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Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds
Current thinking about such topics as reference, naming natural kinds, necessity, analyticity, and identity as been deeply affected by a new theory of reference that has recently aroused much interest. Some of the key papers setting forth the theory, as developed by Keith S. Donnellan, Saul Kripke, and Hilary Putnam, are collected in this illuminating anthology. Disputing many widely held beliefs, the articles present all the essential aspects, arguments, and notions of the new theory of reference. In his lucid introduction, Professor Schwartz discusses the challenge that the theory poses to traditional thinking, summarizes the arguments for these claims and assesses some of its contributions to philosophy. --- from book's back cover
- GenresPhilosophy
277 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1977
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February 24, 2020
Summary: This collection of articles was really well curated and perfect for what I was trying to understand. It builds a lot off of Locke's work, so you might need to go back and re-read that if it's been a while. I'm disappointed in the direction things take.
I was trying to understand philosophy's belief system as relates to naming. This did the trick and also reminded me of Lock's Treatise on Human Understanding, which I never did get to in Uni.
p. 15 He describes this central theory of meaning (Putnam- I don't know this guy so I got to do more work) that entails: "1) Each meaningful term has some meaning, concept, intention, or cluster of features associated with it. It is this meaning that is known or present in the mind when the term is understood. 2) the meaning determines the extension in the sense that something is in the extension fo the term if and only if it has the characteristics included in the meaning, concept, intention, or, in the case of cluster theory, enough of the features. In many contemporary versions, the meaning or concept of the term may include only observable criteria for the application of the term."
p. 16 - He says Locke's is the best definition and then states: "His view is that with each meaningful term there is associated some abstract idea or definition that determine what things have a right to be called by the name. These nominal essences are of our own making whereas real essences exist in the things themselves and are made by nature. It is by the nominal essences that we distinguish things into sorts since, according to Locke, we can never come to know the real essences of natural things."
p. 17 This comes from An analysis of Knowledge and Valuable (LaSalle, p. 39) "The denotion or extension of a term is... the class of all actual or existent things which the term correctly paplies to or names."
p. 21-22 - They are saying the names might at times have no bearing on the descriptions of what they mean. There might be some history that leads up to it that is immaterial. They use the example of Trial for Smith's murder. Everyone that is accused might be related to Smith's Murder, and that might be the naming shortcut, but in fact, that's inappropriate b/c none of them are guilty b/c of association. I have mixed feelings about this, b/c I'm sure every person has taint and is impacted by the nature of that naming convention. I think that's what is currently happening with fake news.
p. 24, he's got a better way of thinking about it. Let's say that we all know Godel's proof, but find out it was his wife who did the proof. We'd still likely call it Godel's proof because it's more common. We all will know the reference, but the name is not related correctly.
p. 26/27 - They talk about rigid designators using the example of gold. "Furthermore, what it is to be gold cannot be analytically specified by some list of properties, for no matter how much properties of something resembling what we take to be the superficial properties of gold, the stuff would not be gold unless it was the same kind of substance that is rigidly designated by "gold." In other words, he's talking about atomic number 79 and going to the lab and stuff. I have mixed feelings, cause it sounds like which one of the properties is vital, but I think when you move away from physical substances, what he's saying is more intriguing.
p. 32 - Causal theory Donellan "Speaking of nothing" His point names, even if you don't know someone or something, you can refer to it because it's in your memory as the referral of something someone else said. This is weird, but I think this is right and also I'd be curious how that means names get warped. I will read this essay in the future as I think there is some nuanced point here.
p. 45 Then they go through whether referring requires some previous knowledge. But what if you're referring to something that does not exist. They use "Is Gualle the king of France." Well no, b/c there is no king of France any longer, so the reference exists even though the object does not. It's nuanced, but not insignificant for my work.
p. 60 They reference a book called "Reference and Referents." Here they talk about mistaken referrals. I want to read the nuance of this. I think this has relevance to the fake news.
p. 79 They talk about this idea of a Rigid Designator that exists in all possible worlds.
p. 85 - They go back to Godel in the idea of what can be known. Recall Godel is saying there is no such thing as perfect knowledge in a given system, even within math.
p. 93 They talk about the fixing of references:
"Even if we fix the reference of such a name as 'Cicero' as the man who wrote such and such works, in speaking of counterfactual situations, when we speak of Cicero, we do not then speak of whoever in such counterfactual situations would have written such and such works, but rather of Cicero, whom we have identified by the contingent property that he is the man who in fact, that is, in the actual world, wrote certain works."
Here they are talking about defining which cicero, but I think the more important take away is that when we name certain things we are not talking about all their properties, but some subset which is relevant. So we are not talking about Cicero as a father or a guy that lives down the street to other people, we care about this particular aspect of his existence. Interesting.
p. 114 - As relates to meaning: "What different kinds of words are associated with what different kinds of core facts? And By what mechanism does it happen that just conveying a small set of core facts brings it about that the hearer is able to imitate the normal use of the word?"
p. 119 "Feeling that meanings are 'public' property -- that the same meaning can be 'grasped' by more than one person and by persons at different times -- he identified concepts (hence 'intensions' or meanings) with abstract entities rather than mental entities."
p. 125 - "The division of linguistic labor rests upon and presupposes the division of nonlinguistic labor, of course." We use words where we don't know the intrinsic property at all, but because someone else does it's fine. Aluminum foil for instance.
p. 127 It's not that I think that it's made of aluminum from a psychological state, it's from a sociolinguistic state. He then moves on, but I think this is important to dwell on, his stakes are different from mine. I mean, if you say bring me aluminum foil and there is none, I'm likely to also bring you saran wrap b/c I understand you're trying to cover something. I'm able to identify which trait was most important. I think b/c he uses the idea of gold instead of what I'm using he misses a very important point.
p. 150 They are talking about which traits are relevant for meaning and which ones are just associated.
p. 152 - "But the properties in the stereotype generally reflect the thing in relationship to man. /i>One very important factor is usefulness."
p. 188 - He talks about Locke's idea that real essence is independent of any sorting or classifying. I think this is his rephrasing, I don't think Locke thought of knowledge quite like this. but I'm down.
p. 207 - It's unfortunate that these guys are using cluster to deal with stupid issues like if someone looks like you and takes over your life, is that the real you. I mean, there's really bigger issues to address that would have been helpful.
p. 243 - Again trying to be too cute in proving Santa doesn't exist. There is actually a real issue they should be addressing and that is the fact that in two different languages, you can make the statement differently and still have it be true or false (depending on how you look at it). Also, if Santa doesn't exist why do both of you know about him, which honestly, is the best topic of what knowledge is (see earlier discussion in the book). I'm disappointed.
p. 260 We go into transworld identity. Whether something exists across all space-time and multi-verse. Again. i'm disappointed.
I was trying to understand philosophy's belief system as relates to naming. This did the trick and also reminded me of Lock's Treatise on Human Understanding, which I never did get to in Uni.
p. 15 He describes this central theory of meaning (Putnam- I don't know this guy so I got to do more work) that entails: "1) Each meaningful term has some meaning, concept, intention, or cluster of features associated with it. It is this meaning that is known or present in the mind when the term is understood. 2) the meaning determines the extension in the sense that something is in the extension fo the term if and only if it has the characteristics included in the meaning, concept, intention, or, in the case of cluster theory, enough of the features. In many contemporary versions, the meaning or concept of the term may include only observable criteria for the application of the term."
p. 16 - He says Locke's is the best definition and then states: "His view is that with each meaningful term there is associated some abstract idea or definition that determine what things have a right to be called by the name. These nominal essences are of our own making whereas real essences exist in the things themselves and are made by nature. It is by the nominal essences that we distinguish things into sorts since, according to Locke, we can never come to know the real essences of natural things."
p. 17 This comes from An analysis of Knowledge and Valuable (LaSalle, p. 39) "The denotion or extension of a term is... the class of all actual or existent things which the term correctly paplies to or names."
p. 21-22 - They are saying the names might at times have no bearing on the descriptions of what they mean. There might be some history that leads up to it that is immaterial. They use the example of Trial for Smith's murder. Everyone that is accused might be related to Smith's Murder, and that might be the naming shortcut, but in fact, that's inappropriate b/c none of them are guilty b/c of association. I have mixed feelings about this, b/c I'm sure every person has taint and is impacted by the nature of that naming convention. I think that's what is currently happening with fake news.
p. 24, he's got a better way of thinking about it. Let's say that we all know Godel's proof, but find out it was his wife who did the proof. We'd still likely call it Godel's proof because it's more common. We all will know the reference, but the name is not related correctly.
p. 26/27 - They talk about rigid designators using the example of gold. "Furthermore, what it is to be gold cannot be analytically specified by some list of properties, for no matter how much properties of something resembling what we take to be the superficial properties of gold, the stuff would not be gold unless it was the same kind of substance that is rigidly designated by "gold." In other words, he's talking about atomic number 79 and going to the lab and stuff. I have mixed feelings, cause it sounds like which one of the properties is vital, but I think when you move away from physical substances, what he's saying is more intriguing.
p. 32 - Causal theory Donellan "Speaking of nothing" His point names, even if you don't know someone or something, you can refer to it because it's in your memory as the referral of something someone else said. This is weird, but I think this is right and also I'd be curious how that means names get warped. I will read this essay in the future as I think there is some nuanced point here.
p. 45 Then they go through whether referring requires some previous knowledge. But what if you're referring to something that does not exist. They use "Is Gualle the king of France." Well no, b/c there is no king of France any longer, so the reference exists even though the object does not. It's nuanced, but not insignificant for my work.
p. 60 They reference a book called "Reference and Referents." Here they talk about mistaken referrals. I want to read the nuance of this. I think this has relevance to the fake news.
p. 79 They talk about this idea of a Rigid Designator that exists in all possible worlds.
p. 85 - They go back to Godel in the idea of what can be known. Recall Godel is saying there is no such thing as perfect knowledge in a given system, even within math.
p. 93 They talk about the fixing of references:
"Even if we fix the reference of such a name as 'Cicero' as the man who wrote such and such works, in speaking of counterfactual situations, when we speak of Cicero, we do not then speak of whoever in such counterfactual situations would have written such and such works, but rather of Cicero, whom we have identified by the contingent property that he is the man who in fact, that is, in the actual world, wrote certain works."
Here they are talking about defining which cicero, but I think the more important take away is that when we name certain things we are not talking about all their properties, but some subset which is relevant. So we are not talking about Cicero as a father or a guy that lives down the street to other people, we care about this particular aspect of his existence. Interesting.
p. 114 - As relates to meaning: "What different kinds of words are associated with what different kinds of core facts? And By what mechanism does it happen that just conveying a small set of core facts brings it about that the hearer is able to imitate the normal use of the word?"
p. 119 "Feeling that meanings are 'public' property -- that the same meaning can be 'grasped' by more than one person and by persons at different times -- he identified concepts (hence 'intensions' or meanings) with abstract entities rather than mental entities."
p. 125 - "The division of linguistic labor rests upon and presupposes the division of nonlinguistic labor, of course." We use words where we don't know the intrinsic property at all, but because someone else does it's fine. Aluminum foil for instance.
p. 127 It's not that I think that it's made of aluminum from a psychological state, it's from a sociolinguistic state. He then moves on, but I think this is important to dwell on, his stakes are different from mine. I mean, if you say bring me aluminum foil and there is none, I'm likely to also bring you saran wrap b/c I understand you're trying to cover something. I'm able to identify which trait was most important. I think b/c he uses the idea of gold instead of what I'm using he misses a very important point.
p. 150 They are talking about which traits are relevant for meaning and which ones are just associated.
p. 152 - "But the properties in the stereotype generally reflect the thing in relationship to man. /i>One very important factor is usefulness."
p. 188 - He talks about Locke's idea that real essence is independent of any sorting or classifying. I think this is his rephrasing, I don't think Locke thought of knowledge quite like this. but I'm down.
p. 207 - It's unfortunate that these guys are using cluster to deal with stupid issues like if someone looks like you and takes over your life, is that the real you. I mean, there's really bigger issues to address that would have been helpful.
p. 243 - Again trying to be too cute in proving Santa doesn't exist. There is actually a real issue they should be addressing and that is the fact that in two different languages, you can make the statement differently and still have it be true or false (depending on how you look at it). Also, if Santa doesn't exist why do both of you know about him, which honestly, is the best topic of what knowledge is (see earlier discussion in the book). I'm disappointed.
p. 260 We go into transworld identity. Whether something exists across all space-time and multi-verse. Again. i'm disappointed.
October 30, 2024
Multiple different essays on language across a few different philosophers. The first essay is Saul Kripke's "Identity and Necessity" which is about whether the identity of a person is contingent and whether a' priori statements of judgement possible. Multiple different points I thought about the essay include whether the writings of a person are inextricably linked to the person, names referring to the thing in itself, identity theory, names being contingently true based on a set of conditions, perception versus designation.
Hilary Putnam's "Is Semantics possible" looks at the scepticism around semantics and he concludes that semantics are dependent on social conditions. Putman also contributed "Meaning and Reference" in how words are meant to mean something and what they are referring to. It is particularly water that he refers to, arguing how the H2O and water refer to the same thing but water means something different.
William Goosens "Underlying Trait Terms" looks at references and likes to talk about what is the meaning of a toad. Goosens argues that "the properties associated with "toad" change under the impact of new kind of knowledge is completely predictable based on merely a knowledge of current usage" (p148)
W. V Quine "Natural Kinds" talks about ravens being black. Who would have thought that philosophy of language isn't fun?
A few thought provoking essays on the philosophy of language
Hilary Putnam's "Is Semantics possible" looks at the scepticism around semantics and he concludes that semantics are dependent on social conditions. Putman also contributed "Meaning and Reference" in how words are meant to mean something and what they are referring to. It is particularly water that he refers to, arguing how the H2O and water refer to the same thing but water means something different.
William Goosens "Underlying Trait Terms" looks at references and likes to talk about what is the meaning of a toad. Goosens argues that "the properties associated with "toad" change under the impact of new kind of knowledge is completely predictable based on merely a knowledge of current usage" (p148)
W. V Quine "Natural Kinds" talks about ravens being black. Who would have thought that philosophy of language isn't fun?
A few thought provoking essays on the philosophy of language
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews