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334 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1997
The sympathetic identifications borne by disgust do not always, by themselves, clarify the moral order. Consider the relation of disgust to the vice of cruelty. Cruelty generates a double disgust in the impartial spectator, that is, once we recover from the shock it can give. First, the perpetrator is looked on with fear and loathing, with the most intense kind of disgust and horror. Then a second disgust focuses on the degraded victim, whether bloody and disfigured or morally annihilated in the disgrace of having been so abused. Our pity and desire to relieve the suffering of the victim are inhibited by the same emotion that compels us to execrate the person responsible for the plight. Thus does cruelty compromise the impartial observer, who is caught up in such a superfluity of disgust that he is paralyzed. The observer must now come to feel acutely his own inadequacy in the face of such evil. The disgust directed against the violator is raised partly by what we would recognize as moral failure; the disgust directed against the victim, however, imputes moral failing to him as a consequence of his having been rendered ugly, deformed, undignified, and disgusting by victimhood. The victim is held to some moral account for being so degraded unless the victim has the peculiar status we accord to infants and children for whom the demands of dignity are largely suspended. This is some of the cost of disgust’s inevitable association with shame. Witnessing another’s shame disgusts us. And this is why shaming is such a powerful sanction; shame is the internalization of the spectator’s disgust and contempt.
upward contempt makes for some psychic space for the low. It never loses the sense of its own limits; it knows itself to be secondary, a kind of remedy for the contempt that is rained down on one, never constitutive, always reactive.... The contempt of the low for the high, unlike conventional contempt, will often be coupled with a kind of Schadenfreude.... It is the contempt of those who actually have to clean up the messes and implement the policies of those they contemn.
The low now have available to them the Hobbesian contempt of just not caring to attend to their superiors, and it is this which does so much to engender anxieties in the superior, for the superior cannot fathom that he or she could be so utterly disattendable.
It just might be that the mutuality of contempt is much of what pluralistic democracy is all about. What democracy has done is arm the lower with some of the contempts that only the high had available to them before. Every person is now entitled to think his vote undervalued in comparison with those of all those contemptible others with whom democracy has lumped him. This is no small achievement. It is much of what makes democracy so different from the old order.
But one might distinguish a difference of emphasis between the disgusts and styles of loathing prompted by Jews and those prompted by lepers. More than lepers, who were associated with rotting flesh and cadavers, Jews were associated with excrement and menstrual blood. Such as the Christian demonization of the Jew—and the uncomprehending Christian horror of circumcision—that the Jewish male was believed to menstruate. Jewish men were thus feminized and all women were thus Judaized to make both more disgusting, more dangerous than they had been before. Without pushing the distinction too far one might notice that physical disgust at appalling sights and odors of lepers led to a belief in their moral loathsomeness; whereas the Jew's assumed moral loathsomeness led to a belief that his body must then be as disfigured as his soul.
The avowal of disgust expects concurrence. It carries with it the notion of its own indisputability, and part of this indisputability depends upon the fact that disgust is processed to particularly via offense to the senses. It argues for the visibility, the palpability, the concreteness, the sheer obviousness of the claim. Disgust poses less of a problem for intersubjectivity than perhaps any other emotion.