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世界帝國二千年： 一部關於權力政治的全球史
為什麼直至二十一世紀，我們依舊活在帝國的世界裡？
跳脫「民族國家與歐洲中心」史觀，以權力運作、差異政治與互動交流為分析核心，直探兩千年來帝國的權力政治！
《世界帝國二千年》為全球帝國政治史的經典之作，不僅顛覆了「民族國家合乎自然且不可或缺」的迷思，更以「權力、差異與互動」為論述核心，闡明了世界史上各帝國對於權力的爭奪、運作與鞏固，如何塑造社會與國家，激發野心與想像力，開啟或終結政治的可能性，影響力持續至今。
跳脫「民族國家與歐洲中心」史觀，以權力運作、差異政治與互動交流為分析核心，直探兩千年來帝國的權力政治！
《世界帝國二千年》為全球帝國政治史的經典之作，不僅顛覆了「民族國家合乎自然且不可或缺」的迷思，更以「權力、差異與互動」為論述核心，闡明了世界史上各帝國對於權力的爭奪、運作與鞏固，如何塑造社會與國家，激發野心與想像力，開啟或終結政治的可能性，影響力持續至今。
624 pages, Paperback
First published May 20, 2010
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 41 reviews
August 16, 2015
I probably would never have picked this book up if it wasn't a core text for a module (I prefer studying topics in depth to breadth) but I'm so glad I did!
This book is such a good read for giving you an understanding of modern international relations as well as being an accessible guide to world history without being too overwhelming.
It was quite easy to read from cover to cover though it took a while (probably because I decided to highlight a lot of it and then resorted to typing out entire sections that I liked!).
Read alongside Stephen Howe's 'Empire' (part of the Very Short Introduction series) which is more about ideologies and concepts surrounding empires, it gave a very thorough, analytic and concise view of cause and effect without being too dry. If more academic history books were written like this then studying history would be much simpler!
This book is such a good read for giving you an understanding of modern international relations as well as being an accessible guide to world history without being too overwhelming.
It was quite easy to read from cover to cover though it took a while (probably because I decided to highlight a lot of it and then resorted to typing out entire sections that I liked!).
Read alongside Stephen Howe's 'Empire' (part of the Very Short Introduction series) which is more about ideologies and concepts surrounding empires, it gave a very thorough, analytic and concise view of cause and effect without being too dry. If more academic history books were written like this then studying history would be much simpler!
February 16, 2016
If someone had never read a general history before, then I would recommend "A Splendid Exchange" or this one. It paints history in broad strokes that don't give you much detail; however, it does so from a world perspective instead of a eurocentric one. You get an excellent understanding of how societies interacted (or didn't interact) over the ages.
The main point of the book is that different empires throughout history emphasized the differences between people, accepted it, and used it to their advantage. I thought that "the politics of difference" as a tool was a little unwieldy since the authors could include almost anything under "difference".
That being said, there are two very important things I took out of this book. First, governments have historically governed separate populations in different ways; however, most governments claim equality for their citizens today. In what ways do these governments continue to govern separate populations differently? For instance, minimum sentencing for powder versus crack cocaine - how does that translate into a more indirect form of "politics of difference"? Second, nation states are a relatively new form of state, and although history is written as if the nation state is the apex of political achievement, this is not necessarily true. Have we made a terrible mistake by spreading the notion that a single state should only contain a single nation? Given the amount of ethnic, religious, and cultural strife in the world today, it would definitely appear so.
The main point of the book is that different empires throughout history emphasized the differences between people, accepted it, and used it to their advantage. I thought that "the politics of difference" as a tool was a little unwieldy since the authors could include almost anything under "difference".
That being said, there are two very important things I took out of this book. First, governments have historically governed separate populations in different ways; however, most governments claim equality for their citizens today. In what ways do these governments continue to govern separate populations differently? For instance, minimum sentencing for powder versus crack cocaine - how does that translate into a more indirect form of "politics of difference"? Second, nation states are a relatively new form of state, and although history is written as if the nation state is the apex of political achievement, this is not necessarily true. Have we made a terrible mistake by spreading the notion that a single state should only contain a single nation? Given the amount of ethnic, religious, and cultural strife in the world today, it would definitely appear so.
February 14, 2021
I learned things.
February 10, 2020
Empires can be a tricky subject to write about. It is easy for people to feel a sense of moral fury when it comes to empires and the way that they have behaved throughout history, but the authors do a good job at being fair-minded when it comes to both the good and bad sides of empires. As many people are not used to giving credit where it is due, that is impressive. The authors are also critical about both the nostalgia for empire as well as the way that imperialism fell not because of humanitarian reasons per se but because in an age of growing social welfare states in imperial states most empires simply ceased to be profitable given the minimal economic development of most colonial areas and the growing opposition that was faced in many areas. Also, the authors are wise to note that the age of empires is not necessarily over, and that they may return because there has been no great change in human nature over the course of the last few decades, something that many writers of history have conveniently forgot.
This book is almost 500 pages long and is divided into 14 large chapters. The book begins with a list of illustrations and a preface and then discusses imperial trajectories (1) around the world as well as the similarities and differences between imperial rule in Rome and ancient China (2). After that the author discusses what happened after Rome in the Mediterranean and European world regarding the different models of empire between Christians and Muslims (3) as well as the Eurasian connections of the Mongol Empire (4). There is a discussion of the Ottoman and Spanish empires and their importance beyond the Mediterranean (5) as well as the Oceanic economies and colonial societies between Europe, Asia, and the Americas (6). The authors discuss empire-building beyond the steppe in Russia and China (7) as well as the relationship between empire, nation, and citizenship in the revolutionary era (8). The authors slow down the time span to discuss the spread of Russia and the United States across continents (9) as well as imperial repertoires and the myths of modern imperialism on the right and left (10). After that the authors discuss sovereignty and empire in 19th century Europe and its near abroad (11) as well as war and revolution in an imperial world between World War I and the end of World War II (12). Finally, the authors close with a discussion of the end of empire (13) as well as the relationship between empires, states, and the political imagination (14), after which there are suggested reading and citations as well as an index.
The author's view of histories is quite expansive, beginning in early history and continuing to the present day. Of particular importance is the way that empires have always involved the disparate power between rulers and ruled as well as the politics of difference that have always separated peoples and prevented a great deal of buy-in. That said, empires have also generally required at least enough local buy-in to endure, and the authors explore those aspects of various empires that have made them more lasting as well as more important in the course of the world. In particular, the authors are intrigued by the difference between the persistent Chinese unity despite periods of disagreement and the equally persistent disunity in the former Roman empire, something that would be of interest to many readers as well. This book is a long one and one that would take people quite a while to read, but if they have an interest in reading about empires and want to do it right, there is a lot to appreciate here. Not everyone is going to want to think of anything positive to come out of the Mongol Empires or the empires of Western European countries, but those who are willing to reflect on the balance sheet of empires will find a lot here to think about.
This book is almost 500 pages long and is divided into 14 large chapters. The book begins with a list of illustrations and a preface and then discusses imperial trajectories (1) around the world as well as the similarities and differences between imperial rule in Rome and ancient China (2). After that the author discusses what happened after Rome in the Mediterranean and European world regarding the different models of empire between Christians and Muslims (3) as well as the Eurasian connections of the Mongol Empire (4). There is a discussion of the Ottoman and Spanish empires and their importance beyond the Mediterranean (5) as well as the Oceanic economies and colonial societies between Europe, Asia, and the Americas (6). The authors discuss empire-building beyond the steppe in Russia and China (7) as well as the relationship between empire, nation, and citizenship in the revolutionary era (8). The authors slow down the time span to discuss the spread of Russia and the United States across continents (9) as well as imperial repertoires and the myths of modern imperialism on the right and left (10). After that the authors discuss sovereignty and empire in 19th century Europe and its near abroad (11) as well as war and revolution in an imperial world between World War I and the end of World War II (12). Finally, the authors close with a discussion of the end of empire (13) as well as the relationship between empires, states, and the political imagination (14), after which there are suggested reading and citations as well as an index.
The author's view of histories is quite expansive, beginning in early history and continuing to the present day. Of particular importance is the way that empires have always involved the disparate power between rulers and ruled as well as the politics of difference that have always separated peoples and prevented a great deal of buy-in. That said, empires have also generally required at least enough local buy-in to endure, and the authors explore those aspects of various empires that have made them more lasting as well as more important in the course of the world. In particular, the authors are intrigued by the difference between the persistent Chinese unity despite periods of disagreement and the equally persistent disunity in the former Roman empire, something that would be of interest to many readers as well. This book is a long one and one that would take people quite a while to read, but if they have an interest in reading about empires and want to do it right, there is a lot to appreciate here. Not everyone is going to want to think of anything positive to come out of the Mongol Empires or the empires of Western European countries, but those who are willing to reflect on the balance sheet of empires will find a lot here to think about.
March 5, 2025
Glömt att uppdatera att jag läste klart denna för något år sedan, oopps!🤫
October 14, 2019
Fascinating! Burbank and Cooper avoid the seemingly inevitable, and largely useless, debates over whether this or that society constituted an empire, and whether empires are good or bad. Instead, they focus on how empires have managed the "politics of difference," meaning how governments have dealt with different people differently. This framework allows for broad comparisons that provide insights into the universal challenges of organizing societies.
February 13, 2025
Le propos est très « scolaire » mais la lecture est facile et agréable. L’ensemble est ponctué d’illustrations (cartes, photographies…) toujours pertinentes.
June 27, 2025
historical maps goes hard af
November 19, 2018
Voor een ieder die op zoek is naar de grote lijnen in de geschiedenis, zijn het gouden tijden. Sinds de val van de Berlijnse muur in 1989 verschijnen met toenemende regelmaat historisch-sociologische studies die zich expliciet richten op de ontwikkelingsgang van economische systemen, beschavingen, culturen en wereldrijken. Boeken van Immanuel Wallerstein (The Modern World-System) Francis Fukuyama (The End of History and the Last Man), Jared Diamond (Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies), Samuel Huntington (The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order), David Landes (The Wealth and Poverty of Nations), Amy Chua (Day of Empire) maar recentelijk ook van Nederlandse historici als Jan Luiten van Zanden (The Long Road to the Industrial Revolution. The European Economy in a Global Perspective, 1000-1800) en Dirk Kooiman (Kapitalisme, kolonialisme en cultuur) bieden niet alleen inzicht in de historische ontwikkelingen over lange periodes en grote gebieden, maar vooral in de wisselwerking tussen economisch-politieke systemen of wereldrijken onderling. En nu is daar Empires in World History van Jane Burbank en Frederick Cooper. Door bart van den bosch.
Deze hausse is niet zonder precedent. Ook in het Interbellum voorzagen schrijvers als Oswalt Spengler (Der Untergang des Abendlandes), Arnold Toynbee (A Study of History) en Pitirim Sorokin (Social and Cultural Dynamics) een breed publiek van een historische duiding ter verklaring voor het roerige tijdsgewricht waarin de wereld zich destijds bevond. Blijkbaar bestaat er een vergelijkbare evenredigheid tussen de wereldwijde politieke, economische en culturele onrust waarin de wereld zich na het einde van de Koude Oorlog - en in verhevigde mate na 9-11 - bevindt en de behoefte om die met breed opgezette historische analyses te beschrijven, te duiden en als het even kan, van een - al dan niet hoopvolle - toekomstvisie te voorzien. De vraag is of Empires in World History iets toevoegt aan de steeds voller wordende plank macrogeschiedenis.
Geschiedenis voorbij de natiestaat
Burbank en Cooper menen van wel. In hun opvatting schiet de gangbare benadering van het verleden op basis van de vorming van de natiestaat op velerlei terrein tekort om het heden afdoende te verklaren. Tenslotte is veel hedendaagse ellende te wijten aan het uiteenvallen van diverse wereldrijken. De teloorgang van het Osmaanse rijk leidde tot chaos op de Balkan en het Midden-Oosten, de naoorlogse instorting van de Franse en Britse imperia veroorzaakte chaos in Afrika en Zuidoost-Azië en het uiteenvallen van het Sovjet-imperium veroorzaakte narigheid in Georgië, Tsjetjsenië en Dagastan. De oorlog, de vernietiging en etnische zuivering waarmee deze ontbindingsprocessen gewoonlijk gepaard gaan, illustreert onmiskenbaar dat de overgang van wereldrijk naar nationale staat niet echt vanzelfsprekend of onvermijdelijk succesvol is.
De centrale vraag die Burbank en Cooper dan ook willen beantwoorden is hoe de in het boek besproken wereldrijken er in het verleden in slaagden om in één groot rijk een veelheid aan verschillende volkeren, met hun grote diversiteit aan culturele, politieke, economische, sociale en religieuze tradities voor langere tijd succesvol bijeen te houden. Natuurlijk sluiten zij niet de ogen voor de enorme humanitaire en economische kosten die dat met zich meebracht, zeker niet in het hoofdstuk waarin het Mongoolse Rijk van Djengiz Khan wordt behandeld. Desondanks menen de auteurs dat het verhelderend is om het bestuurlijk instrumentarium van wereldrijken in kaart te brengen omdat dat een beter begrip van ons eigen verleden, heden en misschien de toekomst verschaft.
Rome en China als voorbeeld, met religie als hulpstof
Empires in World History stelt dat er in de derde eeuw v.Chr. twee 'oer'-wereldrijken ontstonden; het Romeinse en het Chinese. De auteurs onderkennen dat er eerder ook al wereldrijken bestonden, zoals het Egyptische, Assyrische, Perzische of Macedonische, maar dat Rome en China voor alle nakomende rijken een ijkpunt vormden. Beide wakkeren de imperiale verbeelding van latere aspirant-heersers aan door de bestuurlijke vernieuwingen van het burgerschap (Rome) en van een professionele ambtenarij (China) in te voeren.
Alle daarop volgende rijken proberen in de voetsporen van een van beide te treden; het Byzantijnse rijk (zie ook Merlijn Olnons recensie van The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire), het Karolingische rijk en de Moslimkalifaten introduceren het militante monotheïsme als bestuurlijke toevoeging, met wisselend succes. Enerzijds mobiliseerde het ware geloof de strijders die het rijk uitbreidden of verdedigden, anderzijds bleken concurrerende religieuze claims als splijtzwam (Sunnieten contra Shi'iten en later katholieken contra protestanten) te werken en het rijk juist te verzwakken. Via het Mongoolse rijk passeren Rusland, de Moghuls, het Osmaanse rijk, Spanje, Portugal, de Republiek, Engeland, Frankrijk, Duitsland en natuurlijk de Verenigde Staten, meer of minder uitvoerig besproken, de revue. Hoewel elk van de beschreven rijken zijn eigen manier heeft om de uitdagingen waarvoor zij zich gesteld zien op te lossen, zien Cooper en Burbank juist in die uitdagingen tal van overeenkomsten.
Verscheidenheid als enige constante
De subtitel van het boek, Power and Politics of Difference verraadt een belangrijke overeenkomst tussen alle in het boek bestudeerde wereldrijken. Difference oftewel verscheidenheid blijkt het centrale begrip in Empires in World History te zijn. De auteurs constateren dat in alle wereldrijken een grote verscheidenheid aan bestuurlijke strategieën werd toegepast. Er blijkt in het verleden, noch in het heden een blauwdruk voor een duurzaam, efficiënt bestuur van een wereldrijk te zijn. Elk rijk is een unieke constellatie. Afgezien van de unieke geografische omstandigheden waaraan elk gebonden was, blijken onderlinge interacties tussen wereldrijken, interne onrust, onvoorspelbare machtvacuüms, druk op grenzen of tradities van troonsopvolging keer op keer de flexibiliteit en het zelfreinigend vermogen van de heersende dynastieën op de proef te stellen.
De verscheidenheid die de rijken onderling kenmerkt, is terug te vinden in hun verschillende handelswijzen met betrekking tot de verscheidenheid binnen hun territorium. Hoe kan een expanderend wereldrijk de, als gevolg van juist die expansie, toenemende verscheidenheid beheersen? De auteurs brengen verschillende aanpakken in kaart. Sommige rijken, met name de koloniale negentiende eeuwse en de Christelijke, streven naar een strikte zij/wij scheiding. Anderen, zoals het Mongoolse en het Osmaanse rijk, incorporeren juist de culturele verscheidenheid binnen het rijk. Weer een andere insteek vormde de basis van romanisering en americanisering. Zowel Rome als de VS richtten zich op culturele homogenisering van de gebieden in hun invloedsfeer.
Een andere bestuurlijk probleem waar alle imperia zich voor gesteld zagen, vormde het effectieve bestuur van hun uitdijend territorium. Hoe konden de heersers vertrouwen dat ook, of misschien juist, in de verste uithoeken van het rijk hun wil wet was? Ook hier constateren de auteurs dat verschillende rijken verschillende strategieën toepasten. Was de efficiëntie van bestuur gebaat bij het benutten van de lokale know how in de veroverde gebieden, of vergrootte dit juist het risico van opstand? Moest de heerser zijn getrouwen met land belonen en aan hen het bestuur van de geleende gebieden overlaten of was dat juist de kat op het spek binden? Of was het juist raadzaam om volstrekt van de heerser afhankelijke slaven of ambtenaren die geen enkele binding met het te besturen gebied hadden te benoemen? Welke oplossing ook gekozen werd, in de praktijk resulteerde het doorgaans in niet veel meer dan een tijdelijke, vaak fragiele verbondenheid tussen heerser en bestuurder.
Burbank en Cooper benadrukken ook het belang van de beeldvorming van imperiaal bestuur en gezag. De latere wereldrijken kunnen putten uit de successen, zelfs als die slechts propagandistisch van aard waren, van hun voorgangers. De beeldvorming waarmee heersers hun positie legitimeren blijkt een grote kracht te kunnen hebben; Karel de Grote, de Romanovs en Napoleon en Hitler imiteren bewust hun roemrijke Romeinse voorbeelden, niet alleen in de vorm van allerlei rituelen of uiterlijkheden, maar ook in het idee dat het stichten van een imperium überhaupt mogelijk is. Anderen zijn hen immers voorgegaan en hebben bewezen dat het kan.
Wereldrijken in de eenentwinigste eeuw zijn er om te verbinden
Empires in world History sluit af met de vraag of empires sinds de opkomst van de natiestaten definitief verleden tijd zijn. Nee dus. De eenentwintigste eeuw wordt door vier wereldrijken beheerst; De Europese Unie, die erin slaagde de diverse afbrokkelende Europese wereldmachten te herijken; de Russische federatie, die de fakkel heeft overgenomen van de uitgerangeerde Sovjet-Unie; China, dat na een afwezigheid op het wereldtoneel van anderhalve eeuw zijn onvermijdelijke rentree heeft gemaakt; en natuurlijk de VS.
Ook deze moderne imperia hebben te kampen met een veelheid aan uitdagingen en, al dan niet reële, bedreigingen. Hoe zij daarmee omgaan zal hun duurzaamheid bepalen. De reden dat deze vier empires nog steeds zo vitaal aanwezig zijn, is gelegen in het feit dat nationale staten principieel te kort schieten. Geen enkele nationale staat is er ooit in geslaagd zijn vermeende exclusiviteit praktisch of voor langere tijd in te vullen. Het succes van wereldrijken is dat ze per definitie multicultureel zijn, dat onderkennen en hun bestuur daarop afstemmen.
Hoewel de auteurs in hun inleiding nadrukkelijk stellen dat het hen slechts gaat om de beschrijving van wereldrijken en de wijze waarop elk de gestelde uitdagingen tegemoet trad, ontkomen ook zij niet aan datgene dat elke geschiedschrijving, maar vooral macrogeschiedschrijving kenmerkt; waarde-oordelen. Daar is niets mis mee. Sterker nog, het is te verdedigen dat juist geschiedschrijving die zich met het hele grote en langdurige bezighoudt, het publiek moet geven waar het om vraagt: duiding van het heden en het verschaffen van toekomstscenario's, natuurlijk onder alle gebruikelijke voorbehouden.
Het zal niemand verrassen dat Burbank en Cooper een duidelijke taak zien weggelegd voor imperia. In tegenstelling tot de exclusiviteit van de natiestaten en de vluchtelingenstromen die dat regelmatig tot gevolg heeft, vertegenwoordigen de multiculturele wereldrijken een bestuurlijke traditie waar inclusiviteit en wederzijdse afhankelijkheid in ieder geval mogelijk is. Met het belang dat de auteurs hieraan hechten, distantiëren zij zich nadrukkelijk van het conflictmodel zoals dat bijvoorbeeld door Samuel Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order werd gehanteerd.
Dit contrast met Huntington krijgt een verrassende invulling in de beschrijving van het Mongoolse rijk. In de westerse verbeelding is er nauwelijks een gewelddadiger barbaar te vinden dan Djengis Khan, maar in Empires in world History wordt een verband gelegd tussen de flexibiliteit, de tolerantie en het assimilerend vermogen van de diverse Mongoolse rijken en de duurzaamheid ervan. Van Djengis Khan via Koeblai Khan en Tamerlane tot de grote Moghuldynastie van Babur de Tijger. Het werkt, kijk maar naar de Mongolen!
Deze hausse is niet zonder precedent. Ook in het Interbellum voorzagen schrijvers als Oswalt Spengler (Der Untergang des Abendlandes), Arnold Toynbee (A Study of History) en Pitirim Sorokin (Social and Cultural Dynamics) een breed publiek van een historische duiding ter verklaring voor het roerige tijdsgewricht waarin de wereld zich destijds bevond. Blijkbaar bestaat er een vergelijkbare evenredigheid tussen de wereldwijde politieke, economische en culturele onrust waarin de wereld zich na het einde van de Koude Oorlog - en in verhevigde mate na 9-11 - bevindt en de behoefte om die met breed opgezette historische analyses te beschrijven, te duiden en als het even kan, van een - al dan niet hoopvolle - toekomstvisie te voorzien. De vraag is of Empires in World History iets toevoegt aan de steeds voller wordende plank macrogeschiedenis.
Geschiedenis voorbij de natiestaat
Burbank en Cooper menen van wel. In hun opvatting schiet de gangbare benadering van het verleden op basis van de vorming van de natiestaat op velerlei terrein tekort om het heden afdoende te verklaren. Tenslotte is veel hedendaagse ellende te wijten aan het uiteenvallen van diverse wereldrijken. De teloorgang van het Osmaanse rijk leidde tot chaos op de Balkan en het Midden-Oosten, de naoorlogse instorting van de Franse en Britse imperia veroorzaakte chaos in Afrika en Zuidoost-Azië en het uiteenvallen van het Sovjet-imperium veroorzaakte narigheid in Georgië, Tsjetjsenië en Dagastan. De oorlog, de vernietiging en etnische zuivering waarmee deze ontbindingsprocessen gewoonlijk gepaard gaan, illustreert onmiskenbaar dat de overgang van wereldrijk naar nationale staat niet echt vanzelfsprekend of onvermijdelijk succesvol is.
De centrale vraag die Burbank en Cooper dan ook willen beantwoorden is hoe de in het boek besproken wereldrijken er in het verleden in slaagden om in één groot rijk een veelheid aan verschillende volkeren, met hun grote diversiteit aan culturele, politieke, economische, sociale en religieuze tradities voor langere tijd succesvol bijeen te houden. Natuurlijk sluiten zij niet de ogen voor de enorme humanitaire en economische kosten die dat met zich meebracht, zeker niet in het hoofdstuk waarin het Mongoolse Rijk van Djengiz Khan wordt behandeld. Desondanks menen de auteurs dat het verhelderend is om het bestuurlijk instrumentarium van wereldrijken in kaart te brengen omdat dat een beter begrip van ons eigen verleden, heden en misschien de toekomst verschaft.
Rome en China als voorbeeld, met religie als hulpstof
Empires in World History stelt dat er in de derde eeuw v.Chr. twee 'oer'-wereldrijken ontstonden; het Romeinse en het Chinese. De auteurs onderkennen dat er eerder ook al wereldrijken bestonden, zoals het Egyptische, Assyrische, Perzische of Macedonische, maar dat Rome en China voor alle nakomende rijken een ijkpunt vormden. Beide wakkeren de imperiale verbeelding van latere aspirant-heersers aan door de bestuurlijke vernieuwingen van het burgerschap (Rome) en van een professionele ambtenarij (China) in te voeren.
Alle daarop volgende rijken proberen in de voetsporen van een van beide te treden; het Byzantijnse rijk (zie ook Merlijn Olnons recensie van The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire), het Karolingische rijk en de Moslimkalifaten introduceren het militante monotheïsme als bestuurlijke toevoeging, met wisselend succes. Enerzijds mobiliseerde het ware geloof de strijders die het rijk uitbreidden of verdedigden, anderzijds bleken concurrerende religieuze claims als splijtzwam (Sunnieten contra Shi'iten en later katholieken contra protestanten) te werken en het rijk juist te verzwakken. Via het Mongoolse rijk passeren Rusland, de Moghuls, het Osmaanse rijk, Spanje, Portugal, de Republiek, Engeland, Frankrijk, Duitsland en natuurlijk de Verenigde Staten, meer of minder uitvoerig besproken, de revue. Hoewel elk van de beschreven rijken zijn eigen manier heeft om de uitdagingen waarvoor zij zich gesteld zien op te lossen, zien Cooper en Burbank juist in die uitdagingen tal van overeenkomsten.
Verscheidenheid als enige constante
De subtitel van het boek, Power and Politics of Difference verraadt een belangrijke overeenkomst tussen alle in het boek bestudeerde wereldrijken. Difference oftewel verscheidenheid blijkt het centrale begrip in Empires in World History te zijn. De auteurs constateren dat in alle wereldrijken een grote verscheidenheid aan bestuurlijke strategieën werd toegepast. Er blijkt in het verleden, noch in het heden een blauwdruk voor een duurzaam, efficiënt bestuur van een wereldrijk te zijn. Elk rijk is een unieke constellatie. Afgezien van de unieke geografische omstandigheden waaraan elk gebonden was, blijken onderlinge interacties tussen wereldrijken, interne onrust, onvoorspelbare machtvacuüms, druk op grenzen of tradities van troonsopvolging keer op keer de flexibiliteit en het zelfreinigend vermogen van de heersende dynastieën op de proef te stellen.
De verscheidenheid die de rijken onderling kenmerkt, is terug te vinden in hun verschillende handelswijzen met betrekking tot de verscheidenheid binnen hun territorium. Hoe kan een expanderend wereldrijk de, als gevolg van juist die expansie, toenemende verscheidenheid beheersen? De auteurs brengen verschillende aanpakken in kaart. Sommige rijken, met name de koloniale negentiende eeuwse en de Christelijke, streven naar een strikte zij/wij scheiding. Anderen, zoals het Mongoolse en het Osmaanse rijk, incorporeren juist de culturele verscheidenheid binnen het rijk. Weer een andere insteek vormde de basis van romanisering en americanisering. Zowel Rome als de VS richtten zich op culturele homogenisering van de gebieden in hun invloedsfeer.
Een andere bestuurlijk probleem waar alle imperia zich voor gesteld zagen, vormde het effectieve bestuur van hun uitdijend territorium. Hoe konden de heersers vertrouwen dat ook, of misschien juist, in de verste uithoeken van het rijk hun wil wet was? Ook hier constateren de auteurs dat verschillende rijken verschillende strategieën toepasten. Was de efficiëntie van bestuur gebaat bij het benutten van de lokale know how in de veroverde gebieden, of vergrootte dit juist het risico van opstand? Moest de heerser zijn getrouwen met land belonen en aan hen het bestuur van de geleende gebieden overlaten of was dat juist de kat op het spek binden? Of was het juist raadzaam om volstrekt van de heerser afhankelijke slaven of ambtenaren die geen enkele binding met het te besturen gebied hadden te benoemen? Welke oplossing ook gekozen werd, in de praktijk resulteerde het doorgaans in niet veel meer dan een tijdelijke, vaak fragiele verbondenheid tussen heerser en bestuurder.
Burbank en Cooper benadrukken ook het belang van de beeldvorming van imperiaal bestuur en gezag. De latere wereldrijken kunnen putten uit de successen, zelfs als die slechts propagandistisch van aard waren, van hun voorgangers. De beeldvorming waarmee heersers hun positie legitimeren blijkt een grote kracht te kunnen hebben; Karel de Grote, de Romanovs en Napoleon en Hitler imiteren bewust hun roemrijke Romeinse voorbeelden, niet alleen in de vorm van allerlei rituelen of uiterlijkheden, maar ook in het idee dat het stichten van een imperium überhaupt mogelijk is. Anderen zijn hen immers voorgegaan en hebben bewezen dat het kan.
Wereldrijken in de eenentwinigste eeuw zijn er om te verbinden
Empires in world History sluit af met de vraag of empires sinds de opkomst van de natiestaten definitief verleden tijd zijn. Nee dus. De eenentwintigste eeuw wordt door vier wereldrijken beheerst; De Europese Unie, die erin slaagde de diverse afbrokkelende Europese wereldmachten te herijken; de Russische federatie, die de fakkel heeft overgenomen van de uitgerangeerde Sovjet-Unie; China, dat na een afwezigheid op het wereldtoneel van anderhalve eeuw zijn onvermijdelijke rentree heeft gemaakt; en natuurlijk de VS.
Ook deze moderne imperia hebben te kampen met een veelheid aan uitdagingen en, al dan niet reële, bedreigingen. Hoe zij daarmee omgaan zal hun duurzaamheid bepalen. De reden dat deze vier empires nog steeds zo vitaal aanwezig zijn, is gelegen in het feit dat nationale staten principieel te kort schieten. Geen enkele nationale staat is er ooit in geslaagd zijn vermeende exclusiviteit praktisch of voor langere tijd in te vullen. Het succes van wereldrijken is dat ze per definitie multicultureel zijn, dat onderkennen en hun bestuur daarop afstemmen.
Hoewel de auteurs in hun inleiding nadrukkelijk stellen dat het hen slechts gaat om de beschrijving van wereldrijken en de wijze waarop elk de gestelde uitdagingen tegemoet trad, ontkomen ook zij niet aan datgene dat elke geschiedschrijving, maar vooral macrogeschiedschrijving kenmerkt; waarde-oordelen. Daar is niets mis mee. Sterker nog, het is te verdedigen dat juist geschiedschrijving die zich met het hele grote en langdurige bezighoudt, het publiek moet geven waar het om vraagt: duiding van het heden en het verschaffen van toekomstscenario's, natuurlijk onder alle gebruikelijke voorbehouden.
Het zal niemand verrassen dat Burbank en Cooper een duidelijke taak zien weggelegd voor imperia. In tegenstelling tot de exclusiviteit van de natiestaten en de vluchtelingenstromen die dat regelmatig tot gevolg heeft, vertegenwoordigen de multiculturele wereldrijken een bestuurlijke traditie waar inclusiviteit en wederzijdse afhankelijkheid in ieder geval mogelijk is. Met het belang dat de auteurs hieraan hechten, distantiëren zij zich nadrukkelijk van het conflictmodel zoals dat bijvoorbeeld door Samuel Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order werd gehanteerd.
Dit contrast met Huntington krijgt een verrassende invulling in de beschrijving van het Mongoolse rijk. In de westerse verbeelding is er nauwelijks een gewelddadiger barbaar te vinden dan Djengis Khan, maar in Empires in world History wordt een verband gelegd tussen de flexibiliteit, de tolerantie en het assimilerend vermogen van de diverse Mongoolse rijken en de duurzaamheid ervan. Van Djengis Khan via Koeblai Khan en Tamerlane tot de grote Moghuldynastie van Babur de Tijger. Het werkt, kijk maar naar de Mongolen!
June 11, 2014
Que buen libro de historia universal.
Es un recorrido por los principales imperios de la historia: romano, griego, chino, mongol, ruso, otomano, bizantino, turco, indio, hasta llegar a Estados Unidos y la Europa actual pasando por los intentos imperiales de Portugal, Bélgica, Japón y Alemania en el siglo XX.
El libro plantea como los imperios se fueron formando y como fueron incluyendo innovaciones sociales, políticas, militares e incluso religiosas para fortalecer su dominación, y como estas políticas se trasvasaron de un imperio a otro.
Un punto muy interesante es el declive (aunque sea de forma temporal) de los imperios y las razones que se atribuyen a ello, que en términos generales se debe a una deficiente administración de las diferencias que se van haciendo más grande cuando crece el imperio; así como a las dificultades en obtener intermediarios comerciales, diplomáticos y políticos que puedan administrar las riquezas del imperio a distancia. En este sentido se muestra la complejidad de los imperios marítimos como Inglaterra, España, Portugal o Alemania comparados contra los imperios terrestres como China, Rusia, el imperio otomano y el imperio mongol.
Me llamó la atención, como al acercarnos a la "modernidad" (es decir, a nuestros contemporáneos) muchos imperios se vieron en el conflicto de aceptar a los esclavos y súbditos como parte de la ciudadanía principal, o no hacerlo, por temor a debilitar sus raíces y su filosofía fundadora. Esta sería la idea tras la cual la segregación racial duró tanto tiempo en Estados Unidos, o Sudáfrica.
En términos generales se describen pocas cosas en común en los imperios:
- Resultan por el deseo, muchas veces desproporcionado (que se convierte en orgullo y soberbia), de "compartir" un ideal de gobierno y forma de vida con otros (que generalmente desemboca en la fuerza)
- Sirven como medio de transmisión de ideas, formas de gobierno (duh!) y tecnologías entre los pueblos que son gobernados
- Los judíos fueron expulsados por cada imperio donde tuvieron influencia, y no solo por los nazis, esto se puede deber quizás a que se percibía (y quizás la percepción es la realidad) a que este grupo étnico (no forzosamente religioso) conformaba un poder supra nacional y se veía como un imperio mismo sin fronteras (cosa que se ha expresado en muchos otros textos)
Me agradaron algunas de las conclusiones a las que se llegan:
- Los imperios que más han perdurado (particularmente el Chino) son aquellos que han aceptado y administrado mejor las diferencias.
- No es necesaria una religión unificadora del imperio. En muchos casos, como en el español, la religión resultó un freno para la ambición imperial, pese a lo que la leyenda negra pueda indicar. Por ejemplo, el reconocimiento a los indígenas de América como seres humanos con la misma dignidad ante Dios limitó (mas no eliminó) la esclavitud. Así mismo, la expulsión de otras religiones del territorio (principalmente judíos y musulmanes) del imperio contribuye a que disminuya la diversidad.
- Pero con lo anterior, también se muestra como el secularismo a ultranza, como en la URSS y Turquía funge exactamente la misma función que una religión de Estado y limita el propio crecimiento y sostenimiento del imperio.
En los puntos que creo que se queda corto el libro, es en el momento de génesis del imperio. Resulta relativamente fácil ver la situación que sigue en un imperio ya formado, como se tratan las políticas de continuidad, defensa y expansión; pero se trata muy someramente el momento de la creación: ¿qué hace a que los primeros habitantes errantes de una tribu se congreguen alrededor de un líder o caudillo? ¿cómo les vende la idea de convertirse en señores de lo que conocen? ¿En qué momento deciden convertirse en un imperio? ¿Cómo se convence a unos militares para que por medio de la fuerza excesiva dominen a pueblos, que dada su cercanía inicial, es muy probable que sean hermanos?
Finalmente, no estoy muy de acuerdo en ver a algunos imperios modernos como la continuidad del "proyecto imperial" del imperio pasado, particularmente cuando se refiere a China y Rusia. Creo que Vladimir Putin tiene muy poco que ver con Pedro el Grande o los Romanov. Lo mismo con los chinos, el actual partido comunista no creo que sea una continuación de la visión imperial de los Qin o los Yuan. Porque en algunas de las conclusiones parecería que alguien en la dinastía Qin (con su limitado conocimiento del mundo) hubiera detallado un plan de dominación mundial, lo hubiera guardado en una "cápsula del tiempo" y bajo esa filosofía el partido comunista de dos milenios después estarían realizando el plan de antaño.
Es un recorrido por los principales imperios de la historia: romano, griego, chino, mongol, ruso, otomano, bizantino, turco, indio, hasta llegar a Estados Unidos y la Europa actual pasando por los intentos imperiales de Portugal, Bélgica, Japón y Alemania en el siglo XX.
El libro plantea como los imperios se fueron formando y como fueron incluyendo innovaciones sociales, políticas, militares e incluso religiosas para fortalecer su dominación, y como estas políticas se trasvasaron de un imperio a otro.
Un punto muy interesante es el declive (aunque sea de forma temporal) de los imperios y las razones que se atribuyen a ello, que en términos generales se debe a una deficiente administración de las diferencias que se van haciendo más grande cuando crece el imperio; así como a las dificultades en obtener intermediarios comerciales, diplomáticos y políticos que puedan administrar las riquezas del imperio a distancia. En este sentido se muestra la complejidad de los imperios marítimos como Inglaterra, España, Portugal o Alemania comparados contra los imperios terrestres como China, Rusia, el imperio otomano y el imperio mongol.
Me llamó la atención, como al acercarnos a la "modernidad" (es decir, a nuestros contemporáneos) muchos imperios se vieron en el conflicto de aceptar a los esclavos y súbditos como parte de la ciudadanía principal, o no hacerlo, por temor a debilitar sus raíces y su filosofía fundadora. Esta sería la idea tras la cual la segregación racial duró tanto tiempo en Estados Unidos, o Sudáfrica.
En términos generales se describen pocas cosas en común en los imperios:
- Resultan por el deseo, muchas veces desproporcionado (que se convierte en orgullo y soberbia), de "compartir" un ideal de gobierno y forma de vida con otros (que generalmente desemboca en la fuerza)
- Sirven como medio de transmisión de ideas, formas de gobierno (duh!) y tecnologías entre los pueblos que son gobernados
- Los judíos fueron expulsados por cada imperio donde tuvieron influencia, y no solo por los nazis, esto se puede deber quizás a que se percibía (y quizás la percepción es la realidad) a que este grupo étnico (no forzosamente religioso) conformaba un poder supra nacional y se veía como un imperio mismo sin fronteras (cosa que se ha expresado en muchos otros textos)
Me agradaron algunas de las conclusiones a las que se llegan:
- Los imperios que más han perdurado (particularmente el Chino) son aquellos que han aceptado y administrado mejor las diferencias.
- No es necesaria una religión unificadora del imperio. En muchos casos, como en el español, la religión resultó un freno para la ambición imperial, pese a lo que la leyenda negra pueda indicar. Por ejemplo, el reconocimiento a los indígenas de América como seres humanos con la misma dignidad ante Dios limitó (mas no eliminó) la esclavitud. Así mismo, la expulsión de otras religiones del territorio (principalmente judíos y musulmanes) del imperio contribuye a que disminuya la diversidad.
- Pero con lo anterior, también se muestra como el secularismo a ultranza, como en la URSS y Turquía funge exactamente la misma función que una religión de Estado y limita el propio crecimiento y sostenimiento del imperio.
En los puntos que creo que se queda corto el libro, es en el momento de génesis del imperio. Resulta relativamente fácil ver la situación que sigue en un imperio ya formado, como se tratan las políticas de continuidad, defensa y expansión; pero se trata muy someramente el momento de la creación: ¿qué hace a que los primeros habitantes errantes de una tribu se congreguen alrededor de un líder o caudillo? ¿cómo les vende la idea de convertirse en señores de lo que conocen? ¿En qué momento deciden convertirse en un imperio? ¿Cómo se convence a unos militares para que por medio de la fuerza excesiva dominen a pueblos, que dada su cercanía inicial, es muy probable que sean hermanos?
Finalmente, no estoy muy de acuerdo en ver a algunos imperios modernos como la continuidad del "proyecto imperial" del imperio pasado, particularmente cuando se refiere a China y Rusia. Creo que Vladimir Putin tiene muy poco que ver con Pedro el Grande o los Romanov. Lo mismo con los chinos, el actual partido comunista no creo que sea una continuación de la visión imperial de los Qin o los Yuan. Porque en algunas de las conclusiones parecería que alguien en la dinastía Qin (con su limitado conocimiento del mundo) hubiera detallado un plan de dominación mundial, lo hubiera guardado en una "cápsula del tiempo" y bajo esa filosofía el partido comunista de dos milenios después estarían realizando el plan de antaño.
May 17, 2025
De Roma até os dias atuais em menos de 600 páginas não tem como se aprofundar muito. Mas para além da escrita demasiada acadêmica faltou um pouco mais de explicações e fatos sobre os impérios
June 27, 2019
I will be honest and say I did not read it in full but read a few chapters, skimmed others and read the conclusion.
The reason I did so was because I did not feel it to be of very high interest to me. Not that the contents are badly written or that I saw huge mistakes but rather that I have read on almost every chapter more in depth research and books. What I read, read as reminders and at times shallow ones.
To me that stems from the facts that the duo of authors tries to do two things with every chapter. on the one hand they want to briefly summerize the empires to be discussed in every chapter, secondly comment on and compare two or more on the politics of difference they used. In chapters that only has two such as the continental empires Russia and the USA that works adequatly but when it becomes more then that such as the one on 19th century Africa, it results into to brief summeries or shallow comparisons.
The conclusion was on the one hand a commentary on what empires have lasted longest and the most lasting impact, with China and Russia as not that surprising victors in that regard. In addition to a rather vague suggestion on what could be learned from empires as uniters of difference and their potential for return in the future.
My overall impression was one of underwhelming. As I said I have read more detailed accounts on every empire discussed here and altough from what I read the summeries were well done, given the limited amount of space, they still left me wanting for more. More importantly was that I did not really feel the theme shining trough; yes the politics of difference was part of every analysis but again it left me wanting more. Finally I was a bit dissapointed in choises of empires, I think no analysys of empire could ever ommit the Assyrians, arguably the first empire, nor the should it ommit all Indian empires while including the British dominion over India, India has been an actor in the imperial game and one should always emphasise that when discussing Indian history.
I was propably not the right person for this book that felt geared towards a broader audiance. Therefore I feel my review is a bith to harsh; For anyone who does not read as much academic books on the subjects, this book should be a lot more interesting and rewarding to read.
The reason I did so was because I did not feel it to be of very high interest to me. Not that the contents are badly written or that I saw huge mistakes but rather that I have read on almost every chapter more in depth research and books. What I read, read as reminders and at times shallow ones.
To me that stems from the facts that the duo of authors tries to do two things with every chapter. on the one hand they want to briefly summerize the empires to be discussed in every chapter, secondly comment on and compare two or more on the politics of difference they used. In chapters that only has two such as the continental empires Russia and the USA that works adequatly but when it becomes more then that such as the one on 19th century Africa, it results into to brief summeries or shallow comparisons.
The conclusion was on the one hand a commentary on what empires have lasted longest and the most lasting impact, with China and Russia as not that surprising victors in that regard. In addition to a rather vague suggestion on what could be learned from empires as uniters of difference and their potential for return in the future.
My overall impression was one of underwhelming. As I said I have read more detailed accounts on every empire discussed here and altough from what I read the summeries were well done, given the limited amount of space, they still left me wanting for more. More importantly was that I did not really feel the theme shining trough; yes the politics of difference was part of every analysis but again it left me wanting more. Finally I was a bit dissapointed in choises of empires, I think no analysys of empire could ever ommit the Assyrians, arguably the first empire, nor the should it ommit all Indian empires while including the British dominion over India, India has been an actor in the imperial game and one should always emphasise that when discussing Indian history.
I was propably not the right person for this book that felt geared towards a broader audiance. Therefore I feel my review is a bith to harsh; For anyone who does not read as much academic books on the subjects, this book should be a lot more interesting and rewarding to read.
August 4, 2022
To start off, I am giving this 4 stars not 5, not for the quality of the thought, which is a 5, but for the quality of the writing, which is academic and precise, but also somewhat of a slog to get through at times. Not scintillating.
This is the kind of synthesis that it takes veteran historians who have accumulated years of knowledge to pull off. It is a somewhat counterintuitive study of the politics of empires across Eurasia from about 300 BC to the present. I say it is counterintuitive because it does not condemn empire. It merely tries to explain why empire has been such an enduring form of government. What strengths do empires manifest that have made them so prevalent? Today, the nation state is presumed to be the natural form of government, but the authors point out that these are a very modern phenomenon. Throughout most of history, there were city-states, tribes, kingdoms, federations, confederations and empires, which “shaped the context in which people gauged their political possibilities.” These days, it is more or less an insult to call someone an imperialist or a colonizer, but for most of history, it was, if not merely a statement of fact, perhaps a mark of achievement.
This comparative study looks at five different themes. First, the authors look at differences within empires. How did the empires try to integrate subjugated populations? Did they tend towards homogeneity, as in ancient Rome, or did they embrace difference, as did the Mongols? Second, who were the imperial intermediaries, the agents of empire? How did the center work with local elites? Third, what were the intersections between empires? How did they imitate each other, conflict, and transform? Fourth, what were the imperial imaginaries? What was the scope within which imperial leaders imagined they could run the empire? What was the role of religion or institution? What was the viewpoint of the slaver or the missionary? Lastly, what were the repertories of power? Empires have a multilayered structure; emperors could rule directly, or have partial sovereignty in different ways, and this could change strategically. Empires have been “pragmatic, interactive, accommodating.”
The book uses straightforward narrative history, in for example, looking at the results of World Wars One and Two, but the comparative chapters for me are the most informative and innovative. The book compares and contrasts ancient Rome and ancient China, the Spanish and Ottoman empires in the 16th century, how China and Russia expanded across Eurasia and eventually met, and how empire worked in 19th century America and Russia. There are great discussions of the slave trade, modern and ancient, how European empires in the “Age of Empire” compared to each other and their predecessors, and how the “Age of Empire” ended, but not really. There are fantastic insights and details. “Republican Rome did not break the powers of the richest families but contained and exploited their competition through institutionalized procedures.” Columbus thought he was going to meet the Great Khan, so he brought along a translator who spoke Arabic. Therefore, the first words spoken by a European to an American were in the language of Islam. Europeans were “Mongols of the Sea” who used better technology to give them the ability to concentrate forces and crush their opponents.
The variations in empires are richly represented. Empires can be led by emperors, dictators, monarchs, presidents, parliaments, committees or companies. It uses very big brushstrokes, but rejects broad political theories in favor of practical politics. To be honest, I’m not sure about this at all times. For example, the book downplays the importance of the Treaty of Westphalia, but I just read a book by Henry Kissinger telling me how important it was in reframing how European elites regarded state sovereignty. Also, I think that the authors would disagree with Ian Morris’ contention that the Mongols were merely a destructive force; in reality, they reunited China and connected it with Europe and the Middle East, forming a religiously tolerant and commercially vibrant polity. The book claims that the West has not been a uniquely powerful agent of change, for good or for evil. The age of empire was not very long and Europeans did not transform colonial societies as much as they hoped or their detractors said they did because of colonial resistance and a lack of resources. This directly contradicts Yuval Harari’s contention that we live in a world completely transformed by the European empires.
Speaking of the European empires, the authors make some other good points. They avoid teleology. The people who began the “European Age of Exploration” or the “European Age of Empire” were generally just individuals who were trying to get rich and whose actions had long-term impacts far beyond their imagination. Pizarro on why he conquered the Incas “I have come to take away their gold.” In turn, European leaders backed the colonizer/trade schemes because they were looking to escape constraints upon themselves in Europe such as aristocracies, city-states, and other imperial rivals. They were incorporating resources outside Europe to fight their battles within Europe, and this continued from the beginning right until World War Two. Next, Lenin was wrong. Imperialism not a result of capitalism. It far predated it. Neither was imperialism a result of enlightenment values. And those who claim that the racial hierarchies of the 19th century reinforced by ideas of scientific racism helped to justify colonialism are partially correct, but the reality on the ground was far more complicated. There ongoing discussions of how to incorporate colonized peoples in an age of European citizenship. Should subject peoples be included in the national citizenship, or should different peoples be governed differently? What rights do subjected peoples have? What were the contradictions of all this in the 18th, 19th 20th Centuries ? How about people who moved from the center to the empire?
Yuval Harari said that empires are beyond good and evil, and I think that these authors would probably agree with that, to a point. The making of them is a very bloody, unfair process and crushing opposition is necessary and brutal. However, those making the empire find people to cooperate with them. These intermediaries are essential and often willing participants. And once the empire exists, the vast majority accommodate to it. One of the great strengths of empire is the variability of how sovereignty is meted out. “Catharine the Great of Russia was at once and officially an empress, an autocrat, a tsaritsa, a lord, a grand princess, a commander, and a “possessor” of various lands and peoples.” This shifting kaleidoscope of power makes empire flexible and, in the right hands, long-lasting. Finally, when empires collapse, rarely is anyone better off. Order descends into disorder. There are great “unmixings” of people. Trade routes dry up. People tend to live poorly in weak states.
This book made me think about the process of transition from empire to democracy, and what it means to live in a multiethnic democracy. It is quite clear that the nation-state has not been nearly as common as some have claimed, somewhat of an aberration really, but that multi-ethnic states have generally been empires. Both America and Canada are multi-ethnic states managing a transition from empire to democracy, and it is an open-ended process to see how that will go. The federal system is an attempt to bridge the gap between democracy and empire, but the authors’ point about treating communities differently and working through intermediaries as being inherently destabilizing is an important one. If it is true, it means that identity politics is essentially divisive. It is basically a strategy of elite accommodation, but in a democracy if the majority get upset at others’ perceived advantages, it can bring about a populist revolt. How much unity can we expect? How much disunity can we live with? I just finished reading “The Ordeal of the Longhouse” by Daniel Richter, and he showed that the Iroquois League was just about keeping peace among the different villages and peoples, not about having any unity about anything. Maybe, long term, that is the best we can hope for.
This is the kind of synthesis that it takes veteran historians who have accumulated years of knowledge to pull off. It is a somewhat counterintuitive study of the politics of empires across Eurasia from about 300 BC to the present. I say it is counterintuitive because it does not condemn empire. It merely tries to explain why empire has been such an enduring form of government. What strengths do empires manifest that have made them so prevalent? Today, the nation state is presumed to be the natural form of government, but the authors point out that these are a very modern phenomenon. Throughout most of history, there were city-states, tribes, kingdoms, federations, confederations and empires, which “shaped the context in which people gauged their political possibilities.” These days, it is more or less an insult to call someone an imperialist or a colonizer, but for most of history, it was, if not merely a statement of fact, perhaps a mark of achievement.
This comparative study looks at five different themes. First, the authors look at differences within empires. How did the empires try to integrate subjugated populations? Did they tend towards homogeneity, as in ancient Rome, or did they embrace difference, as did the Mongols? Second, who were the imperial intermediaries, the agents of empire? How did the center work with local elites? Third, what were the intersections between empires? How did they imitate each other, conflict, and transform? Fourth, what were the imperial imaginaries? What was the scope within which imperial leaders imagined they could run the empire? What was the role of religion or institution? What was the viewpoint of the slaver or the missionary? Lastly, what were the repertories of power? Empires have a multilayered structure; emperors could rule directly, or have partial sovereignty in different ways, and this could change strategically. Empires have been “pragmatic, interactive, accommodating.”
The book uses straightforward narrative history, in for example, looking at the results of World Wars One and Two, but the comparative chapters for me are the most informative and innovative. The book compares and contrasts ancient Rome and ancient China, the Spanish and Ottoman empires in the 16th century, how China and Russia expanded across Eurasia and eventually met, and how empire worked in 19th century America and Russia. There are great discussions of the slave trade, modern and ancient, how European empires in the “Age of Empire” compared to each other and their predecessors, and how the “Age of Empire” ended, but not really. There are fantastic insights and details. “Republican Rome did not break the powers of the richest families but contained and exploited their competition through institutionalized procedures.” Columbus thought he was going to meet the Great Khan, so he brought along a translator who spoke Arabic. Therefore, the first words spoken by a European to an American were in the language of Islam. Europeans were “Mongols of the Sea” who used better technology to give them the ability to concentrate forces and crush their opponents.
The variations in empires are richly represented. Empires can be led by emperors, dictators, monarchs, presidents, parliaments, committees or companies. It uses very big brushstrokes, but rejects broad political theories in favor of practical politics. To be honest, I’m not sure about this at all times. For example, the book downplays the importance of the Treaty of Westphalia, but I just read a book by Henry Kissinger telling me how important it was in reframing how European elites regarded state sovereignty. Also, I think that the authors would disagree with Ian Morris’ contention that the Mongols were merely a destructive force; in reality, they reunited China and connected it with Europe and the Middle East, forming a religiously tolerant and commercially vibrant polity. The book claims that the West has not been a uniquely powerful agent of change, for good or for evil. The age of empire was not very long and Europeans did not transform colonial societies as much as they hoped or their detractors said they did because of colonial resistance and a lack of resources. This directly contradicts Yuval Harari’s contention that we live in a world completely transformed by the European empires.
Speaking of the European empires, the authors make some other good points. They avoid teleology. The people who began the “European Age of Exploration” or the “European Age of Empire” were generally just individuals who were trying to get rich and whose actions had long-term impacts far beyond their imagination. Pizarro on why he conquered the Incas “I have come to take away their gold.” In turn, European leaders backed the colonizer/trade schemes because they were looking to escape constraints upon themselves in Europe such as aristocracies, city-states, and other imperial rivals. They were incorporating resources outside Europe to fight their battles within Europe, and this continued from the beginning right until World War Two. Next, Lenin was wrong. Imperialism not a result of capitalism. It far predated it. Neither was imperialism a result of enlightenment values. And those who claim that the racial hierarchies of the 19th century reinforced by ideas of scientific racism helped to justify colonialism are partially correct, but the reality on the ground was far more complicated. There ongoing discussions of how to incorporate colonized peoples in an age of European citizenship. Should subject peoples be included in the national citizenship, or should different peoples be governed differently? What rights do subjected peoples have? What were the contradictions of all this in the 18th, 19th 20th Centuries ? How about people who moved from the center to the empire?
Yuval Harari said that empires are beyond good and evil, and I think that these authors would probably agree with that, to a point. The making of them is a very bloody, unfair process and crushing opposition is necessary and brutal. However, those making the empire find people to cooperate with them. These intermediaries are essential and often willing participants. And once the empire exists, the vast majority accommodate to it. One of the great strengths of empire is the variability of how sovereignty is meted out. “Catharine the Great of Russia was at once and officially an empress, an autocrat, a tsaritsa, a lord, a grand princess, a commander, and a “possessor” of various lands and peoples.” This shifting kaleidoscope of power makes empire flexible and, in the right hands, long-lasting. Finally, when empires collapse, rarely is anyone better off. Order descends into disorder. There are great “unmixings” of people. Trade routes dry up. People tend to live poorly in weak states.
This book made me think about the process of transition from empire to democracy, and what it means to live in a multiethnic democracy. It is quite clear that the nation-state has not been nearly as common as some have claimed, somewhat of an aberration really, but that multi-ethnic states have generally been empires. Both America and Canada are multi-ethnic states managing a transition from empire to democracy, and it is an open-ended process to see how that will go. The federal system is an attempt to bridge the gap between democracy and empire, but the authors’ point about treating communities differently and working through intermediaries as being inherently destabilizing is an important one. If it is true, it means that identity politics is essentially divisive. It is basically a strategy of elite accommodation, but in a democracy if the majority get upset at others’ perceived advantages, it can bring about a populist revolt. How much unity can we expect? How much disunity can we live with? I just finished reading “The Ordeal of the Longhouse” by Daniel Richter, and he showed that the Iroquois League was just about keeping peace among the different villages and peoples, not about having any unity about anything. Maybe, long term, that is the best we can hope for.
November 22, 2017
There are a number of places in this book where I felt the authors let their criticisms of the US, and to a lesser extent of Europe, get out of balance with their criticisms of non-Western empires. E.g. there seemed to be an emphasis on the (well-studied, "popular") failings of Western colonialism but Ottoman and Chinese (historical and current) population destruction, movements, etc. were treated... blandly? Uncritically (in the common sense of the word)? This is perhaps the result of bias: as Americans (as I am) it is easier and more comfortable (in the dominant academic and progressive culture, clearly not in conservative or reactionary segments) to "judge" ourselves.
To be clear (see 5 stars) this did not diminish the book greatly, in my view, but it did stick out in a number of places. That critique aside, this book explores how empires have managed people throughout history and indirectly (and in one or two places in the conclusion more directly) asks the questions, "Were/are empires all bad?" and, "What has nationalism/the nation-state gotten wrong?"
To be clear (see 5 stars) this did not diminish the book greatly, in my view, but it did stick out in a number of places. That critique aside, this book explores how empires have managed people throughout history and indirectly (and in one or two places in the conclusion more directly) asks the questions, "Were/are empires all bad?" and, "What has nationalism/the nation-state gotten wrong?"
January 3, 2018
It's dense, it's comprehensive, and it's a great overview of all aspects of empire, in all its forms, over the last 2000 years. If you're a student of history, there will be much in here that is familiar, but it's an excellent synthesis that leaves no stone un-turned in its examination of the mechanics behind running huge polities. That said, it's also an awkward examination; the shape and size of the book isn't conducive to easy reading.
January 29, 2018
Wonderful reference book for anyone wanting a more thematic view of world history. The author is very open about not covering every aspect of world history, but examining empires that aren't normally compared in World History class.
April 26, 2025
If you're looking for a comprehensive book on Empires in world history, I suggest you look elsewhere.
The authors rightfully point out that they don't cover all empires in world history. Rather, just the important ones in Eurasia. This approach is already an issue as the reader gets a patchy understanding of how empires evolved in history, where key empires that played a role are often only briefly mentioned and are often left out of the narrative.
For the empires that the authors selected, the authors don't give you a complete picture of these empires. They go in-depth into how each empire governs but the narrative of each empires is often left out and one doesn't learn much about an empire's evolution over time. What makes it worse is that the authors often study snapshots of an empire, leaving the rest of the story out.
The way the authors analyse each empire is also confusing. They do not take the same approach to choose a few topics to study for each empire to illustrate clear markers of analysis. For example, they inexplicably obsess over slavery for the American and European empires, while omitting to focus on other key aspects. What makes it worse is the writing style. While the book's organisation makes sense to study an empire or two in each chapter, the organisation within each chapter is jumbled up and has no clear organisation. Information isn't organised chronologically nor is there a logical flow. The writing is also often written as a stream of consciousness (which is surprising when there are two authors writing the book).
Ultimately, while Darwin's earlier work stumbled in this aspect slightly, this book is even worse in making broad overtures and statements, particularly talking about how states used power. There are too many of these broad analyses that veer more towards theoretical analysis of the social sciences than historical study. This stumbling block could point to a potential flaw in world history. In attempting to describe global phenomena, authors end up trying to squeeze out commonalities among states around the world in a given period and end up covering up their narrow historical evidence with theoretical and philosophical meandering
The authors rightfully point out that they don't cover all empires in world history. Rather, just the important ones in Eurasia. This approach is already an issue as the reader gets a patchy understanding of how empires evolved in history, where key empires that played a role are often only briefly mentioned and are often left out of the narrative.
For the empires that the authors selected, the authors don't give you a complete picture of these empires. They go in-depth into how each empire governs but the narrative of each empires is often left out and one doesn't learn much about an empire's evolution over time. What makes it worse is that the authors often study snapshots of an empire, leaving the rest of the story out.
The way the authors analyse each empire is also confusing. They do not take the same approach to choose a few topics to study for each empire to illustrate clear markers of analysis. For example, they inexplicably obsess over slavery for the American and European empires, while omitting to focus on other key aspects. What makes it worse is the writing style. While the book's organisation makes sense to study an empire or two in each chapter, the organisation within each chapter is jumbled up and has no clear organisation. Information isn't organised chronologically nor is there a logical flow. The writing is also often written as a stream of consciousness (which is surprising when there are two authors writing the book).
Ultimately, while Darwin's earlier work stumbled in this aspect slightly, this book is even worse in making broad overtures and statements, particularly talking about how states used power. There are too many of these broad analyses that veer more towards theoretical analysis of the social sciences than historical study. This stumbling block could point to a potential flaw in world history. In attempting to describe global phenomena, authors end up trying to squeeze out commonalities among states around the world in a given period and end up covering up their narrow historical evidence with theoretical and philosophical meandering
September 28, 2025
Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper’s Empires in World History is one of those rare works that takes the longue durée seriously without collapsing into a vague litany of names and dates. Their thesis—that empire, not nation-state, has been the default mode of political organization across most of history—is both persuasive and destabilizing.
By juxtaposing Mongols with Ottomans, Romans with British, and Tsarist Russia with the United States, Burbank and Cooper disrupt the triumphalist narrative of modernity as a linear march toward liberal nationhood. They bring into focus how empires have been not merely engines of conquest but also laboratories of governance, using differential citizenship, religious toleration, or brutal assimilation to hold together vast and diverse territories.
Their work is highly synoptic yet precise; one feels the disciplinary breadth of two historians who are equally at home in African and Eurasian contexts.
The book’s most powerful contribution is to reframe global history as an ongoing negotiation between integration and differentiation, coercion and consent, rather than as a story of national awakening.
This is not an abstract argument; it subtly illuminates the present by suggesting that our contemporary “international order” rests on imperial legacies disguised as global norms.
By juxtaposing Mongols with Ottomans, Romans with British, and Tsarist Russia with the United States, Burbank and Cooper disrupt the triumphalist narrative of modernity as a linear march toward liberal nationhood. They bring into focus how empires have been not merely engines of conquest but also laboratories of governance, using differential citizenship, religious toleration, or brutal assimilation to hold together vast and diverse territories.
Their work is highly synoptic yet precise; one feels the disciplinary breadth of two historians who are equally at home in African and Eurasian contexts.
The book’s most powerful contribution is to reframe global history as an ongoing negotiation between integration and differentiation, coercion and consent, rather than as a story of national awakening.
This is not an abstract argument; it subtly illuminates the present by suggesting that our contemporary “international order” rests on imperial legacies disguised as global norms.
July 2, 2021
A fluid read; quality material mainly because of the differential yet coherent perspective of the author regarding many historical events-- the anthropological approach when put together with the cultural, macroeconomic, and unavoidably political context is able to offer original and interesting views even on "mundane" historical events.
The book is able to make the reader develop a more realistic view of how one should think about historical events, critically entertaining a variety of socio-cultural contexts-- resulting in a critically flexibile view of historical events as whole; the many variables and plethora of possible interpretations of any historical event gives us an important perceptionist view, unlike so many monotonous and pretentiously axiomatic didactic books.
I didn't give 5 stars for two reasons: The prose eventually feels repetitive, and because the author could've written in a way to instigate more people to learn about how to "get there" and instigate readers to make their own critical analysis of a subject; thus the book would be way less repetitive, concise, and likely no longer than 300 pages.
All in all, it's a must-read for people interested in an analytical approach concerning inherent human behavior and its consequences; history.
The book is able to make the reader develop a more realistic view of how one should think about historical events, critically entertaining a variety of socio-cultural contexts-- resulting in a critically flexibile view of historical events as whole; the many variables and plethora of possible interpretations of any historical event gives us an important perceptionist view, unlike so many monotonous and pretentiously axiomatic didactic books.
I didn't give 5 stars for two reasons: The prose eventually feels repetitive, and because the author could've written in a way to instigate more people to learn about how to "get there" and instigate readers to make their own critical analysis of a subject; thus the book would be way less repetitive, concise, and likely no longer than 300 pages.
All in all, it's a must-read for people interested in an analytical approach concerning inherent human behavior and its consequences; history.
January 11, 2021
I don’t tend to really enjoy broad global history over more focused and deep studies. However, this work was well written and kept my attention fairly well, while maintaining the through line that empires deal in « the politics of difference. »
Am empire, according to B&C, is a large political unit, expansionist or with a memory of expansion, in which distinction and or hierarchy is maintained as new groups are incorporated - in other words, empires govern different people differently (8).
B&C envision two ideal types of empire - patrimonial (in which power extends from the person and/or household of the ruler, and is thus characterized primarily by vertical, often interpersonal connections with the emperor) and class hierarchy (in which ties between members of a class are stronger than between classes; these are characterized by horizontal, as opposed to vertical, arrangements of affinity, still with the emperor at the top but with more emphasis on the hierarchy and less on the interpersonal links) (146).
Am empire, according to B&C, is a large political unit, expansionist or with a memory of expansion, in which distinction and or hierarchy is maintained as new groups are incorporated - in other words, empires govern different people differently (8).
B&C envision two ideal types of empire - patrimonial (in which power extends from the person and/or household of the ruler, and is thus characterized primarily by vertical, often interpersonal connections with the emperor) and class hierarchy (in which ties between members of a class are stronger than between classes; these are characterized by horizontal, as opposed to vertical, arrangements of affinity, still with the emperor at the top but with more emphasis on the hierarchy and less on the interpersonal links) (146).
July 22, 2023
Esse livro é muito bom para quem está na área da ciência política ou afins. Seu recorte metodológico foca nos Impérios, como diz o próprio nome do livro, europeus e asiáticos, trazendo perspectivas acadêmicas mais atualizadas sobre estes temas. A pesquisa foi bastante fundamentada, bem embasada, e a escrita, embora familiar para o estudante de mestrado ou doutorado, não torna a leitura enfadonha.
Todavia, é uma leitura cansativa para quem se propõe a lê-lo como base para estudos sérios, principalmente por ter quase mil páginas. Mesmo assim, deixo aqui minha recomendação.
Todavia, é uma leitura cansativa para quem se propõe a lê-lo como base para estudos sérios, principalmente por ter quase mil páginas. Mesmo assim, deixo aqui minha recomendação.
July 5, 2024
Its written in a way which makes it easy to understand and follow, and not making the language unnecessary complicated.
It is also not very eurocentric and gives solid info about many great empires throughout the world.
It is also not very eurocentric and gives solid info about many great empires throughout the world.
August 20, 2024
Es interesante describir la historia no terminos de fechas y personas; sino de megaestructuras desarrolladas por el hombre, y el analisis de por que alguna socidades o imperios logran una adaptacion mejor que otras a sus entornos
May 25, 2019
Made a good description for “what is empire”
Read
September 23, 2020Interesting view of world history
December 25, 2021
Read through page 250, then sections on the British and French empires.
To be returned to in full at a later date.
To be returned to in full at a later date.
April 7, 2024
Clear and depth explanation about Impires
Highly recommended, this book explain very clear all topics about Impires and its influence and its impact in the currently society
Highly recommended, this book explain very clear all topics about Impires and its influence and its impact in the currently society
April 21, 2025
不同於一般的視角，對俄羅斯的看法，有其特殊。每章所提供的對比分析挺不錯，至少願意嘗試兩國/區域的跨時代比較。然而，對於帝國的分析，可能因為涵蓋所有範圍，顯得雜多而難有系統性的理解脈絡。
August 29, 2025
An academic text for school, but a fundamental assessment on the concept of State and Empire. A poignant warning on the evanescent concept of State and its unavoidable collapse.
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