Edward Sapir. Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech. 1921.
Kilu von Prince, Ana Krajinović, and Manfred Krifka. “Irrealis is Real”. 2022.
When I was an undergrad studying anthropology back in the mid-1980’s, Sapir’s Language was one of the first books that really spoke to me. It seemed to embody what anthropology was all about. While most of today’s mainstream linguists have taken to criticizing or ignoring Sapir’s methods and discoveries of a century ago (for example, see Steven Pinker’s extended diatribe against Sapir in The Language Instinct), Sapir for me still occupies a special place in the canons of both linguistics and anthropology. In 1921, Sapir thought of the young discipline of linguistics as a real science, yet many of the metaphors and images he uses to characterize LANGUAGE in the abstract appear to be anything but scientific. But I maintain that Sapir is nevertheless consistent in his approach to language. If he flexes his poetic muscles at times, it is to show how language gives its speakers the power to stretch the limits of their understanding, allowing them to say what has never before been said, and to mean it.
Some of Sapir’s metaphors about language bear repeating. One group of metaphors link together thought and language:
“...thought is nothing but language denuded of its outward garb.”
“...language, as a structure, is on its inner face the mold of thought.”
“...speech would seem to be the only road we know of that leads to [thought].”
“...the word, as we know, is not only a key; it may also be a fetter.”
“Culture may be defined as what a society does and thinks. Language is the particular how of thought.”
Another group of metaphors depicts language as a work of art:
“Single Algonquin words are like tiny imagist poems.”
“Every language is itself a collective art of expression.”
“Language is the most massive and inclusive art we know, a mountainous and anonymous work of unconscious generations.”
“Language is the medium of literature as marble or bronze or clay are the materials of the sculptor.”
These images I hope demonstrate that Sapir practiced what he set out to preach. In contradistinction to Chomskyite formal methods and mathematical modeling, Sapir’s tropes give free reign to the power of words to say what has not been said before and to express what possibly cannot be expressed otherwise. From the point of view of Chomsky's Universal Grammar (sub specie aeternatis, as Spinoza might say), Sapir’s linguistic typology does violence to the routine generativist assumption that all languages are underlyingly identical in structure. For Chomsky, and for all other linguists who know not much about languages besides English, language is not a work of art, nor is it the garb of thought. It is the computational system of human cognition, bridging universal and innate ideas to various means of articulating those ideas. But then again, metaphor is at work here, too.
Sapir did not conjure his typological and historicist approach to linguistics out of whole cloth. Rather, he derived many of his ideas about language from German philologists like Wilhelm von Humboldt. But unlike Humboldt, Sapir knew that factors like race, national temperament, or even level of cultural complexity can in no way be tied to the ‘genius’ of a given tongue. Sapir gives the example of English as spoken by African Americans:
“The English language is not spoken by a unified race. In the United States, there are several millions of Negroes who know no other language. It is their mother-tongue, the formal vesture of their inmost thoughts and sentiments. It is as much their property, as inalienably ‘theirs,’ as the King of England’s.”
Unlike Chomsky, and along with Humboldt this time, Sapir divides speech into two key aspects: language as creative activity (energeia, or language as the ‘key’) and language constrained by the habituated sediment of past expression (ergon, or language as the ‘fetter’). Speakers in pursuit of meaning can at times take an active role in fabricating their language, for “language is a purely human and non-instinctive method of communicating ideas, emotions, and desires by means of a system of voluntarily produced symbols.” But the historical context of our language inevitably plays a role in delimiting our speech as well, channeling our thoughts into the cognitive ruts left behind by all that has been said before by speakers of our language.
The fact that each language is unique does not contradict Sapir’s creed that all languages are equivalent, that is, that they are all equally valid. Whereas no language is perfect, all languages are in fact “fully developed”, even though they reflect “an almost incredible diversity.” All languages moreover demonstrate “a certain randomness of association,” which means that our semantic categories may lump together certain ideas while splitting other ideas apart. (Some facile examples from the simpler domain of vocabulary: Unlike English, Chinese makes a lexical distinction between rice as plant (mi) and rice as food (fan). English meanwhile distinguishes goats from sheep, while in Chinese they are both called yang.) There is a tension between our need at times to break grammatical rules and the ordinary obligation to follow those rules, and the apparent imperfections of grammatical systems seem to arise from this tension. Grammars then are not innate but are in fact nearly always a work in progress. As such, grammatical systems are forever incomplete: “Unfortunately, or luckily, no language is tyrannically consistent. All grammars leak.”
If there is one sub-field of linguistics that still finds favor with Sapir’s methods and insights it would have to be typology. Sapir’s own very dated typological system, presented in the “Grammatical Form” chapters of Language, is not really all that useful to the modern student. Despite its name, typology these days is not about typing languages into neat pigeon holes in order to make a final classification of all languages. Instead, typologists seek to discover a useful metalanguage by an extensive inventorying of grammatical categories, categories which are found in some languages and not in others. Empirically, this is what makes an honest comparison of grammars possible. Unlike generativists, typologists do not regard the seemingly endless variety of grammatical systems as a source of consternation or embarrassment. While followers of Saint Noam may be convinced that the empirical diversity of grammars will one day very soon be reduced to rigorous order and timeless uniformity, typologists willingly embrace that same empirical diversity, keeping their minds open to the astonishingly different ways in which grammars can be said to vary. As Sapir put it:
“...if we take our examples freely from the vast storehouse of language, from languages that are exotic as well as those that we are more familiar with, we shall find that there is hardly a possibility that is not realized in actual usage.”
A century after Sapir’s Language appeared, many linguists of a typological persuasion are still dredging up to the surface the kind of grammatical categories which are prominent in some languages but which are absent from others. One such recent study, “Irrealis is Real” by von Prince, Krajinović, and Krifka, looks at the categorical contrast of realis and irrealis. As the article points out, Sapir had already described an irrealis suffix in his 1930 grammar of Southern Paiute: “This element indicates that the activity expressed by the verb is unreal, i.e. either merely potential or contrary to fact (potential in past time)” (Sapir: “Southern Paiute, a Shoshone Language”). In many of the Oceanic languages of the South Pacific, there is this same obligatory grammatical distinction, part of the tense-aspect-mood system of their verb paradigms, by which speakers categorize all events as either actual or else as non-actual. So irrealis, marking the non-actual, is used to indicate future events, hypothetical possibilities, or counterfactual scenarios. All languages can make these kinds of semantic distinctions, but languages with irrealis have grammaticalized a complex idea onto a single morpheme for indicating a modal and often temporal contrast between the actual and the non-actual.
The authors of “Irrealis is Real” identified in their typological studies of Oceanic semantics some of the typical uses of irrealis verb markings: “irrealis markers are used for talking about future and counterfactual events. They are used in future and counterfactual conditionals, in complement clauses of verbs expressing wishes and intentions, in purpose clauses, and in expressions of ability and obligation.” It might be best to think of irrealis in model theoretic terms; irrealis serves to indicate a possible scenario (possible world) which the speaker judges to be incongruous with what we know with certainty to be the truth of the actual scenario, either because something hasn’t yet happened or else because some event is merely desired or speculated upon. In many European languages, the subjunctive mood plays a somewhat similar role to irrealis in being frequently merged with future tense, in bearing a hypothetical/wish connotation, and also by being used in subordinate clauses. Taking a typological approach to grammar, we can make use of ‘exotic’ languages in order to see more familiar languages in a new light.
But typologically speaking, the important thing to remember about irrealis as a unified semantic category is precisely the fact that this form of grammatical contrast is not universal. Rather, reallis/irrealis appears to be localized to some languages in certain places, like the South Pacific. In a sense, irrealis is like other grammatical categories which appear in some languages but not in most—for example, definiteness (many languages do not have articles) and tone (you oftentimes find tone languages in Bantu Africa and East Asia, but not much elsewhere).
It is perhaps fitting to end this review of Sapir’s Language by asserting once again that most rationalist assumptions of formal uniformity in all grammars are reductionist. What’s preferable is an empirical method that shows we are all human, not because we all think the exact same thoughts, but because humans at different times and in different places had arrived at the same solution for understanding reality (and in this case, irreality). Having merged under a single cognition ideas that most languages keep distinct, the South Seas islander and the Paiute Native American came to share a grammatical category of irrealis--despite being separated by 8,000 miles of ocean, desert, and the Grand Canyon. I find this patterning of variation to be interesting, but not altogether surprising. And I find it somehow reassuring that all languages are in fact potentially the same in their choice of semantically restrictive categories. But that potential does not imply that two languages separated by time and distance must somehow be cognitively identical. As any good anthropological linguist would say, ‘Vive la différence!’
Sapir’s Language is in the public domain. You can get it in lots of places, including gutenberg.org. “Irrealis is Real” was published in the journal Language vol 98:2. Paul Friedrich’s book The Language Parallax reflects on the poetic spirit of both Sapir and of Native American speakers. Rhetoric and Grammar, my master’s thesis at Rice, was written in part about Sapir’s rhetorical and grammatical contributions to linguistics and the other human sciences. A good recent reference for typology can be found in Payne’s Describing Morphosyntax and in Mithun's Languages of Native North America.