In Margin of Victory Douglas Macgregor tells the riveting stories of five military battles of the twentieth century, each one a turning point in history. Beginning with the British Expeditionary force holding the line at the Battle of Mons in 1914 and concluding with the Battle of Easting in 1991 during Desert Storm, Margin of Victory teases out a connection between these battles and teaches its readers an important lesson about how future battles can be won. Emphasizing military strategy, force design, and modernization, Macgregor links each of these seemingly isolated battles thematically. At the core of his analysis, the author reminds the reader that to be successful, military action must always be congruent with national culture, geography, and scientific-industrial capacity. He theorizes that strategy and geopolitics are ultimately more influential than ideology. Macgregor stresses that if nation-states want to be successful, they must accept the need for and the inevitability of change. The five warfighting dramas in this book, rendered in vivid detail by lively prose, offer many lessons on the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.
Douglas Abbott Macgregor is a retired colonel in the United States Army, former government official, author, consultant, and political commentator. An Armor Branch officer by background, Macgregor was a leader in an early tank battle in the Gulf War and was a top planner in the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. His 1997 book Breaking the Phalanx argued for radical reforms inside the United States Army. After retiring from the military in 2004, Macgregor became more politically active.
An engaging and compelling tour de force, Douglas Macgregor's MARGIN OF VICTORY: FIVE BATTLES THAT CHANGED THE FACE OF MODERN WAR knits together narratives of lesser- known 20th Century battles to generate observations relevant to America's 21st Century strategic defense challenges. Macgregor puts his main emphasis on the national military analyses, decisions, and preparations of the eventual victor, made well before these battles were fought. His accounts of combat actions effectively illustrate how critical these were to create conditions leading to success in the field. Whether the margins of victory were narrow (such as the British Expeditionary Force—despite retreating from Mons and Le Cateau--throwing grit in the Schlieffen Plan’s gears in France, 1914), or wide (illustrated by the Soviets crushing an entire German army group in a matter of weeks in 1944), institutional foresight and preparation was key.
There are other books that examine this but typically examine failure to learn the right lessons after a war. Still other works focus narrowly on technical innovations in weaponry, organization, and/or tactical concepts resulting from lessons learned.
What is different about MARGIN OF VICTORY is its focus on how some institutions did not extrapolate contemporary trends to characterize future national security environments, but came up with new kinds of forecasts breaking with conventional wisdom. Indeed, these militaries were able to envision far more accurately what types of conflicts they would be fighting in the future, rather than merely mirror the kinds of wars they had fought in the recent past. Macgregor’s case studies are intended as exceptions to the well-worn notion that nations always prepare for the next war or campaign as if they were fighting the last one.
While military history buffs will appreciate the author's perspective as an accomplished combat leader in describing these battles in the first five chapters, this book is meant to inform senior defense policymakers, military officers, and defense reform advocates who are seriously concerned about American national military strategy. Macgregor enjoys a well-established track record for creative thinking, conditioned by a soldier’s sense; he does not disappoint in his concluding chapter, spelling out what needs to be done to prepare the United States for the next war.
This is a timely book as the U.S. Defense Department grapples with the dilemma of configuring the military to fight wars of choice against much less capable adversaries (Iraq and Afghanistan), or prioritizing development to win against near-peer competitors if (or when) war is forced upon the United States.
Macgregor has fired a heavy salvo in the ongoing debate on the future size, shape, organization, and characteristics of the U.S. military. Those with an interest in how history should or should not influence national strategy formulation or who are simply curious about alternative views on defense reform will find MARGIN OF VICTORY a provocative and satisfying read.
Colonel Douglas Macgregor offers studies of five major 20th-century battles from Mons in 1914 to Desert Storm in 1991—where he served as tank commander—plus brief detours into other conflicts to illustrate surprising facets of war. He recounts baffling outcomes, gruesome deaths, bureaucratic pettiness, sheer stupidity, and everything in between.
Macgregor draws several intriguing parallels between armies, leaders and societies in several countries, including Great Britain, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, Egypt, Israel, Iran, Iraq, and the United States. His accounts are thorough, erudite, painstakingly footnoted (with many excellent references for further reading), and crafted with genuine literary merit.
The final chapter analyzes future trends and presents new visions for the future of America’s defense. In a jeremiad full of heartfelt patriotism, Macgregor exhorts American soldiers and American society to heed past errors and prepare for an uncertain, potentially dangerous future. His voice needs to be heard.
MARGIN OF VICTORY: Five Battles that Changed the Face of Modern War **** Good Reads Review
by
Stormrider
Macgregor, Douglas. 2016. Margin of Victory: Five Battles that Changed the Face of Modern War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press Louis.
Read: 03 - 31 January 2021
An exceptionally clear appraisal of the necessity for the restructuring of the US military. Macgregor grounds his analyses and recommendations in five battles beginning in 1914 and ending in 1991. He is clear-eyed about the poor quality of and top heavy nature of the general officer and flag ranks. His rebuke of American military adventurism in the prosecution of ideologically motivated wars to export democracy is spot on. America must be prepared to win the “first fight” with a peer or near-peer adversary and not squander our capabilities and resources on engagements with weak, tribal, or insurgent nations or groups. I am a map guy and I would have liked to see more detailed maps of the battles he covers. This is not a quick, casual read if you truly want to understand the evolving nature of modern war. The order of battle information is dense and requires careful reading. I am sure Col. Macgregor is unwelcome in the self-congratulatory culture of senior military leaders. As a former US Army combat-decorated Green Beret staff sergeant, given to a less eloquent and somewhat rougher descriptive lexicon of the momentous issues facing America’s ability to project military power, the message Col. Macgregor is sending is that unless we make serious policy and organizational changes, we may have our ass handed to us by a rival power. “War in the absolute sense, a true war of decision, is coming” (192).
This is a very good summary on what the writer thinks is needed to prepare the U.S. military for war in the 21st century. The ideas of it being more agile responding quicker and how to do so are more fully explained in some of his earlier works but the historical examples he provides are outstanding.
Great, thought provoking book. I learned a lot about the battles described and found the successes and failures fascinating. The author's recommendations at the end for changes to American military structure seem sensible, although I'm sure many will disagree. Unfortunately, with the seeming permanent paralysis in Congress, nothing can be done.
Great read. Interesting insight into some lesser-known battles. Might be too technical for some non-military or those unfamiliar with military organization/formations. The layout of the book is fluid with each chapter containing an individual battle. Certainly recommend.
I listen to Douglas Macgregor a lot on Youtube, etc., and found this book a strong addition to my military collection. He takes five battles and from them draws conclusions, essentially about the proper preparation for conflict, especially in training, equipment, and tactics. He offers his belief that an army is always defeated before it goes into battle from improperly utilizing any of the above. He begins with the battle of Mons in WWII, offers a good analysis of 1937 Shanghai (a little-known campaign in the west that is very informative), then goes on to Russia, Suez, the Persian Gulf (at the battle of 73 Easting, where he fought), and always has readable and provoking analysis, also capturing the personalities and ethos of all the military forces in his book, and the cultural factors that led to their victory or defeat. Macgregor offers some sobering recommendations for the contemporary U.S. military and its shortcomings. A very thoughtful and probing study.
So, this book was not written with me in mind. It reviews 5 important battles, and tries to draw conclusions from how they were fought, to guide future American military arms and doctrine. I don't know enough to judge its content, but it was interesting, and moves right along. It could benefit from many more maps/pictures. Still, if you are interested in the theory of war, this is worth a few hours.
For each of the five battles, long on details but short on explaining what the margin of victory is. At least not obvious to me. The offered solutions is not convincing as well.
Excellent lecture by military expert. This is the first time I have encountered such book. It is not written by historian, and this makes this book quite special. McGregor does not tell much about 'why' and tries to stay away from politics. He focuses most of the time on 'HOW'. He is not trying to teach us which fighting nation was GOOD or BAD. Instead he describes TACTICS and provides analyses. The least interesting is chapter about Desert Storm, where Americans and so called 'coalition' forces practically squashed Iraqi forces and unnecessary brutally killed many of them. In the last chapter author conveys indirectly message to the American military politruks: do not engage into wars that are not necessary and far away, particularly with strong and well prepared nations. Clearly, it’s time for the U.S. government to stop policing the globe. The main drawback are poorly presented battles' maps...that is why only four stars. "Margin of Victory" is a very good and recommended read , especially when considering proxy war/conflict in Ukraine.
Five case studies presented in good detail with logical conclusions drawn from each. I recommend it to military history enthusiasts & those interested in current defence policy.