It is symptomatic that while in the final chapter Wallerstein proclaims the breakdown of the longstanding liberal consensus since the French Revolution, he exemplifies the continuance and deepening of the selfsame consensus.
First of all, it has to be said, Wallerstein in several regards provides welcome correctives to a wide variety of misguided avenues of analysis. A focus on economic relations, as poor as the actual analysis is, shifts the focus from more culturalist explanations of phenomena. The titular focus on world systems counters nationalist explanations that don't take the international division of labour seriously. Finally, there is a salutary, if perhaps facile, criticism of official or vulgar Marxism, which in the book goes by the name "orthodox" Marxism, and with it, a criticism of overly schematic analyses that trample over mixed modes of economic organisation, impose rigid stages for developement and overly deterministic accounts of historical change.
However useful some of these constructs may be particularly the notions of long systems and longue duree, the analysis that is to substitute the models criticised leaves too much to be desired, even in an "introductory" work, for it to constitute a serious way forward.
After an introductory chapter detailing the course of academic disciplines since the French Revolution and the illustrious pedigree of world-systems analysis that seems in large cogent, despite the lack of citations and a couple of errors in the details that a simple reading threw up, Wallerstein jumps right into sketching out the undergirding structure of the theory in chapter 2, arriving straight away at the biggest theoretical failing is unfortunately also the most important underpinning of the theory, specifically the theory of unequal exchange. Wallerstein jumps over a couple of steps in the argument, but he essentially argues that profits occur due to the existence of monopolies. The way this is supposed to work is he posits a structural advantage for buyers in exchange, such that in normal market conditions, buyers would be able to argue sellers down to the cost of production (or as he says a cent above this). In order to get around this, and through various means more or less linked to the state, sellers are able to turn the tables of structural advantage and organise themselves in oligopolies in order to demand a permium in the sales price that amounts to the profit. Wallerstein is then able to build his entire analysis of this story, to a desciption of developed economies being so due to being the home of monopolised industries, which then generates global inequalities between states as non-monopolised industries in the periphery drive the profits down through competition.
The problems with this just-so-story crop up at every level of analysis. First of all, the analysis runs onto the shoals from the very beginning in trying to locate the source of profit in exchange. There must be a continuity between the current world-systems and previous ones in producing more than is consumed. In the same way, a slave or serf has to produce more than they themselves consume in order not only to support other social elements but in order to say replenish the seed grain, so workers in the capitalist world-system must produce more with the means of production made available by capitalists, thus producing profit. If there is no surplus-product that is then merely transformed into money during market exchange, it is a wonder anybody in the market has the money to pay the monopolists' profits, as opposed to profit merely being redistributed from the competitive to the monopolised industry. In fact, Wallerstein undercuts his own argument by saying that sellers drive the price to the cost of production thus undermining continued production through a lack of profitability. It thus turns out they couldn't drive the price down so much or else they wouldn't have anything to buy.
The canard also fails as an explanation for unequal exchange. For one thing, monopolised industries do not necessarily correlate with stellar profitability, especially in the case of raw materials. Russia is either the largest or second-largest oil producer in the world and arguably no industry is more monopolised than oil production and yet it would take a very enthusiastic systems theorist to say Russia is a core country. Wallerstein further adduces the example of the British textile industry in the 19th century in his defense, yet it's hard to characterise that as monopolised given the profusion of owner-proprietor owning one or at most a couple of mills. Granted the use of steam looms was nationally monopolised but it was neither the case that Britain was the only country producing cloth (there obviously being plenty of handicraft handloom production), or even that there was an oligopoly of large producers in collusion to keep prices high. The answer to unequal exchange likely is a combination of a generalised use of labour-saving technologies across industries in developed economies, structural advantages for finished goods producers (it being harder to switch to a different producer of finished goods due to cross-compatibility and overhauling production lines than it is to buy identical lithium or coal from a different source), and yes, there being also a place for monopoly rents as an explanation for differential profits.
After giving this explanation of profits in the grand old liberal tradition from the perspective of the individual small business owner competing against everyone else, and having thus obviated the category of exploitation, he of course arrives at an exposition that will be built upon later of the conviction that being a proletarian is in fact the thing everyone longs to be. He explains people are not in fact individuals, but are parts of households that engage in income sharing (they are in fact both on different levels of analysis, and different households in different times and places often have different expectations of income sharing) and can receive one of 5 types of income.
Having thus explained away profits previously, profits are not one of the 5, which are wages, subsistence production, petty commodity production, rent (which thus is taken to include at least some profits) and transfers. It is further hard to see how subsistence production constitutes an income, when it does not produce any money. At most it obviates the need to increase one's income. Given this confusion, he writes himself into saying in addition to subsistence agriculture, writing one's own emails is a form is also a form of subsistence because one is not paying for a secretary. Presumably not paying for someone to spoon soup into one's mouth is also a form of subsistence and a very prevalent one at that. Which category the income a small business owner derives slots into is hard to see. Perhaps it is a combination of the rent off the capital used to start the business and the income one pockets by not hiring a manager, but then this would really be a form of subsistence making a mess of the whole thing. But we now arrive at the kicker, not only are wages one of many forms of income, they are the best one. The argument goes as such: it is necessary to give waged emplyees enough money to repoduce themselves and their families, but it's also possible for the worker's household to supplement this income with the other 4 sources. If the other 4 sources form the majority of the household's income the wage-earner(s) can accept lower salaries and still maintain themselves, thus making household that survive mostly from working for wages better off. Here we have the beginning of a trend to ignore power relationships when analysing structural links.
First of all, what is ignored is there is only one labour market, not 2 separate ones, one for proletarian households, and one for non-proletarian households. If non-proletarian households drive down wages, then proletarians have to get the same reduced wages without the further means to sustain themselves, presumably either working more, becoming non-proletarian households by receiving transfers from the state (thus undermining their own priviledged status) or not reproducing their households, say by not having children. Which brings us to the postulate that families must earn a minimum to reproduce themselves (one of the only things Wallerstein copies from Marx, it of course being one of the things that is true only to an approximate degree). Wallerstein seems to assign a large degree of long-sightedness to capitalists, such that they pay enough wages to their workers because they see that if they don't they will undercut themselves in a couple of decades. It is really giving capitalists too much credit to say they will never steal from tomorrow to pay for today especially when they may go under before tomorrow. The fact that in the West we live in a crisis of social reproduction and have been for some time, with continuously fewer younger people starting families and having children would seem to imply precisely that you can pay less than the requirement for social reproduction and not see adverse effects until far in the future. Not to mention that each individual capitalist is trying all the time to lower his own salaries while trying to get the other to pay for social reproduction, for example, though taxes. Historically this was even worse, with the open maw of early modern cities gobbling the surplus rural population and capitalists certainly not providing this minimum wage necessary for social reproduction.
History also militates against this best of all possible incomes. During the early modern period, there was a long period of enclosure of common lands that allowed a budding rural proletariat to work as little as possible for wages or not at all. This enclosure happened through acts of parliament at the behest of agricultural entrepreneurs and landlords who presumably did this for the privilege of paying their workers more. Not only this but presumably a buy-to-let landlord whose household's income largely comes from their properties, but then be an inviting target when looking for a job, since employers could pay them close to nothing at all (perhaps a cent). It is clear this analysis will not do. In fact, every additional income one can get amounts to an increased ability to not take the first job offer one gets, and to quit a bad one and be supported for a limited period while looking for a better one. This additional income from outside the wage relationship amounts to an increase in bargaining power and a levelling of the power imbalance between employee and employer. But this is again the quagmire Wallerstein reaches when obviating exploitation and poses the main problem to be solved precisely exclusion from exploitation.
There is a kernel in what he says in that there has historically been a sexual division of labour with men engaging to a larger extent in wage work and women in what he terms subsistence, with men dominating due to having control of the actual income the wage. But according to Wallerstein, women should have been just as able to dictate terms to men since they controlled the income from subsistence.
After this atrocious economic treatment, we receive some breathing space in chapter 3 with the discussion of the inter-state system. While by no means groundbreaking, this chapter is at least not obviously wrong. Wallerstein adeptly describes the relationship between strong states and weak states as one of power imbalance that maintains structural inequalities (for once power imbalances are neither passed over, nor explained away) through the medium of the relationship between these 2 and the national champions of strong states that can expect support against the weak states form their own state. He also describes the struggle between capitalists and workers through the state for who is to pay for various externalities like infrastructure, waste, and resource depletion. He also insightfully points out that in the current would-system, every state becomes a nation-state by producing a nationalism. There is a strong implication, not fully worked out, that the nation-state is the expression of the state given a particular state capacity and capillary ability, being able at least to enforce a uniform dialect through the school system.
The vision of the future Wallerstein leaves us with betrays another fundamental obviation of power relations in distinguishing between the liberties of the minority and of the majority. On the face of it, it seems plausible. One should want that the majority gets to implement its will in some things and lets individuals decide in others, however, it cannot be the case that both the majority and the minority hold the balance of power and get to implement their will. Either power rests with the majority or it rests with any one minority. The goal of any egalitarian movement cannot be anything else than to try to modify power relations such that the balance rests with the majority. Beyond that one can only hope that that majority will exercise its power wisely and tactfully. The only alternative is to rest one's hopes that some elite will defend individual liberty more vigorously and less in their own interest than the broadest stratum defending their own rights at the same time they defend everyone else's.
Beyond deep theoretical issues, there is a complete lack of citations even for the more controversial statements like the support of workers' movements for coerced labour, at the same time as there is a generally unfair treatment of the workers' movement, implying that any opposition to upper-class women's and ethnic minority organisations is an opposition to women's and ethnic minority rights. In addition, there is as well as the presence of more verifiably false statements, like the Soviet Union adapting development theory, when this was a Cold War response to historical materialism for consumption in the Third World, making the work overall a fairly shoddy piece of scholarship, even as an introductory text.