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On Interpretation
De Interpretatione or On Interpretation is the second text from Aristotle's Organon and is among the earliest surviving philosophical works in the Western tradition to deal with the relationship between language and logic in a comprehensive, explicit, and formal way. The work is usually known by its Latin title. The work begins by analyzing simple categoric propositions, and draws a series of basic conclusions on the routine issues of classifying and defining basic linguistic forms, such as simple terms and propositions, nouns and verbs, negation, the quantity of simple propositions (primitive roots of the quantifiers in modern symbolic logic), investigations on the excluded middle (what to Aristotle is not applicable to future tense propositions - the problem of future contingents), and on modal propositions. The first five chapters deal with the terms that form propositions. Chapters 6 and 7 deal with the relationship between affirmative, negative, universal and particular propositions. These relationships are the basis of the well-known Square of opposition. The distinction between universal and particular propositions is the basis of modern quantification theory. The last three chapters deal with modalities. Chapter 9 is famous for the discussion of the sea-battle. (If it is true that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow, then it is true today that there will be a sea-battle. Thus a sea-battle is apparently unavoidable, and thus necessary. Another interpretation would be: that we cannot know that which has not yet come to pass. In other words: if there is a sea battle tomorrow then it is true today that tomorrow there will be a sea battle. So, only if we can know whether or not there will be a sea battle tomorrow then can we know if there will be a sea battle).
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First published January 1, 348
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Aristotle
4,339 books5,655 followersAristotle (Greek: Αριστοτέλης; 384–322 BC) was an Ancient Greek philosopher and polymath. His writings cover a broad range of subjects spanning the natural sciences, philosophy, linguistics, economics, politics, psychology, and the arts. As the founder of the Peripatetic school of philosophy in the Lyceum in Athens, he began the wider Aristotelian tradition that followed, which set the groundwork for the development of modern science.
Little is known about Aristotle's life. He was born in the city of Stagira in northern Greece during the Classical period. His father, Nicomachus, died when Aristotle was a child, and he was brought up by a guardian. At 17 or 18, he joined Plato's Academy in Athens and remained there until the age of 37 (c. 347 BC). Shortly after Plato died, Aristotle left Athens and, at the request of Philip II of Macedon, tutored his son Alexander the Great beginning in 343 BC. He established a library in the Lyceum, which helped him to produce many of his hundreds of books on papyrus scrolls.
Though Aristotle wrote many treatises and dialogues for publication, only around a third of his original output has survived, none of it intended for publication. Aristotle provided a complex synthesis of the various philosophies existing prior to him. His teachings and methods of inquiry have had a significant impact across the world, and remain a subject of contemporary philosophical discussion.
Aristotle's views profoundly shaped medieval scholarship. The influence of his physical science extended from late antiquity and the Early Middle Ages into the Renaissance, and was not replaced systematically until the Enlightenment and theories such as classical mechanics were developed. He influenced Judeo-Islamic philosophies during the Middle Ages, as well as Christian theology, especially the Neoplatonism of the Early Church and the scholastic tradition of the Catholic Church.
Aristotle was revered among medieval Muslim scholars as "The First Teacher", and among medieval Christians like Thomas Aquinas as simply "The Philosopher", while the poet Dante Alighieri called him "the master of those who know". His works contain the earliest known formal study of logic, and were studied by medieval scholars such as Pierre Abélard and Jean Buridan. Aristotle's influence on logic continued well into the 19th century. In addition, his ethics, although always influential, gained renewed interest with the modern advent of virtue ethics.
Little is known about Aristotle's life. He was born in the city of Stagira in northern Greece during the Classical period. His father, Nicomachus, died when Aristotle was a child, and he was brought up by a guardian. At 17 or 18, he joined Plato's Academy in Athens and remained there until the age of 37 (c. 347 BC). Shortly after Plato died, Aristotle left Athens and, at the request of Philip II of Macedon, tutored his son Alexander the Great beginning in 343 BC. He established a library in the Lyceum, which helped him to produce many of his hundreds of books on papyrus scrolls.
Though Aristotle wrote many treatises and dialogues for publication, only around a third of his original output has survived, none of it intended for publication. Aristotle provided a complex synthesis of the various philosophies existing prior to him. His teachings and methods of inquiry have had a significant impact across the world, and remain a subject of contemporary philosophical discussion.
Aristotle's views profoundly shaped medieval scholarship. The influence of his physical science extended from late antiquity and the Early Middle Ages into the Renaissance, and was not replaced systematically until the Enlightenment and theories such as classical mechanics were developed. He influenced Judeo-Islamic philosophies during the Middle Ages, as well as Christian theology, especially the Neoplatonism of the Early Church and the scholastic tradition of the Catholic Church.
Aristotle was revered among medieval Muslim scholars as "The First Teacher", and among medieval Christians like Thomas Aquinas as simply "The Philosopher", while the poet Dante Alighieri called him "the master of those who know". His works contain the earliest known formal study of logic, and were studied by medieval scholars such as Pierre Abélard and Jean Buridan. Aristotle's influence on logic continued well into the 19th century. In addition, his ethics, although always influential, gained renewed interest with the modern advent of virtue ethics.
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July 15, 2023
On a number of levels, I was surprised, while reading this treatise by Aristotle, to find myself encountering Aristotle the grammarian. The great philosopher begins On Interpretation by writing that “By a noun we mean a sound significant by convention, which has no reference to time, and of which no part is significant from the rest” (p. 1). And, as a verb often follows a noun, it seems only fair that Aristotle follows up by stating that “A verb is that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time” (p. 2).
But then again, as I have already read the work of Aristotle the rhetorician, and Aristotle the ethicist, and Aristotle the physicist, and Aristotle the literary critic, and Aristotle the metaphysician, and Aristotle the biologist, and Aristotle the political scientist, perhaps I should not be surprised to meet Aristotle the grammarian. That’s simply how it is when one is dealing with the man who knew everything.
From that grammatically-inflected introduction, On Interpretation proceeds to a consideration of the principles of a logically formed proposition, in a manner that may seem familiar to readers of other Aristotelian treatises like Categories and Prior Analytics. Distinctions are made between the universal and the individual, between the true and the false, between affirmation and denial –
For if all propositions, whether positive or negative, are either true or false, then any given predicate must either belong to the subject or not, so that if one man affirms that an event of a given character will take place and another denies it, it is plain that the statement of the one will correspond with reality and that of the other will not. For the predicate cannot both belong and not belong to the subject at one and the same time with regard to the future. (p. 7)
It is all quite logical. Hey, it’s Aristotle!
As with other treatises, like those mentioned above, Aristotle pays considerable attention to the idea of predication. As, in English, the predicate of a sentence follows the subject, so, in Aristotelian logic, predication should follow logically upon the naming (the noun-ing) of a subject. In this regard, Aristotle writes that “Those predicates…which are accidental either to the same subject, or to one another, do not combine to form a unity” (p. 20).
As an example of this principle, Aristotle states that “if a man is both good and a shoemaker, we cannot combine the two propositions and say simply that he is a good shoemaker”; in other words, he could be a good man and a bad shoemaker. By contrast, “we are…able to combine the predicates ‘animal’ and ‘biped’ and say that a man is an animal with two feet, for these predicates are not accidental” (p. 20).
While reading On Interpretation, I found – as I often find while reading Aristotle’s work – that the philosopher’s ideas are more accessible to me when he provides examples in support of those ideas. I liked how Aristotle engaged the idea of the possible:
For the term “possible” is ambiguous, being used in the one case with reference to facts, to that which is actualized, as when a man is said to find walking possible because he is actually walking, and…in the other case, with reference to a state in which realization is conditionally practicable, as when a man is said to find walking possible because under certain conditions he could walk. (p. 28)
With On Interpretation, I finished the last of the twelve Aristotelian treatises that are listed on the Great Books curriculum of Saint John’s College in Annapolis, Maryland. Does that mean that I now think I understand the work and ideas of the man who studied with Plato, founded the Lyceum of Athens, and tutored Alexander the Great? Όχι, από τον Όλυμπο! (No, by Olympus!) But it does mean that I feel glad and fortunate to have made this beginning – and I look forward to renewing my conversation with the man from Stageira sometime soon.
But then again, as I have already read the work of Aristotle the rhetorician, and Aristotle the ethicist, and Aristotle the physicist, and Aristotle the literary critic, and Aristotle the metaphysician, and Aristotle the biologist, and Aristotle the political scientist, perhaps I should not be surprised to meet Aristotle the grammarian. That’s simply how it is when one is dealing with the man who knew everything.
From that grammatically-inflected introduction, On Interpretation proceeds to a consideration of the principles of a logically formed proposition, in a manner that may seem familiar to readers of other Aristotelian treatises like Categories and Prior Analytics. Distinctions are made between the universal and the individual, between the true and the false, between affirmation and denial –
For if all propositions, whether positive or negative, are either true or false, then any given predicate must either belong to the subject or not, so that if one man affirms that an event of a given character will take place and another denies it, it is plain that the statement of the one will correspond with reality and that of the other will not. For the predicate cannot both belong and not belong to the subject at one and the same time with regard to the future. (p. 7)
It is all quite logical. Hey, it’s Aristotle!
As with other treatises, like those mentioned above, Aristotle pays considerable attention to the idea of predication. As, in English, the predicate of a sentence follows the subject, so, in Aristotelian logic, predication should follow logically upon the naming (the noun-ing) of a subject. In this regard, Aristotle writes that “Those predicates…which are accidental either to the same subject, or to one another, do not combine to form a unity” (p. 20).
As an example of this principle, Aristotle states that “if a man is both good and a shoemaker, we cannot combine the two propositions and say simply that he is a good shoemaker”; in other words, he could be a good man and a bad shoemaker. By contrast, “we are…able to combine the predicates ‘animal’ and ‘biped’ and say that a man is an animal with two feet, for these predicates are not accidental” (p. 20).
While reading On Interpretation, I found – as I often find while reading Aristotle’s work – that the philosopher’s ideas are more accessible to me when he provides examples in support of those ideas. I liked how Aristotle engaged the idea of the possible:
For the term “possible” is ambiguous, being used in the one case with reference to facts, to that which is actualized, as when a man is said to find walking possible because he is actually walking, and…in the other case, with reference to a state in which realization is conditionally practicable, as when a man is said to find walking possible because under certain conditions he could walk. (p. 28)
With On Interpretation, I finished the last of the twelve Aristotelian treatises that are listed on the Great Books curriculum of Saint John’s College in Annapolis, Maryland. Does that mean that I now think I understand the work and ideas of the man who studied with Plato, founded the Lyceum of Athens, and tutored Alexander the Great? Όχι, από τον Όλυμπο! (No, by Olympus!) But it does mean that I feel glad and fortunate to have made this beginning – and I look forward to renewing my conversation with the man from Stageira sometime soon.
August 20, 2019
Interesting treatise of Aristotle on how to interpret propositions. He starts by pointing out his goal is an inquiry into propositions, that is: sentences that have the characteristic of being either wrong or false. Then he proceeds to discuss linguistics: nouns (a sound that signifies something by convention), verbs (a sound that is temporal and lacks independent significance), sentences (meaningful part of speech lacking a judgement) and propositions (meaningful parts of speech that contain a judgement and hence are either right or wrong). De Interpretatione then focuses solely on the last category, and tells us how propositions can be simple or composite, affirmative or denying, and contrary or contradictory.
An interesting part of the treatise deals with the notion of necessity. If a proposition is either right or wrong, this seems to imply that the world is deterministic and doesn't leave room for chance events. If I claim that in 5000 years some X will happen, this statement is either true or false. Whether it is actually true or false doesn't matter, since both imply that the status of this sentence causally determines the fact to be so or not so. Aristotle rescues himself from the determinist trap by distinguishing between potentiality and actuality. What is true is that either X will or will not happen; what actually happens is not determined but a chance event.
The rest of the treatise then goes on to explain what types of propositions there are, based on the distinctions universal/particular and affirmation/denial. An important point is the determination of terms in propositions: not-X means the term is undetermined, while not X means something entirely else. Aristotle distinguishes between six types of propositions (or rather, four, but E and F are mentioned as well):
A. All A are B
B. All A are not-B
C. Not all A are B
D. Not all A are not-B
E. All not-A are B
F. All not-A are not-B
Another interesting part of the treatise sees Aristotle dealing with the notions of necessity and possibility, their opposites contingency and impossibility, and how they relate to one another. Necessity is, by far, the most important type, since he views it as principle of existence and non-existence. Is something is of necessity, it is actual. Actuality thus precedes potentiality, and this is exactly the case with Aristotle's primary substances (i.e. the fundamental building blocks of everything existing). Next, we have things that are both actual and potential, in which actuality in its nature precedes potentiality, but in time it actually comes after potentiality. If I interpret it correctly Aristotle seems to mean that teleology precedes causality. Finally, there are things which forever remain pure potentiality - they never are actualized.
A last important part of the treatise consists of the difference between contraries and contradictions. Contraries come in the form 'all A are B' - 'no A is B', while contradictions come in the form 'all A are B' - 'not all A are B'. Here it is important to focus on what is essential in a given substance and what is not. In 'A is B', B seems to be an essential part of A. Given that B is the polar opposite of C, we can confound the two alternatives of 'A is B', i.e. 'A is not B' and 'A is C'. For example, the proposition 'Mike is just' can lead us to think that its opposite is either 'Mike is not just' or 'Mike is unjust'. Which of the two is the contradiction of 'Mike is just?' Again, the proposition 'All men are animals' can lead us to the alternatives 'No man is an animal' and 'Not all men are animals'. In both examples, the contradictory propositions are 'Mike is not just' and 'Not all men are animals' - clarifying how we should distinguish true from false statements.
So, while in the Categories Aristotle deals with words, in the Interpretation he deals with sentences as propositions. Next up we have the Prior Analytics, in which Aristotle deals with the combination of propositions into syllogisms. I was planning to read the Metaphysics first, but I feel much more curiosity towards the Prior Analytics, having read On Interpretation.
An interesting part of the treatise deals with the notion of necessity. If a proposition is either right or wrong, this seems to imply that the world is deterministic and doesn't leave room for chance events. If I claim that in 5000 years some X will happen, this statement is either true or false. Whether it is actually true or false doesn't matter, since both imply that the status of this sentence causally determines the fact to be so or not so. Aristotle rescues himself from the determinist trap by distinguishing between potentiality and actuality. What is true is that either X will or will not happen; what actually happens is not determined but a chance event.
The rest of the treatise then goes on to explain what types of propositions there are, based on the distinctions universal/particular and affirmation/denial. An important point is the determination of terms in propositions: not-X means the term is undetermined, while not X means something entirely else. Aristotle distinguishes between six types of propositions (or rather, four, but E and F are mentioned as well):
A. All A are B
B. All A are not-B
C. Not all A are B
D. Not all A are not-B
E. All not-A are B
F. All not-A are not-B
Another interesting part of the treatise sees Aristotle dealing with the notions of necessity and possibility, their opposites contingency and impossibility, and how they relate to one another. Necessity is, by far, the most important type, since he views it as principle of existence and non-existence. Is something is of necessity, it is actual. Actuality thus precedes potentiality, and this is exactly the case with Aristotle's primary substances (i.e. the fundamental building blocks of everything existing). Next, we have things that are both actual and potential, in which actuality in its nature precedes potentiality, but in time it actually comes after potentiality. If I interpret it correctly Aristotle seems to mean that teleology precedes causality. Finally, there are things which forever remain pure potentiality - they never are actualized.
A last important part of the treatise consists of the difference between contraries and contradictions. Contraries come in the form 'all A are B' - 'no A is B', while contradictions come in the form 'all A are B' - 'not all A are B'. Here it is important to focus on what is essential in a given substance and what is not. In 'A is B', B seems to be an essential part of A. Given that B is the polar opposite of C, we can confound the two alternatives of 'A is B', i.e. 'A is not B' and 'A is C'. For example, the proposition 'Mike is just' can lead us to think that its opposite is either 'Mike is not just' or 'Mike is unjust'. Which of the two is the contradiction of 'Mike is just?' Again, the proposition 'All men are animals' can lead us to the alternatives 'No man is an animal' and 'Not all men are animals'. In both examples, the contradictory propositions are 'Mike is not just' and 'Not all men are animals' - clarifying how we should distinguish true from false statements.
So, while in the Categories Aristotle deals with words, in the Interpretation he deals with sentences as propositions. Next up we have the Prior Analytics, in which Aristotle deals with the combination of propositions into syllogisms. I was planning to read the Metaphysics first, but I feel much more curiosity towards the Prior Analytics, having read On Interpretation.
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August 30, 2023An Exceptional work in the field of logic and philosophy of language.
Brilliant. And simple, at the same time. The most significant achievement of reading this, is gaining a deeper understanding of the logical relationships between propositions and the principles of contradiction and excluded middle. Aristotle discusses here the four basic types of categorical propositions :
- the universal affirmative, universal negative, particular affirmative and particular negative.
( Those who are not fans of language challenges can stop here, the phenomenon of yawning may occur. )
So, the propositions above involve statements about the inclusion or exclusion of members within a category. Let's consider the following example :
Statement 1 : All cats are mammals. ( universal affirmative)
Statement 2 : No cats are reptiles. ( universal negative)
According to the principle of contradiction, no two contradictory propositions can be simultaneously true. Statement 1 and Statement 2 are contradictory because if all cats are mammals, then it can not be the case that no cats are reptiles. Therefore, if one of the contradictory statements is true, the other is necessarilly false. On the other hand, the principle of excluded middle states that for every proposition, it must be either true or false. Applying this principle, we can infer the following :
Statement 3 : Some cats are mammals. ( particular affirmative)
Statement 4 : Some cats are reptiles. ( particular affirmative)
The principle of excluded middle allows for the possibility that Statement 3 and Statement 4 can both be true at the same time. It acknowledges that between the extremes of the universal affirmative and universal negative propositions, there can be particular affirmatives where some members of a category may or may not have a particular quality.
So, I think by studying " On Interpretation", readers gain a clearer understanding of these logical relationships and principles, enabling them to analyze arguments, evaluate claims, and make valid deductive inferences. This particular achievement of reading the book helps to develop critical thinking skills and logical reasoning abilities that can be applied across various domains and disciplines.
The example above is just a simplified illustration to demonstrate the logical relationships discussed by Aristotle. His work goes beyond this basic example and explore more complex topics and applications of logic.
Brilliant. And simple, at the same time. The most significant achievement of reading this, is gaining a deeper understanding of the logical relationships between propositions and the principles of contradiction and excluded middle. Aristotle discusses here the four basic types of categorical propositions :
- the universal affirmative, universal negative, particular affirmative and particular negative.
( Those who are not fans of language challenges can stop here, the phenomenon of yawning may occur. )
So, the propositions above involve statements about the inclusion or exclusion of members within a category. Let's consider the following example :
Statement 1 : All cats are mammals. ( universal affirmative)
Statement 2 : No cats are reptiles. ( universal negative)
According to the principle of contradiction, no two contradictory propositions can be simultaneously true. Statement 1 and Statement 2 are contradictory because if all cats are mammals, then it can not be the case that no cats are reptiles. Therefore, if one of the contradictory statements is true, the other is necessarilly false. On the other hand, the principle of excluded middle states that for every proposition, it must be either true or false. Applying this principle, we can infer the following :
Statement 3 : Some cats are mammals. ( particular affirmative)
Statement 4 : Some cats are reptiles. ( particular affirmative)
The principle of excluded middle allows for the possibility that Statement 3 and Statement 4 can both be true at the same time. It acknowledges that between the extremes of the universal affirmative and universal negative propositions, there can be particular affirmatives where some members of a category may or may not have a particular quality.
So, I think by studying " On Interpretation", readers gain a clearer understanding of these logical relationships and principles, enabling them to analyze arguments, evaluate claims, and make valid deductive inferences. This particular achievement of reading the book helps to develop critical thinking skills and logical reasoning abilities that can be applied across various domains and disciplines.
The example above is just a simplified illustration to demonstrate the logical relationships discussed by Aristotle. His work goes beyond this basic example and explore more complex topics and applications of logic.
March 3, 2019
Aristotle’s distinctions of contrary and contradictory are somewhat watery and sometimes misunderstood quite frankly. I found this book in particular to be very useful in understanding the correct way to interpret these different terms. I know for a fact that the distinctions between participle and subject are tied in now to the definitions of contrary and contradictory. This and true moral propositions in the penultimate chapter really helped me think very greatly about Aristotle’s system. I liked how his Metaphysical system can help you understand how things are defined as well, as when he is speaking about the noun (to be), then these things were fleshed out by Aristotle very logically, from a linguistic perspective.
A must read for anyone interested in language, linguistics, or just philosophy in general. This is a great companion to his Metaphysics or Prior Analytics
A must read for anyone interested in language, linguistics, or just philosophy in general. This is a great companion to his Metaphysics or Prior Analytics
June 11, 2022
My basic takeaway from this is that not every not-man is not not just.
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July 9, 2025Da Interpretação é um texto importantíssimo mas que por ser muito compacto, acaba meio que esquecido. Seu lugar no Organon vem depois das categorias, o estudo das palavras isoladas, e antes dos “Tópicos” ou Primeiros Analíticos”, a teoria das proposições. Nessa perspectiva “Da Interpretação” seria o estudo da symplochē, ou das palavras em conjunções entre si; um tema intermediário. Essa ordem é demasiada didática e talvez não esteja em consonância com a intenção do estagirita. Alguns comentaristas já notaram, por exemplo, que a teoria da predicação aqui difere um pouco daquela dos primeiros analíticos. Outro ponto é que, por ter sido o último deste grupo a ser escrito, Da Interpretação parece ser uma meditação filosófica sobre a linguagem e a lógica.
Além de enxergar aqui uma filosofia da linguagem, o livro me surpreendeu desmontando uma concepção já cristalizada de Aristóteles, a de que este advogava um realismo ingênuo. Várias vezes, mesmo enquanto lia as notas, me ocorria essa passagem de Ernst Tugendhat que peço licença para citar aqui por extenso:
“Aristóteles trata desse problema na Metafísica IV, 4. Ele indica inicialmente ser impossível que o princípio da contradição seja demonstrado diretamente. A única coisa que se poderia fazer seria refutar aquele que nega o principio. Só que uma demonstração indireta normal através da refutação do oposto também não é possível, pois uma tal demonstração pressuporia que se pudesse indicar uma contradição na hipótese do opositor. Mas isso não poderia atingi-lo nesse caso em que sua hipótese consiste justamente na negação do princípio da contradição. A refutação tem que ter portanto um caráter especial. A única coisa que se quer que o opositor admita é que ele fala, que ele diz algo. E isso ele faria quando negasse o princípio da contradição. Se ele, ao contrário, não dissesse nada, então seria ridículo que se devesse argumentar com alguém que, por sua vez, não diz nada, "pois uma tal pessoa é, desse modo, apenas como uma planta". Ora, o que está implícito quando alguém admite que diz algo? Dizer algo significa "dar algo a entender (semainein) tanto para si mesmo quanto para um outro”. Dar algo a entender significaria contudo dar algo de determinado (horismenon) a entender. Quem não desse uma coisa (algo de determinado) a entender não daria nada a entender.
No capítulo 1 já levantamos a questão sobre se a necessidade do princípio da contradição - e, com base nesta, sobre se a necessidade da lógica em geral - se fundaria na essência do ser (da realidade), do pensar ou do falar. Aristóteles dá uma resposta inequívoca a esta pergunta: A condição de possibilidade para que se fale - e isto significa: para que se dê algo a entender - é que se fale algo de determinado.”
As críticas ao realismo filosófico geralmente partem da instabilidade do mundo fenomênico. Então a este postularia-se um mundo realíssimo, composto de conceitos. Assim, por exemplo, o mundo das ideias platônico lastrearia o mundo das percepções a tal ponto que até os nomes são símbolos que remetem às ideias. Já para Aristóteles as proposições são afeições da alma articuladas de tal modo para se referir ao mundo objetivo. Qualquer que seja o resultado dessa conceituação a lógica prescinde dela para funcionar, desde que o significado esteja bem definido (convencionado: “Todos os discursos são significativos, não como ferramenta, mas, como já tinha sido dito, por convenção;”) sua verdade valerá (huparchein, subsistirá) se a proposição for formalmente correta.
Esse “convencionalismo” dá um caráter pouco ingênuo ao realismo aristotélico. Se coaduna com a língua grega em que existe uma TERCEIRA pessoa do imperativo. Passaria como um capricho não fosse usado nos postulados científicos e na oração do Pai Nosso. Quem declara recorta a “realidade” (pragma) e “ordena” esse recorte à existência atráves da atribuição de componentes: “Com efeito, [dizer] o ser ou o não ser não é sinal do que subsiste nem mesmo se dissesses simplesmente aquilo que é. De fato, por ele próprio o ser não é nada, mas agrega aquilo que ele já significa alguma composição, a qual é impensável sem os componentes.”
Além de enxergar aqui uma filosofia da linguagem, o livro me surpreendeu desmontando uma concepção já cristalizada de Aristóteles, a de que este advogava um realismo ingênuo. Várias vezes, mesmo enquanto lia as notas, me ocorria essa passagem de Ernst Tugendhat que peço licença para citar aqui por extenso:
“Aristóteles trata desse problema na Metafísica IV, 4. Ele indica inicialmente ser impossível que o princípio da contradição seja demonstrado diretamente. A única coisa que se poderia fazer seria refutar aquele que nega o principio. Só que uma demonstração indireta normal através da refutação do oposto também não é possível, pois uma tal demonstração pressuporia que se pudesse indicar uma contradição na hipótese do opositor. Mas isso não poderia atingi-lo nesse caso em que sua hipótese consiste justamente na negação do princípio da contradição. A refutação tem que ter portanto um caráter especial. A única coisa que se quer que o opositor admita é que ele fala, que ele diz algo. E isso ele faria quando negasse o princípio da contradição. Se ele, ao contrário, não dissesse nada, então seria ridículo que se devesse argumentar com alguém que, por sua vez, não diz nada, "pois uma tal pessoa é, desse modo, apenas como uma planta". Ora, o que está implícito quando alguém admite que diz algo? Dizer algo significa "dar algo a entender (semainein) tanto para si mesmo quanto para um outro”. Dar algo a entender significaria contudo dar algo de determinado (horismenon) a entender. Quem não desse uma coisa (algo de determinado) a entender não daria nada a entender.
No capítulo 1 já levantamos a questão sobre se a necessidade do princípio da contradição - e, com base nesta, sobre se a necessidade da lógica em geral - se fundaria na essência do ser (da realidade), do pensar ou do falar. Aristóteles dá uma resposta inequívoca a esta pergunta: A condição de possibilidade para que se fale - e isto significa: para que se dê algo a entender - é que se fale algo de determinado.”
As críticas ao realismo filosófico geralmente partem da instabilidade do mundo fenomênico. Então a este postularia-se um mundo realíssimo, composto de conceitos. Assim, por exemplo, o mundo das ideias platônico lastrearia o mundo das percepções a tal ponto que até os nomes são símbolos que remetem às ideias. Já para Aristóteles as proposições são afeições da alma articuladas de tal modo para se referir ao mundo objetivo. Qualquer que seja o resultado dessa conceituação a lógica prescinde dela para funcionar, desde que o significado esteja bem definido (convencionado: “Todos os discursos são significativos, não como ferramenta, mas, como já tinha sido dito, por convenção;”) sua verdade valerá (huparchein, subsistirá) se a proposição for formalmente correta.
Esse “convencionalismo” dá um caráter pouco ingênuo ao realismo aristotélico. Se coaduna com a língua grega em que existe uma TERCEIRA pessoa do imperativo. Passaria como um capricho não fosse usado nos postulados científicos e na oração do Pai Nosso. Quem declara recorta a “realidade” (pragma) e “ordena” esse recorte à existência atráves da atribuição de componentes: “Com efeito, [dizer] o ser ou o não ser não é sinal do que subsiste nem mesmo se dissesses simplesmente aquilo que é. De fato, por ele próprio o ser não é nada, mas agrega aquilo que ele já significa alguma composição, a qual é impensável sem os componentes.”
April 24, 2025
ptsd de la bacul la logica
dar nice cred
dar nice cred
November 18, 2022
“Thus, if it is true to say that a thing is white, it must necessarily be white; if the reverse proposition is true, it will of necessity not be white. Again, if it is white, the proposition stating that it is white was true; if it is not white, the proposition to the opposite effect was true. And if it is not white, the man who states that it is making a false statement; and if the man who states that it is white is making a false statement, it follows that it is not white. It may therefore be argued that it is necessary that affirmations or denials must be either true or false.”
That’s, like, your opinion man.
That’s, like, your opinion man.
April 4, 2011
The second of Aristotle's works in the Organon, 'On Interpretation' basically analyses propositions, nouns, verbs, negation, etcetera, with classification based on various categories. In the first of the Organon works these 'categories' which include, substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, etc. were explained.
Note: My exploration of Aristotle continues...
Note: My exploration of Aristotle continues...
August 15, 2022
If Aristotle seems clunky, remember he is creating logic by analyzing formal relations among types of propositions.
November 24, 2020
It's Categories, but more boring, and more convoluted than sensible.
Read
March 27, 2023aula de linguística :´)
March 6, 2023
Aristotle, Grammar, and Reality, Part 2.
https://medium.com/@peterseanbradle/a...
On Interpretation by Aristotle
Aristotle's "On Interpretation" is next on the batting order for Online Great Books ("OGB"). I was surprised by this book. Despite being familiar with Aristotle, I had never heard of this text previously. When it was assigned, I thought it would be a selection of topics. Instead, "On Interpretation" seems to be foundational for Metaphysics. For OGB, I read Aristotle in this order: Nicomachean Ethics, Metaphysics, Categories, and On Interpretation. It makes more sense to reverse the order since the building blocks are provided in reverse order.
In Metaphysics, I suspected that Aristotle was connecting grammar and reality. It seemed as if Aristotle was identifying humanity's knowledge of grammar with humanity's power of knowing reality. In Categories, the connection became clear, as I pointed out in my prior essay. In Interpretation, Aristotle states:
Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images. This matter has, however, been discussed in my treatise about the soul, for it belongs to an investigation distinct from that which lies before us.
Aristotle's thesis is that words are symbols of ideas in the mind. Words are the way we get out into the public what exists in our private mental world. In turn, those ideas come from the outside world. The "treatise about the soul" must be De Anime. In De Anime, Aristotle assumes that our mental ideas are abstracted from our experience. The Scholastic (and later Empiricist) version of this was the epigram "There is nothing in the mind which was not first in the senses."
So, words are intimately based on external reality.
In turn, words are divided into "nouns" and "verbs." "Nouns" are things that exist (or which can be extrapolated from existing things):
By a noun we mean a sound significant by convention, which has no reference to time, and of which no part is significant apart from the rest.
Aristotle called nouns "substances" or "subjects" in Metaphysics and Categories. Things that are connected to symbols[1] in the category of "nouns" exist independently from other things - they exist in themselves whether they are a man or a man's head.
"Verbs" are predicates and necessarily convey a time element:
A verb is that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time. No part of it has any independent meaning, and it is a sign of something said of something else. I will explain what I mean by saying that it carries with it the notion of time. 'Health' is a noun, but 'is healthy' is a verb; for besides its proper meaning it indicates the present existence of the state in question. Moreover, a verb is always a sign of something said of something else, i.e. of something either predicable of or present in some other thing.
Verbs are "accidents" in the sense used by Metaphysics. Verbs connote things that do not exist by themselves. You cannot point to "running" but point to a running deer. The element of time exists because things happen to things in time.
Aristotle also posits things that are contradictory to nouns. "Not-man" is the contradictory of "man." "Not healthy" is the contradictory of "healthy." Because it is not clear what these words are referring to - Do they have a mental image other than the negation of man and healthy? - he calls the former "indefinite nouns" and the latter "indefinite verbs" since "since they apply equally well to that which exists and to that which does not."[2]
Nouns and verbs are gathered into sentences. "Propositions" are sentences which can be true of false. "Feed the dog" is not a proposition; "The dog has been fed to the crocodile" is a proposition. An affirmation is a positive assertion of something about something; a denial is a negative assertion.
Every affirmation has an opposite denial and vice versa. Aristotle defines this kind of opposition as "contradiction":
We will call such a pair of propositions a pair of contradictories. Those positive and negative propositions are said to be contradictory which have the same subject and predicate. The identity of subject and of predicate must not be 'equivocal'. Indeed there are definitive qualifications besides this, which we make to meet the casuistries of sophists.
Aristotle's interest in On Interpretation is mostly about contraries, contradictions, and unity.[3]
Aristotle defines "contraries" as pertaining to "universals."[4]
Our propositions necessarily sometimes concern a universal subject, sometimes an individual. If, then, a man states a positive and a negative proposition of universal character with regard to a universal, these two propositions are 'contrary'. By the expression 'a proposition of universal character with regard to a universal', such propositions as 'every man is white', 'no man is white' are meant. When, on the other hand, the positive and negative propositions, though they have regard to a universal, are yet not of universal character, they will not be contrary, albeit the meaning intended is sometimes contrary. As instances of propositions made with regard to a universal, but not of universal character, we may take the 'propositions 'man is white', 'man is not white'. 'Man' is a universal, but the proposition is not made as of universal character; for the word 'every' does not make the subject a universal, but rather gives the proposition a universal character. If, however, both predicate and subject are distributed, the proposition thus constituted is contrary to truth; no affirmation will, under such circumstances, be true. The proposition 'every man is every animal' is an example of this type.
An affirmation is opposed to a denial in the sense which I denote by the term 'contradictory', when, while the subject remains the same, the affirmation is of universal character and the denial is not. The affirmation 'every man is white' is the contradictory of the denial 'not every man is white', or again, the proposition 'no man is white' is the contradictory of the proposition 'some men are white'. But propositions are opposed as contraries when both the affirmation and the denial are universal, as in the sentences 'every man is white', 'no man is white', 'every man is just', 'no man is just'.
So, contraries can be found in universals. Contradictions are oppositions of universals or statements with "a universal characteristic" that oppose the universal with a singular. Thus:
Contrary
Every man is white
No man is white
Contradiction
Every man is white
No man is white
Not every man is white
Some men are white
Later, Aristotle offers this example:
Contrary
Every man is unwise (false)
Is every man wise?
Answer: No.
Contradiction
Not every man is wise (true)
This seems reasonable. Even if "not every man is wise," some men might be wise.
An interesting feature of propositions is that one of the propositions must be true. Further, the true one must have always been true and will always be true. The truth of one of the propositions is a matter of necessity.
These awkward results and others of the same kind follow, if it is an irrefragable law that of every pair of contradictory propositions, whether they have regard to universals and are stated as universally applicable, or whether they have regard to individuals, one must be true and the other false, and that there are no real alternatives, but that all that is or takes place is the outcome of necessity. There would be no need to deliberate or to take trouble, on the supposition that if we should adopt a certain course, a certain result would follow, while, if we did not, the result would not follow. For a man may predict an event ten thousand years beforehand, and another may predict the reverse; that which was truly predicted at the moment in the past will of necessity take place in the fullness of time.
Aristotle goes on to note:
Let me illustrate. A sea-fight must either take place to-morrow or not, but it is not necessary that it should take place to-morrow, neither is it necessary that it should not take place, yet it is necessary that it either should or should not take place to-morrow. Since propositions correspond with facts, it is evident that when in future events there is a real alternative, and a potentiality in contrary directions, the corresponding affirmation and denial have the same character.
Of course, either event exists as a potential event. It is at this point that I would suggest that potentiality exists in "matter" and "accident," which imply that there is a "form" that does not change. Could that form be "truth" or God? This section reminded me of an article in Communio (Winter 2005), Rationality and Faith in God by Robert Spaemann. Spaemann argued that The author asked what it meant for the truth to be eternal if the present could be forgotten. When we say something about the future - there will be a sea-fight 3023 AD - our statement implies a connection between past and future. The connection, according to Spaemann, is that the present always remains the past of that future. Remove the present and the future's past is removed. What then would remain? Spaemann quotes Nietzsche's aphorism from "Death of the Idols," "I am afraid that we are not free of God because we still believe in grammar." In some sense, this is what Aristotle (whom Nietzsche despised) may have been driving at.
Aristotle also deals with "modal logic," possibilities and impossibilities. He offers this list of contradictions:
We must consider the following pairs as contradictory propositions:
It may be. It cannot be.
It is contingent. It is not contingent.
It is impossible. It is not impossible.
It is necessary. It is not necessary.
It is true. It is not true.
Aristotle also deals with something that can look like the ultimate hair-splitting, namely, what is the contrary to the proposition "Callias is good." The possibilities map out:
Callias is Good
Good is good (essential) and not bad (accidental)
1 Not-Callias is good
2Callias is not good
3Callias is bad
Prima facie #1 is out of the running because there might be something that is not-Callias which is bad, e.g., Bob might be bad.
#2 and #3 seem to be the same thing, but Aristotle finds a distinction between the "not good" and "bad."
Now that which is good is both good and not bad. The first quality is part of its essence, the second accidental; for it is by accident that it is not bad. But if that true judgement is most really true, which concerns the subject's intrinsic nature, then that false judgement likewise is most really false, which concerns its intrinsic nature. Now the judgement that that is good is not good is a false judgement concerning its intrinsic nature, the judgement that it is bad is one concerning that which is accidental. Thus the judgement which denies the true judgement is more really false than that which positively asserts the presence of the contrary quality. But it is the man who forms that judgement which is contrary to the true who is most thoroughly deceived, for contraries are among the things which differ most widely within the same class. If then of the two judgements one is contrary to the true judgement, but that which is contradictory is the more truly contrary, then the latter, it seems, is the real contrary. The judgement that that which is good is bad is composite. For presumably the man who forms that judgement must at the same time understand that that which is good is not good.
This is hard to follow. I wonder if everything "not good" is "bad." I've seen movies that lack the quality of being "good" but which I would not call "bad." Mediocre perhaps?
The principle behind this is the Law of Non-contradiction. This principle goes without explicit mention. It is developed in Metaphysics. The concluding paragraph of On Interpretation gives it a definite acknowledgment:
It is evident, also, that neither true judgments nor true propositions can be contrary the one to the other. For whereas, when two propositions are true, a man may state both at the same time without inconsistency, contrary propositions are those which state contrary conditions, and contrary conditions cannot subsist at one and the same time in the same subject.
[1] "The limitation 'by convention' was introduced because nothing is by nature a noun or name-it is only so when it becomes a symbol; inarticulate sounds, such as those which brutes produce, are significant, yet none of these constitutes a noun." Aristotle. Categories and On Interpretation (With Active Table of Contents) Kindle Edition.
[2] The indefinite noun is a universal of everything but the noun. Later in On Interpretations, Aristotle points out the absurdity of thinking that the contradiction of "man is white" is "not man is white,' which would imply that a piece of wood is "a man that is not white."
[3] We can see an introduction to Aristotle's logical treatises in On Interpretation.
[4] Universals are things of a nature that "can be predicated of many subjects," e.g., "man."
https://medium.com/@peterseanbradle/a...
On Interpretation by Aristotle
Aristotle's "On Interpretation" is next on the batting order for Online Great Books ("OGB"). I was surprised by this book. Despite being familiar with Aristotle, I had never heard of this text previously. When it was assigned, I thought it would be a selection of topics. Instead, "On Interpretation" seems to be foundational for Metaphysics. For OGB, I read Aristotle in this order: Nicomachean Ethics, Metaphysics, Categories, and On Interpretation. It makes more sense to reverse the order since the building blocks are provided in reverse order.
In Metaphysics, I suspected that Aristotle was connecting grammar and reality. It seemed as if Aristotle was identifying humanity's knowledge of grammar with humanity's power of knowing reality. In Categories, the connection became clear, as I pointed out in my prior essay. In Interpretation, Aristotle states:
Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images. This matter has, however, been discussed in my treatise about the soul, for it belongs to an investigation distinct from that which lies before us.
Aristotle's thesis is that words are symbols of ideas in the mind. Words are the way we get out into the public what exists in our private mental world. In turn, those ideas come from the outside world. The "treatise about the soul" must be De Anime. In De Anime, Aristotle assumes that our mental ideas are abstracted from our experience. The Scholastic (and later Empiricist) version of this was the epigram "There is nothing in the mind which was not first in the senses."
So, words are intimately based on external reality.
In turn, words are divided into "nouns" and "verbs." "Nouns" are things that exist (or which can be extrapolated from existing things):
By a noun we mean a sound significant by convention, which has no reference to time, and of which no part is significant apart from the rest.
Aristotle called nouns "substances" or "subjects" in Metaphysics and Categories. Things that are connected to symbols[1] in the category of "nouns" exist independently from other things - they exist in themselves whether they are a man or a man's head.
"Verbs" are predicates and necessarily convey a time element:
A verb is that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time. No part of it has any independent meaning, and it is a sign of something said of something else. I will explain what I mean by saying that it carries with it the notion of time. 'Health' is a noun, but 'is healthy' is a verb; for besides its proper meaning it indicates the present existence of the state in question. Moreover, a verb is always a sign of something said of something else, i.e. of something either predicable of or present in some other thing.
Verbs are "accidents" in the sense used by Metaphysics. Verbs connote things that do not exist by themselves. You cannot point to "running" but point to a running deer. The element of time exists because things happen to things in time.
Aristotle also posits things that are contradictory to nouns. "Not-man" is the contradictory of "man." "Not healthy" is the contradictory of "healthy." Because it is not clear what these words are referring to - Do they have a mental image other than the negation of man and healthy? - he calls the former "indefinite nouns" and the latter "indefinite verbs" since "since they apply equally well to that which exists and to that which does not."[2]
Nouns and verbs are gathered into sentences. "Propositions" are sentences which can be true of false. "Feed the dog" is not a proposition; "The dog has been fed to the crocodile" is a proposition. An affirmation is a positive assertion of something about something; a denial is a negative assertion.
Every affirmation has an opposite denial and vice versa. Aristotle defines this kind of opposition as "contradiction":
We will call such a pair of propositions a pair of contradictories. Those positive and negative propositions are said to be contradictory which have the same subject and predicate. The identity of subject and of predicate must not be 'equivocal'. Indeed there are definitive qualifications besides this, which we make to meet the casuistries of sophists.
Aristotle's interest in On Interpretation is mostly about contraries, contradictions, and unity.[3]
Aristotle defines "contraries" as pertaining to "universals."[4]
Our propositions necessarily sometimes concern a universal subject, sometimes an individual. If, then, a man states a positive and a negative proposition of universal character with regard to a universal, these two propositions are 'contrary'. By the expression 'a proposition of universal character with regard to a universal', such propositions as 'every man is white', 'no man is white' are meant. When, on the other hand, the positive and negative propositions, though they have regard to a universal, are yet not of universal character, they will not be contrary, albeit the meaning intended is sometimes contrary. As instances of propositions made with regard to a universal, but not of universal character, we may take the 'propositions 'man is white', 'man is not white'. 'Man' is a universal, but the proposition is not made as of universal character; for the word 'every' does not make the subject a universal, but rather gives the proposition a universal character. If, however, both predicate and subject are distributed, the proposition thus constituted is contrary to truth; no affirmation will, under such circumstances, be true. The proposition 'every man is every animal' is an example of this type.
An affirmation is opposed to a denial in the sense which I denote by the term 'contradictory', when, while the subject remains the same, the affirmation is of universal character and the denial is not. The affirmation 'every man is white' is the contradictory of the denial 'not every man is white', or again, the proposition 'no man is white' is the contradictory of the proposition 'some men are white'. But propositions are opposed as contraries when both the affirmation and the denial are universal, as in the sentences 'every man is white', 'no man is white', 'every man is just', 'no man is just'.
So, contraries can be found in universals. Contradictions are oppositions of universals or statements with "a universal characteristic" that oppose the universal with a singular. Thus:
Contrary
Every man is white
No man is white
Contradiction
Every man is white
No man is white
Not every man is white
Some men are white
Later, Aristotle offers this example:
Contrary
Every man is unwise (false)
Is every man wise?
Answer: No.
Contradiction
Not every man is wise (true)
This seems reasonable. Even if "not every man is wise," some men might be wise.
An interesting feature of propositions is that one of the propositions must be true. Further, the true one must have always been true and will always be true. The truth of one of the propositions is a matter of necessity.
These awkward results and others of the same kind follow, if it is an irrefragable law that of every pair of contradictory propositions, whether they have regard to universals and are stated as universally applicable, or whether they have regard to individuals, one must be true and the other false, and that there are no real alternatives, but that all that is or takes place is the outcome of necessity. There would be no need to deliberate or to take trouble, on the supposition that if we should adopt a certain course, a certain result would follow, while, if we did not, the result would not follow. For a man may predict an event ten thousand years beforehand, and another may predict the reverse; that which was truly predicted at the moment in the past will of necessity take place in the fullness of time.
Aristotle goes on to note:
Let me illustrate. A sea-fight must either take place to-morrow or not, but it is not necessary that it should take place to-morrow, neither is it necessary that it should not take place, yet it is necessary that it either should or should not take place to-morrow. Since propositions correspond with facts, it is evident that when in future events there is a real alternative, and a potentiality in contrary directions, the corresponding affirmation and denial have the same character.
Of course, either event exists as a potential event. It is at this point that I would suggest that potentiality exists in "matter" and "accident," which imply that there is a "form" that does not change. Could that form be "truth" or God? This section reminded me of an article in Communio (Winter 2005), Rationality and Faith in God by Robert Spaemann. Spaemann argued that The author asked what it meant for the truth to be eternal if the present could be forgotten. When we say something about the future - there will be a sea-fight 3023 AD - our statement implies a connection between past and future. The connection, according to Spaemann, is that the present always remains the past of that future. Remove the present and the future's past is removed. What then would remain? Spaemann quotes Nietzsche's aphorism from "Death of the Idols," "I am afraid that we are not free of God because we still believe in grammar." In some sense, this is what Aristotle (whom Nietzsche despised) may have been driving at.
Aristotle also deals with "modal logic," possibilities and impossibilities. He offers this list of contradictions:
We must consider the following pairs as contradictory propositions:
It may be. It cannot be.
It is contingent. It is not contingent.
It is impossible. It is not impossible.
It is necessary. It is not necessary.
It is true. It is not true.
Aristotle also deals with something that can look like the ultimate hair-splitting, namely, what is the contrary to the proposition "Callias is good." The possibilities map out:
Callias is Good
Good is good (essential) and not bad (accidental)
1 Not-Callias is good
2Callias is not good
3Callias is bad
Prima facie #1 is out of the running because there might be something that is not-Callias which is bad, e.g., Bob might be bad.
#2 and #3 seem to be the same thing, but Aristotle finds a distinction between the "not good" and "bad."
Now that which is good is both good and not bad. The first quality is part of its essence, the second accidental; for it is by accident that it is not bad. But if that true judgement is most really true, which concerns the subject's intrinsic nature, then that false judgement likewise is most really false, which concerns its intrinsic nature. Now the judgement that that is good is not good is a false judgement concerning its intrinsic nature, the judgement that it is bad is one concerning that which is accidental. Thus the judgement which denies the true judgement is more really false than that which positively asserts the presence of the contrary quality. But it is the man who forms that judgement which is contrary to the true who is most thoroughly deceived, for contraries are among the things which differ most widely within the same class. If then of the two judgements one is contrary to the true judgement, but that which is contradictory is the more truly contrary, then the latter, it seems, is the real contrary. The judgement that that which is good is bad is composite. For presumably the man who forms that judgement must at the same time understand that that which is good is not good.
This is hard to follow. I wonder if everything "not good" is "bad." I've seen movies that lack the quality of being "good" but which I would not call "bad." Mediocre perhaps?
The principle behind this is the Law of Non-contradiction. This principle goes without explicit mention. It is developed in Metaphysics. The concluding paragraph of On Interpretation gives it a definite acknowledgment:
It is evident, also, that neither true judgments nor true propositions can be contrary the one to the other. For whereas, when two propositions are true, a man may state both at the same time without inconsistency, contrary propositions are those which state contrary conditions, and contrary conditions cannot subsist at one and the same time in the same subject.
[1] "The limitation 'by convention' was introduced because nothing is by nature a noun or name-it is only so when it becomes a symbol; inarticulate sounds, such as those which brutes produce, are significant, yet none of these constitutes a noun." Aristotle. Categories and On Interpretation (With Active Table of Contents) Kindle Edition.
[2] The indefinite noun is a universal of everything but the noun. Later in On Interpretations, Aristotle points out the absurdity of thinking that the contradiction of "man is white" is "not man is white,' which would imply that a piece of wood is "a man that is not white."
[3] We can see an introduction to Aristotle's logical treatises in On Interpretation.
[4] Universals are things of a nature that "can be predicated of many subjects," e.g., "man."
March 10, 2023
Language and logic, the inseparables. Great, though demanding, reading.
June 6, 2022
There’s a reason why they teach Aristotelian logic from textbooks - he ain’t easy going. But there's a certain rush of pleasure attained from scaling these mountains of piled-up words and finally understanding what the author is saying. You’re being taught by one of the greatest teachers the world has known, and that is a thrill no one should be deprived of.
February 28, 2022
I found this treatise much more difficult to follow than The Categories. I'll have to revisit later.
June 10, 2025
I felt like I was reading prior analytics again this sucks
TLDR
Know your basic grammar
A noun can be posited generally with the verb "to be" and all other characteristics of action or temporality can be ascribed to a gerund in a sort of progressive tense or an adjective. At least in my opinion it is most easy to think of a simple sentence or phrase in this way. For example, I am running where I is the subject, am is the to be verb, and running is the gerund. Or I can say I am male. Regardless, the importance of meaning lies in the verb "to be" because it places a condition on my existence or the subjects existence to clarify interpretation.
From this "is" can also be placed may be and cannot be, contingent and not contingent, impossible and possible, necessary and not necessary, true and not true which are all contradictory propositions.
Then there are more layers like something being "not not" something in an affirmative and negative sense. Also in regards to words having double meanings e.g. biped in regards to a being with two legs but also a being itself or an animate being.
TLDR
Know your basic grammar
A noun can be posited generally with the verb "to be" and all other characteristics of action or temporality can be ascribed to a gerund in a sort of progressive tense or an adjective. At least in my opinion it is most easy to think of a simple sentence or phrase in this way. For example, I am running where I is the subject, am is the to be verb, and running is the gerund. Or I can say I am male. Regardless, the importance of meaning lies in the verb "to be" because it places a condition on my existence or the subjects existence to clarify interpretation.
From this "is" can also be placed may be and cannot be, contingent and not contingent, impossible and possible, necessary and not necessary, true and not true which are all contradictory propositions.
Then there are more layers like something being "not not" something in an affirmative and negative sense. Also in regards to words having double meanings e.g. biped in regards to a being with two legs but also a being itself or an animate being.
July 10, 2021
O objeto da obra Da Interpretação de Aristóteles é a construção da proposição e linguagem. O autor define, de início, o que é nome, verbo, afirmação, negação, declaração e discurso. Em seguida, Aristóteles discute o que é universal e singular. A partir disso, o autor aplica a lei da não-contradição às proposições e discursos. E demonstra a afirmação e negação das proposições conforme à lógica formal. Assim, nesse tratado, Aristóteles se preocupa com os elementos formais da lógica interpretativa.
A edição da Unesp é irretocável. A obra conta com o texto de Aristóteles em uma folha e na outra o texto original. Ademais, a obra tem mais de 100 páginas de comentários que ajudam bastante na compreensão da argumentação de Aristóteles.
A edição da Unesp é irretocável. A obra conta com o texto de Aristóteles em uma folha e na outra o texto original. Ademais, a obra tem mais de 100 páginas de comentários que ajudam bastante na compreensão da argumentação de Aristóteles.
January 25, 2026
Bir cümlenin bir şey bildiren bir niteliği olması için doğruluk veya yanlışlık niteliği barındırması gerekir ve Doğruluk ve yanlışlık arz edebilmesi için de bu cümlelerin bir eylem içermesi veya bildirmesi gerekir.
Bir eylem olmaksızın evetleme veya değilleme gerçekleşmez.
Bazen evetlemeler ve değillemeler belirsizlik oluşturabilir. Bunların doğrulanması zaman alabilir. Bu durumda olgulara yaslanmak en doğrusudur. Evetlenseler veya değillenseler bile olgular sabittir onlar neyse odur.
Yarın bir deniz savaşının olacağı veya olmayacağına dair durum buna örnektir. İki örnek birbirini değillemez. Hala ikiside mümkün ancak bu gibi durumlarda olgular(şartlar/gerçekler) ele alınmalı.
Tanrının varlığı meselesinin böyle irdelenmesi gerektiğini düşünüyorum.
Bir eylem olmaksızın evetleme veya değilleme gerçekleşmez.
Bazen evetlemeler ve değillemeler belirsizlik oluşturabilir. Bunların doğrulanması zaman alabilir. Bu durumda olgulara yaslanmak en doğrusudur. Evetlenseler veya değillenseler bile olgular sabittir onlar neyse odur.
Yarın bir deniz savaşının olacağı veya olmayacağına dair durum buna örnektir. İki örnek birbirini değillemez. Hala ikiside mümkün ancak bu gibi durumlarda olgular(şartlar/gerçekler) ele alınmalı.
Tanrının varlığı meselesinin böyle irdelenmesi gerektiğini düşünüyorum.
February 23, 2021
It's hard to review ancient Greek books/essays. You have to keep in mind that some things are currently logical or some things are outdated. I had the feeling with this book that it was logical in the sense that we use it in the modern world. But that also says something about the influence of >2000 year old philosopher. And although some things may sound logical, it also dragged some of my attention to fields where I would have never thought to think of.
July 9, 2021
A edição é singular pela lucidez e didática dos comentários do tradutor, José Veríssimo Teixeira da Mata, que elucida áreas bastante áridas do texto base, de explanação muito direta e sucinta, trazendo correlações com o estudo da Lógica contemporânea, abordando paralelismos com a obra de Frege e fazendo análise crítica de intérpretes e tradutores pregressos. Edição, para mim, indispensável. Aguardo ansiosamente pela publicação dos demais livros do Organon!
April 27, 2024
Schrödinger'in kedisi kafasında yazılmış bir makaleydi. Dili hafif olmasına karşın karışık bir yoldan anlatılıyor gibi görünüyordu fakat yine de güzeldi. Sadece bu çağ için biraz hafifliğe bağlı bir anlaşılmazlığı vardı metinlerin.
“İlkin ad ile eylemin, sonra da değillemenin, evetlemenin, önermenin, sözün ne olduğunu belirlemek gerekiyor.”
“İlkin ad ile eylemin, sonra da değillemenin, evetlemenin, önermenin, sözün ne olduğunu belirlemek gerekiyor.”
June 14, 2024
Although recognised as one of the earliest texts to deal with the relationship between language and logic, On Interpretation sits so firmly in the realm of the abstract that it's difficult to glean quite what we can take from it that isn't intuitive to us already.
Aristotle gives some descriptions of how particular words (nouns, verbs, etc.) operate within sentences, rather than attempting universal definitions of them. But, in his systematically setting down such a schema, one is reminded of Ibn Taymiyyah's criticism of formal logic as being like camel meat on the top of a mountain: difficult to reach, and not particularly rewarding when you get there. To be sure, this is but one part of Aristotle's larger Organon, and his definition of universals as being 'that which is predicated of many' has sometimes been read as an implicit endorsement of what later became known as nominalism, after it was developed by Porphyry. But again, I go back to Ibn Taymiyyah's quote, after we've read On Interpretation and recognise its analysis as accurate... what do we actually gain from that?
Aristotle gives some descriptions of how particular words (nouns, verbs, etc.) operate within sentences, rather than attempting universal definitions of them. But, in his systematically setting down such a schema, one is reminded of Ibn Taymiyyah's criticism of formal logic as being like camel meat on the top of a mountain: difficult to reach, and not particularly rewarding when you get there. To be sure, this is but one part of Aristotle's larger Organon, and his definition of universals as being 'that which is predicated of many' has sometimes been read as an implicit endorsement of what later became known as nominalism, after it was developed by Porphyry. But again, I go back to Ibn Taymiyyah's quote, after we've read On Interpretation and recognise its analysis as accurate... what do we actually gain from that?
July 4, 2020
Aristotle give a basic grammar lesson. What is a verb? A noun? A proposition? The rules of language have generally stated the same, but it was interesting to hear the master philosopher explain the differences the way he does.
June 16, 2021
On Interpretation is the beginning of Aristotle's discussion on logic. This sentence describes my reading experience: Now that which is must needs be when it is, and that which is not must needs not be when it is not.
August 25, 2024
Rereading this 30 years later, if I am this confused now, I must have known nothing as a freshman.
Aristotle makes many useful, helpful distinctions. Make sure you read this with someone else, as it is distilled and needs conversation to flush it out.
Aristotle makes many useful, helpful distinctions. Make sure you read this with someone else, as it is distilled and needs conversation to flush it out.
January 12, 2018
Note: I read Edgehill's translation in a free eBook online, but I couldn't find that translation on Goodreads.
August 6, 2018
Pequeno livreto de Aristóteles sobre interpretação, que na verdade inicia com definições de nomes, verbos, etc, e passa para lógica proposicional. Muito básico, porém ainda útil.
April 12, 2019
on certainty
June 25, 2019
Thank you
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