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Confucius: The Secular As Sacred
Book by Fingarette, Herbert
84 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1972
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About the author
Herbert Fingarette
13 books21 followersHerbert Fingarette was an American philosopher and emeritus professor of philosophy at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He received his PhD at the University of California, Los Angeles under the direction of Donald Piatt.
Fingarette's work deals with issues in philosophy of mind, psychology, ethics, law, and Chinese philosophy.
Fingarette's work deals with issues in philosophy of mind, psychology, ethics, law, and Chinese philosophy.
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
April 16, 2017
(Long review)
This book offers a unique perspective on the Confucian vision. As someone who has studied Confucius and Confucianism in Chinese for more than ten years, I believe that Fingarette has revealed an important aspect of the original vision of Confucius even the book has some flaws. (That is why I have only awarded it four stars.) He is as careful with the text as he can be without being an Orientalist and without expertise in classical Chinese language. This is commendable.
Fingarette’s main argument is that rituals (li) played a central role in Confucius’s thinking not only because of their social significance but also because of their religious or spiritual significance. In fact, Fingarette goes on to argue that the social significance derives from the religious significance. I generally agree that this is indeed one of Confucius’s most important teachings, and that it is under-appreciated or misinterpreted in modern scholarship. However, I do not agree with Fingarette’s choice of the word “magical”. I prefer to say religious or spiritual, for it is one of the greatest of achievements of the Confucian vision that it has shown man the way of deep religiousness without the machinery of institutionalized religion or a complex theology. It is also one of its greatest distinctive features. To be fair to Fingarette, he does mix the usage with the words “religious” and “spiritual”.
Chapter 1 establishes this central doctrine of ceremonies as “intensified and sharply elaborated extension of everyday civilized intercourse” (p.11) and man as a “ceremonial being” (p.16). In summary, “Thus the perfect community of men – the Confucian analogue to Christian brotherhood – becomes an inextricable part, the chief aspect, of Divine worship – again an analogy with the central Law taught by Jesus.” (p.17) I agree with Fingarette’s view that Confucius indeed saw human civilization as a perfect embodiment of the Way if it is united under the central symbol of holy ceremony. However, I think Fingarette carries his analysis too far with JL Austin’s notion of performative utterance. (p.11-15) While I do think that the Austin-Wittgenstein line of linguistic philosophy is not contradictory or even in some sense complementary to Confucius, I would characterize the language in the Analects as primarily poetic or metaphorical. Metaphors are used extensively throughout the Analects. In a way, it illustrates Santanya’s point that poetry at its highest is indistinguishable from religion. The high “poetry” of the Analects is its very religiousness, expressed and united under the central metaphor of ritual.
Chapter 2 seeks to explain how Confucius can discuss man’s place in society without the conceptual complex of choice-guilt-responsibility. It is a rather dense chapter which compares the Confucian vision against some of the most fundamental concepts of ethics in Western thought. I agree with Fingarette’s view that Confucius never discussed his ethics in terms of the choice-guilt-responsibility complex, and Fingarette’s characterization that “the spiritually noble man arrives at a condition rather than a place, the condition of following the Way without effort and properly.” (p.20)
As Fingarette neatly points out, modern Western thought has gravitated towards a utilitarian view of responsibility, which is in stark contrast to Confucius’s view of responsibility as personal commitment. For Confucius, the ethical life is largely a problem of personal commitment (or will) rather than a problem of decision. On the other hand, I would not go as far as Fingarette to say that “no genuine option” (p.21) exists for Confucius. Moral choice may not be a main concern for him, but I think it is against Confucius’s character that he would rule out other options. A sage of Confucius’s humility would most likely not claim that his approach to the Way is the only approach even though he might insist on his belief that there is only one true Way.
Fingarette seems to imply that Confucius is quite against punishment and sanctions. I would only say that given the body of text of the Analects, his view on these matters are simply not conclusive. Remark 2.3 of the Analects clearly states that governing by moral is superior and that governing by sanctions is not sufficient. I also agree that the Confucian spirit biases “against litigation” (p.33) since he does not think that the litigation mode of human intercourse is the most civilized way to resolve disagreement. However, we cannot conclude that Confucius is simply against litigation, punishments and sanctions.
As for the concept of guilt, Fingarette insists that the Confucian notion of shame (chi) is public while the Graeco-Christian notion of guilt is primarily inward. As he said in the preface, Fingarette is careful not to read the European, Buddhist and neo-Confucian bias towards an inner psychic life into the Analects. However, he overdoes it here. It is fair to say that shame is not only inward, and that its public dimension ties in with the practical orientation of Confucius. But the Confucian notion of shame does have an inward dimension. (I agree with the other reviewers here.) Without an inward dimension, shame cannot motivate self reflection, which Confucius repeatedly emphasizes.
I agree with Fingarette’s point that Confucius emphasizes “self-reeducation” (p.35) in contrast to the Graeco-Christian emphasis on self-condemnation. Self-reeducation, or self-cultivation is an important theme in the Analects and all subsequent Confucian thought. It is a pity that Fingarette did not develop this theme further. I would recommend Confucian Moral Cultivation by P J Ivanhoe for readers interested in this important theme.
I must commend Fingarette’s profound insight that “Confucius’s vision provides no basis for seeing man as a being of tragedy, of inner crisis and guilt; but it does provide a socially-oriented, action-oriented view which provides for personal dignity.” (p. 36) This underlying optimism of the human condition is at once deeply peaceful and infinitely dynamic. Man is not burdened with original sin, nor placed in existential angst by the forces of Olympian gods. Man simply has to commit himself to the Way. Through learning and cultivation, through committed praxis, man can uphold his dignity and attain sagacity. The absence of the tragic view of man permeates subsequent Chinese thought. Even in the most tumultuous times, the Chinese sage is a smiling figure shining with wisdom, not a Faustian figure deeply perturbed by moral dilemma, nor a Miltonic figure forever locked in the conscious agony of sin.
Chapter 3 treats the central Confucian notion of ren (or jen). Fingarette is right to point out the duality between ren and li, but goes too far to resist the inner dimension of ren. Whether ren is a psychological concept, an inner state or an emotion does not preclude its inner dimension. A man must look to himself and others to achieve ren. Even Fingarette’s own characterizations of ren, which are quite accurate, cannot escape this inner dimension. He compares ren to aiming: “Outer obstacles do not prevent the aiming, only the success of the act. Hence, in this light we see that there are no obstacles to aiming. All one need do is aim.” (p.52) He also describes it as “a form of concern”. (p.52) How curious it is to deny that a form of concern is inward!
The whole point of duality between ren and li is the union of the inward and the outward, the inner life and the public life. It is “a power emanating from the person” (p.56), as described by his analogies of the music performance (p.53) and acting (p.54). Fingarette evidently grasps this important point, but he doesn’t seem to want to admit it because of his insistent denial of the inward dimension of ren.
Chapter 4 tries to argue that Confucius is a visionary who uses tradition creatively to provide an imaginative solution to the problems of age. It is the weakest chapter of the book due to Fingarette’s lack of understanding of Chinese history. Fingarette holds the view that Confucius wants to unite the various warring states of his time with the culture of Lu through “cultural conquest” (p. 61). This is a very problematic description because Confucius never believed in a unique culture of Lu. He simply saw the state of Lu as the true heir to the culture of the Zhou dynasty. A united culture did exist before when the Zhou empire was strong. As Confucius himself put it, he was interested in a new Zhou order by restoring the pre-eminence of Zhou culture. Confucius believed in a past golden age, which Fingarette did not mention. He extended an old ideal, and didn’t create an entirely new one. The Confucian spirit is to create by adding to tradition, not but imagining new ideals out of the blue.
Hence Fingarette is right that Confucius emphasized tradition but is off on Confucius’s use of narrative myth. In fact, Confucius rarely mentioned mythical figures in the distant past. He only referred to them in passing. He emphasized the culture and history of Zhou dynasty because, as Confucius himself said, the literature and records existed whereas the literature and records of the more distant past was not available. One could call this “deriving a narrative myth” for Zhou culture and empire from an anthropological point of view, but one must remember that Confucius himself carefully distinguished recorded history from folklore.
Still, Fingarette recognized the importance of the role of inheriting a vast body of accumulated practices from the previous age in the Confucian vision. Inherited forms of life give man his dignity. As Fingarette puts it, “It is essential to see that Confucius was concerned not merely with communal order but with human dignity, with a culture that was founded in a sense of the beautiful, the noble and the sacred as distinctive dimensions of human existence. Cultural unity was to be consummation of humanity, not an order imposed upon sheep in human form.” (p.64)
Chapter 5, the concluding chapter, discusses Confucius’s vision of society. Fingarette, to his credit, avoids framing the discussion around individual and society. Instead, “It is the thesis of the present remarks that we would do better to think of Confucius as concerned with the nature of ‘humanity’ rather than with the polar terms ‘individual’ and ‘society’. The formulation in terms of individual and society reflects Western preoccupations and categories – and perhaps Taoist, Buddhist and neo-Confucian concerns.” (p.72-3) I agree that this line of thinking stays much closer to the Confucian spirit.
Although Fingarette is stubbornly fixated on the metaphor of the holy vessel based on remark 5.3 of the Analects, he nevertheless grasps the Confucian vision that the point of society is to civilize men. “To become civilized is to establish relationships that are not merely physical, biological or instinctive; it is to establish human relationships, relationships of an essentially symbolic kind, defined by tradition and convention and rooted in respect and obligation.” (p.76) This is a far deeper understanding than the typical modern interpretation that Confucius has “discovered” the individual.
This view of society shares more similarities with Plato’s than the modern view which looks at the society in terms of the social contract. In the Confucian vision, society has an ethical mission united under li. Through persistence, effort and a deep sense of personal commitment, man fulfills his humanity by learning civilized intercourse and walking the Way. “To ‘be self-disciplined and ever turning to li’ (12:1) is to be no longer at the mercy of animal needs and demoralizing passion, it is to achieve that freedom in which the human spirit flowers; it is not, as Waley’s translation may lead one to think, a matter of ‘submission’ but of the triumph of the human spirit.” (p.78) I commend Fingarette for pointing this out important Confucian lesson.
One aspect that Fingarette could have developed is that Confucius was more interested in ceremoniousness than ceremonies in themselves. This has particular modern relevance. For ceremonies grow rigid and antiquated, but the attitude of ceremoniousness lasts. Confucius understood his point. He knew that the culture of Xia and Shang had past and their ceremonies had waned. He knew that the culture of Zhou would suffer the same fate in the great chaos of his own age. His great achievement was turning ceremonies into ceremoniousness, turning li into a metaphor. This is why his teaching is universal and still relevant – even particularly relevant – in our own turbulent age.
Fingarette’s book is refreshing despite its flaws because it helps the reader to cut through modern bias and appreciate the original Confucius. It is not an introductory book on Confucius ad Confucianism, but certainly not a book that a serious student of Confucius or Confucianism can ignore.
This book offers a unique perspective on the Confucian vision. As someone who has studied Confucius and Confucianism in Chinese for more than ten years, I believe that Fingarette has revealed an important aspect of the original vision of Confucius even the book has some flaws. (That is why I have only awarded it four stars.) He is as careful with the text as he can be without being an Orientalist and without expertise in classical Chinese language. This is commendable.
Fingarette’s main argument is that rituals (li) played a central role in Confucius’s thinking not only because of their social significance but also because of their religious or spiritual significance. In fact, Fingarette goes on to argue that the social significance derives from the religious significance. I generally agree that this is indeed one of Confucius’s most important teachings, and that it is under-appreciated or misinterpreted in modern scholarship. However, I do not agree with Fingarette’s choice of the word “magical”. I prefer to say religious or spiritual, for it is one of the greatest of achievements of the Confucian vision that it has shown man the way of deep religiousness without the machinery of institutionalized religion or a complex theology. It is also one of its greatest distinctive features. To be fair to Fingarette, he does mix the usage with the words “religious” and “spiritual”.
Chapter 1 establishes this central doctrine of ceremonies as “intensified and sharply elaborated extension of everyday civilized intercourse” (p.11) and man as a “ceremonial being” (p.16). In summary, “Thus the perfect community of men – the Confucian analogue to Christian brotherhood – becomes an inextricable part, the chief aspect, of Divine worship – again an analogy with the central Law taught by Jesus.” (p.17) I agree with Fingarette’s view that Confucius indeed saw human civilization as a perfect embodiment of the Way if it is united under the central symbol of holy ceremony. However, I think Fingarette carries his analysis too far with JL Austin’s notion of performative utterance. (p.11-15) While I do think that the Austin-Wittgenstein line of linguistic philosophy is not contradictory or even in some sense complementary to Confucius, I would characterize the language in the Analects as primarily poetic or metaphorical. Metaphors are used extensively throughout the Analects. In a way, it illustrates Santanya’s point that poetry at its highest is indistinguishable from religion. The high “poetry” of the Analects is its very religiousness, expressed and united under the central metaphor of ritual.
Chapter 2 seeks to explain how Confucius can discuss man’s place in society without the conceptual complex of choice-guilt-responsibility. It is a rather dense chapter which compares the Confucian vision against some of the most fundamental concepts of ethics in Western thought. I agree with Fingarette’s view that Confucius never discussed his ethics in terms of the choice-guilt-responsibility complex, and Fingarette’s characterization that “the spiritually noble man arrives at a condition rather than a place, the condition of following the Way without effort and properly.” (p.20)
As Fingarette neatly points out, modern Western thought has gravitated towards a utilitarian view of responsibility, which is in stark contrast to Confucius’s view of responsibility as personal commitment. For Confucius, the ethical life is largely a problem of personal commitment (or will) rather than a problem of decision. On the other hand, I would not go as far as Fingarette to say that “no genuine option” (p.21) exists for Confucius. Moral choice may not be a main concern for him, but I think it is against Confucius’s character that he would rule out other options. A sage of Confucius’s humility would most likely not claim that his approach to the Way is the only approach even though he might insist on his belief that there is only one true Way.
Fingarette seems to imply that Confucius is quite against punishment and sanctions. I would only say that given the body of text of the Analects, his view on these matters are simply not conclusive. Remark 2.3 of the Analects clearly states that governing by moral is superior and that governing by sanctions is not sufficient. I also agree that the Confucian spirit biases “against litigation” (p.33) since he does not think that the litigation mode of human intercourse is the most civilized way to resolve disagreement. However, we cannot conclude that Confucius is simply against litigation, punishments and sanctions.
As for the concept of guilt, Fingarette insists that the Confucian notion of shame (chi) is public while the Graeco-Christian notion of guilt is primarily inward. As he said in the preface, Fingarette is careful not to read the European, Buddhist and neo-Confucian bias towards an inner psychic life into the Analects. However, he overdoes it here. It is fair to say that shame is not only inward, and that its public dimension ties in with the practical orientation of Confucius. But the Confucian notion of shame does have an inward dimension. (I agree with the other reviewers here.) Without an inward dimension, shame cannot motivate self reflection, which Confucius repeatedly emphasizes.
I agree with Fingarette’s point that Confucius emphasizes “self-reeducation” (p.35) in contrast to the Graeco-Christian emphasis on self-condemnation. Self-reeducation, or self-cultivation is an important theme in the Analects and all subsequent Confucian thought. It is a pity that Fingarette did not develop this theme further. I would recommend Confucian Moral Cultivation by P J Ivanhoe for readers interested in this important theme.
I must commend Fingarette’s profound insight that “Confucius’s vision provides no basis for seeing man as a being of tragedy, of inner crisis and guilt; but it does provide a socially-oriented, action-oriented view which provides for personal dignity.” (p. 36) This underlying optimism of the human condition is at once deeply peaceful and infinitely dynamic. Man is not burdened with original sin, nor placed in existential angst by the forces of Olympian gods. Man simply has to commit himself to the Way. Through learning and cultivation, through committed praxis, man can uphold his dignity and attain sagacity. The absence of the tragic view of man permeates subsequent Chinese thought. Even in the most tumultuous times, the Chinese sage is a smiling figure shining with wisdom, not a Faustian figure deeply perturbed by moral dilemma, nor a Miltonic figure forever locked in the conscious agony of sin.
Chapter 3 treats the central Confucian notion of ren (or jen). Fingarette is right to point out the duality between ren and li, but goes too far to resist the inner dimension of ren. Whether ren is a psychological concept, an inner state or an emotion does not preclude its inner dimension. A man must look to himself and others to achieve ren. Even Fingarette’s own characterizations of ren, which are quite accurate, cannot escape this inner dimension. He compares ren to aiming: “Outer obstacles do not prevent the aiming, only the success of the act. Hence, in this light we see that there are no obstacles to aiming. All one need do is aim.” (p.52) He also describes it as “a form of concern”. (p.52) How curious it is to deny that a form of concern is inward!
The whole point of duality between ren and li is the union of the inward and the outward, the inner life and the public life. It is “a power emanating from the person” (p.56), as described by his analogies of the music performance (p.53) and acting (p.54). Fingarette evidently grasps this important point, but he doesn’t seem to want to admit it because of his insistent denial of the inward dimension of ren.
Chapter 4 tries to argue that Confucius is a visionary who uses tradition creatively to provide an imaginative solution to the problems of age. It is the weakest chapter of the book due to Fingarette’s lack of understanding of Chinese history. Fingarette holds the view that Confucius wants to unite the various warring states of his time with the culture of Lu through “cultural conquest” (p. 61). This is a very problematic description because Confucius never believed in a unique culture of Lu. He simply saw the state of Lu as the true heir to the culture of the Zhou dynasty. A united culture did exist before when the Zhou empire was strong. As Confucius himself put it, he was interested in a new Zhou order by restoring the pre-eminence of Zhou culture. Confucius believed in a past golden age, which Fingarette did not mention. He extended an old ideal, and didn’t create an entirely new one. The Confucian spirit is to create by adding to tradition, not but imagining new ideals out of the blue.
Hence Fingarette is right that Confucius emphasized tradition but is off on Confucius’s use of narrative myth. In fact, Confucius rarely mentioned mythical figures in the distant past. He only referred to them in passing. He emphasized the culture and history of Zhou dynasty because, as Confucius himself said, the literature and records existed whereas the literature and records of the more distant past was not available. One could call this “deriving a narrative myth” for Zhou culture and empire from an anthropological point of view, but one must remember that Confucius himself carefully distinguished recorded history from folklore.
Still, Fingarette recognized the importance of the role of inheriting a vast body of accumulated practices from the previous age in the Confucian vision. Inherited forms of life give man his dignity. As Fingarette puts it, “It is essential to see that Confucius was concerned not merely with communal order but with human dignity, with a culture that was founded in a sense of the beautiful, the noble and the sacred as distinctive dimensions of human existence. Cultural unity was to be consummation of humanity, not an order imposed upon sheep in human form.” (p.64)
Chapter 5, the concluding chapter, discusses Confucius’s vision of society. Fingarette, to his credit, avoids framing the discussion around individual and society. Instead, “It is the thesis of the present remarks that we would do better to think of Confucius as concerned with the nature of ‘humanity’ rather than with the polar terms ‘individual’ and ‘society’. The formulation in terms of individual and society reflects Western preoccupations and categories – and perhaps Taoist, Buddhist and neo-Confucian concerns.” (p.72-3) I agree that this line of thinking stays much closer to the Confucian spirit.
Although Fingarette is stubbornly fixated on the metaphor of the holy vessel based on remark 5.3 of the Analects, he nevertheless grasps the Confucian vision that the point of society is to civilize men. “To become civilized is to establish relationships that are not merely physical, biological or instinctive; it is to establish human relationships, relationships of an essentially symbolic kind, defined by tradition and convention and rooted in respect and obligation.” (p.76) This is a far deeper understanding than the typical modern interpretation that Confucius has “discovered” the individual.
This view of society shares more similarities with Plato’s than the modern view which looks at the society in terms of the social contract. In the Confucian vision, society has an ethical mission united under li. Through persistence, effort and a deep sense of personal commitment, man fulfills his humanity by learning civilized intercourse and walking the Way. “To ‘be self-disciplined and ever turning to li’ (12:1) is to be no longer at the mercy of animal needs and demoralizing passion, it is to achieve that freedom in which the human spirit flowers; it is not, as Waley’s translation may lead one to think, a matter of ‘submission’ but of the triumph of the human spirit.” (p.78) I commend Fingarette for pointing this out important Confucian lesson.
One aspect that Fingarette could have developed is that Confucius was more interested in ceremoniousness than ceremonies in themselves. This has particular modern relevance. For ceremonies grow rigid and antiquated, but the attitude of ceremoniousness lasts. Confucius understood his point. He knew that the culture of Xia and Shang had past and their ceremonies had waned. He knew that the culture of Zhou would suffer the same fate in the great chaos of his own age. His great achievement was turning ceremonies into ceremoniousness, turning li into a metaphor. This is why his teaching is universal and still relevant – even particularly relevant – in our own turbulent age.
Fingarette’s book is refreshing despite its flaws because it helps the reader to cut through modern bias and appreciate the original Confucius. It is not an introductory book on Confucius ad Confucianism, but certainly not a book that a serious student of Confucius or Confucianism can ignore.
March 8, 2010
Fingarette does a great job at presenting Confucius as an original thinker with insights that I have not heard articulated anywhere else. Very legible, zero bullshit.
August 14, 2016
The author asks that we read the Analects with an open mind, i.e., to not impose a Western framework on what Fingarette argues is a distinctly Confucian perspective. Fingarette’s main theme is that while Western philosophers emphasize the individual, Confucius looks at society. Individual freedom and rights are sources of disorder whereas the ancient Chinese social ordering rituals (“li”) merge the individual into a harmonious whole. Confucius, Fingarette states, even goes beyond this utilitarian, ordering function. By following “li” he writes, “man realizes himself. Thus perfect community of men–the Confucian analogue to Christian brotherhood–becomes an inextricable part, the chief aspect, of Divine worship—again an analogy with the central Law taught by Jesus.”
Despite Fingarette’s advice to read the Analects in a non-Western way, his argument ended up with a Western-like perspective nonetheless. There’s his vision of the whole as Christian brotherhood, and there’s the Platonic-like Good, the Tao, that objective truth that motivates us to follow it. Like the Platonic philosopher-king, Fingarette writes that “Only the sage is able to walk the Way in a completely stable, spontaneous way.” The sage now becomes the ruler who is responsible for educating and civilizing the citizens and this in turn leads to the Confucian emphasis on deference to custom, tradition and those who are arbiters of such. In yielding this way we leave the animal past behind and become truly human. We perfect ourselves in accord with the Tao.* These lessons from the Analects, Fingarette concludes, are "universal."
As opposed to an alternative reading of Lao Tzu, where one is urged to respect the individual’s freedom without imposing on the freedom of others, I thought Fingarette's reading of Confucius was depressing.
*Also, Fingarette states that Confucius was about human affairs, not metaphysics. His version of the Tao, however, hardly can be read to be non-metaphysical as he writes that there is “one ‘li’ and that it is in harmony with a greater, cosmic Tao.”
Despite Fingarette’s advice to read the Analects in a non-Western way, his argument ended up with a Western-like perspective nonetheless. There’s his vision of the whole as Christian brotherhood, and there’s the Platonic-like Good, the Tao, that objective truth that motivates us to follow it. Like the Platonic philosopher-king, Fingarette writes that “Only the sage is able to walk the Way in a completely stable, spontaneous way.” The sage now becomes the ruler who is responsible for educating and civilizing the citizens and this in turn leads to the Confucian emphasis on deference to custom, tradition and those who are arbiters of such. In yielding this way we leave the animal past behind and become truly human. We perfect ourselves in accord with the Tao.* These lessons from the Analects, Fingarette concludes, are "universal."
As opposed to an alternative reading of Lao Tzu, where one is urged to respect the individual’s freedom without imposing on the freedom of others, I thought Fingarette's reading of Confucius was depressing.
*Also, Fingarette states that Confucius was about human affairs, not metaphysics. His version of the Tao, however, hardly can be read to be non-metaphysical as he writes that there is “one ‘li’ and that it is in harmony with a greater, cosmic Tao.”
January 9, 2018
I took this book off my shelf in order to get a fresh perspective on our human condition. I was particularly intrigued by the opening chapter, "Human Community as Holy Rite." I was not disappointed in my expectation that this chapter would add dimension to talk show host, Dennis Prager's frequent assertion that people need ritual to elevate and enrich life. The concept also reminded me of Jesus' saying that "The Kingdom of God is among you." Another echo of Confucius' sacred community is expressed in Abraham Lincoln's first inaugural address:
"We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies.
Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection.
The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battle-field, and patriot grave,
to every living heart and hearthstone, all over this broad land,
will yet swell the chorus of the Union,
when again touched, as surely they will be,
by the better angels of our nature."
As author Herbert Fingarette interprets Confucius, human ritual and ceremony ("Li") is an enactment of relationships that are sanctified by the virtue, mutuality, and tradition that govern a civil society. In turn, engagement in a life directed on the path of "Li" elevates and dignifies man as a vessel of honor, a "Jen" (think of gen-tleman, or "mensch"). "Li" and "Jen" are interdependent forces. For good insights on the concepts discussed in this book, read the excellent reviews and summaries posted on the Amazon product page by several students and experts on the works of Confucius.
"We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies.
Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection.
The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battle-field, and patriot grave,
to every living heart and hearthstone, all over this broad land,
will yet swell the chorus of the Union,
when again touched, as surely they will be,
by the better angels of our nature."
As author Herbert Fingarette interprets Confucius, human ritual and ceremony ("Li") is an enactment of relationships that are sanctified by the virtue, mutuality, and tradition that govern a civil society. In turn, engagement in a life directed on the path of "Li" elevates and dignifies man as a vessel of honor, a "Jen" (think of gen-tleman, or "mensch"). "Li" and "Jen" are interdependent forces. For good insights on the concepts discussed in this book, read the excellent reviews and summaries posted on the Amazon product page by several students and experts on the works of Confucius.
June 21, 2022
Excellent little book that sheds light by contrast on Western preoccupations. I've not been exposed to Confucius before but found this book highly readable and enlightening. A central idea is that for Confucius the good life, spiritually speaking, has a lot to do with learning the ways of the world and particularly the social ways.
May 1, 2014
A new perspective to see Confucius for Westerners. According to Confucius, we learn "li" to be "Jen", humane. If we perform li appropriately, magically Jen is there, people around us will respond to us positively.
June 20, 2016
If I wrote a book this good in the morning, I could die content in the evening.
Crisp insights, clearly and concisely argued. A brilliant book.
Crisp insights, clearly and concisely argued. A brilliant book.
February 5, 2020
Ma migliore introduzione a Confucio e al suo modo di intendere la vita che sia stata scritta. Chiara e concisa.
September 8, 2020
I had to read this for my Chinese philosophy class in college. I found some of the views contrived. Ultimately, ended feeling more connected to Confucianism.
December 19, 2022
Enlightening.
January 23, 2024
Did you want a philosophy about how the constructed social forms are ritualistic magic that generate energy and promote human progress?? Yeah you did!
June 2, 2014
Alcoholism-denying US philosopher says that the ceremony of society is the ultimate good and sacrament for Confucius. He also explains basic terms like li and Ren to new students of Confucius.
I recommend Pierre Ryckmans' Analects instead.
I recommend Pierre Ryckmans' Analects instead.
September 25, 2021
A fascinating not exactly non-Western but equally not quite Eastern analysis of Confucius for modern Western readers. Fingarette has set the area of debate on Confucius with this study.
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews