My Years with General Motors

by Alfred P. Sloan

My Years with General Motors  became an instant bestseller when it was first published in 1963. It has since been used as a manual for managers, offering personal glimpses into the practice of the "discipline of management" by the man who perfected it. This is the story no other businessman could tell—a distillation of half a century of intimate leadership experience with a giant industry and an inside look at dramatic events and creative business management.

Only a handful of business books have reached the status of a classic, having withstood the test of over fifty years' time. Even today, Bill Gates praises My Years with General Motors as the best book to read on business, and Business Week has named it the number one choice for its "bookshelf of indispensable reading."

Genres: Business, Biography, Management, Nonfiction, Leadership, History, Autobiography

496 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1964

Reviews

[Lobstergirl · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's not really accurate to call this a memoir. It's more a business history of the early years of General Motors, from the viewpoint of its most famous executive Alfred P. Sloan. Sloan today is revered as a pioneer of business management; his name graces the Sloan School of Management at MIT, as well as his charitable causes, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center (Charles Kettering was a pioneering GM engineer).

Sloan instituted and oversaw many of GM's trademark features, such as the divisions, the differential pricing for each car so that one division wouldn't cannibalize sales from another, the careful balance between centralization and decentralization, the used-car trade-in, the dealerships, and the idea of company financing. Henry Ford made cars affordable by making them cheap; GM made them affordable by instituting the trade-in, and by offering credit to finance the purchase when no banks would do so. It was of great importance to Sloan to hire the best people, and let them make their own decisions (but subject to his veto, Kettering's unsuccessful copper-cooled engine being a prime example).

Parts of the book are quite interesting, but other parts are absolutely deadly dull. Sloan's style is so dry and impersonal. We never see Sloan the man, who is remote, formal, and detached in these pages (and was so in life as well, according to his ghostwriter John McDonald, in A Ghost's Memoir: The Making of Alfred P. Sloan's My Years with General Motors). His insistence on inserting long excerpts of company memoranda and correspondence in the text makes it sometimes painfully arid, enlightening only to the most devoted readers of corporate histories.

If you're going to read Sloan's book, I would recommend reading his ghostwriter's account of it as well (linked above). Apparently management legend Peter Drucker's introduction contains enormous and inexplicable inaccuracies, such as the assertion that Sloan was griefstricken by the death of his brother Raymond (Raymond actually outlived Alfred by nearly 20 years), and that Sloan waited until all the other executives at GM had died to publish, in order not to offend anyone (publication of the book was delayed, rather, when GM sued to suppress publication because it feared material in the book might negatively impact a possible Justice Department antitrust case).

[Tara · Rating 5 out of 5]

Over 50 years since its initial publication, this books still stands as one of the greatest business management classics. Written in a practical, matter-of-fact way, Sloan does not deliver a business how-to or a doctrine to follow, he simply explains the how and the why of various business decisions he was faced with during the take-off of the automobile industry in the early 20s. Sloan demonstrates how careful planning and market analysis allowed GM to topple Ford's Model T. An interesting discussion of centralisation vs decentralisation and other management decisions is interspersed with a thorough history of GM in its early days and the development of the industry until the 50s. Key takeways include the importance of financial and inventory controls and the benefits of economies of scale in operations and production. It is interesting reading this book knowing that shortly after Sloan's retirement, the Japanese auto industry took off, exposing the inefficiencies in the GM model of production by focusing on quality above all else. This book is a pretty long read and many sections will not be of interest to those without any enthusiasm for cars or engineering know-how, those looking to simply glean business lessons should read the first half of the book and then the last 2 chapters.
Overall an engaging and interesting read that gives a unique insight into a very different time.

[Omar Halabieh · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a true business classic. In this book Alfred Sloan shares his years of wisdom - while heading General Motors - in a variety of areas including planning, strategy, finance, leadership, innovation and management. Alfred was a true pioneer of his time in building the discipline of management and his approach is just as applicable now as it was in the early 1900s.

Below are key lessons in the form of excerpts that I found particularly insightful from this must read classic.

1- "I feel that a proper balance can and must necessarily be established in the course of time between the activities of any particular Operation and that of all our Operations together and as I see the picture at the moment no better way or even as good a way has yet been advanced as to ask those members of each organization who have the same functional relationship to get together and decide for themselves what should be done where coordination is necessary, giving such a group the power to deal with the problem where it is felt that the power can be constructively applied. I believe that such a plan properly developed gives the necessary balance between each Operation and the Corporation itself and will result in all the advantages of co-ordinated action where such action is of benefit in a broader way without in any sense limiting the initiative of independence of action of any component part of the group."

2- "I am not going to say that rate of return is a magic want for every occasion in business. There are times when you have to spend money just to stay in business, regardless of the visible rate of return...Nevertheless, no other financial principle with which I am acquainted serves better than rate of return as an objective aid to business judgment."

3- "The growth in the capital employed in General Motors reflects the progress of the corporation. In an economy based on competition, we have operated as rational businessmen, a fact I have tried to demonstrate with close description of the development of our approach to management. The result has been an efficient enterprise. It should be noted that a rising successful economy like that of the United States is not only an opportunity, it is also very demanding on those whose ambition is to excel in it. "

4- "I believe that the franchise system (dealerships), which has long prevailed in the automobile industry, is the best one for manufacturers, dealers, and consumers."

5- "The potential rewards of the Bonus Plan to ego satisfaction generate a tremendous driving force within the Corporation...To the recipient it is also an evaluation of his personal contribution to the success of the business. It is a means of conveying to the executive a form of recognition which he prizes independently of his monetary compensation."

6- "It has been a thesis of this book that good management rests on a reconciliation of centralization and decentralization, or "decentralization with coordinated control." Each of the conflicting elements brought together in this concept has its unique results in the operation of a business. From decentralization we get initiative, responsibility, development of personnel, decisions close to the facts, flexibility - in short, all the qualities necessary for an organization to adapt to new conditions. From coordination we get efficiencies and economies It must be apparent that c-oordinated decentralization is not an easy concept to apply."

7- "...To meet the challenge of the market place, we must recognize changes in customer needs and desires far enough ahead to have the right products in the rights places at the right time and in the right quantity. We must balance trends in preference against the many compromises that are necessary volume. We must design, not just the cars we would like to build, but more importantly, the cars that our customers want to buy."

8- "I also hope I have not left an impression that the organization runs itself automatically. An organization does not make decisions; its function is to provide a framework, based upon established criteria, within which decisions can be fashioned in an orderly manner. Individuals make decisions and take the responsibility for them."

[Denis Vasilev · Rating 4 out of 5]

Классика менеджмента, СЕО General Motors об управлении корпорацией

[Jay French · Rating 5 out of 5]

I read “My Years at General Motors” when I was in college, roughly 32 years ago. My interest at the time was in reading a piece of business history, and I find I still recall a number of topics covered in the book. I can’t say that for many books I read so many decades back. I think that what struck me was that Sloan and his managers really changed how things worked, and organized the automotive industry in a way I see many companies trying to organize their industries today. As I think about it, I realize that what made this book resonate with me all those years ago was that I recognized so many of the business and technical innovations that Sloan described, innovations that really created the world I lived in by being embedded in every organization I interacted with, from schools and colleges to Kmart to the Boy Scouts. I learned of customer segmentation from Sloan’s division of cars by class of the customer they aimed at, Chevy for the masses and Caddy for the upper class, with Olds, Buick, etc. falling in the middle, and with defined target customers. That business move lasted decades and drove changes, usually replication, across the industry. I also remember learning about technical innovation – the good and the bad. Sloan described some of the innovations that GM came up with, including, if I recall correctly, leaded gasoline. Some innovation is right for the times but wrong for other times. Other innovations included allowing car buyers to buy on credit, and building a massive organizational structure with staff departments and hierarchy and span of control optimized to the company’s needs. I also learned of Detroit, and of Dayton, GM hotbed of research. This book made me think highly of Dayton, and when I visited there for a job interview soon after I read Sloan’s book I felt I understood the city a bit better.

I’ve read other reviews that point out that Sloan’s book could be quite dry, with long company memos recorded. Thankfully, the years have allowed me to forget those kinds of specifics. While I do remember this was a challenge to read through, my interest was kept high by reading of the growth of modern big business from an early master. Impactful.

[David McClendon, Sr · Rating 5 out of 5]

Book Review
My Years With General Motors
Alfred P. Sloan Jr.

David E. McClendon Sr.
The book My Years with General Motors by Alfred P. Sloan Jr. is highly recommended as the one business book every aspiring business student should read. Management guru Peter Drucker speaks of it several times throughout his writings. Bill Gates told Fortune, “My Years with General Motors is probably the best book to read if you want to read only one book about business.”
This book really is not a “how to book”. It is more a book about what Sloan and his contemporaries at General Motors did and why they did it. Sloan tells a little about the concept of centralized decentralization. This can be a hard to understand concept, but Sloan explains in detail how the concept came to be invented and why. He also explains when and how General Motors moved away from decentralization and when and how they moved towards centralization. Somehow, he makes it all make sense.

When General Motors first started out, the whole concept of a corporation that size was fairly new. Sloan and the executives working with him literally wrote the book on how a corporation works. They did not coin the phrase “Social Responsibility” but they did help to invent the concept. National Cash Register was developing the concept at the same time.

I would not suggest that this be the only book you read on business. However, I agree with Gates that if you could only read one business book that this would be a great choice. Sloan does not use complicated terms to explain the concepts. In fact, many of the terms used today were not invented yet when Sloan began writing this book. Sloan had to treat his readers as if they were unfamiliar with management concepts. This is because so few people were familiar with these concepts at the time.

[Kurishin · Rating 2 out of 5]

I suspect one would learn considerably more valuable lessons from a history of GM after Sloan departed the company. Like many books of its ilk, this amounts to a victory lap. I struggle to learn much from my own victories, let alone anyone else's, particularly one who rode one of the 20th century's structural growth engines. I found large chunks of this book irrelevant, at least to this reader.
I further give myself 2 stars for not adequately analyzing what this was likely to be like prior to reading.

[Ari · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a hard book to classify. The title suggests it will be a memoir, but it's much more nearly a corporate history or business case study, told in the first-person. Sloan says almost nothing personal. He freely alternates between the singular and the plural -- it's never quite clear which decisions were his and which were collective. The preface suggests that this is deliberate; the book was written several decades after much of the history and it might not have been clear to the writers who was responsible for what.

Writers, I say. While the book has only Sloan's name on the cover, it was partly ghostwritten by John McDonald of Life Magazine. This is really for the best. My Years with General Motors is full of excerpts from memos and the like that were really written by Sloan, and McDonald is a much better stylist.

The theme of the book is "management in the large," and particularly the creation of GM as a modern automobile company in the 1920s. GM was started by Will Durant; he was brilliant but disorganized, ran out of money and got pushed out. Then he build his own car company (Chevrolet) and took back GM in a reverse merger. He then proceeded to expand in a disorderly and expensive way, and ran out of money again. But along the way he had bought up a small bearings company run by Sloan, who moved quickly up to be a senior vice president at GM. In the financial crisis of 1920, the shareholders pushed out Durant and put in Pierre Dupont to replace him, with Sloan as the "operational" vice president to assist him.

Once they were in charge, Dupont and Sloan had to figure out how to bring order out of chaos, and create a management structure that would let them control the company without stunting it. GM in the 1920s was one of the largest and most complicated businesses in the world. It had five or six automobile divisions, plus assorted ancillary lines of business (GMAC, Frigidaire, etc)

I found the book on the whole easy and rewarding. However, there are some passages that are unreadable minutia, without explanation. There are long passages about the intricate financial engineering of manager stock plans, or how the company raised capital in the 1920s. I found these hard to understand and impossible to care about, and I know more than a little about stock-based compensation about business capitalization structures.

Many of the other technical details, however, were real eye-openers. We all snigger at Henry Ford saying "your car can be any color so long as it's black." But Sloan points out that before the 1920s, they didn't have automobile paint as we know it. Painting a car would take a month, and this imposed enormous inventory costs. Black enamel could be put on comparatively quickly. So there was a lot of logic to saying "we aren't gonna do paint."

Another insight -- Sloan explains that much of the logic of dealer franchises is that dealers do an awful lot of buying and selling of used cars, and the car companies didn't want to manage the trading risks. Having franchisees struck a compromise between wanting some control over sales and service, but without having a swarm of hard-to-manage sales people trading automobiles on the company's account.

[Max Lapin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Certainly a must read business encyclopedia for corporate management and governance

[TΞΞL❍CK Mith!lesh · Rating 5 out of 5]

My Years with General Motors is a must-read. Sloan explains the policies and processes he used to make his company the best-selling motor company. When studying his proven strategies, you can take and implement them in your own business, and this will take your company to greater heights.

[Frank Stein · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's odd that this book is celebrated by many of today's corporate luminaries, including Bill Gates, as the best business book of all time. In fact, it's hard to imagine something more anathema to today's open offices and leaderless companies than this book, which often reads like a paean to the "org chart." The appendix contains seven such charts, which supplement another half-dozen sprinkled throughout the text, along with endless discussions of their benefits and problems.

Admittedly, Alfred P. Sloan was operating in a different era, and in a different environment. The problem he faced when he effectively took over General Motors in 1920 was not building up a new behemoth, but wrangling a horde of barely connected entities into some sort of coherent whole. On and off for the preceding 12 years, William Durant, the creator of General Motors, had used new stock sales and borrowing to buy a host of companies, from Oldsmobile, to Chevrolet, to Fisher Body, to Dayton Engineering, to Frigidaire, to Hyatt Roller Bearing (the last of which brought its leader Sloan into the GM). Despite existing under the umbrella of General Motors, all these companies competed with each other and with the head office, which they ran as a single committee, for more cash and more power, until Durant was forced out and the whole ramshackle organization almost collapsed in the 1920 recession. Sloan said Durant "was a great man with a great weakness - he could create but not administer." Sloan's job, and he did seem to have a real genius for it, was to provide an organization to get these groups to function in harmony. As reported by Peter Drucker in the introduction, Sloan "had gone back again and again to the American Constitution" to figure out how to create a whole that was more than the sum of its parts. It's not what you'd expect in a business book, but Sloan's administrative and political sense shines through.

As Sloan shows, the famously "decentralized" GM wasn't the result of conscious decision to create a number of semi-competitive divisions under one roof, it was the result of an effort to allow old companies to continue to operate with some measure of supervision. In Sloan's foundational 1920 memo, "Organization Study," he argued that the real goal of the head office of a company such as GM was to evaluate the return on invested capital for each division, and allow "the Corporation to direct the placing of additional capital where it will result in the greatest benefit." He advocated a central and independent Executive Committee, which would decide on general ideas about policy, and a Financial Committee, which would allocate capital based on each division's returns, but the rest would be left up to the independent divisions. The central committees would be supplied with "staff" for research and long-term analysis, while the "line" officers in the operating divisions would control and run actual operations. This seemingly easy division involved no end of line-drawing and debates (styling and research were once done in divisions, but moved up to the corporate office), but the general outlines of Sloan's "Organization Study" lasted, and propelled one of the world's most successful companies for over 50 years. However these organization charts appear today, they were once an unquestioned and unquestionable success.

There are loads of interesting stories about the history of the automobile sprinkled throughout the general organizational story. There's the engineering geniuses Charles Kettering and Thomas Midgley creating tetraethyl lead as an anti-knock agent in 1922 (and thus unwittingly poisoning generations of Americans with leaded air). The annual model change, often seen as an attempt to encourage frivolous consumer spending, is shown to be a gradual move in the 1920s away from the old "continuous improvement" system, which made it difficult to retool production lines. The franchised car dealerships were largely an attempt by GM to allow locals to control the sudden influx of used cars on the market, and their owners' desire to "trade-in" for a newer one in the 1920s.

On the whole, however, the book gets too bogged down in procedural minutiae and organizational changes. Sloan can be rightly celebrated for his work in corralling and controlling an old industrial monster in the heyday of conglomerates, but I'm not sure how much he has to offer readers today.

[Tommy Kiedis · Rating 5 out of 5]

Alfred Sloan published My Years with General Motors in 1964. The Beatles were on the top of the pop charts and Sloan's General Motors also reigned supreme, topping the FORTUNE 500 as the most profitable company on the planet. Sloan's book sold more than 50,000 hardcover copies when issued. When re-issued in 1990, Peter Drucker touted it as "the best management book ever."

That's strong praise!

Believing that "a manager does not criticize subordinates in public," Sloan refused to publish My Years with General Motors as long as any of the GM people mentioned in the book were still alive. Given his age, many were fearful his work would never be published, but Sloan released the book for publication on the day the last person mentioned in the book passed away. Sloan himself died just two years later.

About Alfred P. Sloan:

Alfred Sloan was born on May 23, 1875 and died on February 17, 1966. He was an engineer, an entrepreneur, a "captain of industry," a visionary, a thinker, a competitor, a Republican who distrusted Franklin D. Roosevelt, and a philanthropist. Above all he was the man primarily responsible for General Motors' meteoric rise to become one of the largest corporations (if not largest at that time) in the world. Sloan was CEO of GM for twenty-three years and a member of the board for forty-five. You can read, "Alfred P. Sloan Jr. Dead at 90; G.M. Leader and Philanthropist" by the New York Times for an excellent summary of Sloan's life.

How Sloan Organized This Book:
My Years with General Motors tells the story of GM from it origins until the early 60's. One of the "pivotal facts" of this story is the downfall of Ford "after achieving its historic purpose" (4). Sloan organized the book (broadly speaking) around three concepts:

1. GM's decentralized approach to business

2. GM's financial controls

3. GM's concept of business as it applies primarily to the automotive market

The latter is most significant in that at the time of writing GM accounted for half of the automobiles produced in American, ten-percent of the passenger cars and trucks made outside of the United States. The corporation, however, also produced locomotive, diesel and gas-turbine engines, and household appliances. The book is divided into two parts:

Part One: The GM Story, focusing on the "corporation's basic management concepts in the areas of organization, finance, and product. Sloan puts primary focus on the period after 1920, and particularly from 1923 to 1946, when he served as president and chairman.

Part Two: Individual sections dealing with engineering, distribution, overseas operations, and war production as well as other aspects of the enterprise.

Lessons in Leadership & Management:

1. Seeing The Trends (vs splurges):
Ford sold 500K Model T's in 1916 and more than 2M in one year in the early 20's, but the trend was away from his model. "The downfall of that great car in later years, after it had served its historic purpose, is one of the pivotal facts of this story" (4). GM recognized that buyers had moved away from the automobile as "transportation's utility machine" to one marked by style, taste, and variety. Sloan writes:

Mr. Ford’s concept of the American market did not adequately fit the realities after 1923. . . . Middle income buyers … created the demand, not for basic transportation, but for progress in news cars, for comfort, convenience, power, and style. This was the actual trend of American life and those who adapted to it prospered (163).

This resonated with me in that, as a leader of an educational enterprise, we must determine how we will react to a changing market (demographics, modalities, needs, cultural nuances).<

2. Know yourself. Play to your strengths:
General Motors was founded in 1908 by William C. Durant, Stewart Mott, and Frederic L. Smith with Durant serving as the CEO. Sloan heralded Durant and Henry Ford as men with "unusual vision, courage, daring, imagination,and foresight" (4). Durant would build Chevrolet into a major player in the automotive industry. But Sloan also notes, "Mr. Durant was a great man with a great weakness--he could create but not administer" (4). Durant operated "by the seat of his pants" (52). Poor administration forced him to step aside from managing GM in 1910, though he took over the company again (1916-1920) before it ultimately passed to Alfred Sloan. Sloan writes:

Thanks mainly to Mr. Durant, General Motors had then the makings of a great enterprise. But it was in good part physically unintegrated and in management uncoordianted (sic); the expenditures for new companies, plants and equipment, and inventories were terrific--some of them not to bring a return for a long time, if ever--and as they went up, the cash went down. General Motors was heading for the crisis from which the modern General Motors Corporation would emerge (16).

Sloan said he was of two minds about Mr. Durant. He admired his automotive genius, imagination, integrity and loyalty. But he felt that Durant was too casual as an administrator, overloading himself (by not decentralizing), hence stalling important decisions until he was free (25f).

3. Your team makes you or breaks you:
William Durant's number two man was Charles W. Nash. Sloan writes, "He had been with Mr. Durant in the Durant-Dort Carriage Company for about twenty years and had stayed on as a manager there when Mr. Durant first went into the automobile business. He was as steady and careful and Mr. Durant was brilliant and daring--or reckless, as you may choose to call it" (8). This duo proved powerful until Durant's "reckless ways" led to his initial demise and the more careful Nash became president of GM in 1912 before leaving in 1916 to start the Nash Motors Company. See also the relationship between Mr. du Pont and Mr. Raskob (43).

4. Clarify your organizing principle:
Sloan inherited a General Motors that was feeling the effects of a Durant presidency, i.e. a company that had been led by a man whose administrative style would be described as "in his own way," and "by the seat of his pants." It was part of his brilliance to recognize the necessity to maintain (as Jim Collins would later identify as) loose/tight properties. At the time GM had many divisions, each with chief executive. Sloan said that each organization headed by its chief executive "shall be complete in every necessary function and enable[d] to exercise its full initiative and logical executive" (53). However, Sloan also recognized that "Certain central organization functions are absolutely essential to the logical development and proper control of the Corporation's activities" (53). He writes:

It has been a thesis of this book that good management rests on a reconciliation of centralization and decentralization, or "decentralization with coordinated control" (429).

To that end, Sloan envisioned centralized "control of all the executive functions of the Corporation in the President as its chief executive officer" (54). In decentralizing, Sloan never wanted to minimize the administrative power of the chief executive officer. Exercise power with discretion was his theme: "I get better results by selling my ideas than by telling people what to do" (54). He believed in limiting "as far as practical" the number of executive reporting to the president. He also worked to ensure all executive branches were organized in such a way that the development of each would be constructive to the whole.

5. Know your differentiator:
Sloan notes that companies compete in broad policies as well as specific products. Over against the Ford policy of one car for the masses, the product policy GM proposed was three-fold:

(1) Produce a line of cars that corresponded (in price) to national income brackets.

(2) Keep price gaps at a level that generated quality at each level while leaving enough gap to create a "step" or "leap" to the next level. Chevrolet . . . Pontiac . . . Oldsmobile . . . Buick . . . Cadillac

(3) No duplication by the corporation in the price fields or steps.

This principle seems axiomatic, but it caused me to work to continually clarify our differentiators, for example in online education. We will deliver an education that is:

(1) Missional

(2) Biblically integrated

(3) Exceptional

(4) Marked by high personal touch in a digital age

GM's ability to provide that clarity enabled them to leap over Ford and become the dominant player in the automotive industry. However, without that clarity, GM floundered. In 1920 they had 17% of the market, in 1921 only 12%; Ford on the other hand rose from 45% to 60% over the same time period (62).

GM's journey to eclipse Ford moved on the path of differentiation: Sloan writes: "Chevrolet's internal statement of policy [in 1924] was that it was our objective to get a public reputation for giving more for the dollar than Ford. As a matter of fact, when the Ford and Chevrolet were considered on a comparable-equipment basis, the Ford price was not far below that of Chevrolet. On the quality side we proposed to demonstrate to the buyer that, though our car cost X dollars more, it was X plus Y dollars better. Too, we proposed to improve our product regularly. We expected Ford, generally speaking, to stay put. We set this plan in motion and it worked as forecast" (155).

6. Why growth matters: "Growth, or striving for it, is, I believe essential to good health of an enterprise" (xxii).

7. The price of leadership:
Alfred Sloan's understanding as to the cost of leadership is worth pointing out. He writes:

I recognized that my election to the presidency of the corporation was a big responsibility and a business opportunity that comes to few. I resolved in my own mind that I would make any personal sacrifice for the cause, and that I would put forth all the energy, experience, and knowledge I had to make the corporation an outstanding success. General Motors has been for me a dedicated activity ever since, perhaps to a fault(98).

8. Determining the propriety of proposed projects:

a. Is the Project a logical or necessary one considered as a commercial venture?

b. Has the Project been properly developed technically?

c. Is the Project proper, considering the interest of the Corporation as a whole?

d. What is the relative value of the Project to the Corporation as compared with other projects under consideration (return on investment/need)?

Sloan built in these guidelines as a means of improving financial controls (120). His basic elements of financial control for GM were: cost, price, volume, and rate of return on investment (140). See also chapter 11 (e.g. 198).

9. Careful communication:
Alfred P. Sloan was not a captivating communicator as far as I can tell, but he excelled in providing timely, consistent, and clear communication. We see in memos to committees, letters to key constituents (e.g. To Harry Basset of Buick to convince him of the need for styling, 267), or to Charles Kettering (260), to GM executives (see 320). Sloan's communication was marked by formality (Mr. So and So), clarity, and politeness.

10. Behind household names, often lie people with an idea:
Many familiar with automotive brands will be interested to know the people behind them. For example:
a. The Chevrolet Motor Company: Brainchild of Louis Chevrolet
b. Champion spark plugs: Named after Albert Champion, former president of AC Spark Plug Co
c. Nash Motors Company: Named after founder and former GM President, Charles W. Nash.
d. Fisher Body Company: Initially carriage builders, the Fisher brothers (who were devoted to their mother) built this company, which was ultimately acquired by GM. You must see the picture on page 194.
e. Buick Car Company: The oldest surviving car company in the US was started by automotive pioneer David Dunbar Buick.
f. Oldsmobile: Ransom E. Olds launched the "Olds Motor Vehicle Company" in 1897. It was acquired by GM.
g. Diesel engines: Rudolph Diesel intended his engine to run on powered coal, but ended up using petroleum oil instead at the urging of assistant engineers (343).

11. Sometimes seeing the obvious takes time:
Addressing the open-top touring cars vs closed body touring cars: "For twenty years we protected ourselves with a variety of rubber coats, hats, lab robes, and other makeshift things. For some reason or other, it took us a long time to realize that the way to keep dry in a motorcar was to keep the weather out of the car. With the closed car came styling as we know it today" (267).

12. The incredible impact of the right "player."
It is worth the time to read Chapter 15 (Styling) both for the power of a concept applied (styling) and the impact of one person for a company and that concept (Harey Earl). Earl not only "made the difference" for GM when it came to design, but he also influenced the entire automobile industry. See my review of Fins: Harley Earl, the Rise of General Motors, and the Glory Days of Detroit.

13. Don't let derision keep you from your vision:
After GM bought the German company Opel, which had been producing about 45,000 cars a year, Sloan visited their factory to cast vision for the Opel of the future. At the meeting of some five or six hundred employees, Sloan noted that the production might run as high as 150,000 vehicles a year. "When the statement was translated into German, it was received with a good deal of derision. I was viewed as another impractical, visionary American. Yet as I write this, the capacity has been brought up to 650,000 vehicles" (327). See also diesels and locomotives (352).

Quotes worth quoting:

1. On influence: "I got better results by selling my ideas than by telling people what to do. Yet the power to act must be located in the chief executive officer" (55).

2. On executive confidence (here in reference to the burgeoning automobile market): "Confidence is an important element in business; it may on occasion make the difference between one man's success and another's failure." At the same time enthusiasm does not guarantee success. Charles Kettering, a brilliant engineer and inventor, was very enthusiastic for his "copper-cooled" engine, which proved to be a very expensive failure for GM (See chapter 5).

3. On slumps: "The slump had the effect of show up all kinds of weaknesses, as slumps usually do" (63).

4. What groups cannot do: I have often been taxed, by people who do not know me, with being a committee man--and in a sense I most certainly am--I have never believed that a group as such could manage anything. A group can make policy, but only individuals can administer policy" (100).

5. Responding to change: Speaking of Henry Ford and his loss of market share, Sloan writes: "The old master had failed to master change. Don't ask me why. There is a legend cultivated by sentimentalists that Mr. Ford left behind a great car expressive of the pure concept of cheap, basic transportation. The fact is that he left behind a car that no longer offered the best buy, even as raw, basic transportation" (162). "Mr. Ford, who had so many brilliant insights in earlier years, seemed never to understand how completely the market had changed from the one in which he made his name to which he was accustomed. . . . [his] concept of the the American market did not adequately fit the realities after 1923" (163).

6. On debt: "I think it would be generally agreed that, in principle, debt enhances the return on the stockholders' investment, while at the same time increasing the risk involved" (205).

7. On resolving uncertainty and enhancing efficiency: "Uncertainty must be eliminated. Uncertainty and efficiency are as far apart as the North Pole is from the South. If I could wave a magic wand over our dealer organization, with the result that every deal could have a proper accounting system, could know the facts about his business and could intelligently deal wit the many details incident to his business in an intelligent manner as a result thereof, I would be will to pay for that accomplishment an enormous sum and I would be fully justified in doing so" (287).

8. On recognizing success: "When your competitors follow you, that's the medal in business" (290).

9. On getting the facts: Addressing a group studying partnerships overseas: "that you should take nothing for granted--every point should be studied and approached with an "Open Mind," without prejudice and with the sole purpose of getting the facts wherever they may lead us. As a matter of fact, this is one of the most important steps from the standpoint of capital investment and expansion . . ." (325).

Conclusion:

My Years With General Motors is a fascinating, if at times, a tedious read. It conveys, however, the genius of Sloan, the complexity of organization, and what happens when ideas, mental fortitude, and courage are combined to act. As Harold Hamilton, president of Electro-Motive in 1929, who was considering utilizing GM's diesel engine technology to propel his locomotives, said "that he was not attracted to General Motors merely by the corporation's great economic strength. '. . . we had more than that in General Motors,' he commented. '. . . of the companies that I knew at that time, many of them with plenty of financial resources, none of them had the mental approach to this problem that was necessary to take it at that stage that it was in the, and the courage that went along with it to move it to that point of success'" (348). That is Albert P. Sloan: Ideas, organizing genius, mental toughness, and the courage to act.

I heartily recommend My Years With General Motors. He will not spell out his principles of effectiveness, but they are there for those who want to see them. And that is exactly what Sloan wants you to do: search, see, and apply.

[JP · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is so highly rated because Sloan conveys through simple, concise language the solutions to the same problems we have made so complex (not that I know how to simplify them again). He writes it as a story. Credits include Bill Gate's acclaim and my original prompt to read it based on it's inclusion in a list of the top ten business books of all time. Sloan began with an engineering background, some business experience and a successful bearings business. It was bought by GM when the firm was consolidating horizontally and vertically. Sloan was at the front of that early success, from the 20's and into the 60's. To summarize it into one lesson: centralize what is most effective centralized, then let human initiative drive from that common framework. Sloan can be credited with running the first corporation of that size with reason, fair dealing, and a visionary outlook. He foresaw the impact of business trends, war, and technology, and yet he was flexible when the consensus opposed him. He carefully considered their international footprint (and re-entry into Opel when assets were returned after WWII). He brought international talent when the design team needed more new influence. He fits the profile of the Type 5 leader described in "Good to Great" - modest, yet driven (in his words "any personal sacrifice for the cause"). He frequently gives credit to others and only once exhibits the slightest hint of boast in his own capabilities (wondering what would have happened to the French automaker Citroen if he or one of his capable peers had decided to run it). One other management theme: the firm would coordinate more during slow time and in times of expansion or matters of innovation, allow more decentralized control. Sloan divides the auto industry into 3 periods: pre-1908 (class market), 1908 to the mid 1920's (mass market), and beyond that (mass-class market). Four elements drove the transformation into the modern period: installment selling, the used-car trade-in, the closed body, and the annual model (would add improved roads as a driving external factor).

[Rob Lanphier · Rating 3 out of 5]

Too many words ;-) It's not conversational easy reading like contemporary business books. It's a pain to read it. However, it's a really good lesson in leadership. Sloan clearly didn't believe in pulling rank or letting himself get lobbied to make stupid business decisions by division leaders within GM. One of the central conflicts described in the book is the conflict over whether GM should bet big on copper-cooled engines (e.g. Chevrolet_Series_M_Copper-Cooled), which was (pardon the pun) the hot new technology of the day. It's been so long since I've read the book that I don't remember all of the details, but the short answer is that GM minimized the investment in copper-cooled engines due to GM's willingness to allow for decentralized experimentation.

Microsoft was clearly modeled after Sloan's GM, which I believe played a pretty substantial role in their first few decades of success. In many ways, I think Google is trying to be the modern GM to Apple's Ford.

[Paul Downs · Rating 3 out of 5]

As a book, unsuccessful. Dry as toast writing, strange arrangement of subjects, extensive quotation from the most boring original sources (letters, board reports, memos). No attempt to paint a picture of Sloan as a person, nothing at all that reveals what he brought to his job. No introspection whatsoever.

As a piece of history, illuminating. Just how does one go about managing a company that consists of widespread physical plants, employing hundreds of thousands of workers, using the tools available in the early 20th century? Sloan tells how it was done, and it's hard to argue with success.

[Mitri Laatvala · Rating 4 out of 5]

Декілька років тому читав книгу Генрі Форда і очікував що тут буде щось схоже. Ті самі роки, та сама країна, той самий початок чогось нового з нуля. Але подача матеріалу тут для мене є слабшим, якось забагато цифр і фактів і замало самого життя. Зате дізнався про те які люди і компанії вийшли з цієї біз��ес структури, а саме з General Motors включала в себе Chevrollet, Buick, Cadillac та Crysler. На цю фірму працювали абсолютно талановиті розробники і механіки.І так було десь половину книги одні цифри і цифри, другу половину автор почав набагато краще і почав описувати як виглядала індустрія в ті роки.
Як спочатку автомобілі не мали дахів бо міцних плащів і парасоль мало вистачити.
Як швидко облуплювалась фарба бо раніше таку саму використовувади для карет і інших рухомих складів але їх так сильно не трясло тому вона не лущилась але тепер треба продумувати щось міцніше.
Які деталі вважались комфортом на початку століття, а саме те щоб машину банально не гойдало, бо ж дороги не стали кращими а швидкості авто зростали відповідно комфорт погіршувався. Ці деталі і тонкості мені сподобались про це читав з захватом. І звісно конкуренція з Фордом, прорахунки всіх цінових категорій щоб охопити якомога більше покупців.
Так наприклад були моделі по 500 долларів а далі аж по 900. То було проведене дослідження як створити модель яка мала переваги і заповнить цю нішу в умовних 700 долларів.І коли я вже подумав що залишилось найцікавіше автор знов почав в цифри. А до війни ми продали стількито а от в 1950му вже стількито. Суцільна марудятина ,але як я помітив нудні розділи чергувались з цікавими. Автор розповів які країни були залучені для будівництва заводів, і перелік дуже вражає, це і Англія, Німеччина, Австралія ітд.G M хотіли купити Сітроен в Франції але щось в кінці не склалось хоча сума 20 мільйонів вже була домовлена. Зате купили Опель і мали великі надії на них в Німеччині. Але після війни з ним були проблеми адже прийшли асвабадітєлі і хотіли забрати Опель собі в якості репарації. Але уряд США не дав совєтам взять всьо і падєліть і в повітрі вже відчувавсь пролог холодної війни. Рада деректорів порадилась що країни які входять в сферу впливу ссср ненадійний плацдарм для розширення, тому на східну Європу навіть не дивились.Насправді книга читалась дуже повільно, чи то подача чи якісь незрозумілості від автора мішали. Зокрема вказано що писав він її з десяток років і видав в 1963му, але неясності є в тому що він каже от зараз ми запустили це але по контексту зовсім не ясно який це рік чи етап історії. Бо він подав матеріал більше як економічні розділи, розширення і тому структури де ми немає. Набагато краще б читолось поетапно про все але з наростанням років. Мені от було цікаво 1940-50ті але щоб вікрити і почитати про них такого нема, є там трохки потім через пару розділів ще трохи.Ще цікавим фактом були такі етапи в історії коли компанія займалась холодильним обладнанням і авіацією.
Холодильники вони почали випускати під час 2ї світової тому що була така дилема що виробництво можуть зменшити бо пріоритет надавався стратегічно важливим речам або військовій техніці. І компанія зіграла в таку гру запустивши для себе абсолютно нову лінійку. А авіація це більше про мотори для літаків. Так до війни в компанії були замовлення на орієнтовно 2.5 мільярди долларів на рік а вже за перші місяці війни вони отримали замовлень на 2 мільярди які згодом доросли до 4 і до 8 мільярдів. Нові реалії змусили компанію діяти по новому але і тут вона показала ріст. Також автор розповів про премії і ріст зарплат в компанії. Так премії він вважав кращим рішенням адже це лише фіксована сума занесена в бюджет , а не ріст зарплати який треба буде нести щомісячно. І навіть премії розбивались на частини наприклад з 5 штук щоб в працівника був стимул працювати на компанію і не покидати її в короткостроковій перспективі. Про ріст зарплат теж є, і він теж частково з нюансом. Так в них було підвищення на 3 центи для абсотютно всіх від двірника до топ менеджера. І це також вигідно адже ріст іде не у відсотках від зп, бо тоді підіймати б довелось набагато більше ніж 3 центи.

[Dan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Living in – but not being from – the Detroit area, I felt the need to better understand how the auto industry, and particularly General Motors, grew up in the 20th Century. Alfred P. Sloan answers the question in his impersonal memoir/management case history of the corporation through his more than 40 years there beginning in 1918.

It is a very long book, partly because of the endless financial details, such as in the chapter where Billy Durant loses the presidency of the company in the early 1920s due to ill-advised loans, or in the later chapter about bonus and stock option calculations.

It is also long because the auto industry and the company that “personified” it for a century are extremely complex – more so than I realized until this book gave me the big picture. Of course, we all think about the design and manufacturing of the cars, but what about the many seemingly peripheral but actually essential aspects like:
- dealer relations
- labor relations
- finance and insurance of dealer-held cars
- overseas operations (to sell US exports or to make custom products in the other countries)
- use of GM products in refrigerators, airplanes, diesel trains, and wartime production?

And most importantly, what about the overall management of a corporation made up of divisions that may work well singularly (decentralized), or may work better when coordinated centrally? Sloan relays how and why they had to thread this needle.

Some guiding Sloan-isms:

- It has been a thesis of this book that good management rests on a reconciliation of decentralization with coordinated control. Decentralization allows adaptation to new conditions through initiative, responsibility, development of personnel, decisions close to the facts, and flexibility. From coordination we get efficiencies and economies.

- The professional manager manages through the force of facts not personality. "Bedside manner is no substitute for the right diagnosis."

- The manager is a professional with a client: The enterprise.

- Dissent and conflict (in committee meetings) bring understanding for right decisions.

- The professional manager is a servant. Rank does not confer privilege or power, only responsibility.

- The job of a professional manager is not to like people or change people. It is to put their strengths to work. Their performance, which includes setting an example of integrity, is the only thing that counts and the only thing the manager is permitted to pay attention to.
-----------------------------------------------
Despite the enormous events of the 20th Century, Sloan makes almost no reference to the world beyond the auto industry. One exception: The corporation had to make a bet on what America’s economy and post-war appetite for cars would be – a boom or a recession. As early as 1943, Sloan addressed a business and economics forum and said GM came down on the side of boom. “We recognized when the war would end, there would be a tremendous release of pent-up demand. We acted boldly on this assumption.” This would mean they would have to “lay money on the line to convert plants from wartime to peacetime production as quickly as possible in order to meet demand, provide peacetime jobs, and fulfill our obligation to shareholders.” Sure enough, the war factories were again turning out cars in less than 2 months after the war ended in 1945, and the demand was hot!

The book, published in 1964, two years before Sloan’s death, pre-dates most of what we think of as the women’s movement. Hence, every reference is to the men in the company, recognition of the man, etc. It grates like fingernail on a chalkboard now and serves as a stark reminder of how recently half the population did not even enter the thinking of this business leader and his peers.

4 stars: A worthwhile read that requires a strong will to finish.

[catinca.ciornei · Rating 5 out of 5]

This management book was published in 1964 - 55 years ago. That in itself would not recommend it - so (so so) much has changed since then, one may think. But it is entirely mind-blowing that so so much remained the same! Mr. Sloan's interest in building the complex delicate intricacies of a large organisation (General Motors had 600,000 employees at the time of publishing) are endearing, and deeply interesting. Mind that I myself am a manager, and have studied the subject, so my intense interest is sincerely biased.
I've enjoyed this book a lot. So much that I probably will reread it, and I'll recommend it to the university of management studies in my home country (why it's not obligatory reading is beyond me). It is sometimes slow to read (the language has evolved a lot, and older writings tend to deliberately test the reader more than nowadays), but the gifts of persistence are large.
Mr. Sloan talks about the history of the car market (that in itself is wonderfully detailed, for those specifically interested), the history of General Motors, its organisation, its r&d, its product policy (how the product line came to be, how the pricing was established), its development of financial controls (the much-loved return on investment is king here), its bonus structure, its dealers' network, its financing arm, its development abroad (how it was considered and negotiated and implemented), its involvement in national defence during both World Wars. There are detailed descriptions of methods to keep inventory in check, of keeping managers motivated and engaged, of negotiating with employees, of navigating internal disputes, even of managing geniuses (Mr. Kettering was General Motor's head of innovation, responsible for many huge technical breakthroughs; the Sloan-Kettering Cancer Centre comes indeed from the donations and involvement of these two gentlemen). More than anything, Mr. Sloan aims to convince us that rational, scientific management is best. He carefully explains that General Motors "is not the appropriate organisation for purely intuitive executives, but it provides a favourable environment for capable and rational men".
As Mr. Sloan himself says: "the perpetuation of an unusual success or the maintenance of an unusually high standard of leadership in any industry is sometimes more difficult than the attainment of that success or leadership in the first place. This is the greatest challenge to be met by the leader of an industry".
For those with a NY Times Book Review subscription, see here https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1964... - the original review in 1964!
And for a modern, anniversary take - https://hbr.org/2014/03/my-years-with...

[Mamduh Halawa · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excruciatingly dull read. But other than that, an interesting book.

Sloan walks the reader through his years as executive in various leading positions at the largest automobile company in the world. The book concerns his early re-organisation of the then loosely tied conglomerate of several smaller manufacturers into one cohesive corporation. A central tenet in most of the work concerns creating policies that generate informed data for decision-making. And that decision-making should preferably be de-centralized to smaller departments but incentivised to gain the organisation as a whole.

Central to the work is the constant balancing force of adaptability and the need for long-term planning. Since production cycles for new car models take such a long-time, sufficient resources need to be activated far before one can actually make an informed guess about the market conditions. This means one needs some leeway to change course built in to the production cycle, in a predictable way. Sloan and the corporation generally, seemed to have been adept at this kind of rational decision-making, and develop a culture that is not to a great extent dependsnt on any individual but instead of the constant tinkering of processes and policies.

Maybe one of the more interesting chapters concerns Sloans first tentative years as a GM executive. After taking over as right hand-man to the president, Sloan first develops his grand theory of management as an internal report. This report contains a great deal of the philosophies that can be seen in GM as it develops. However, for the first years, GM is slowly adapting towards this new de-centralized and data-driven organisation and finds itself unable to cope with the right models for business. Sloan himself contradicts his own management style by lobbying for Kitterings brilliant but un-ready air-cooled engine - taking an irrational and risky bet on a new technology and severely limiting GM:s ability to meet market demand for their product as well as leaving the manufacturing divisions in disarray and at headlock with esch other. Sloan inevtiably pulls the plug on this new invention, and this type of engine does not re-appear until almost 40 years later. There are several of these episodes, where both the management and the corporation struggle with their implementation of their lofty ideals. I think the lesson to be drawn is that they did not back down on their fundamental principles, but instead revised and honed all aspects of their organisation.

[Jason Braatz · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is dryer than hell.

But it's still a must read for an Executive-level within a company.

Here's why: it breaks down perhaps one of the most state-of-the-art management systems that we still use today: committees. Committee's get a bad wrap ; there's an old saying that : "Go into a park and try to find a statue someone made of a committee" - and there's some truth to that. On the other hand, leadership is defined by people who are able to get things done, and Mr. Sloan definitely got things done.

In fact, GM had to gut their whole business model during World War II and build-to-spec items for the US Government for war materials. When the war was done, they had to go back to business as usual. It's noted that GM made money the whole time - they weren't a war bride (a company who inappropriately made money on the war), but rather, they had an effective management system.

Peter Drucker wrote about GM in Concept of the Corporation and supposedly, according to Drucker, this was GM's response. Drucker, it's written, believed that many of those people in GM whom he wrote about took quite an offense to how he wrote about the management technique of having competitive divisions with a shared central services core - and what's odd is that there's nothing Sloan does to dispute that (if anything) he expands on it greatly.

I bring this up because Drucker's book, supposedly more seminal than this one vis-a-vis management books, lacks the spine that Sloan presents here. I sense no animosity, but in a foreward to Drucker's book he wrote that there certainly was some. It's history now.

If you are a CEO or are in an executive role, this is a required read. I know, much of it is dry (read: boring) because Sloan's writing style is like reading the minutes of a corporate board meeting. That said, the information itself is worth slogging it through, the ideas which come to mind and the management techniques which bond are priceless.

[Austin Gaghadar · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book provided interesting information on the history of the car industry and approaching managing a business from first principles. Two key concepts that I found particularly relevant to my current circumstances were the deliberate approach to decision making and the determination between centralization and decentralization. I appreciated the willingness of Sloan to share the specifics of how he was making his decisions on these topics to understand the benefits and costs and how he was weighing them, as well as a frank review of the outcomes to understand what worked well and what did not. This book also helped make more tangible the wide varying role of the CEO of a manufacturing company in a changing industry and the plethora of demands for their time and energy and limitation to how much one individual can actively manage. This helped to build the case for a central authority with greater visibility that made policy but the implementation of that policy devolved to those with more details on how it would work in progress. I believe a lack of using this approach, where a more dictatorial approach has been adopted in management without empowering those closer to the creation process has led to significant inefficiencies in the current economy and limited small scale innovations that can compound.

I found the second half of the book much more difficult to read than the first half. I believe I do not have the requisite background on how cars work, either now or in the past, and the way that a manufacturing based corporation operates. This made it very difficult to parse and understand the implications of the myriad details that Sloan shared throughout the second half of the book on the different aspects of managing the business. Overall, more detailed than I would have preferred but a very wide ranging exposition of management, growth, decision making and the modern corporation.

[Oliver · Rating 4 out of 5]

Alfred P. Sloan, the man that led a corporation which provided mass-manufacturing of customisable and quality products at an affordable price, before anyone else.

- Allow company divisions to compete with one another (decentralisation), however, ensure the divisions don't cannibalise one another through central management (centralisation).

- The role of central management is to see the current trends in consumer demand and actively participate in changing the organisation to accommodate for the trends years in advance.

- If you cannot contribute a product to the market which will be uniquely beneficial to the consumer, don't bother in serving that consumer demand. The competition will beat you out if you endeavour to start where everyone else is.

- A critical aspect of building a company designed to outcompete competition is introducing innovations before your competition.

- Be strategic with revenue/cost ratios for company investment. Purchase materials/services from external sources if they can provide a lower revenue/cost ratio than what is provided from reinvesting in your pre-existing revenue yielding activities.

- Engage the managers, so they become the best. Grow the performance of the managers by providing them financial incentives which increase their ownership of the company. Allow the bonuses to be decided by their divisional manager and approved by a centralised small bonus committee. Ensure their bonuses scale with their salary and responsibilities.

The book initially felt like a bore, the lacking description of character development and mediocre storytelling is quite apparent. However, the layered descriptions of how General Motors grew and developed, essentially provided fascinating world building. Dull yet enthralling.

[Bob Wallner · Rating 4 out of 5]

I've heard quite a bit about this book and it was time to listen.

When management guru Peter Drucker says that a piece of work is important to the science of management, you know it's important.

This book Chronicles GM's rise to fame beginning with Durant's consolidation and whimsical purchases, to the 1960s. I was a little skeptical when Sloan started by saying that he wanted to hold off publishing this book until everyone had died as I thought it was going to be a book about burying people and blaming people. On the contrary, one major difference between this book and Ford's autobiography is Sloan uses the word "we" while Ford uses the word I. There is a major difference where Sloan considers his team around him as a major piece of the success of GM while Ford, other than a couple people, takes a lot of credit himself.

Just this piece is enough to prove to me that Sloan was a true leader and he combined leadership and management into one science.

The book was good, got into a lot of details that were hard to follow at times audibly as numbers were being thrown left and right. If you listen beyond that you really get a sense of his leadership style.

Definitely a good read and one I will reread in the future.

[Dan Albert · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is one of the few sources we have on how Alfred P. Sloan saw the world and organized General Motors into the largest and most profitable company of its day. Although Sloan rightfully deserves his place as a giant in the world of business -- and a philanthropist -- one does have to wonder how much he should be held accountable for GM's long slide from the top of the mountain from 1960 to its bankruptcy.

There are critical business lessons in here about how to develop consensus and think about a company (GM existed not to make cars but to make money he declared as early as the 1920s). It's heavy going unless you have a keen interest.

Historians will glean insight into Sloan and important source material for GM's early years. Other than this, there is a fluffy and thin autobiography, Adventures of a White Collar Man, and an attempt at biography, Sloan Rules. The latter tries hard but suffers from the lack of sources. John McDonald, who was Sloan's ghost writer, produced A Ghost's Memoir in 2002, an excellent companion to this volume.

There are other easier to read tales, such as William Pelfrey's Billy, Alfred, and General Motors, but start with Sloan and McDonald.

[Alex Campbell · Rating 4 out of 5]

Alfred Sloan's account of his time at General Motors is the book that any auto investor should read before any other. What stands out is the extent to which he was ahead of his time, whether that's in the early usage of DuPont's ROE decomposition or the adherence to "coordinated decentralisation" for which he so powerfully advocates. There is lots of detailed and thoughtful discussion of every option for running a business, including, notably for me, the importance of properly-designed incentive schemes.

Sloan was a true pioneer, particularly in the way he thought about his model lineup, changes to it and therefore the cycle that it created. He also led the way on the importance of captive finance arms and their importance as a sales funnel, on which he shares his knowledge here. Only not 5 stars as some of the corporate history is a little dry.

[Tony Pitttarese · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is obviously very old, having been published in 1963. Nonetheless, there are several sections of the book that are highly relevant in contemporary business. The discussion of centralized vs. decentralized operations and how Alfred Sloan established used various committees to guide corporate decision making is interesting. Even the sections that dealt with unions, collective bargaining, and incentive programs are interesting to explore GM's philosophy of dealing with workers at this point in their organization. I wouldn't recommend this go to the top of anyone's reading list, but for someone who wants to get a sense of big business in the U.S. in mid-1990's this book is a must read.

[Jeff Keehr · Rating 4 out of 5]

I know that Sloan left a lot out of this memoir, such as his attempts to destroy the union and other greedy plots, but the story of cars is immensely interesting. There were lots of small car companies in the beginning and until they were combined into the rather unimaginative name of General Motors they were not that interesting. Once the company became large and was able to pour money into research and engineering, the story becomes fascinating. Of course, Sloan ended up creating a foundation that has done a lot of good long after his death. He was a pretty cool character.

[Andrew · Rating 5 out of 5]

Understandably an authoritative classic for both management & automotive enthusiasts.
A firsthand account of corporation, from the most influential figure of the largest production industry of the 1900's.
This book offers invaluable insight for those whom possess interest in; corporation, management or the automotive industry & its product.
I view it best to leverage the text as a reference as to how things have being done, to explore how things could be done, sadly it appears more often than not the ideologies presented within texts such as this are applied as rule not guidance.

[Chase · Rating 4 out of 5]

7.0/10 - Remarkably Dry for as Valuable and Implicative the Events Covered. This is a very unique book straight from the source of the CEO of the largest company on earth through world wars, Great Depression, and automotive era, but it’s stylistically written like meetings transcribed into notes and email summaries. Truly a slog to get through the 21 hour book. You’d be surprised how much of it is about refrigeration too! But it was a book I wanted to read and finish and I’m still glad I did. It takes you back to business in the 20s through 40s well. It’s interesting to explore the subject of decentralization, centralization, and corporation in their early pioneering times. Also vertical integration and segmentation for customers. Some parts like the foreign expansion was impressively dull lol. This was all authentically by the person who systematically built such a corporation I guess! Not Phil Knight haha.

A car for every person and purpose! (and purse, they add at the end)

[Nguyen Pham · Rating 3 out of 5]

Bản Tiếng Việt dịch còn nhiều điểm thiếu sót như dùng sai đại từ, một số chỗ dịch word by word, dịch nguyên câu văn dài từ tiếng anh, đọc rất khó hiểu. Về nội dung, nửa đầu rất hay, nói về những ngày đầu tiên Sloan thiết lập cơ chế quản trị phi tập trung, và phối hợp thông qua các ủy ban, về làm chính sách và điều hành. Nửa sau đang đọc, sẽ cập nhật tiếp.

Vì sách tiếng việt và dịch giả làm công nghiệp quá nên tôi chỉ cho 3 sao. Bạn nào có khả năng nên đọ sách tiếng anh sẽ hấp dẫn hơn nhiều