Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam

by Kathryn C. Statler

Using recently released archival materials from the United States and Europe, Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam explains how and why the United States came to assume control as the dominant western power in Vietnam during the 1950s. Acting on their conviction that American methods had a better chance of building a stable, noncommunist South Vietnamese nation, Eisenhower administration officials systematically ejected French military, economic, political, bureaucratic, and cultural institutions from Vietnam. Kathryn C. Statler examines diplomatic maneuvers in Paris, Washington, London, and Saigon to detail how Western alliance members sought to transform South Vietnam into a modern, westernized, and democratic ally but ultimately failed to counter the Communist threat. Abetted by South Vietnamese prime minister Ngo Dinh Diem, Americans in Washington, D.C., and Saigon undermined their French counterparts at every turn, resulting in the disappearance of a French presence by the time Kennedy assumed office. Although the United States ultimately replaced France in South Vietnam, efforts to build South Vietnam into a nation failed. Instead, it became a dependent client state that was unable to withstand increasing Communist aggression from the North. Replacing France is a fundamental reassessment of the origins of U.S. involvement in Vietnam that explains how Franco-American conflict led the United States to pursue a unilateral and ultimately imperialist policy in Vietnam.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, American, France, American History

392 pages, Hardcover

First published June 22, 2007

Reviews

[Stefania Dzhanamova · Rating 5 out of 5]

In her book, Kathryn C. Statler narrates the story of America's transition from an ally in the French struggle against its former colony Indochina to the dominant Western power in South Vietnam in the late 1950s. It is, essentially, the story of the failed Franco-American alliance.

Although there are many books on the subject of how and why the American government shouldered the task of stopping a Communist overtake of the entirety of Vietnam, almost none of them examine the troubled alliance between America and France in detail. This is surprising, considering that it was characterized by a puzzlingly large number of clashes. The American and French policy-makers faced the same threat in Vietnam. Despite differences in ability and strategy, they were allies, who in theory should have collaborated. Why then did they prove so tragically incapable of agreeing on a single, common policy of confronting the Viet Minh? Statler's study is the first one I have read that gives a well-argumented, insightful, and elaborate answer to this question. 

The first reason for the disagreements between the Americans and the French was their conviction that it was their country that should be at the helm of the Western civilization. Because America and France were both world powers, their respective governments assumed that they always knew best; that this gave them the right to pursue whatever foreign policy they wished to without consulting anyone else, and that smaller nations, or any nation for that matter, could simply be coerced to serve their interests. Therefore, instead of trying to understand its ally, its motivations, domestic political situation, objectives, and worldview, each of the two governments stubbornly sought to impose its own course of action on the other. Washington and Paris officials butted heads so often not because they had conflicting goals, but because they constantly misunderstood each other. President Dwight Eisenhower called France "hysterical" in its desire to maintain its great power status and be America's equal and publicly expressed reservations about the value of the Franco-American alliance. The French government voiced misgivings about "Yankee superpower", making the already tense relationship even more bitter.

Second, the two countries practiced fundamentally different diplomacy. For the French, it was highly important to keep an open dialogue with the enemy. The Eisenhower administration, however, saw their eagerness to negotiate and end the bloody and costly war as a betrayal of the Franco-American anti-Communist alliance. American policy-makers, who had been suspicious of Communist influence in France since the end of the Second World War, believed that French officials were being fooled by Communist political propaganda regarding Indochina. In reality, however, the First Indochina War was simply taking a heavier toll on French resources than France could bear.

Interestingly, Statler links this flawed American understanding of French diplomacy to the explanation for American leaders' failure to learn the valuable lessons the French struggle in Indochina could have taught them. As France realized from bitter personal experience, military escalation would not crush the Communist insurgency. But the American government was convinced that the French had failed simply because they were weak, and decided to replace them politically, militarily, and economically, engage in state-building, and escalate the war effort – with widely known tragic results.

The third reason for the ineffectiveness of the Franco-American alliance was that Washington and Paris had different visions of the post-WWII world, of the future of colonialism, and of what role their and other countries should play in world affairs. America's know-it-all attitude to Cold War problems irritated the French, who saw Americans as well-intentioned but also obsessed with their anti-Communist crusade and naive in their attempts to impose American-style democracy on the whole world. The Americans, on the other hand, despised France's desire to preserve its colonial empire. They acknowledged that the French were smart and sophisticated, but also thought of them as egotistical, corrupt, and fatalistic.

As Statler explains, the rapidly changing international situation also aggravated the problem. In the 1950s, the United States emerged as one of the two world superpowers. "Financially and morally bankrupt colonial powers were out. Liberal capitalism and eastern communism (depending on one’s geographic location) were in," the author aptly describes the new state of affairs. America was now fighting an ideological war against the Soviet Union. To win over the countries of the Third World, it had to stop promoting imperialism. The American mission in Indochina was not only about stopping Communism anymore – it was about destroying colonialism, the preservation of which France was fighting for. The Franco-American alliance was further shaken by French indignation at the prospect of decolonization raised by America. 

All of the aforementioned eventually led to the Eisenhower administration's decision to abandon the French. The two allies had been spending more time trying to prevail over each other than deciding what to do about the conflict in Indochina. After the Geneva conference, France left its former colony for good, and America assumed the burden of saving a Southeast Asian country it knew virtually nothing about from a Communist overtake. 

REPLACING FRANCE is a truly outstanding study. Kathryn C. Statler has done an incredible job both as a writer and as a researcher. Her take on this important but largely ignored topic leaves no room or reason for criticism. Although it is yet the beginning of February, I can confidently rank this book among my best reads of the year. I highly recommend it to all Vietnam history buffs. 

[Jacob Pimentel · Rating 5 out of 5]

I thoroughly enjoyed this book. It’s thought provoking argument of the United States deliberately sought to replace France from Vietnam and take their place, challenged the previous narrative of America “stumbling” into Vietnam due to France’s incompetence. It has certainly reshaped my thinking on how the origins of American involvement in Vietnam.

[Davy Bennett]

This sounds like a good book.
I will look for it.

I was blown away by a book written by John M. Newman called JFK & Vietnam. He documents that Kennedy had plans to pull us out of Nam in his possible second term. I personally think that contributed to his sudden death.

[Facundo Castro · Rating 4 out of 5]

Impressive analysis on the origins of US involvement in Vietnam with special focus on the diplomatic side of Franco-American relationship and actions towards the Vietnamese state.

[Marios · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great book with an accurate recount on how the USA replaced France in Indochine. I used this for a paper I had to write. It covers all the aspects of the Indochine problem and enlightens many details which were unknown until now.