament of Arabia’s aborted collective demand for a life of deserved dignity is cast in disappointment with the liberal academic and political class’ failure to recognize the movement as a legitimate groundswell of peaceful revolution. Instead, “Arab commentators and civil society leaders, along with many in the West, now refer to the Arab Spring as the Arab Winter, comparing this moment in history to a virus and a curse.” Gerges goes on to note both the political left and right devised a conspiratorial view in framing the uprisings and their demise. These conspiracies, whether they be borne of Western or regional actors like Turkey and Saudi Arabia, relieve the autocrats of their responsibility of stoking sectarian divide and prolonging poverty among the people.
Chapter seven also provides a welcomed cooling-off point in a book that otherwise delivers a white-hot pitch of information about Earth’s most shocking human force. But it is all necessary information. Overall, ISIS: A History is a straightforward, moderate read for most university-level and popular nonfiction consumers. However, it is often difficult to keep tabs on the extensive and diverse Arabic names mentioned throughout the text. A listing and brief annotation of these players and places inserted before the endnotes section would assist readers. Another shortcoming is the complete absence of geographic maps. Gerges’ editors dropped the ball on these two deficiencies. Further, readers less-attuned to academic density might be squeamish with paragraphs spanning pages, but the writer’s composition is measured and focused.
ISIS: A History marks a fascinating turn in investigative journalism. The author’s citations rely heavily on internet sources, and he is not above crediting Twitter feeds as valuable insight. No doubt, these precarious attribution techniques will soon be common practice among scholars and established journalists alike. Gerges often inserts himself in the text, indicating a reflexivity all too absent from scholarly work. Cumulatively, these methods in no way diminish credibility. On the contrary, they prove necessary for a timely subject, and one that Gerges knows through first-hand experience. He was born in Lebanon during an early war there, and exiled during the bloody sectarian Civil War in the late-1970s. The scholar spent five years conducting field research on social movements and jihadist groups in the Middle East. He is currently Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
For anyone who finds Arab politics confusing and the rise of terrorism concerning, this book goes a long way toward disentangling these matters. The author's comfort with complexity and nuance is helpful. He describes the evolution of Salafist jihadism--a particularly violent and fanatical strand of Islam that declares war not only in the West but on anyone following more moderate forms of the Islamic faith. He provides careful studies of the series of self-proclaimed, thug leaders who have kept this brand of jihad alive and growing for the past decade. Drawing from scholarly and journalistic sources, as well as his own interviews with dozens of Arabs, Gerges dispassionately dissects the Salafist genius for appealing to -- and recruiting -- members of the most disenfranchised segments of Arab society to commit suicide missions and genocide. He ends on a grim note--noting the Salafist movement will endure so long as Arab countries leave millions to live in economic oppression under leaders who fail to offer alternative ideas of hope and empowerment. He calls for a separation of mosque and state as a key precondition for a better result.
4.5 stars. A truly comprehensive primer on ISIS. This book places ISIS in historical perspective, explaining the roots of various Salafi interpretations of Islam and the groups that have been promoting them, the impact of colonial activities in the Middle East, the inter-relatedness of different extremist and terrorist groups, the unintended consequences of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the impetus and aftermath of the Arab Spring (including the destabilization of the power balance in that part of the world). The book also includes detailed analysis and explanation of the worldviews of key players in ISIS, ISIS's goals, how it interacts with local populations, and an evaluation of its long-term prospects, weaknesses, and lasting footprint on global affairs. Sobering and densely packed with information, an excellent place to start if trying to get a deeper understanding of ISIS and world events.
Incredibly dense, immensely thorough and painfully comprehensive, ISIS: A History is not only a history of ISIS itself but a measured, well researched argument on the domino effect of decades of multiple crises that have compounded despair in an area continuously bereft of hope.
I admit total ignorance when I first picked up this book (it's why I picked up ths book) and so the book itself cannot receive full marks because I can't be sure of the legitimacy of all of Gerges' claims. What I can say is that while dense and often complicated, Gerges attempts here are admirable: 50+ pages of notes from varying sources, multiple insights on varying perspectives, the inclusion of counterarguments are all a testament to Gerges' credibility.
I think previous people have said it best. 1. This book is as non-biased as you can get. 2. It's dry. 3. It feels like it could have been edited down more. 4. It feels like it was rushed to print.
Beyond that it's a solid history of what we live with today in our world. If you want to know all there is to know about ISIS this is the book. But you should have some prior knowledge of Islam and what is a Sunni and Shia and the history behind the division.
Though it was a good book I doubt I'll ever read it again.
The analysis is very good but the structure and writing is intolerable. Apparently there was no editing done as it is a mess of long, ungainly paragraphs that shift content and topics. Boring and repetitious in a number of spots. Good material but the delivery should have been assigned to someone more facile with prose.
There is always a danger, when writing a book about current affairs, that the content will be overtaken by events. In principle that ought to be the case with a book on ISIS, the self-styled Islamic State, given the group’s rapid loss of the territory that it had seized in Iraq and Syria. However, not only is the new paperback edition of Fawaz Gerges’s study of ISIS an update of the 2016 edition but it is, as the title states, a history, and therefore more concerned about where ISIS came from rather than where it might be going. The book’s great advantage over more journalistic works that have appeared over the past couple of years is that the author relies mainly on Arabic-language sources as well as interviews with men – and they are mainly men – who hold various types of Islamist believes. Islamism, as opposed to Islam, is a political ideology based on a conservative yet radical interpretation of selective texts from the Koran and the hadith, the reported sayings, actions or habits of the Prophet Mohammad. Most mainstream Muslims – Sunni and Shia alike – are quick to denounce ISIS as being alien to Islam, but there is no denying that its leaders and followers self-identify as being true believers, while decrying all others, including other Muslims, as meriting death because of their failure to embrace the “truth”. Gerges helpfully analyses different strands of Islamist thinking, placing ISIS firmly within the Salafist Sunni spectrum, albeit at an extreme end. Moreover, two of the most important recruiting grounds for ISIS fighters and supporters have been among poor, marginalised Sunni communities – farm labourers, café waiters and the like – and former Iraqi army officers from Iraq’s Sunni minority who were disbanded and sent home by the American occupying forces in 2003, later being further excluded from public life and gainful livelihoods by Nouri al-Maliki’s Shia-dominated government. Shia critics of ISIS, not least the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, often accuse the Americans of “creating” ISIS. Objectively, they did play an indirect and probably unintentional role in that process. But the sectarian politics of al-Maliki, backed by gross abuses of human rights by Baghdad government forces and Shia militia, were more directly to blame. It is clear from reports from Mosul and Tikrit that some of Saddam Hussain’s former army officers were welcomed by ISIS with open arms. Moreover, their experience of crushing dissent in Ba’athist Iraq proved useful in enforcing Islamic State’s harsh rule. For many Westerners, the most difficult thing to comprehend about ISIS is its barbarism. The filmed execution of foreign captives, the sexual enslavement of Yazidi women and throwing gay men off the top of high buildings are just some of the most egregious examples. Undoubtedly terror is used by ISIS as an instrument of control, but the group’s ideologues “justify” it through their perverse interpretation of religious texts. Nonetheless, it is very clear from Gerges’s book that the self-declared Caliph of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – perhaps, but not definitely, killed last year – is or was a psychopath, for whom the torture and killing of unbelievers was deeply satisfying.
The other reviews are spot on when they state that this book is horribly unstructured. Gerges presents a lot of great facts but he does so by confusingly jumping all over the place. I highly recommend choosing Black Flags by Joby Warrick, if you are to choose only one book on ISIS.
Additionally, many people felt that this book seemed unbiased but I had a very different opinion. While America undoubtedly served as a catalyst to certain events surrounding ISIS, I felt that Gerges had an agenda to assign as much blame as possible to the U.S. Additionally, he seemed to frequently speak well one of one political party while casting the other in a poor light. Having no previous idea of how Gerges aligned politically, a quick Google search confirmed that he is quite vocally supportive of one side and it comes through in his book. An unfortunate fact when presenting supposed historical facts.
One such example of assigning too much blame: "The social turmoil caused by the US-led invasion, particularly the destruction of state institutions, triggered a deep sectarian divide between Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims and propelled the rise of ISIS from an inconsequential non-state actor to an Islamic state." (p. 12)
...Deep sectarian divides between Sunnis and Shias have existed since the death of Muhammad. The invasion may have served as a catalyst that furthered those divides, but Gerges makes many such accusations which in my opinion have a tone bent on assigning as much blame as possible on the U.S. That being said, this is just my opinion and either way I feel more informed having read Gerges book.
Of all the books on ISIS--which story is not yet finished, but we may be forgiven for hoping it is largely finished--this is in my opinion the best. Try to find the 2017 new paperback edition. F. Gerges--who is also often seen on Al Jazeera and other new channels, lately, talking about Syria, etc.--teaches in London. What I admire about this work (and I also used it in recent graduate work) is its ability to look at the growth of jihadi and fundamentalist movements in a system-wide (i.e. throughout the Middle East), comprehensive way. There are several books on ISIS and related movements, including W. McCants' somewhat breathless 2015 "The ISIS Apocalypse," Political Scientist Glenn E. Robinson's "Global Jihad" (2020), and others, but Gerges' work is so far superior to these. One example: only Gerges finds the very interesting quote from Usama bin Laden in a letter unearthed after the raid that resulted in his death, in which he says (I paraphrase), "Perhaps we shouldn't be so anxious to declare the establishment of the caliphate, since experience has shown that when we do so, the US comes and crushes it." In other words, the fundamentalists should bide their time. Of course, when writing on a topic of this kind, the danger is that your work will quickly become obsolete, but I still recommend this book. And anything current Dr. Gerges comes up with. Enjoy.
Essential reading. In the highest rank of book I could possibly award. Its scope, depth, sourcing and methodology are of a caliber which creates a simply unbeatable work. The fact is compounded by the absolutely baffling ability of the author to predict with wild accuracy the impact of ISIS and the fate’s of ISIS leaders. In one famous passage, four years before Al Baghdadi’s demise and with no indication that it would happen whatsoever, he remarks that it is inconsequential to the inevitable downfall of the caliphate, yet that the idea would survive and spread. Almost pinpoint accuracy. The sectarian element, as well as the many western myths about ISIS are laid bare and replaced with their inconvenient truths, not with anger, but with fully undue grace. I have not yet seen very many authors with as perfect a grasp on their subject as Mr. Gerges has upon this.
There are plenty of conspiracy theories about how the Islamic State was formed. For example, a popular belief among the Malay-Muslim community here in Singapore and Malaysia, is that the Islamic State was formed by Israel. Fawaz A. Gerges cuts through the clutter of daft, uneducated opinions like these, and taps on primary accounts from journalists, academics, and security personnel on the ground in Iraq and Syria, to form a comprehensive picture of how the militant group came about, including the origins of its elusive founder, Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi. He has also quite clearly explained the differences between Salafi-Jihadists ideologies proliferating today, and how these are expected to evolve in the coming years.
written overall as a history thus far of the ISIS movement this does make for an interesting read but is much more scholarly in tone and perhaps a little harder to engage with than other books I'd picked up on this topic over the last year.
One area I did feel that this book gave a particularly interesting account of is the relationship between ISIS and Al-Qaeda and how this is actually a much more fractured dynamic than many might expect.
for anyone highly interested in the topic this is worth reading but for anyone wanting to just pick up a book on the topic to quickly come to grips with matters I fear this might not be the one for you.
The topic is actual. The book is objective. It's too academic, even a bit distant. Probably not the best read on ISIS, but provides a thorough exploration into the reasons of the rise and eventual fall of ISIS.
In summary: ISIS is created through the chaos in Iraq in the wake of US botched intervention and they never really moved past the superficial religious jihadism to create actual alternative governance structures for the people. Popularity is easy to come by, but hard to maintain, once your people get a glimpse behind the scenes.
Excellent short history of ISIS. It does a great job of explaining how they formed out of Al Qaeda and evolved into the most dangerous Islamic terrorist organization in the world. I also very much liked how it explained the Salifi Jihadist ideology and cleared up several misconceptions of both their ideology and why they managed to attain power. Unfortunately, it is a bit outdated, but with something ongoing that's not surprising. It would be nice to read a follow up that covers ISIS after the Liberation of Raqqa by SDF and their recent activities in South Asia.
This book is informative about ISIS, its worldview, and the sociopolitical circumstances that allowed it to grow and thrive.
This book is also very repetitive, and it’s very repetitive of surface-level conclusions without going further into detail about these conclusions. Gerges wrote a great and informative piece, but it needs to be either much shorter or much more detailed. 306 pages with this much repetition is just too much.
I recommend this book if you want a solid explainer on ISIS. But it’s a dry one.
While the writer is very informed about the topic, the narrative is very confused. The problem is to understand origins of Isis we need to go back to history of Islam is itself. The author starts at a point at the cusp of Al Qaeda and Isis. Now it is become a bit hard read when you start at this point. It’s a good book to know the history but a difficult read. I hope the author learns from Michael Lewis or James Glieck Or even Walter Isaacson who write with a good narrative.
Izuzetno zanimljiva knjiga koja opisuje okolnosti u kojima je ISIS nastao i što je te na koji način utjecalo na jednu od najvećih sigurnosnih prijetnja danas. Autor detaljno opisuje ideologiju tj. manjak iste na kojoj počiva ISIS, odnose između ključnih ljudi ISIS-a i Al Qaide te način na koji organizacija funkcionira.
Za nekoga tko želi znati više, ovo je uistinu odlična knjiga upravo zbog jasnoće svojeg pisanja.
"...and its all the fault of those Muslims who seem unable to manage their heathen societies. All we did was economic collapse and a series of coups and funding and arming multiple opposing factions".
Some of this history seemed good but.. erased NATOs involvement and then said a BUNCH of crazy shit in the last section that really makes the earlier stuff unstable. Also whoever wrote those last few paragraphs about how Daesh is nihilistic emphatically does not understand what nihilism means.
Excellent if not too cerebral. Reads like a college text book on the subject, it covers the subject thoroughly. It is a year or two behind current conditions; the names have changed but the story remains the same - a borrowed description that fits most effectively here. If you want intimate knowledge on ISIS / ISIL this book is the one. If you want an easy read, look elsewhere.
Very informative book. I admit being very confused about the past and current conflicts in the Middle East. The author did a good job presenting the data in a succinct manner, and I appreciate his objective inferences about the significance of certain events. I honestly will read this book again to better grasp the information.