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Politics as Public Choice
This volume presents a collection of thirty-four essays and shorter works by James M. Buchanan that represent the brilliance of his founding work on public-choice theory.
The work of James M. Buchanan is perhaps most often associated with his helping to found public-choice theory. Buchanan’s book-length works such as The Calculus of Consent or The Reason of Rules (Volumes 3 and 10, respectively, in Liberty Fund’s The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan) are best known for their brilliant application of market behavioral models to government. But Buchanan’s shorter works represented here all show originality and insight as well as clear articulation of important theoretical principles. What’s more, these essays have all had a significant impact on the subsequent literature about public choice.
In this volume, the works are broken down into these major categorical groupings:
1.General Approach
2.Public Choice and Its Critics
3.Voters
4.Voting Models
5.Rent Seeking
6.Regulation
7.Public Choice and Public Expenditures
As Robert D. Tollison concludes his foreword to this volumes, Read in conjunction with the other parts of the Collected Works,’ these papers offer the reader a fuller appreciation of the public-choice revolution and its impact and prospects.”
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
The work of James M. Buchanan is perhaps most often associated with his helping to found public-choice theory. Buchanan’s book-length works such as The Calculus of Consent or The Reason of Rules (Volumes 3 and 10, respectively, in Liberty Fund’s The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan) are best known for their brilliant application of market behavioral models to government. But Buchanan’s shorter works represented here all show originality and insight as well as clear articulation of important theoretical principles. What’s more, these essays have all had a significant impact on the subsequent literature about public choice.
In this volume, the works are broken down into these major categorical groupings:
1.General Approach
2.Public Choice and Its Critics
3.Voters
4.Voting Models
5.Rent Seeking
6.Regulation
7.Public Choice and Public Expenditures
As Robert D. Tollison concludes his foreword to this volumes, Read in conjunction with the other parts of the Collected Works,’ these papers offer the reader a fuller appreciation of the public-choice revolution and its impact and prospects.”
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty
Volume 2: Public Principles of Public Debt
Volume 3: The Calculus of Consent
Volume 4: Public Finance in Democratic Process
Volume 5: The Demand and Supply of Public Goods
Volume 6: Cost and Choice
Volume 7: The Limits of Liberty
Volume 8: Democracy in Deficit
Volume 9: The Power to Tax
Volume 10: The Reason of Rules
Volume 11: Politics by Principle, Not Interest
Volume 12: Economic Inquiry and Its Logic
Volume 13: Politics as Public Choice
Volume 14: Debt and Taxes
Volume 15: Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory
Volume 16: Choice, Contract, and Constitutions
Volume 17: Moral Science and Moral Order
Volume 18: Federalism, Liberty, and the Law
Volume 19: Ideas, Persons, and Events
Volume 20: Indexes
510 pages, Paperback
First published December 1, 2000
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About the author
James M. Buchanan
123 books66 followersAmerican economist known for his work on public choice theory, for which in 1986 he received the Nobel Memorial Prize. Buchanan's work initiated research on how politicians' self-interest and non-economic forces affect government economic policy. He was a Member of the Board of Advisors of The Independent Institute, a Distinguished Senior Fellow of the Cato Institute, and professor at George Mason University.
Buchanan was the founder of a new Virginia school of political economy. He taught at the University of Virginia—where he founded the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression—UCLA, Florida State University, the University of Tennessee, and the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, where he founded the Center for the Study of Public Choice (CSPC). In 1983 a conflict with Economics Department head Daniel M. Orr came to a head and Buchanan took the CSPC to its new home at George Mason University. In 1988 Buchanan returned to Hawaii for the first time since the War and gave a series of lectures later published by the University Press. In 2001 Buchanan received an honorary doctoral degree from Universidad Francisco Marroquín, in Guatemala City, Guatemala, for his contribution to economics.
Buchanan was the founder of a new Virginia school of political economy. He taught at the University of Virginia—where he founded the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression—UCLA, Florida State University, the University of Tennessee, and the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, where he founded the Center for the Study of Public Choice (CSPC). In 1983 a conflict with Economics Department head Daniel M. Orr came to a head and Buchanan took the CSPC to its new home at George Mason University. In 1988 Buchanan returned to Hawaii for the first time since the War and gave a series of lectures later published by the University Press. In 2001 Buchanan received an honorary doctoral degree from Universidad Francisco Marroquín, in Guatemala City, Guatemala, for his contribution to economics.
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December 4, 2024
Buchanan's insights are important and heralded the institutional policies founded on methodological individualism that we take for granted today. Unfortunately he oversteps his bounds as an economist. His broad-scale analysis of the distribution of political power and (most prominently) his emphasis on constitutionalising restraints on power by big-tent coalitions that align private interests with the common good are invaluable. Yet his micro-level analysis of policy-making is reductive, disregarding established principles of governance in the social sciences in favour of a hyper-rationalistic game theory. Buchanan sheds light on the theoretical basis for both the good, and bad, of 1980s neoliberalism.
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