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Roots of Russia's War in Ukraine
In February 2014, Russia initiated a war in Ukraine, its reasons for aggression unclear. Each of this volume's authors offers a distinct interpretation of Russia's motivations, untangling the social, historical, and political factors that created this war and continually reignite its tensions.
What prompted President Vladimir Putin to send troops into Crimea? Why did the conflict spread to eastern Ukraine with Russian support? What does the war say about Russia's political, economic, and social priorities, and how does the crisis expose differences between the EU and Russia regarding international jurisdiction? Did Putin's obsession with his macho image start this war, and is it preventing its resolution? The exploration of these and other questions gives historians, political watchers, and theorists a solid grasp of the events that have destabilized the region.
What prompted President Vladimir Putin to send troops into Crimea? Why did the conflict spread to eastern Ukraine with Russian support? What does the war say about Russia's political, economic, and social priorities, and how does the crisis expose differences between the EU and Russia regarding international jurisdiction? Did Putin's obsession with his macho image start this war, and is it preventing its resolution? The exploration of these and other questions gives historians, political watchers, and theorists a solid grasp of the events that have destabilized the region.
144 pages, Paperback
First published December 15, 2015
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September 12, 2024
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
По существу, перед нами четыре больших статьи на тему российско-украинского конфликта. Как я понял из Acknowledgments, книга стала результатом некого политического форума или сессии на этом самом форуме.
The idea for this book emerged from a panel discussion we held under the aegis of the Kennan Institute.
Что-то подобное я себе и представлял. В принципе, сегодня книга не сильно актуальна, но не по причине потери актуальности из-за временного устаревания, а потому, что многое, о чём рассказывает книга множество раз проговаривалось различными экспертами. Тем не менее, особо понравившиеся моменты я всё равно проговорю. Лишь хочу подчеркнуть, что книга очень маленькая, а поднятая проблематика слишком большая.
It is nonsense to think that Moscow had no viable alternatives to the use of force; none was seriously tried after the fall of the Yanukovych government. An impatient Russian leader-ship acted as if it had been deliberately double-crossed in the diplomatic deal-making in Kyiv and opted for a military solution. This opened a Pandora’s box for the region, with results which redounded first and foremost on Ukraine and its people but then very much on Russia itself. Moscow’s suzerainty in most of Ukraine is now a thing of the past.
Although only a minority of Ukraine’s population was anti-Russian before the crisis, Moscow’s resort to war has created a genuine sense of nationhood in parts of that country where previously it had been weak.
Такая недальновидная политика Кремля действительно выглядит странно, если исходить из существования российских интересов. Однако с моей точки зрения, в настоящее время не существует именно российских интересов, а существуют лишь путинские интересы. Если посмотреть на ситуацию именно с этой точки зрения, то окажется что использование военной силы, а также аннексия Крыма, выгодна непосредственно Путину, но не России.
The consequences for Ukraine are severe. Crimea and the Donbas are Russian protectorates for the foreseeable future. Despite Ukraine’s vast human and natural assets, its legacy of decades of political dysfunction and economic corruption, greatly compounded by the impact of war, have reduced Kyiv to dependency on the EU as well as on the International Monetary Fund and the United States.
Очень точное и верное замечание особенно глядя из 2024. Уже многие начинают спрашивать, что Украина делала все эти 30 лет независимости и почему вместо того чтобы бороться с коррупцией и строить по-настоящему европейское демократическое государство, украинские политики ограничивались лишь риторикой. Сегодня как никогда видна полная зависимость Украины от настроения ЕС и США. К сожалению, в будущем это может сыграть решающую, а для кого-то, и негативную роль в данном российско-украинском конфликте, т.к. страны Запада исходят из своих собственных, а не украинских интересов.
An illustrative comparison is the case of Goa, a territory possessed by Portugal for 451 years before India seized it in an act of blatant and bloody mili-tary aggression in 1961. Western governments, including the United States, condemned India’s actions at the time. Today, those same governments accept India’s hold on Goa.
Тоже верный пример, который приводит автор в качестве предостережения (которое актуально даже сегодня или особенно сегодня). Судя по силе наложенных на Россию санкций после 2014 года, странам Запада важнее бизнес интересы, чем принадлежность Крыма к тому или иному государству.
As someone who was born in Russia and spent most of his adult life there, I can vouch for the fact that Crimea had never carried a religious or historic significance of such proportions. The Russian people universally supported the annexation not because of Crimea itself, but because of something else. It was a moment when a derzhava completely eclipsed a nation in the Russian mind.
It was understood that if Moscow had not come up with a quick and forceful response to the West, Russia would have been seen as weak. Crimea was that forceful response.
Пожалуй, соглашусь с таким выводом. Хотя россияне и были рады "воссоединению" с Крымом, но какой-то искренней радости или радости подлинно народной в России в то время не было. Я бы охарактеризовал настроение тех лет скорее как "приятный пофигизм", но подлинной имперской радости среди больших масс населения не было. В то время авторитаризм Путина уже был высок (силён), поэтому открыто становиться фрондой Путину, был удел либо несистемной оппозиции и активистов либо маргиналов. В общем, главным для россиян, если бы они имели возможность выбирать себе политиков и путь развития страны, был бы путь развития экономики, улучшения благосостояния, финансирование науки и медицины, городов и пр. Аннексия Крыма была организована, чтобы поднять рейтинг Путину и тут я с автором полностью согласен.
“For Putin, the reserves that Russia has accumulated over the past fourteen years equal political power,” Alexei Kudrin, who ran Russia’s finances from 2000 to 2011, said in a March 2015 interview.
Прибыль от нефти и газа и нужны были Путину на такие PR проекты как аннексия Крыма с последующей войной на Донбассе. В данном случаи слова Кудрина можно понимать как признание того, что нефтедоллары изначально не предназначались для улучшения качества жизни россиян, да и сами россияне их явно бы никогда не увидели. Это был инструмент, который нужен был, чтобы гарантировать Путину и дальше править Россией. Думаю, наличие этих средств сыграло существенную роль в событиях 2014 на востоке Украины. Все же удивительно, насколько откровенным тогда был Кудрин.
Sharply divisive official rhetoric and the war imagery evoked by state-owned media certainly played a role in inducing the Russians to buy into the Crimean adventure.
But there is another, less obvious factor at work. The annexation of Crimea with its implicit consequences of increased security concerns and defense spending favors what might be called Russia’s Soviet industrial core.
В отзыве книге “The Dead Hand” by David E. Hoffman я как раз отмечал, что советский военно-промышленный комплекс (ВПК) обладал неимоверной политической силой. Мне даже кажется, что ВПК был политически как минимум не слабее КГБ и что он в большей степени влиял на партийное руководство, нежели партийное руководство могло влиять на советский ВПК. Кто знает, возможно, что вся эта история с востоком Украины произошла не без помощи (лоббировании) представителей российского ВПК. Для российского ВПК 2014 год стал началом роскошной жизни. Мы даже себе представить не можем, какие суммы были украдены, начиная с 2014 года, т.е. года, когда эта машина начала раскручиваться на полную силу, а вместе с этим и коррупция в этой области, которая ещё с советских времён была в этой области огромной. Но в любом случаи, это интересное наблюдение со стороны автора.
The choice between “greatness” on the world stage and domestic prosperity is a false one. Russia will be both a formidable world power and a flourishing economy as soon as it learns to take into account the interests of all social groups, including those disgruntled urbanites who recently have been forced to hunker down and wait for better times.
Золотые слова. Именно об этом много раз говорил Алексей Навальный. К сожалению, ни Путину, ни его окружению не нужно чтобы хорошо жили все россияне. Им нужно чтобы хорошо жили лишь путинские чиновники и бюрократы. Понимают ли россияне это? Думаю да. Но что они могут сделать с этой путинской "элитой", которая ещё с Норд-Оста и Беслана показала, что не пожалеет ни детей, ни женщин, чтобы и дальше оставаться у горнила власти.
What changed between September and December 2013? Why did Putin turn to an all-out conservatism as his central ideology? Here, the obvious answer is that while he had chosen to come out fighting aggressively after the May 2012 inauguration, the Maidan uprising starting in November 2013 had given the authorities grave cause for concern.
Перевороты были не только в Украине и Грузии, но и в Кыргызстане и Армении. Скорее сыграла сумма факторов. Да и консервативную политику Путин начал проводить, как только пришёл к власти - одно решение возродить советский гимн чего стоит. Так что нет, я не думаю что Майдан, да ещё в 2013, стал триггером запуска консервативной политики в РФ.
Whereas Putin had had virtually no ideology in his first two terms in office (2000–8), he now had developed an ideology of patriotic conservatism and national glory.
Даже сегодня нет никакой идеологии у Путина. Всё что мы видим после 2014 года, лишь иллюзия, фасад консервативной и националистической идеологии Путина. Я даже думаю, что важность имплементации такой вот консервативной и националистической идеологии стало очевидно Путину ещё при правлении Ельцина, когда произошёл знаменитый разворот самолёта Примакова над Атлантикой. Уже тогда Россия начинала заигрывать как с национализмом, так и консерватизмом и империализмом (хотя и не так очевидно). Многие просто не помнят, но в 90-ые был взлёт различных псевдо-монархических организаций и движений.
In essence, we have four large articles on the topic of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. As I understood from the Acknowledgments, the book was the result of some kind of political forum or session at this very forum.
The idea for this book emerged from a panel discussion we held under the aegis of the Kennan Institute.
I had imagined something like this. In principle, the book is not very relevant today, not because of the loss of relevance due to becoming outdated, but because much of what the book tells us has been talked about many times by various experts. Nevertheless, I will still mention the points I particularly like. I just want to emphasize that the book is very small, and the issues raised are too big.
It is nonsense to think that Moscow had no viable alternatives to the use of force; none was seriously tried after the fall of the Yanukovych government. An impatient Russian leader-ship acted as if it had been deliberately double-crossed in the diplomatic deal-making in Kyiv and opted for a military solution. This opened a Pandora’s box for the region, with results which redounded first and foremost on Ukraine and its people but then very much on Russia itself. Moscow’s suzerainty in most of Ukraine is now a thing of the past.
Although only a minority of Ukraine’s population was anti-Russian before the crisis, Moscow’s resort to war has created a genuine sense of nationhood in parts of that country where previously it had been weak.
Such a short-sighted policy of the Kremlin does look strange if we proceed from the existence of Russian interests. However, from my point of view, at present, there are no Russian interests but only Putin's interests. If we look at the situation from this point of view, it turns out that the use of military force, as well as the annexation of Crimea, benefits Putin directly, but not Russia.
The consequences for Ukraine are severe. Crimea and the Donbas are Russian protectorates for the foreseeable future. Despite Ukraine’s vast human and natural assets, its legacy of decades of political dysfunction and economic corruption, greatly compounded by the impact of war, have reduced Kyiv to dependency on the EU as well as on the International Monetary Fund and the United States.
Very accurate and true remark especially looking from 2024. Many people are already starting to ask what Ukraine has been doing all these 30 years of independence and why, instead of fighting corruption and building a truly European democratic state, Ukrainian politicians have limited themselves to rhetoric. Ukraine's complete dependence on the mood of the EU and the United States is more evident today than ever before. Unfortunately, in the future, this may play a decisive, and for some, a negative role in this Russian-Ukrainian conflict as Western countries proceed from their own, not Ukrainian, interests.
An illustrative comparison is the case of Goa, a territory possessed by Portugal for 451 years before India seized it in an act of blatant and bloody mili-tary aggression in 1961. Western governments, including the United States, condemned India’s actions at the time. Today, those same governments accept India’s hold on Goa.
This is also a true example, which the author gives as a warning (which is relevant even today or especially today). Judging by the strength of the sanctions imposed on Russia after 2014, Western countries care more about business interests than whether Crimea belongs to this or that state.
As someone who was born in Russia and spent most of his adult life there, I can vouch for the fact that Crimea had never carried a religious or historic significance of such proportions. The Russian people universally supported the annexation not because of Crimea itself, but because of something else. It was a moment when a derzhava completely eclipsed a nation in the Russian mind.
It was understood that if Moscow had not come up with a quick and forceful response to the West, Russia would have been seen as weak. Crimea was that forceful response.
I think I agree with this conclusion. Although Russians were happy about the “reunification” with Crimea, there was no sincere joy or genuine popular joy in Russia at that time. I would characterize the mood of those years more as “pleasant pofigism” (don't-give-a-damn attitude), but there was no genuine imperial joy among large swaths of the population. At that time Putin's authoritarianism was already high (strong), so openly becoming a fronde to Putin was the destiny of either non-systemic opposition and activists or marginalized people. In general, the main thing for Russians, if they had the opportunity to choose their own politicians and the way of development of the country, would be the way of economic development, improvement of welfare, financing of science and medicine, cities, etc. The annexation of Crimea was organized by the Russian government. The annexation of Crimea was organized to raise Putin's rating, and here I fully agree with the author.
“For Putin, the reserves that Russia has accumulated over the past fourteen years equal political power,” Alexei Kudrin, who ran Russia’s finances from 2000 to 2011, said in a March 2015 interview.
Putin needed the profits from oil and gas for such PR projects as the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent war in Donbass. In this case, Kudrin's words can be understood as an admission that petrodollars were not originally intended to improve the quality of life of Russians, and Russians themselves would obviously never see them. It was a tool that was needed to ensure that Putin would continue to rule Russia. I think the availability of these funds played a significant role in the events of 2014 in eastern Ukraine. Still, it's amazing how outspoken Kudrin was back then.
Sharply divisive official rhetoric and the war imagery evoked by state-owned media certainly played a role in inducing the Russians to buy into the Crimean adventure.
But there is another, less obvious factor at work. The annexation of Crimea with its implicit consequences of increased security concerns and defense spending favors what might be called Russia’s Soviet industrial core.
In a review of the book “The Dead Hand” by David E. Hoffman, I was just pointing out that the Soviet military-industrial complex (MIC) wielded tremendous political power. It even seems to me that the MIC was at least as strong politically as the KGB and that it had more influence on the party leadership than the party leadership had on the Soviet MIC. Who knows, it is possible that the whole story with eastern Ukraine did not happen without the help (lobbying) of representatives of the Russian MIC. For the Russian military-industrial complex, 2014 was the beginning of a luxurious life. We cannot even imagine what sums have been stolen since 2014, i.e., the year when this machine began to spin up to its full potential, and with it the corruption in this area, which has been huge in this area since Soviet times. But in any case, this is an interesting observation on the part of the author.
The choice between “greatness” on the world stage and domestic prosperity is a false one. Russia will be both a formidable world power and a flourishing economy as soon as it learns to take into account the interests of all social groups, including those disgruntled urbanites who recently have been forced to hunker down and wait for better times.
Golden words. This is exactly what Alexei Navalny has said many times. Unfortunately, neither Putin nor his entourage needs all Russians to live well. They only want Putin's officials and bureaucrats to live well. Do Russians understand this? I think so. But what can they do with this Putin's “elite”, which has shown since Nord-Ost and Beslan that it will not spare neither children nor women in order to remain at the crucible of power?
What changed between September and December 2013? Why did Putin turn to an all-out conservatism as his central ideology? Here, the obvious answer is that while he had chosen to come out fighting aggressively after the May 2012 inauguration, the Maidan uprising starting in November 2013 had given the authorities grave cause for concern.
There have been revolutions not only in Ukraine and Georgia but also in Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. Rather, the sum of factors played a role. And Putin started to pursue a conservative policy as soon as he came to power - the decision to revive the Soviet anthem is worth one thing. So no, I don't think that Maidan, even in 2013, was the trigger for the launch of conservative policy in Russia.
Whereas Putin had had virtually no ideology in his first two terms in office (2000–8), he now had developed an ideology of patriotic conservatism and national glory.
Even today, Putin has no ideology. Everything we see after 2014 is just an illusion, a facade of Putin's conservative and nationalist ideology. I even think that the importance of implementing such a conservative and nationalist ideology became obvious to Putin during Yeltsin's reign when Primakov's plane made its famous turn over the Atlantic. Even then, Russia was beginning to flirt with nationalism, conservatism, and imperialism alike (though not as obviously). Many people simply don't remember, but in the 90s, there was a rise of various pseudo-monarchist organizations and movements.
По существу, перед нами четыре больших статьи на тему российско-украинского конфликта. Как я понял из Acknowledgments, книга стала результатом некого политического форума или сессии на этом самом форуме.
The idea for this book emerged from a panel discussion we held under the aegis of the Kennan Institute.
Что-то подобное я себе и представлял. В принципе, сегодня книга не сильно актуальна, но не по причине потери актуальности из-за временного устаревания, а потому, что многое, о чём рассказывает книга множество раз проговаривалось различными экспертами. Тем не менее, особо понравившиеся моменты я всё равно проговорю. Лишь хочу подчеркнуть, что книга очень маленькая, а поднятая проблематика слишком большая.
It is nonsense to think that Moscow had no viable alternatives to the use of force; none was seriously tried after the fall of the Yanukovych government. An impatient Russian leader-ship acted as if it had been deliberately double-crossed in the diplomatic deal-making in Kyiv and opted for a military solution. This opened a Pandora’s box for the region, with results which redounded first and foremost on Ukraine and its people but then very much on Russia itself. Moscow’s suzerainty in most of Ukraine is now a thing of the past.
Although only a minority of Ukraine’s population was anti-Russian before the crisis, Moscow’s resort to war has created a genuine sense of nationhood in parts of that country where previously it had been weak.
Такая недальновидная политика Кремля действительно выглядит странно, если исходить из существования российских интересов. Однако с моей точки зрения, в настоящее время не существует именно российских интересов, а существуют лишь путинские интересы. Если посмотреть на ситуацию именно с этой точки зрения, то окажется что использование военной силы, а также аннексия Крыма, выгодна непосредственно Путину, но не России.
The consequences for Ukraine are severe. Crimea and the Donbas are Russian protectorates for the foreseeable future. Despite Ukraine’s vast human and natural assets, its legacy of decades of political dysfunction and economic corruption, greatly compounded by the impact of war, have reduced Kyiv to dependency on the EU as well as on the International Monetary Fund and the United States.
Очень точное и верное замечание особенно глядя из 2024. Уже многие начинают спрашивать, что Украина делала все эти 30 лет независимости и почему вместо того чтобы бороться с коррупцией и строить по-настоящему европейское демократическое государство, украинские политики ограничивались лишь риторикой. Сегодня как никогда видна полная зависимость Украины от настроения ЕС и США. К сожалению, в будущем это может сыграть решающую, а для кого-то, и негативную роль в данном российско-украинском конфликте, т.к. страны Запада исходят из своих собственных, а не украинских интересов.
An illustrative comparison is the case of Goa, a territory possessed by Portugal for 451 years before India seized it in an act of blatant and bloody mili-tary aggression in 1961. Western governments, including the United States, condemned India’s actions at the time. Today, those same governments accept India’s hold on Goa.
Тоже верный пример, который приводит автор в качестве предостережения (которое актуально даже сегодня или особенно сегодня). Судя по силе наложенных на Россию санкций после 2014 года, странам Запада важнее бизнес интересы, чем принадлежность Крыма к тому или иному государству.
As someone who was born in Russia and spent most of his adult life there, I can vouch for the fact that Crimea had never carried a religious or historic significance of such proportions. The Russian people universally supported the annexation not because of Crimea itself, but because of something else. It was a moment when a derzhava completely eclipsed a nation in the Russian mind.
It was understood that if Moscow had not come up with a quick and forceful response to the West, Russia would have been seen as weak. Crimea was that forceful response.
Пожалуй, соглашусь с таким выводом. Хотя россияне и были рады "воссоединению" с Крымом, но какой-то искренней радости или радости подлинно народной в России в то время не было. Я бы охарактеризовал настроение тех лет скорее как "приятный пофигизм", но подлинной имперской радости среди больших масс населения не было. В то время авторитаризм Путина уже был высок (силён), поэтому открыто становиться фрондой Путину, был удел либо несистемной оппозиции и активистов либо маргиналов. В общем, главным для россиян, если бы они имели возможность выбирать себе политиков и путь развития страны, был бы путь развития экономики, улучшения благосостояния, финансирование науки и медицины, городов и пр. Аннексия Крыма была организована, чтобы поднять рейтинг Путину и тут я с автором полностью согласен.
“For Putin, the reserves that Russia has accumulated over the past fourteen years equal political power,” Alexei Kudrin, who ran Russia’s finances from 2000 to 2011, said in a March 2015 interview.
Прибыль от нефти и газа и нужны были Путину на такие PR проекты как аннексия Крыма с последующей войной на Донбассе. В данном случаи слова Кудрина можно понимать как признание того, что нефтедоллары изначально не предназначались для улучшения качества жизни россиян, да и сами россияне их явно бы никогда не увидели. Это был инструмент, который нужен был, чтобы гарантировать Путину и дальше править Россией. Думаю, наличие этих средств сыграло существенную роль в событиях 2014 на востоке Украины. Все же удивительно, насколько откровенным тогда был Кудрин.
Sharply divisive official rhetoric and the war imagery evoked by state-owned media certainly played a role in inducing the Russians to buy into the Crimean adventure.
But there is another, less obvious factor at work. The annexation of Crimea with its implicit consequences of increased security concerns and defense spending favors what might be called Russia’s Soviet industrial core.
В отзыве книге “The Dead Hand” by David E. Hoffman я как раз отмечал, что советский военно-промышленный комплекс (ВПК) обладал неимоверной политической силой. Мне даже кажется, что ВПК был политически как минимум не слабее КГБ и что он в большей степени влиял на партийное руководство, нежели партийное руководство могло влиять на советский ВПК. Кто знает, возможно, что вся эта история с востоком Украины произошла не без помощи (лоббировании) представителей российского ВПК. Для российского ВПК 2014 год стал началом роскошной жизни. Мы даже себе представить не можем, какие суммы были украдены, начиная с 2014 года, т.е. года, когда эта машина начала раскручиваться на полную силу, а вместе с этим и коррупция в этой области, которая ещё с советских времён была в этой области огромной. Но в любом случаи, это интересное наблюдение со стороны автора.
The choice between “greatness” on the world stage and domestic prosperity is a false one. Russia will be both a formidable world power and a flourishing economy as soon as it learns to take into account the interests of all social groups, including those disgruntled urbanites who recently have been forced to hunker down and wait for better times.
Золотые слова. Именно об этом много раз говорил Алексей Навальный. К сожалению, ни Путину, ни его окружению не нужно чтобы хорошо жили все россияне. Им нужно чтобы хорошо жили лишь путинские чиновники и бюрократы. Понимают ли россияне это? Думаю да. Но что они могут сделать с этой путинской "элитой", которая ещё с Норд-Оста и Беслана показала, что не пожалеет ни детей, ни женщин, чтобы и дальше оставаться у горнила власти.
What changed between September and December 2013? Why did Putin turn to an all-out conservatism as his central ideology? Here, the obvious answer is that while he had chosen to come out fighting aggressively after the May 2012 inauguration, the Maidan uprising starting in November 2013 had given the authorities grave cause for concern.
Перевороты были не только в Украине и Грузии, но и в Кыргызстане и Армении. Скорее сыграла сумма факторов. Да и консервативную политику Путин начал проводить, как только пришёл к власти - одно решение возродить советский гимн чего стоит. Так что нет, я не думаю что Майдан, да ещё в 2013, стал триггером запуска консервативной политики в РФ.
Whereas Putin had had virtually no ideology in his first two terms in office (2000–8), he now had developed an ideology of patriotic conservatism and national glory.
Даже сегодня нет никакой идеологии у Путина. Всё что мы видим после 2014 года, лишь иллюзия, фасад консервативной и националистической идеологии Путина. Я даже думаю, что важность имплементации такой вот консервативной и националистической идеологии стало очевидно Путину ещё при правлении Ельцина, когда произошёл знаменитый разворот самолёта Примакова над Атлантикой. Уже тогда Россия начинала заигрывать как с национализмом, так и консерватизмом и империализмом (хотя и не так очевидно). Многие просто не помнят, но в 90-ые был взлёт различных псевдо-монархических организаций и движений.
In essence, we have four large articles on the topic of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. As I understood from the Acknowledgments, the book was the result of some kind of political forum or session at this very forum.
The idea for this book emerged from a panel discussion we held under the aegis of the Kennan Institute.
I had imagined something like this. In principle, the book is not very relevant today, not because of the loss of relevance due to becoming outdated, but because much of what the book tells us has been talked about many times by various experts. Nevertheless, I will still mention the points I particularly like. I just want to emphasize that the book is very small, and the issues raised are too big.
It is nonsense to think that Moscow had no viable alternatives to the use of force; none was seriously tried after the fall of the Yanukovych government. An impatient Russian leader-ship acted as if it had been deliberately double-crossed in the diplomatic deal-making in Kyiv and opted for a military solution. This opened a Pandora’s box for the region, with results which redounded first and foremost on Ukraine and its people but then very much on Russia itself. Moscow’s suzerainty in most of Ukraine is now a thing of the past.
Although only a minority of Ukraine’s population was anti-Russian before the crisis, Moscow’s resort to war has created a genuine sense of nationhood in parts of that country where previously it had been weak.
Such a short-sighted policy of the Kremlin does look strange if we proceed from the existence of Russian interests. However, from my point of view, at present, there are no Russian interests but only Putin's interests. If we look at the situation from this point of view, it turns out that the use of military force, as well as the annexation of Crimea, benefits Putin directly, but not Russia.
The consequences for Ukraine are severe. Crimea and the Donbas are Russian protectorates for the foreseeable future. Despite Ukraine’s vast human and natural assets, its legacy of decades of political dysfunction and economic corruption, greatly compounded by the impact of war, have reduced Kyiv to dependency on the EU as well as on the International Monetary Fund and the United States.
Very accurate and true remark especially looking from 2024. Many people are already starting to ask what Ukraine has been doing all these 30 years of independence and why, instead of fighting corruption and building a truly European democratic state, Ukrainian politicians have limited themselves to rhetoric. Ukraine's complete dependence on the mood of the EU and the United States is more evident today than ever before. Unfortunately, in the future, this may play a decisive, and for some, a negative role in this Russian-Ukrainian conflict as Western countries proceed from their own, not Ukrainian, interests.
An illustrative comparison is the case of Goa, a territory possessed by Portugal for 451 years before India seized it in an act of blatant and bloody mili-tary aggression in 1961. Western governments, including the United States, condemned India’s actions at the time. Today, those same governments accept India’s hold on Goa.
This is also a true example, which the author gives as a warning (which is relevant even today or especially today). Judging by the strength of the sanctions imposed on Russia after 2014, Western countries care more about business interests than whether Crimea belongs to this or that state.
As someone who was born in Russia and spent most of his adult life there, I can vouch for the fact that Crimea had never carried a religious or historic significance of such proportions. The Russian people universally supported the annexation not because of Crimea itself, but because of something else. It was a moment when a derzhava completely eclipsed a nation in the Russian mind.
It was understood that if Moscow had not come up with a quick and forceful response to the West, Russia would have been seen as weak. Crimea was that forceful response.
I think I agree with this conclusion. Although Russians were happy about the “reunification” with Crimea, there was no sincere joy or genuine popular joy in Russia at that time. I would characterize the mood of those years more as “pleasant pofigism” (don't-give-a-damn attitude), but there was no genuine imperial joy among large swaths of the population. At that time Putin's authoritarianism was already high (strong), so openly becoming a fronde to Putin was the destiny of either non-systemic opposition and activists or marginalized people. In general, the main thing for Russians, if they had the opportunity to choose their own politicians and the way of development of the country, would be the way of economic development, improvement of welfare, financing of science and medicine, cities, etc. The annexation of Crimea was organized by the Russian government. The annexation of Crimea was organized to raise Putin's rating, and here I fully agree with the author.
“For Putin, the reserves that Russia has accumulated over the past fourteen years equal political power,” Alexei Kudrin, who ran Russia’s finances from 2000 to 2011, said in a March 2015 interview.
Putin needed the profits from oil and gas for such PR projects as the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent war in Donbass. In this case, Kudrin's words can be understood as an admission that petrodollars were not originally intended to improve the quality of life of Russians, and Russians themselves would obviously never see them. It was a tool that was needed to ensure that Putin would continue to rule Russia. I think the availability of these funds played a significant role in the events of 2014 in eastern Ukraine. Still, it's amazing how outspoken Kudrin was back then.
Sharply divisive official rhetoric and the war imagery evoked by state-owned media certainly played a role in inducing the Russians to buy into the Crimean adventure.
But there is another, less obvious factor at work. The annexation of Crimea with its implicit consequences of increased security concerns and defense spending favors what might be called Russia’s Soviet industrial core.
In a review of the book “The Dead Hand” by David E. Hoffman, I was just pointing out that the Soviet military-industrial complex (MIC) wielded tremendous political power. It even seems to me that the MIC was at least as strong politically as the KGB and that it had more influence on the party leadership than the party leadership had on the Soviet MIC. Who knows, it is possible that the whole story with eastern Ukraine did not happen without the help (lobbying) of representatives of the Russian MIC. For the Russian military-industrial complex, 2014 was the beginning of a luxurious life. We cannot even imagine what sums have been stolen since 2014, i.e., the year when this machine began to spin up to its full potential, and with it the corruption in this area, which has been huge in this area since Soviet times. But in any case, this is an interesting observation on the part of the author.
The choice between “greatness” on the world stage and domestic prosperity is a false one. Russia will be both a formidable world power and a flourishing economy as soon as it learns to take into account the interests of all social groups, including those disgruntled urbanites who recently have been forced to hunker down and wait for better times.
Golden words. This is exactly what Alexei Navalny has said many times. Unfortunately, neither Putin nor his entourage needs all Russians to live well. They only want Putin's officials and bureaucrats to live well. Do Russians understand this? I think so. But what can they do with this Putin's “elite”, which has shown since Nord-Ost and Beslan that it will not spare neither children nor women in order to remain at the crucible of power?
What changed between September and December 2013? Why did Putin turn to an all-out conservatism as his central ideology? Here, the obvious answer is that while he had chosen to come out fighting aggressively after the May 2012 inauguration, the Maidan uprising starting in November 2013 had given the authorities grave cause for concern.
There have been revolutions not only in Ukraine and Georgia but also in Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. Rather, the sum of factors played a role. And Putin started to pursue a conservative policy as soon as he came to power - the decision to revive the Soviet anthem is worth one thing. So no, I don't think that Maidan, even in 2013, was the trigger for the launch of conservative policy in Russia.
Whereas Putin had had virtually no ideology in his first two terms in office (2000–8), he now had developed an ideology of patriotic conservatism and national glory.
Even today, Putin has no ideology. Everything we see after 2014 is just an illusion, a facade of Putin's conservative and nationalist ideology. I even think that the importance of implementing such a conservative and nationalist ideology became obvious to Putin during Yeltsin's reign when Primakov's plane made its famous turn over the Atlantic. Even then, Russia was beginning to flirt with nationalism, conservatism, and imperialism alike (though not as obviously). Many people simply don't remember, but in the 90s, there was a rise of various pseudo-monarchist organizations and movements.
August 11, 2017
too many prejudgement,
axiom and postulate is poorly made
waste of time
axiom and postulate is poorly made
waste of time
January 19, 2024
ridiculous claptrap
neither informative, nor informed, nor well-researched
Felt the author was an idiot (first paper), second paper was better structured, but still full of glib nonsense
Felt this book made me dumber
neither informative, nor informed, nor well-researched
Felt the author was an idiot (first paper), second paper was better structured, but still full of glib nonsense
Felt this book made me dumber
January 31, 2022
Good historical and contemporary analysis
April 9, 2022
I love this book. One of the reasons I read it is because of its conciseness. It only has about 39k words.
With the current war going on, with Russia invading the whole of Ukraine, my curiosity got the better of me. Can’t help but go into search mode and find out what’s going on. I have other books lined up about this war but let me write down what I think I’ve learned from this book.
Parts of the blame can be shared by the 3 players: the EU, Ukraine and Russia. I have no dog in this fight. I just want to know the root causes. But major blame should be put on the shoulders of Putin for being a war freak. The other two players were just basically concerned about trade and commerce. Putin’s knee-jerk reaction was so out of proportion as to involve his military to go to war! It should have been the last resort or not the resort at all by finding solutions or compromises with the problem at hand.
EU’s fault lies in flirting with the apple of Russia’s eyes which made the latter so jealous and furious. Never had the former any clue as to the consequences of its disastrous actions.
As for Ukraine, she could have weaned herself from the economic sustenance of Russia’s largesse, thus from Russia’s dictates and sphere of influence, if only the apparatchiks in her government were not junkies of corruption.
With the current war going on, with Russia invading the whole of Ukraine, my curiosity got the better of me. Can’t help but go into search mode and find out what’s going on. I have other books lined up about this war but let me write down what I think I’ve learned from this book.
Parts of the blame can be shared by the 3 players: the EU, Ukraine and Russia. I have no dog in this fight. I just want to know the root causes. But major blame should be put on the shoulders of Putin for being a war freak. The other two players were just basically concerned about trade and commerce. Putin’s knee-jerk reaction was so out of proportion as to involve his military to go to war! It should have been the last resort or not the resort at all by finding solutions or compromises with the problem at hand.
EU’s fault lies in flirting with the apple of Russia’s eyes which made the latter so jealous and furious. Never had the former any clue as to the consequences of its disastrous actions.
As for Ukraine, she could have weaned herself from the economic sustenance of Russia’s largesse, thus from Russia’s dictates and sphere of influence, if only the apparatchiks in her government were not junkies of corruption.
December 29, 2025
?Really it was the COUP and those that took Power in that coup and the people that facilitated it: Victoria Nuland and Geoffrey Pratt during Maidan (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G5FVV...).
This is like talking about Anna Frank leaving Nazi invasion and the Final Solution,,,, There is a special place in hell for Professors who sell out - I recon is the last Circle.
There are way better books - I would recommend "Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands" by Richard Sakwa.
This should be Ok for lovers of Antony Beevor's fast-food approach to History, I would avoid it like a Kentucky Fry Chicken burger.
This is like talking about Anna Frank leaving Nazi invasion and the Final Solution,,,, There is a special place in hell for Professors who sell out - I recon is the last Circle.
There are way better books - I would recommend "Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands" by Richard Sakwa.
This should be Ok for lovers of Antony Beevor's fast-food approach to History, I would avoid it like a Kentucky Fry Chicken burger.
January 18, 2016
Smart if very incomplete on its own, a good contribution to what I hope will be a long-developing literature on this crisis.
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