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Operation Menace: The Dakar Expedition and the Dudley North
Continuing on from Arthur Marder's previous book, "From the Dardanelles to Oran: Studies of the Royal Navy in Peace 1915-1940" this next volume investigates the Allied expedition of September that year, with De Gaulle present, which unsuccessfully attempted to break the French at Dakar away from the Vichy Government.
A pet operation of Prime Minister Churchill, the operation was undertaken against all advice, and it turned out to be a fiasco. In the author's words, "Menace exemplified, in its genesis, planning, and execution, all that can go wrong in warfare; an operation fouled up by unforeseen contingencies, the accidents of war, and human error, and against a background of undue political interference, inadequate planning, and half-baked co-operation between Allies."
Using Admiralty and Cabinet papers, as well as private sources of information, Marder weaves a skilled course through all the complex material to produce a masterly case-study of how an operation is mounted and how it can go disastrously wrong. It is a classic, tragicomic illustration of the fog of war.
A pet operation of Prime Minister Churchill, the operation was undertaken against all advice, and it turned out to be a fiasco. In the author's words, "Menace exemplified, in its genesis, planning, and execution, all that can go wrong in warfare; an operation fouled up by unforeseen contingencies, the accidents of war, and human error, and against a background of undue political interference, inadequate planning, and half-baked co-operation between Allies."
Using Admiralty and Cabinet papers, as well as private sources of information, Marder weaves a skilled course through all the complex material to produce a masterly case-study of how an operation is mounted and how it can go disastrously wrong. It is a classic, tragicomic illustration of the fog of war.
- GenresNaval History
289 pages, Paperback
First published February 5, 1976
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About the author
Arthur J. Marder
24 books3 followersThe son of Maxwell J. Marder and Ida Greenstein, Arthur Jacob Marder was raised in Boston, Massachusetts. He attended Harvard University, where he obtained his Bachelor's degree in 1931, his master's degree in 1934, and his Ph.D. in 1936 with a study of British naval policy 1880-1905.
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
June 24, 2024
Arthur Marder has long had a reputation as one of the finest American naval historians, and here he does not disappoint.
This episode is largely unknown, but it provided many lessons for the British in conducting overseas expeditions, and Marder believes that it might have had a decent chance of success had it not been plagued by bad luck from beginning to end.
If it had succeeded, de Gaulle might have rallied West Africa against the Axis, and Churchill was even ambitious enough to contemplate a follow up operation (Threat) to repeat the success at Casablanca.
It is exciting to think about what might have happened had de Gaulle carried the French Empire as early as late 1940, but Marder also provides counterpoints.
He believes that success at Dakar might have pushed Germany into occupying French North Africa, or even Spain. He points out that the failure of Dakar had an unintentional benefit to the Allies by boosting German confidence in Vichy's determination to defend her colonies.
As others have pointed out, this also had a powerful effect in helping Franco stay neutral, for Hitler was reluctant to offer Spain (and Italy) French territory due to his fear of pushing Vichy into the arms of England.
Hitler's consequent refusal to make any definite or specific concessions to Spain in French Morocco may well have contributed to Spain's decision to remain neutral and in this way, as in others, Dakar might have had some silver lining for the British.
The second part of the book is tough reading. Marder establishes early on that the French ships that fled Toulon for Dakar were not considered to have materially enhanced the defences of the latter place, based on the testimonies of the commanders of the operation.
So in a sense Admiral Sir Dudley North's 'failure' to apprehend them seems a moot point. I rather enjoyed this foray into Admiralty politics and the question of whether North was guilty of an omission of duty as the Admiralty alleged, or if he had been cast as a scapegoat for Dakar's failure as many professional colleagues suspected.
This section is repetitive and dry, and does not deal much more with the operation itself and more with the Admiralty's charges against North, his relief from command, his attempts to appeal for an enquiry, and the various support or resistance he met within the naval service.
It is an interesting examination of how the Royal Navy worked, but it seems only tangentially related to Menace and may strike readers as an odd addition.
This episode is largely unknown, but it provided many lessons for the British in conducting overseas expeditions, and Marder believes that it might have had a decent chance of success had it not been plagued by bad luck from beginning to end.
If it had succeeded, de Gaulle might have rallied West Africa against the Axis, and Churchill was even ambitious enough to contemplate a follow up operation (Threat) to repeat the success at Casablanca.
It is exciting to think about what might have happened had de Gaulle carried the French Empire as early as late 1940, but Marder also provides counterpoints.
He believes that success at Dakar might have pushed Germany into occupying French North Africa, or even Spain. He points out that the failure of Dakar had an unintentional benefit to the Allies by boosting German confidence in Vichy's determination to defend her colonies.
As others have pointed out, this also had a powerful effect in helping Franco stay neutral, for Hitler was reluctant to offer Spain (and Italy) French territory due to his fear of pushing Vichy into the arms of England.
Hitler's consequent refusal to make any definite or specific concessions to Spain in French Morocco may well have contributed to Spain's decision to remain neutral and in this way, as in others, Dakar might have had some silver lining for the British.
The second part of the book is tough reading. Marder establishes early on that the French ships that fled Toulon for Dakar were not considered to have materially enhanced the defences of the latter place, based on the testimonies of the commanders of the operation.
So in a sense Admiral Sir Dudley North's 'failure' to apprehend them seems a moot point. I rather enjoyed this foray into Admiralty politics and the question of whether North was guilty of an omission of duty as the Admiralty alleged, or if he had been cast as a scapegoat for Dakar's failure as many professional colleagues suspected.
This section is repetitive and dry, and does not deal much more with the operation itself and more with the Admiralty's charges against North, his relief from command, his attempts to appeal for an enquiry, and the various support or resistance he met within the naval service.
It is an interesting examination of how the Royal Navy worked, but it seems only tangentially related to Menace and may strike readers as an odd addition.
January 2, 2013
This is a well researched book and will be of particular value to those interested in this operation or in the Admiral Dudley North affair. The book is well written but the pattern of reading is broken up by copious footnotes. If you are interested in an overview of this event - perhaps before visiting Dakar - 'The Guns of Dakar' by John Williams is an easier read and just as informative.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews