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Luis de Molina: The Life and Theology of the Founder of Middle Knowledge
When Luis de Molina died in Madrid in 1600, he had every reason to believe he was about to be anathametized by Pope Clement VIII. The Protestant Reformation was splitting Europe, tribunals of the Inquisition met regularly in a dozen Spanish cities, and the Pope had launched a commission two years earlier to investigate Molina’s writings.
Molina was eventually vindicated, though the decision came seven years after his death. In the centuries that followed Molina was relegated to relatively minor status in the history of theology until a renaissance of interest in recent years. His doctrine of God’s “middle knowledge,” in particular, has been appropriated by a number of current philosophers and theologians, with apologist William Lane Craig calling it “one of the most fruitful theological ideas ever conceived.”
In Luis de The Life and Theology of the Founder of Middle Knowledge, author Kirk R. MacGregor outlines the main contours of Molina’s subtle and far-reaching philosophical theology, covering his views on God’s foreknowledge, salvation and predestination, poverty and obedience, and social justice. Drawing on writings of Molina never translated into English, MacGregor also provides insight into the experiences that shaped Molina, recounting the events of a life fully as dramatic as any of the Protestant Reformers.
With implications for topics as wide-ranging as biblical inerrancy, creation and evolution, the relationship between Christianity and world religions, the problem of evil, and quantum indeterminacy, Molina’s thought remains as fresh and relevant as ever. Most significantly, perhaps, it continues to offer the possibility of a rapprochement between Calvinism and Arminianism, a view of salvation that fully upholds both God’s predestination and human free will.
As the first full-length work ever published on Molina, Kirk MacGregor’s Luis de Molina provides an accessible and insightful introduction for scholars, students, and armchair theologians alike.
Molina was eventually vindicated, though the decision came seven years after his death. In the centuries that followed Molina was relegated to relatively minor status in the history of theology until a renaissance of interest in recent years. His doctrine of God’s “middle knowledge,” in particular, has been appropriated by a number of current philosophers and theologians, with apologist William Lane Craig calling it “one of the most fruitful theological ideas ever conceived.”
In Luis de The Life and Theology of the Founder of Middle Knowledge, author Kirk R. MacGregor outlines the main contours of Molina’s subtle and far-reaching philosophical theology, covering his views on God’s foreknowledge, salvation and predestination, poverty and obedience, and social justice. Drawing on writings of Molina never translated into English, MacGregor also provides insight into the experiences that shaped Molina, recounting the events of a life fully as dramatic as any of the Protestant Reformers.
With implications for topics as wide-ranging as biblical inerrancy, creation and evolution, the relationship between Christianity and world religions, the problem of evil, and quantum indeterminacy, Molina’s thought remains as fresh and relevant as ever. Most significantly, perhaps, it continues to offer the possibility of a rapprochement between Calvinism and Arminianism, a view of salvation that fully upholds both God’s predestination and human free will.
As the first full-length work ever published on Molina, Kirk MacGregor’s Luis de Molina provides an accessible and insightful introduction for scholars, students, and armchair theologians alike.
288 pages, Kindle Edition
First published November 3, 2015
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October 7, 2019
Middle knowledge is the most impressive and elegant idea I've encountered for reconciling the Scriptural truths of both divine sovereignty and human freedom. If you've rejected Molinism because you're a Calvinist, you have an obligation to read this book. You'll be surprised what you find.
Notes:
Nook
Middle knowledge is God's knowledge of all things that would happen in every possible set of circumstances, both things that are determined to occur by those circumstances and things that are not determined to occur by those circumstances (13)
God can create a world providentially planned to the last detail where his purposes are achieved through free creaturely decisions and random events (13)
It should be emphasized that little in Molina's thought is specifically Roman Catholic in its orientation; indeed, much of Molina's thought stood in directly opposition to the Catholicism of his day (14)
Personal note: Middle knowledge compatible with Reformed theology? (15)
Misconception 1: Molina is only for Catholics (17)
Misconception 2: Molina is a slightly more philosophically sophisticated version of Arminius. (19)
Key difference between Arminiusand Molina on middle knowledge, Molina's conception is God knows conditionals logically prior to creation. (21)
Molina believed that making middle knowledge depend on potential created beings undermined divine perfection, since it insinuated that God needs created beings to to be omniscient (21)
Rather , Molina bases middle knowledge squarely on God 's nature, specific God 's innate and timelessly present attribute of omniscience (22)
Misconception 3: Molina stifled God's sovereignty
Molina objected that any system of salvation in which God is put in a position where creatures can compel God to save them constituents a violation of God 's sovereignty (25)
Thus an agent is called free who, with all the prerequisites for action taken into account , is able to act and able not to act, or is able to do something in such a way that he is also able to do some contrary thing (58)
Molina deduced, along with Calvin, that humans left to their own devices could not freely choose salvation. But contra Calvin, Molina believed that God's sufficient grace for salvation given to all humans by the Holy Spirit -- namely, God 's prevenient grace -- supernaturally restored their mental faculty to choose spiritual good. Hence Molina's doctrine of justification maintained that while anyone human we’ve could freely embrace Christ , this was only possible through the grace of God, without which no one could embrace Christ (76)
Molina held to double predestination? (78)
Molina agreed that good works were a logically necessary condition of salvation, such that it is impossible for anyone to possess salvation without good works. On the other hand, Molina denied that works were a casually necessary condition to salvation , such that works are not the means by which salvation is achieved (80)
Middle `election is God 's prevolitional knowledge of all true counterfactuals (93)
God apprehended the truth value of all counterfactuals, or conditional propositions in the subjunctive mood (93)
If this, then that (93)
Thus included in God's middle knowledge is God's awareness of what all possible individually with libertarian freedom 9 freely do in any set of circumstances in which they find themselves as well as how completely random, chance events would turn out in any possible set of circumstances (93)
Biblical examples of middle knowledge (95)
As Luther summarized: "So the foreknowledge and omnipotence of God are diametrically opposed to our 'free-will'" (99)
In contrast to Luther and Calvin, Molina placed God's counterfactual knowledge logically prior to the divine creative decree (100)
It is logically impossible to determine that a libertarian creature freely does something says that it cannot do otherwise or to determine that a stochastic (utterly random) process contingently turn out in a certain way such that it could not turn out otherwise (101)
Circumstances do not determine. There are logically possible worlds where Peter does not deny Christ in identical circumstances (105)
Did I misunderstand? "there remains a contingent fact of the matter that if Peter's essence were instantiated in these circumstances, then Peter would indeterministically deny Jesus" (105)
We may now illustrate Molina's structure of omniscience with the following enumeration of its logical moments: 1. Natural knowledge: God's knowledge of all possible truths and therefore of all possible worlds (i.e. logically consistent sets of possible circumstances) 2. Middle knowledge : God's knowledge of all counterfactual truths and the of all feasible worlds (i.e. logically consistent sets of circumstances compatible with the decision springing from libertarian freedom and the actions springing from natural randomness) 3. Free knowledge: God's knowledge of all actual truths (past, present, and future) in the world he has chosen to create (106)
Here it should be stressed that Molina's doctrine of middle knowledge carries with it a conceptualist model of divine cognition rather than a perceptualist model of divine cognition. On the perceptualist model, God derives his knowledge by looking and seeing what exists...God 's knowledge is self-contained and should be construed on the analogy of a mind's knowledge of innate ideas (107)
As the omniscient being, God essentially possesses the attribute of knowing all truths; there exist counterfactual truths; therefore God knows all counterfactual truths. Craig has shown that one can employ this fact about omniscience to construct a philosophical argument that, if successful, proves that God has middle knowledge. The argument, in modified form, runs as follows:
1. If there exist counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creatures (known as “counterfactuals of creaturely freedom”) and counterfactual truths aboutstochastic processes (which we may call “counterfactuals of natural randomness”), then the omniscient God knows these truths.
2. There exist counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creatures andstochastic processes.
3. If God knows counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creatures and stochastic processes, then God knows them either logically prior to the divine creative decree or only logically posterior to the divine creative decree.
4. Counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creatures and stochastic processes cannot be known only logically posterior to the divine creative decree.
5. Therefore God knows counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creaturesand stochastic processes (from 1 and 2).
6. Therefore God knows counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creatures and stochastic processes either logically prior to the divine creative decree or only logically posterior to the divine creative decree (from 3 and 5).
7. Therefore God knows counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creatures and stochastic processes logically prior to the divine creative decree (from 4 and 6), which is the sum and substance of middle knowledge.
The grounding objection holds that there is no ground or basis on which God could have middle knowledge (109)
The ground of middle knowledge is God's omniscience, from which middle knowledge follows deductively (109)
Here we detect a further refutation of the grounding objection, as we may say that Molina grounded middle knowledge in God 's cognitive ability to comprehend perfectly his own creative aptitude and power (111)
knowledge is not causally determinative (113)
Summary of middle knowledge (113)
God causes everything to happen by concurring with the choices of free individually and stochastic processes in producing their effects. however, God does this in a way that preserves contingency, including human freedom and indeterminacy in the natural world (121)
At this point Molina drew on what contemporary philosophers call the distinction between strong and weak actualization (or causation). An agent strongly actualizes (or strongly causes) an event if and only if the agent causally determines the event's obtaining (123)
God causes everything in the world either strongly or weakly (124)
Molina insisted that every evil act is weakly caused by God , whereas every good act is either weakly or strongly caused by God. Hence God causes, either indirectly or directly , every action without being the author of evil or standing morally responsible for evil (124)
Molina insisted it is obvious that a God who can infallibly control every libertarian free creaturely action and random natural event without compromising that freedom and randomness is more sovereign than a God who can only control every creaturely action or natural event if creatures lack libertarian freedom and natural processes lack randomness (131)
God always answers our prayer when it's good for us. When he doesn't, we can know that it would not have been good for us (141)
"in formulating his doctrine of predestination, Molina attempted to reconcile three sets of biblical texts -- passages affirming sovereign individually predestination, passages affirming libertarian human freedom, and passages affirming God 's universal salvific will" (148)
Molina insisted that because of the effects of the fall, no one can come to Christ by their own devices. Rather for anyone to come to Christ , God must first give that individually a new, soft heart and a new spirit to replace the old, stony heart and dead spirit wrought by the fall. Hence prior grace given by the Holy Spirit, which Molina called prevenient grace, sufficient grace, or grace making gracious, is necessary for anyone to receive Christ (151)
"For if our freely believing in Christ is the reason why God predestines us, then it is we who, in effect, predestine ourselves by our faith rather than God 's predestining us" (152)
Molina declared that "foreseen faith cannot be the ground of justification or predestination, as affirming otherwise would undermine the face-value implication that God's decree" to elect Jacob and elect Jacob and reprobate Esau dd not take into account any future good or evil acts on their part, such as belief or unbelief" (152)
Consequently, Molina was a firm believer in unconditional election, holding that God elects purely according to his pleasure without regard to any foreseen faith or good works and reprobates without regard to any foreseen unbelief or sins (153)
"...the foreknowledge described in Romans 8:29-30 and 1 Peter 1:1-2 amount to God 's prior relational knowledge of the persons whom he would predestine" (155)
Putting these passages from Ezekiel together, it followed for Molina that anyone could freely choose to cooperate with preventive grace which iteslf supplied their libertarian freedom, and thereby receive its benefits of new spiritual birth (the new heart and the new spirit). (157)
Personal note: the above seems contradictory to unconditional election. I look forward to some attempt at resolution
aS cRAIG EXPLAINS, "mOLINSA REJECTS As CALVINISTic and heretical the view ... that God gatuitously chooses certain persons to be saved and others to be damned and then premoves each elect person's will to produce saving faith, while living the non-elect in sin, so that the elect are subjects of predestination while the non-elect are subjects of reprobation" (157)
Doctrine of transworld damnation. formulated by William lane Craig and held by several contemporary Molinists, the doctrine of transworld damnation affirms that God has so providentially ordered things that any one who was lost in the actual world would have been lost in any feasible world that God could create (159) Molina himself did not hold
Molina insisted that predestination was unconditional. He proposed that god's unconditional predestination is accomplished when, in making his sovereign providential choice of which of these equally good feasible worlds to create, God does not take into consideration any particular individuals Salvation, damnation, or nonexistence. Without regard for any possible individuals salvific status or existence coma God chooses the physical world he desires as a sheer act of his sovereign T . Any individual who would freely choose to embrace god's offer of Salvation in the world God selects is the pre destined to Salvation and so we elected by God, even though God could have just as easily selected an equally good world in which that same individual would freely choose to reject god's author of Salvation or a different equally good world in which that same individual would not exist (160)
Search Molina this doctrine of predestination is entirely harmonious with libertarian freedom, and the respective sets of biblical texts teaching individual predestination and human freedom maybe simultaneously affirmed at face value (161) Personal note: unconditional because God ordains worlds. Any elect person could just as easily have been reprobate had God chosen otherwise. Yet the agents are free in the libertarian sense
Personal note: In this way Molina is very Calvinistic. He affirms both unconditional election and libertarian freedom.
Thus far, Molina agreed entirely with Calvin. The difficulty Molina had with Calvin lay in his further contention that God deterministically controls the means by which the salvation of the elect is accomplished (186)
Molina charged Calvin with confusion sing certainty with necessity (186)
God knows via his middle knowledge that the proposition, "The elect will be saved" is in fact true, even though it could have been false. In sum, it is certain that the elect will be saved contingently (186)
Our libertarian freedom, bestowed in creationa nd regained by preveniant grace...
In other words,, while God gives all persons a completely sufficient grace for salvation, God gives the elect a grace that is so perfectly adapted to their unique characters, temperaments, and situation s that they infallibly yet freely respond affirmatively to its influence (262)
In sum, since what the Reformed tradition historically denounced as middle knowledge was not Molina's doctrine of middle knowledge, and since Arminian tradition has never disclaimed Molina's doctrine of middle knowledge, their is no reason why member of both traditions cannot draw on it as a rapprochement (275)
Molinism gives the Christian the "best of both worlds" of Calvinism and Arminianism and , in the process , removes the motivation and appeal of open theism. Per Calvinism, one retains God's sovereignty over every detail of the world, good and evil. One also retains unconditional, individual election, where God chooses (but in no way determines or is morally responsible for) who is saved and who is lost. For any possible person, God can choose to actualize a world in which he is freely saved or a world in which he is freely lost. God could also choose not to create that person at all. The decision is entirely the result of God's good pleasure. Per Arminianism, one retains God's genuine desire to save all persons and the libertarian freedom of all persons. If there existed a feasible world where all the lost people in this world were freely saved and all the saved people in this world were freely saved, God would have created it. However, God middle-knows that such a world is impossible given libertarian human freedom, Thus necessitating god's choice of who is saved and who was lost. But this choice, based as it is on middle knowledge, exerts no causal power over any one's salvation or damnation, as knowledge is not causally determinative. God gives everyone sufficient grace for Salvation, such that each person has an equal chance to be saved. Each person then freely embraces or freely rejects that saving grace (276)
Molina formulated a logically consider stent and highly compelling account of divine omniscience that successfully reconciles full-blown divine sovereignty and full-blow human freedom. To date, it is the only account proposed that enjoys this significant theological benefit (293)
Hence on Molinism (1) passages teaching God's predestination of individuals (2) passages teaching God's all-encompassing providence (3) passages teaching genuine human freedom, and (4) passages teaching God's universal salvifc will may all be simultaneously taken at face value (293)
Notes:
Nook
Middle knowledge is God's knowledge of all things that would happen in every possible set of circumstances, both things that are determined to occur by those circumstances and things that are not determined to occur by those circumstances (13)
God can create a world providentially planned to the last detail where his purposes are achieved through free creaturely decisions and random events (13)
It should be emphasized that little in Molina's thought is specifically Roman Catholic in its orientation; indeed, much of Molina's thought stood in directly opposition to the Catholicism of his day (14)
Personal note: Middle knowledge compatible with Reformed theology? (15)
Misconception 1: Molina is only for Catholics (17)
Misconception 2: Molina is a slightly more philosophically sophisticated version of Arminius. (19)
Key difference between Arminiusand Molina on middle knowledge, Molina's conception is God knows conditionals logically prior to creation. (21)
Molina believed that making middle knowledge depend on potential created beings undermined divine perfection, since it insinuated that God needs created beings to to be omniscient (21)
Rather , Molina bases middle knowledge squarely on God 's nature, specific God 's innate and timelessly present attribute of omniscience (22)
Misconception 3: Molina stifled God's sovereignty
Molina objected that any system of salvation in which God is put in a position where creatures can compel God to save them constituents a violation of God 's sovereignty (25)
Thus an agent is called free who, with all the prerequisites for action taken into account , is able to act and able not to act, or is able to do something in such a way that he is also able to do some contrary thing (58)
Molina deduced, along with Calvin, that humans left to their own devices could not freely choose salvation. But contra Calvin, Molina believed that God's sufficient grace for salvation given to all humans by the Holy Spirit -- namely, God 's prevenient grace -- supernaturally restored their mental faculty to choose spiritual good. Hence Molina's doctrine of justification maintained that while anyone human we’ve could freely embrace Christ , this was only possible through the grace of God, without which no one could embrace Christ (76)
Molina held to double predestination? (78)
Molina agreed that good works were a logically necessary condition of salvation, such that it is impossible for anyone to possess salvation without good works. On the other hand, Molina denied that works were a casually necessary condition to salvation , such that works are not the means by which salvation is achieved (80)
Middle `election is God 's prevolitional knowledge of all true counterfactuals (93)
God apprehended the truth value of all counterfactuals, or conditional propositions in the subjunctive mood (93)
If this, then that (93)
Thus included in God's middle knowledge is God's awareness of what all possible individually with libertarian freedom 9 freely do in any set of circumstances in which they find themselves as well as how completely random, chance events would turn out in any possible set of circumstances (93)
Biblical examples of middle knowledge (95)
As Luther summarized: "So the foreknowledge and omnipotence of God are diametrically opposed to our 'free-will'" (99)
In contrast to Luther and Calvin, Molina placed God's counterfactual knowledge logically prior to the divine creative decree (100)
It is logically impossible to determine that a libertarian creature freely does something says that it cannot do otherwise or to determine that a stochastic (utterly random) process contingently turn out in a certain way such that it could not turn out otherwise (101)
Circumstances do not determine. There are logically possible worlds where Peter does not deny Christ in identical circumstances (105)
Did I misunderstand? "there remains a contingent fact of the matter that if Peter's essence were instantiated in these circumstances, then Peter would indeterministically deny Jesus" (105)
We may now illustrate Molina's structure of omniscience with the following enumeration of its logical moments: 1. Natural knowledge: God's knowledge of all possible truths and therefore of all possible worlds (i.e. logically consistent sets of possible circumstances) 2. Middle knowledge : God's knowledge of all counterfactual truths and the of all feasible worlds (i.e. logically consistent sets of circumstances compatible with the decision springing from libertarian freedom and the actions springing from natural randomness) 3. Free knowledge: God's knowledge of all actual truths (past, present, and future) in the world he has chosen to create (106)
Here it should be stressed that Molina's doctrine of middle knowledge carries with it a conceptualist model of divine cognition rather than a perceptualist model of divine cognition. On the perceptualist model, God derives his knowledge by looking and seeing what exists...God 's knowledge is self-contained and should be construed on the analogy of a mind's knowledge of innate ideas (107)
As the omniscient being, God essentially possesses the attribute of knowing all truths; there exist counterfactual truths; therefore God knows all counterfactual truths. Craig has shown that one can employ this fact about omniscience to construct a philosophical argument that, if successful, proves that God has middle knowledge. The argument, in modified form, runs as follows:
1. If there exist counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creatures (known as “counterfactuals of creaturely freedom”) and counterfactual truths aboutstochastic processes (which we may call “counterfactuals of natural randomness”), then the omniscient God knows these truths.
2. There exist counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creatures andstochastic processes.
3. If God knows counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creatures and stochastic processes, then God knows them either logically prior to the divine creative decree or only logically posterior to the divine creative decree.
4. Counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creatures and stochastic processes cannot be known only logically posterior to the divine creative decree.
5. Therefore God knows counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creaturesand stochastic processes (from 1 and 2).
6. Therefore God knows counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creatures and stochastic processes either logically prior to the divine creative decree or only logically posterior to the divine creative decree (from 3 and 5).
7. Therefore God knows counterfactual truths about the actions of libertarian creatures and stochastic processes logically prior to the divine creative decree (from 4 and 6), which is the sum and substance of middle knowledge.
The grounding objection holds that there is no ground or basis on which God could have middle knowledge (109)
The ground of middle knowledge is God's omniscience, from which middle knowledge follows deductively (109)
Here we detect a further refutation of the grounding objection, as we may say that Molina grounded middle knowledge in God 's cognitive ability to comprehend perfectly his own creative aptitude and power (111)
knowledge is not causally determinative (113)
Summary of middle knowledge (113)
God causes everything to happen by concurring with the choices of free individually and stochastic processes in producing their effects. however, God does this in a way that preserves contingency, including human freedom and indeterminacy in the natural world (121)
At this point Molina drew on what contemporary philosophers call the distinction between strong and weak actualization (or causation). An agent strongly actualizes (or strongly causes) an event if and only if the agent causally determines the event's obtaining (123)
God causes everything in the world either strongly or weakly (124)
Molina insisted that every evil act is weakly caused by God , whereas every good act is either weakly or strongly caused by God. Hence God causes, either indirectly or directly , every action without being the author of evil or standing morally responsible for evil (124)
Molina insisted it is obvious that a God who can infallibly control every libertarian free creaturely action and random natural event without compromising that freedom and randomness is more sovereign than a God who can only control every creaturely action or natural event if creatures lack libertarian freedom and natural processes lack randomness (131)
God always answers our prayer when it's good for us. When he doesn't, we can know that it would not have been good for us (141)
"in formulating his doctrine of predestination, Molina attempted to reconcile three sets of biblical texts -- passages affirming sovereign individually predestination, passages affirming libertarian human freedom, and passages affirming God 's universal salvific will" (148)
Molina insisted that because of the effects of the fall, no one can come to Christ by their own devices. Rather for anyone to come to Christ , God must first give that individually a new, soft heart and a new spirit to replace the old, stony heart and dead spirit wrought by the fall. Hence prior grace given by the Holy Spirit, which Molina called prevenient grace, sufficient grace, or grace making gracious, is necessary for anyone to receive Christ (151)
"For if our freely believing in Christ is the reason why God predestines us, then it is we who, in effect, predestine ourselves by our faith rather than God 's predestining us" (152)
Molina declared that "foreseen faith cannot be the ground of justification or predestination, as affirming otherwise would undermine the face-value implication that God's decree" to elect Jacob and elect Jacob and reprobate Esau dd not take into account any future good or evil acts on their part, such as belief or unbelief" (152)
Consequently, Molina was a firm believer in unconditional election, holding that God elects purely according to his pleasure without regard to any foreseen faith or good works and reprobates without regard to any foreseen unbelief or sins (153)
"...the foreknowledge described in Romans 8:29-30 and 1 Peter 1:1-2 amount to God 's prior relational knowledge of the persons whom he would predestine" (155)
Putting these passages from Ezekiel together, it followed for Molina that anyone could freely choose to cooperate with preventive grace which iteslf supplied their libertarian freedom, and thereby receive its benefits of new spiritual birth (the new heart and the new spirit). (157)
Personal note: the above seems contradictory to unconditional election. I look forward to some attempt at resolution
aS cRAIG EXPLAINS, "mOLINSA REJECTS As CALVINISTic and heretical the view ... that God gatuitously chooses certain persons to be saved and others to be damned and then premoves each elect person's will to produce saving faith, while living the non-elect in sin, so that the elect are subjects of predestination while the non-elect are subjects of reprobation" (157)
Doctrine of transworld damnation. formulated by William lane Craig and held by several contemporary Molinists, the doctrine of transworld damnation affirms that God has so providentially ordered things that any one who was lost in the actual world would have been lost in any feasible world that God could create (159) Molina himself did not hold
Molina insisted that predestination was unconditional. He proposed that god's unconditional predestination is accomplished when, in making his sovereign providential choice of which of these equally good feasible worlds to create, God does not take into consideration any particular individuals Salvation, damnation, or nonexistence. Without regard for any possible individuals salvific status or existence coma God chooses the physical world he desires as a sheer act of his sovereign T . Any individual who would freely choose to embrace god's offer of Salvation in the world God selects is the pre destined to Salvation and so we elected by God, even though God could have just as easily selected an equally good world in which that same individual would freely choose to reject god's author of Salvation or a different equally good world in which that same individual would not exist (160)
Search Molina this doctrine of predestination is entirely harmonious with libertarian freedom, and the respective sets of biblical texts teaching individual predestination and human freedom maybe simultaneously affirmed at face value (161) Personal note: unconditional because God ordains worlds. Any elect person could just as easily have been reprobate had God chosen otherwise. Yet the agents are free in the libertarian sense
Personal note: In this way Molina is very Calvinistic. He affirms both unconditional election and libertarian freedom.
Thus far, Molina agreed entirely with Calvin. The difficulty Molina had with Calvin lay in his further contention that God deterministically controls the means by which the salvation of the elect is accomplished (186)
Molina charged Calvin with confusion sing certainty with necessity (186)
God knows via his middle knowledge that the proposition, "The elect will be saved" is in fact true, even though it could have been false. In sum, it is certain that the elect will be saved contingently (186)
Our libertarian freedom, bestowed in creationa nd regained by preveniant grace...
In other words,, while God gives all persons a completely sufficient grace for salvation, God gives the elect a grace that is so perfectly adapted to their unique characters, temperaments, and situation s that they infallibly yet freely respond affirmatively to its influence (262)
In sum, since what the Reformed tradition historically denounced as middle knowledge was not Molina's doctrine of middle knowledge, and since Arminian tradition has never disclaimed Molina's doctrine of middle knowledge, their is no reason why member of both traditions cannot draw on it as a rapprochement (275)
Molinism gives the Christian the "best of both worlds" of Calvinism and Arminianism and , in the process , removes the motivation and appeal of open theism. Per Calvinism, one retains God's sovereignty over every detail of the world, good and evil. One also retains unconditional, individual election, where God chooses (but in no way determines or is morally responsible for) who is saved and who is lost. For any possible person, God can choose to actualize a world in which he is freely saved or a world in which he is freely lost. God could also choose not to create that person at all. The decision is entirely the result of God's good pleasure. Per Arminianism, one retains God's genuine desire to save all persons and the libertarian freedom of all persons. If there existed a feasible world where all the lost people in this world were freely saved and all the saved people in this world were freely saved, God would have created it. However, God middle-knows that such a world is impossible given libertarian human freedom, Thus necessitating god's choice of who is saved and who was lost. But this choice, based as it is on middle knowledge, exerts no causal power over any one's salvation or damnation, as knowledge is not causally determinative. God gives everyone sufficient grace for Salvation, such that each person has an equal chance to be saved. Each person then freely embraces or freely rejects that saving grace (276)
Molina formulated a logically consider stent and highly compelling account of divine omniscience that successfully reconciles full-blown divine sovereignty and full-blow human freedom. To date, it is the only account proposed that enjoys this significant theological benefit (293)
Hence on Molinism (1) passages teaching God's predestination of individuals (2) passages teaching God's all-encompassing providence (3) passages teaching genuine human freedom, and (4) passages teaching God's universal salvifc will may all be simultaneously taken at face value (293)
March 7, 2017
Great read
Understanding how you can reconcile sovereign choices of God and our choices, Molina laid out the most comprehensive theological system conceived in theological history. Dr. MacGregor weaves in and out theology and biology to keep the truths engaging and makes historical sense. Molinism is a very robust system -this is the book to get YOU STARTED!!!
Understanding how you can reconcile sovereign choices of God and our choices, Molina laid out the most comprehensive theological system conceived in theological history. Dr. MacGregor weaves in and out theology and biology to keep the truths engaging and makes historical sense. Molinism is a very robust system -this is the book to get YOU STARTED!!!
March 28, 2024
Kirk R. MacGregor received his PhD from the University of Iowa. Currently, he serves as “assistant professor and chair of the Department of Philosophy and Religion at McPherson College in McPherson, Kansas” (Book cover). His philosophical prowess is on display in his work on Molina as he interacts with many of Molina’s philosophical arguments and ideas. Furthermore, MacGregor has made significant contributions to Molinist theology as he has not only written on Luis de Molina himself, but has also written A Molina-Anabaptist Systematic Theology (Book cover). Such contributions undoubtedly make MacGregor a key figure among Molinist theologians.
As the title indicates, Luis de Molina: The Life and Theology of the Founder of Middle Knowledge is not merely a biographical work on Molina, but is additionally an exploration of Molina’s theological teachings on a number of issues. In the introduction, MacGregor concisely summarizes the content of his work (28–29) and devotes much space to “clearing up misconceptions” about Molina that people may have (16–28). Chapter one, titled “Early Years and Religious Conversion” describe his initial educational and vocational ambitions (33), as well as his faith in and “full surrender to Christ” (37). It was not long after his conversion that he became a member of the Jesuit order, and this was when he “exhibited a voracious appetite for philosophy and theology” (41). His passion for and skill in these disciplines were apparent. MacGregor also points out that Molina had a passion and “concern for social justice” (44), and this particular passion is explored later in the book.
Chapter two reveals the points where Molina’s theological views agreed with and departed from Aquinas’s and the Reformers’ theological views. These points include God’s grace and the doctrine of justification by faith. MacGregor goes on to further detail Molina’s education, growth, and renown in the disciplines of theology and philosophy as he “would make a name for himself as one of the greatest philosophical theologians in all Europe” (76). Molina became a prominent theological figure during his day.
Chapter two’s description of Molina’s theological impact paves the way for an explicit definition and argument for middle knowledge in chapter three. MacGregor defines the concept well: “In short, middle knowledge is God’s prevolitional knowledge of all true counterfactuals” (79). God’s knowledge of counterfactuals, “or conditional propositions in the subjunctive mood” (79), is key to the concept of middle knowledge. The remainder of the chapter focuses on Molina’s biblical and philosophical defense of middle knowledge. Chapters four and five are dedicated to Molina’s views of providence and predestination. MacGregor considers these doctrines as “derivative doctrines” of middle knowledge (78). For Molina, “the infinitely wise God providentially orders which circumstances transpire (i.e., by choosing to create a feasible world comprising those circumstances) so that his purposes are achieved notwithstanding, and even through sinful human decisions and natural evils” (107). In other words, God works providentially in creation by choosing a particular world in which events take place according to his will. Additionally, “Molina defined predestination as that segment of God’s providence pertaining to eternal life” (133), so his understanding of predestination follows directly from his understanding of providence. Providence and predestination are understood by Molina as God’s choice of the world he would create (156).
Chapter six returns to a biographical focus on Molina’s life as it describes the praise, as well as the criticism and persecution that Molina experienced from Dominicans, the Spanish Inquisition, and even some Jesuits over his teaching of middle knowledge (159). Unfortunately, middle knowledge did not accomplish what Molina hoped it would accomplish: “[Resolving] the age-old dispute between the monergistic and synergistic doctrines of grace that separated the Dominican order from his Jesuit order” (158). However, it was amidst this persecution and chaos that Molina wrote On Justice and Law (177).
Chapters seven and eight analyze Molina’s teachings in On Justice and Law. Molina’s convictions on matters such as hermeneutics, natural law, the church, and money are examined in the chapter on practical theology. Money is a recurring issue in the chapter on social justice as MacGregor explains Molina’s views on lending money, trading, the economy, the “complementary” relationship between church and state (216), and slavery. In all of these matters, MacGregor captures Molina’s ethical convictions.
The final two chapters are concerned with the theological controversy that Molina experienced with the Congregatio de auxiliis gratiae which so severely affected him that it resulted in his death (229), as well as “Molina’s legacy on Christian thought” (242). Despite the controversial responses and criticisms that Molina faced during his life, MacGregor concludes, “no future history of the Christian tradition, history of Christian thought, history of the Reformation, philosophical theology, or systematic theology can legitimately afford to ignore Molina and his influence” (270). Philosophers and theologians alike must seriously consider Molina’s concept of middle knowledge in their theological reflections on God’s sovereignty and human responsibility.
MacGregor states the purpose of his book in the introduction: “Here unveiled for the first time, Molina’s deeply inspirational and fascinating life serves as a model of faithful Christian service and heroism despite opposition” (28). MacGregor’s hope is that his description of Molina’s life and theology will inspire readers to emulate Molina and his virtuous teachings (30). Therefore, the purpose of MacGregor’s work is not so much to defend a thesis—although he does defend Molina’s doctrine of middle knowledge throughout the book—but to give an account of Molina’s life which will result in the believer’s greater faithfulness and service to God. He accomplishes his purpose well as he gives a very thorough account of Molina’s life and work. However, it is difficult for any one reader to observe whether or not this work successfully inspires readers to emulate Molina’s example since part of MacGregor’s purpose is not something found within the book, but is instead something that the work is supposed to do. Nevertheless, the book is an inspirational read and MacGregor successfully accomplishes his purpose to that end.
The purpose of his book is closely tied to the intended audience of his book. MacGregor wrote his book for the church: “let us pay careful and close attention to the many ways that Molina’s theological and social ideas can strengthen the universal church in all its branches and reflect on how to implement those ideas” (30). He desires for any believer to read and be edified by Molina’s work. Still, his explanation of middle knowledge and its many implications may not be very accessible to the lay reader. The book seems more like an academic work that theologians and scholars will have much more ease in understanding and benefiting from.
MacGregor points out the value of his book: “The reason for the general ignorance of the narrative of Molina’s life is not hard to find. Until the present volume, no modern critical biography of Molina has been composed in any language, and no Molina biography of any significant length has ever been written” (14). The lack of any significant works on the life of Molina makes MacGregor’s book a special and informative resource for those desiring to learn about an unknown figure of church history. The book truly is one of a kind. What also makes this account of Luis de Molina unique and valuable is that MacGregor balances his focus on both the biographical details and theological views of Molina. He transitions between his life and theology in a very natural way, and this presentation of both life and theology is one of the books greatest strengths as it gives the reader a very comprehensive understanding of Molina. Additionally, the high praise that MacGregor gives to the doctrine of middle knowledge throughout the book makes it a worthwhile concept to read and understand.
Another strength of this work is that MacGregor gives a very holistic description of Molina’s theology. He does not simply focus on Molina’s soteriology, but desires to explain many more of his teachings. As MacGregor himself writes, “During his novitiate, Molina’s insatiable appetite for philosophy and theology was joined by an enduring sense of pastoral sensitivity and concern for social justice” (44). Understanding Molina’s views on social justice—and not just his views on middle knowledge—is fundamental to understanding Molina.
A particular weakness in MacGregor’s work is that the middle knowledge approach does not always meet the high praise that MacGregor gives to the approach. For example, MacGregor straightforwardly states, “Molina claimed that on his account of divine providence, the traditional tension between divine sovereignty and genuine human freedom evaporates” (116). He makes this claim at several points in the book, and so the reader must assess the truth of his statement. Paul Helm observes about the Molinist view of God’s sovereignty and human freedom, “God could not ‘steer’ the course of events in this fashion, given that all the while the individuals in the actualized universe have indeterministic freedom. For the circumstances never ensure one determinate freely-chosen outcome; they provide only the conditions for the free choice of one of several outcomes” (The Providence of God, 59). Helm recognizes that the Molinist approach does not adequately solve God’s control over free human choices. Helm additionally points out that “The universe cannot, given the strong view of freedom endorsed by the Molinists, have a shadow form; a form of a purely conditional kind which is the mirror-image of how the universe will be when it is actual” (59). Why is it the case that the Molinist view and emphasis on freedom cannot truly guarantee God’s plan for the world will be accomplished? Helm continues, “For how it will be when it is actual is, at least in part, up to the free actions of the agents who are actualized, once God has decided to actualize that universe” (59). The middle knowledge approach has difficulty in properly emphasizing God’s control over everything that occurs if man is truly free. Therefore, rather than “evaporating” the problem of divine sovereignty and human responsibility, middle knowledge creates its own problems that need to be solved.
Having written a Molinist systematic theology and giving a defense of Molina’s view of middle knowledge in this particular work, MacGregor’s bias towards Molinism is clear. He often contends for the superiority of the Molinist position over the Calvinist and Arminian positions (see, for example, pp. 269–270). He even defends Molinism from the abuses that the position suffered from Arminius (245). His bias is also evident in the title he ascribes to Molina as “one of the greatest philosophical and moral theologians in the history of Christianity” (240). However, it is worth noting that MacGregor does take issue with Molina on a few issues he highlights in the book (see pp. 30, 179). Nevertheless, MacGregor has a high regard for Molina and Molinism.
As the title indicates, Luis de Molina: The Life and Theology of the Founder of Middle Knowledge is not merely a biographical work on Molina, but is additionally an exploration of Molina’s theological teachings on a number of issues. In the introduction, MacGregor concisely summarizes the content of his work (28–29) and devotes much space to “clearing up misconceptions” about Molina that people may have (16–28). Chapter one, titled “Early Years and Religious Conversion” describe his initial educational and vocational ambitions (33), as well as his faith in and “full surrender to Christ” (37). It was not long after his conversion that he became a member of the Jesuit order, and this was when he “exhibited a voracious appetite for philosophy and theology” (41). His passion for and skill in these disciplines were apparent. MacGregor also points out that Molina had a passion and “concern for social justice” (44), and this particular passion is explored later in the book.
Chapter two reveals the points where Molina’s theological views agreed with and departed from Aquinas’s and the Reformers’ theological views. These points include God’s grace and the doctrine of justification by faith. MacGregor goes on to further detail Molina’s education, growth, and renown in the disciplines of theology and philosophy as he “would make a name for himself as one of the greatest philosophical theologians in all Europe” (76). Molina became a prominent theological figure during his day.
Chapter two’s description of Molina’s theological impact paves the way for an explicit definition and argument for middle knowledge in chapter three. MacGregor defines the concept well: “In short, middle knowledge is God’s prevolitional knowledge of all true counterfactuals” (79). God’s knowledge of counterfactuals, “or conditional propositions in the subjunctive mood” (79), is key to the concept of middle knowledge. The remainder of the chapter focuses on Molina’s biblical and philosophical defense of middle knowledge. Chapters four and five are dedicated to Molina’s views of providence and predestination. MacGregor considers these doctrines as “derivative doctrines” of middle knowledge (78). For Molina, “the infinitely wise God providentially orders which circumstances transpire (i.e., by choosing to create a feasible world comprising those circumstances) so that his purposes are achieved notwithstanding, and even through sinful human decisions and natural evils” (107). In other words, God works providentially in creation by choosing a particular world in which events take place according to his will. Additionally, “Molina defined predestination as that segment of God’s providence pertaining to eternal life” (133), so his understanding of predestination follows directly from his understanding of providence. Providence and predestination are understood by Molina as God’s choice of the world he would create (156).
Chapter six returns to a biographical focus on Molina’s life as it describes the praise, as well as the criticism and persecution that Molina experienced from Dominicans, the Spanish Inquisition, and even some Jesuits over his teaching of middle knowledge (159). Unfortunately, middle knowledge did not accomplish what Molina hoped it would accomplish: “[Resolving] the age-old dispute between the monergistic and synergistic doctrines of grace that separated the Dominican order from his Jesuit order” (158). However, it was amidst this persecution and chaos that Molina wrote On Justice and Law (177).
Chapters seven and eight analyze Molina’s teachings in On Justice and Law. Molina’s convictions on matters such as hermeneutics, natural law, the church, and money are examined in the chapter on practical theology. Money is a recurring issue in the chapter on social justice as MacGregor explains Molina’s views on lending money, trading, the economy, the “complementary” relationship between church and state (216), and slavery. In all of these matters, MacGregor captures Molina’s ethical convictions.
The final two chapters are concerned with the theological controversy that Molina experienced with the Congregatio de auxiliis gratiae which so severely affected him that it resulted in his death (229), as well as “Molina’s legacy on Christian thought” (242). Despite the controversial responses and criticisms that Molina faced during his life, MacGregor concludes, “no future history of the Christian tradition, history of Christian thought, history of the Reformation, philosophical theology, or systematic theology can legitimately afford to ignore Molina and his influence” (270). Philosophers and theologians alike must seriously consider Molina’s concept of middle knowledge in their theological reflections on God’s sovereignty and human responsibility.
MacGregor states the purpose of his book in the introduction: “Here unveiled for the first time, Molina’s deeply inspirational and fascinating life serves as a model of faithful Christian service and heroism despite opposition” (28). MacGregor’s hope is that his description of Molina’s life and theology will inspire readers to emulate Molina and his virtuous teachings (30). Therefore, the purpose of MacGregor’s work is not so much to defend a thesis—although he does defend Molina’s doctrine of middle knowledge throughout the book—but to give an account of Molina’s life which will result in the believer’s greater faithfulness and service to God. He accomplishes his purpose well as he gives a very thorough account of Molina’s life and work. However, it is difficult for any one reader to observe whether or not this work successfully inspires readers to emulate Molina’s example since part of MacGregor’s purpose is not something found within the book, but is instead something that the work is supposed to do. Nevertheless, the book is an inspirational read and MacGregor successfully accomplishes his purpose to that end.
The purpose of his book is closely tied to the intended audience of his book. MacGregor wrote his book for the church: “let us pay careful and close attention to the many ways that Molina’s theological and social ideas can strengthen the universal church in all its branches and reflect on how to implement those ideas” (30). He desires for any believer to read and be edified by Molina’s work. Still, his explanation of middle knowledge and its many implications may not be very accessible to the lay reader. The book seems more like an academic work that theologians and scholars will have much more ease in understanding and benefiting from.
MacGregor points out the value of his book: “The reason for the general ignorance of the narrative of Molina’s life is not hard to find. Until the present volume, no modern critical biography of Molina has been composed in any language, and no Molina biography of any significant length has ever been written” (14). The lack of any significant works on the life of Molina makes MacGregor’s book a special and informative resource for those desiring to learn about an unknown figure of church history. The book truly is one of a kind. What also makes this account of Luis de Molina unique and valuable is that MacGregor balances his focus on both the biographical details and theological views of Molina. He transitions between his life and theology in a very natural way, and this presentation of both life and theology is one of the books greatest strengths as it gives the reader a very comprehensive understanding of Molina. Additionally, the high praise that MacGregor gives to the doctrine of middle knowledge throughout the book makes it a worthwhile concept to read and understand.
Another strength of this work is that MacGregor gives a very holistic description of Molina’s theology. He does not simply focus on Molina’s soteriology, but desires to explain many more of his teachings. As MacGregor himself writes, “During his novitiate, Molina’s insatiable appetite for philosophy and theology was joined by an enduring sense of pastoral sensitivity and concern for social justice” (44). Understanding Molina’s views on social justice—and not just his views on middle knowledge—is fundamental to understanding Molina.
A particular weakness in MacGregor’s work is that the middle knowledge approach does not always meet the high praise that MacGregor gives to the approach. For example, MacGregor straightforwardly states, “Molina claimed that on his account of divine providence, the traditional tension between divine sovereignty and genuine human freedom evaporates” (116). He makes this claim at several points in the book, and so the reader must assess the truth of his statement. Paul Helm observes about the Molinist view of God’s sovereignty and human freedom, “God could not ‘steer’ the course of events in this fashion, given that all the while the individuals in the actualized universe have indeterministic freedom. For the circumstances never ensure one determinate freely-chosen outcome; they provide only the conditions for the free choice of one of several outcomes” (The Providence of God, 59). Helm recognizes that the Molinist approach does not adequately solve God’s control over free human choices. Helm additionally points out that “The universe cannot, given the strong view of freedom endorsed by the Molinists, have a shadow form; a form of a purely conditional kind which is the mirror-image of how the universe will be when it is actual” (59). Why is it the case that the Molinist view and emphasis on freedom cannot truly guarantee God’s plan for the world will be accomplished? Helm continues, “For how it will be when it is actual is, at least in part, up to the free actions of the agents who are actualized, once God has decided to actualize that universe” (59). The middle knowledge approach has difficulty in properly emphasizing God’s control over everything that occurs if man is truly free. Therefore, rather than “evaporating” the problem of divine sovereignty and human responsibility, middle knowledge creates its own problems that need to be solved.
Having written a Molinist systematic theology and giving a defense of Molina’s view of middle knowledge in this particular work, MacGregor’s bias towards Molinism is clear. He often contends for the superiority of the Molinist position over the Calvinist and Arminian positions (see, for example, pp. 269–270). He even defends Molinism from the abuses that the position suffered from Arminius (245). His bias is also evident in the title he ascribes to Molina as “one of the greatest philosophical and moral theologians in the history of Christianity” (240). However, it is worth noting that MacGregor does take issue with Molina on a few issues he highlights in the book (see pp. 30, 179). Nevertheless, MacGregor has a high regard for Molina and Molinism.
September 7, 2017
A middle ground to Calvinism and Arminianism is fascinating in a culture that diametrically opposes the two. I began this book desiring to be compelled that Molinism is a valid philosophical theology to adhere to. I was terribly underwhelmed. (note: I'm coming at this heavily influenced by Calvinistic thought)
When a theologian's primary concern is to maintain human libertarian free will, you run into a profound issue: an anthropocentric philosophy with hardly a mention of who God is or how He interacts with humanity.
Molina, in his attempts to philosophize compatibility between free will and God's sovereignty, I would argue, lost sight of the primary goal of theology: discerning the nature of God. He effectively lost sight of theology and built a thoughtful (and possibly legitimate) philosophical system.
There are two main issues I see with the book:
1.) Whether it's MacGregor's writing style or actually Molina's theology, very little of the book is concerned with the nature of God. Rather, the primary concern is practical theology, or the outcomes of a Molinistic theology. There are three chapters that discuss God (middle-knowledge, predestination, and providence). The practical theology is long-winded and obsesses over details that I find hard to establish relevance for, but feel very influenced by Jesuit/Catholic thinking - caring more than necessary about what we do rather than who God is.
2.) Molina established a highly elaborate, complex philosophical system to seemingly-establish a compatibility between libertarian free will and predestination, heavily grounded in the concept of middle knowledge. Part of me feels like the ideas made more sense prior to reading about middle knowledge than afterwards. Once I got past the chapter on middle knowledge, I became more and more unsure that the way I understood the concept was correct. I wonder: At what point should Ockham's razor be applied? Also, at what point should one's philosophy (that is, one's fundamental understanding of reality) be submissive to one's theology (that is, one's fundamental understanding of God, creator of reality) wherein there is a certain level of mystery to how God influences / interacts with the world? The lack of exegesis arguing for Molina's points is frustrating.
If one desires to understand Molinism, this book may shed light on the philosophy - or confound it. Either way, one thing is clear: When a theology supplants God's rightful place with man's libertarian free will as its central premise, much of God is forgotten and you end up with an anthropocentric philosophy loosely based on eisegetical interpretations of a handful of scriptures.
All that being said, there are valuable ideas to be taken from the text:
1.) Molina was an advocate of the reality that knowledge is not causally determinative. e.g., because God knows who is saved does not means he necessarily dictates it. Although the reformed position would intertwine knowledge with causation, they are not necessarily connected.
2.) God certainly has an understanding of counterfactuals and is not constrained in that knowledge by man's will: the sheer weight of the idea that God knows everything that could happen prior to even creation is utterly overwhelming, that in every single hypothetical universe God maintains knowledge of every single possible event throughout eternity compels one to be astonished by the reality of God's supercomprehension, as Molina puts it.
3.) The concept of God's glory being most manifest when sovereignty and human free will are measured in parallel (God is most glorious when He maintains utter sovereignty over a man with complete libertarian free will) rather than inverse was a profound thought; regardless of whether or not it is compelling, the idea challenged me to make me genuinely wonder why I view God's sovereignty as opposed to the present extent of human free will.
The book challenged me to think about theology different than I have, which is immensely valuable. And the philosophical system itself may even be legitimate, but I think it gets too caught up in the weeds and fails to really discuss who God is in-depth. Maybe Molina's Concordia can clear that up. It also is just tough to get through sometimes when the MacGregor moves through complex philosophical concepts very quickly. One last note: The last chapter argues for the value of Molinism through the explanatory power it offers with regard to philosophical questions; I don't think explanatory power is equivalent to truth content so the last chapter in particular was especially underwhelming.
When a theologian's primary concern is to maintain human libertarian free will, you run into a profound issue: an anthropocentric philosophy with hardly a mention of who God is or how He interacts with humanity.
Molina, in his attempts to philosophize compatibility between free will and God's sovereignty, I would argue, lost sight of the primary goal of theology: discerning the nature of God. He effectively lost sight of theology and built a thoughtful (and possibly legitimate) philosophical system.
There are two main issues I see with the book:
1.) Whether it's MacGregor's writing style or actually Molina's theology, very little of the book is concerned with the nature of God. Rather, the primary concern is practical theology, or the outcomes of a Molinistic theology. There are three chapters that discuss God (middle-knowledge, predestination, and providence). The practical theology is long-winded and obsesses over details that I find hard to establish relevance for, but feel very influenced by Jesuit/Catholic thinking - caring more than necessary about what we do rather than who God is.
2.) Molina established a highly elaborate, complex philosophical system to seemingly-establish a compatibility between libertarian free will and predestination, heavily grounded in the concept of middle knowledge. Part of me feels like the ideas made more sense prior to reading about middle knowledge than afterwards. Once I got past the chapter on middle knowledge, I became more and more unsure that the way I understood the concept was correct. I wonder: At what point should Ockham's razor be applied? Also, at what point should one's philosophy (that is, one's fundamental understanding of reality) be submissive to one's theology (that is, one's fundamental understanding of God, creator of reality) wherein there is a certain level of mystery to how God influences / interacts with the world? The lack of exegesis arguing for Molina's points is frustrating.
If one desires to understand Molinism, this book may shed light on the philosophy - or confound it. Either way, one thing is clear: When a theology supplants God's rightful place with man's libertarian free will as its central premise, much of God is forgotten and you end up with an anthropocentric philosophy loosely based on eisegetical interpretations of a handful of scriptures.
All that being said, there are valuable ideas to be taken from the text:
1.) Molina was an advocate of the reality that knowledge is not causally determinative. e.g., because God knows who is saved does not means he necessarily dictates it. Although the reformed position would intertwine knowledge with causation, they are not necessarily connected.
2.) God certainly has an understanding of counterfactuals and is not constrained in that knowledge by man's will: the sheer weight of the idea that God knows everything that could happen prior to even creation is utterly overwhelming, that in every single hypothetical universe God maintains knowledge of every single possible event throughout eternity compels one to be astonished by the reality of God's supercomprehension, as Molina puts it.
3.) The concept of God's glory being most manifest when sovereignty and human free will are measured in parallel (God is most glorious when He maintains utter sovereignty over a man with complete libertarian free will) rather than inverse was a profound thought; regardless of whether or not it is compelling, the idea challenged me to make me genuinely wonder why I view God's sovereignty as opposed to the present extent of human free will.
The book challenged me to think about theology different than I have, which is immensely valuable. And the philosophical system itself may even be legitimate, but I think it gets too caught up in the weeds and fails to really discuss who God is in-depth. Maybe Molina's Concordia can clear that up. It also is just tough to get through sometimes when the MacGregor moves through complex philosophical concepts very quickly. One last note: The last chapter argues for the value of Molinism through the explanatory power it offers with regard to philosophical questions; I don't think explanatory power is equivalent to truth content so the last chapter in particular was especially underwhelming.
October 31, 2020
There is a lot of good biographical information in this book about Molina that is not readily available in contemporary literature. However, when it came to Molina’s theological and philosophical ideas it seemed as if most of it was merely a summarization of the work of Alvin plantinga and especially William lane Craig. Those familiar with Plantinga and Craig’s work will find little new insight. The biggest problem I had with this book is the lack of theological familiarity with Catholic theology and especially thomism. I would of liked to see a more robust analysis of Aquinas and Molina’s doctrine of God/ divinity simplicity.
September 12, 2024
Great overview of the life & and theology of Luis De Molina. While it is not super in-depth, the information is succinct & helpful regardless. MacGregor's work has led me to consider many questions regarding Molinism & appreciate Molina himself as a fellow Christian.
My favorite sections were definitely the ones contrasting Bañezian Thomism & Molinism, the one regarding Molina's perspective on the African Slave Trade, & the final chapter on Molina's Legacy.
My favorite sections were definitely the ones contrasting Bañezian Thomism & Molinism, the one regarding Molina's perspective on the African Slave Trade, & the final chapter on Molina's Legacy.
May 25, 2020
What a stunning overview of Middle Knowledge. Don't dismiss Middle Knowledge until you have read about it from an informed viewpoint, and not from someone wishing to disguise how little they actually know about it.
This will change your view, in particular, on God's omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence and prayer too!
This will change your view, in particular, on God's omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence and prayer too!
January 3, 2019
Must read for anyone who is interested in God's Providence and Human Freedom.
August 8, 2023
Absolutely fascinating. And highly persuasive.
Excellent book.
Excellent book.
August 15, 2023
A Protestant look at Luis de Molina, Jesuit priest and popularizer of Middle knowledge.
June 4, 2016
In his book, Luis de Molina: The Life and Theology of the Founder of Middle Knowledge, Kirk R. MacGregor chronicles the tumultuous days of a brilliant Jesuit priest who attempts to reconcile the doctrines of God’s sovereignty and human “free will.” A contemporary of Luther and Calvin, Molina and his theology sparked controversy when he disagreed with the Catholic Church and the Council of Trent. But for his death, Molina would have been excommunicated by the Pope. However, he was later vindicated and his theological explanations are still being discussed and debated today.
Macgregor’s book is an academic but interesting read about a fascinating man. It is necessary to understand the differences between Catholic and Protestant theology as well as the Doctrines of Grace in order to grasp Molina’s argument. The book should be read deliberately as it is technical at times. His attempt to explain these thorny theological issues is intriguing and even admirable. However, it does not fully explore the biblical views of God’s power and human responsibility. Frankly, these two fundamental issues cannot be fully explained by human reason or completely understood this side of eternity.
Overall, Luis de Molina is an interesting read, but not an easy one. Had the author devoted as much time to Molina’s biography (as advertised) rather than advocating for Molina’s theological perspective, this would have been a stronger work. As it is, the theology dominates the entire narrative and leaves little room for Molina’s fascinating life.
I was given a free copy from the publisher in exchange for my honest review.
Macgregor’s book is an academic but interesting read about a fascinating man. It is necessary to understand the differences between Catholic and Protestant theology as well as the Doctrines of Grace in order to grasp Molina’s argument. The book should be read deliberately as it is technical at times. His attempt to explain these thorny theological issues is intriguing and even admirable. However, it does not fully explore the biblical views of God’s power and human responsibility. Frankly, these two fundamental issues cannot be fully explained by human reason or completely understood this side of eternity.
Overall, Luis de Molina is an interesting read, but not an easy one. Had the author devoted as much time to Molina’s biography (as advertised) rather than advocating for Molina’s theological perspective, this would have been a stronger work. As it is, the theology dominates the entire narrative and leaves little room for Molina’s fascinating life.
I was given a free copy from the publisher in exchange for my honest review.
November 5, 2022
Kirk R. MacGregor’s book Luis de Molina is must read literature.
Kirk. R. MacGregor’s work on producing a biography of Luis de Molina, which, throughout the writing, infuses the teachings, concepts, philosophy, theology, and application of Luis’ doctrines of Middle Knowledge and social justice, is a must read for any and all serious students of Christianity or theology. Kirk’s clear writing and prose makes this book not only an easy read, but one you’ll want to read many times.
Admittedly I re-read the first seven chapters before completing my first full read through of the book, only because there was so much brilliant content and I didn’t want to forget any of it. Not only do I plan to read this book again this year, but I also plan to use it for all future references when discussing Molinism and Middle Knowledge.
Chapter 10 alone, as put by a friend of mine, is worth the price of the book. However, I disagree. Each chapter is worth the price of the book. Chapter 8’s discussion of Molina’s doctrines around social justice, real and biblical social justice, is a sobering and encouraging rebuttal to our modern and secular understanding of social justice.
The highest praise that I have for any book can only be expressed by my saying, “Good Lord, I want to read that again!” Kirk MacGregor’s Luis de Molina has made this coveted list of mine and is very quickly reaching the top of that list. Thank you, Kirk, for your outstanding scholarly work on Molina and making him accessible to lay and scholarly theologians. I will be recommending this book to others.
Kirk. R. MacGregor’s work on producing a biography of Luis de Molina, which, throughout the writing, infuses the teachings, concepts, philosophy, theology, and application of Luis’ doctrines of Middle Knowledge and social justice, is a must read for any and all serious students of Christianity or theology. Kirk’s clear writing and prose makes this book not only an easy read, but one you’ll want to read many times.
Admittedly I re-read the first seven chapters before completing my first full read through of the book, only because there was so much brilliant content and I didn’t want to forget any of it. Not only do I plan to read this book again this year, but I also plan to use it for all future references when discussing Molinism and Middle Knowledge.
Chapter 10 alone, as put by a friend of mine, is worth the price of the book. However, I disagree. Each chapter is worth the price of the book. Chapter 8’s discussion of Molina’s doctrines around social justice, real and biblical social justice, is a sobering and encouraging rebuttal to our modern and secular understanding of social justice.
The highest praise that I have for any book can only be expressed by my saying, “Good Lord, I want to read that again!” Kirk MacGregor’s Luis de Molina has made this coveted list of mine and is very quickly reaching the top of that list. Thank you, Kirk, for your outstanding scholarly work on Molina and making him accessible to lay and scholarly theologians. I will be recommending this book to others.
April 26, 2018
Kirk MacGregor is known by many as the worlds leading expert on Luis De Molina and the theological system that sprang from him, known as Molinism. This book is both a biography of Molina as well as an introduction and defense of Molinism.
This book is really great, and I recommend it to anyone interested in studying Molinism.
This book is really great, and I recommend it to anyone interested in studying Molinism.
February 25, 2016
Excellent summation of middle knowledge and Molina's formation of it. Brilliant theological/philosophical insights.
August 8, 2016
As my introduction to Molina and to the concept of middle knowledge, this work contains clear explanations of difficult concepts. It's worth a slow read, but MacGregor's writing is engaging.
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