MacArthur's Korean War Generals

Modern War Studies

by Stephen R. Taaffe

Wedged chronologically between World War II and Vietnam, the Korean War which began with North Korea's invasion of South Korea in June of 1950 possessed neither the virtuous triumphalism of the former nor the tragic pathos of the latter. Most Americans supported defending South Korea, but there was considerable controversy during the war as to the best means to do so and the question was at least as exasperating for American army officers as it was for the general public. A longtime historian of American military leadership in the crucible of war, Stephen R. Taaffe takes a close critical look at how the highest ranking field commanders of the Eighth Army acquitted themselves in the first, decisive year in Korea. Because an army is no better than its leadership, his analysis opens a new perspective on the army's performance in Korea, and on the conduct of the war itself.

In that first year, the Eighth Army's leadership ran the gamut from impressive to lackluster, a surprising unevenness since so many of the high-ranking officers had been battle-tested in World War II. Taaffe attributes these leadership difficulties to the army's woefully unprepared state at the war's start, army personnel policies, and General Douglas MacArthur's corrosive habit of manipulating his subordinates and pitting them against each other. He explores the personalities at play, their pre-war experiences, the manner of their selection, their accomplishments and failures, and, of course, their individual relationships with each other and MacArthur. By explaining who these field, corps, and division commanders were, Taaffe exposes the army's institutional and organizational problems that contributed to its up-and-down fortunes in Korea in 1950 1951. Providing a better understanding of MacArthur's controversial generalship, Taafee's book offers new and invaluable insight into the army's life-and-death struggle in America's least understood conflict.

280 pages, Hardcover

First published April 8, 2016

Reviews

[Shrike58 · Rating 4 out of 5]

Unlike certain books I've read lately, this monograph actually does work like something of a general introduction to a larger event, but Taaffe's main focus is the personal politics of MacArthur's Far East command, and how the toxic elements of MacArthur's command style were a liability in the conduct of the war. Apart from "Dugout Doug," the most problematic characters here are "Johnny" Walker (commander of U.S. Eighth Army) and Ed Almond (commander of U.S. X Corps); hard-driving officers of some competence, but arguably not leaders of the first rank.

In particular, Walker probably could not be as forceful as he should have been with MacArthur, because it would seem that he really enjoyed no confidence in any quarter (with the possible exception of U.S. Army Chief of Staff "Lightning Joe" Collins). For all his faults though, Walker is owed a debt of gratitude because it was because of his hard work that U.S. troops in the Far East were even a little bit prepared for the trials to come in 1950.

As for Almond, while he tends to get pilloried for his racism in most accounts, his biggest flaws as a general were unthinking aggression and a thirst for military glory. However, his will to win made him appreciated in the company of U.S. flag-grade commanders who were mostly past their prime.

The range of this book is actually a bit wider than the title suggests, as it does consider Matt Ridgway's period of command after the sacking of MacArthur, but before the long period of stalemate until 1953. This leads to an examination of how the time-serving generals who had happened to be in command when North Korean assault came were replaced. As opposed to the world wars, these men were eased out of command more than being unceremoniously sacked, showing the way to the future command politics of the U.S. military. In the wake of the results of Washington's subsequent wars one can wonder whether this is a good thing.

Originally written: November 3, 2019.

[William Troy · Rating 5 out of 5]

I did not know much about the General Officers who served in Korea during the War except for General of the Army MacArthur. I did know a lot about General Ridgway and General Walker from World War II and from Ridgway's Biography and books about the Korean War. I knew a little bit about General Almond from other books about the Korean War none of them were very favorable towards Almond. I read General Oliver Smith's (USMC) biography. I have read General Van Fleet's biography. This work is an assessment of the effectiveness of the Army, Corps and Division Commanders and sometimes reaches down to the Regimental level. As author Stephen R. Taaffe points out, "It is impossible to accurately evaluate the army's performance during the Korean War...After all, an army's potency is usually directly proportional to the skill of its generals who run its machinery and execute directives" (Taaffe, p. 204).
From my previous readings about the Korean War I had a shabby opinion of General Almond. Pompous, abusive of subordinates, vain, overall a poor leader who ignored intelligence and got his Tenth Corps into trouble nearing the Yalu. I have a better opinion of him now thanks to the assessment of Mr. Taaffe. As the author points out, although Almond was a favorite of General MacArthur, General Ridgway did not relieve him when he assumed Eight Army command or the Supreme Command when General MacArthur was relieved. Ridgway found Almond capable and loyal as well as aggressive which was one of the traits Ridgway liked. I also had poor opinions of General Soule who commanded the Third Infantry Division and General Milburn who led Ninth Corps. Again the author pointed out that both were not relieved by General Ridgway because he judged them effective. I had a higher opinion of General Gay who commanded the First Cavalry Division. Gay performed credibly but became worn out and needed a rest. As for Regimental Commanders, Colonel "Mike" Michaelis of the 27th Infantry Regiment in the Twenty-Fifth Infantry Division, is spoken of highly and deservedly so. Colonel Paul Freeman who led the 23rd Regiment of the Second Infantry Division did not fare as well. He was not liked by Almond and was eventually relieved when a wound made it convenient. Both Michaelis and Freeman remained in service and reached General Officer Rank interestingly, Freemen a full General and Michaelis a Lieutenant General. Another officer who is spoken of highly is Charles Palmer who assumed command of the First Cavalry Division and eventually went on to four star rank. It is almost axiomatic that the army that went to war in Korea was unprepared, undermanned, poorly equipped, and weakly led. It struggled in the first year and after adjustments were made to better supply, equip and man the fighting forces and solid commanders emerged, the army performed better and inflicted mass casualties on the North Korean and Chinese armies! Additionally, the Truman Administration and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided poor guidance strategically and tactically to the forces in Korea. My only regret in this book is that it does not include pictures of the officers it assesses. I recommend this to all interested in the Korean War and military history!

[Stephen Graham · Rating 4 out of 5]

Continuing on from Taaffe's Marshall and His Generals: U.S. Army Commanders in World War II that I now want to go back and skim. Taaffe does a good, professional job of surveying higher formation commanders in the Korean War during MacArthur's tenure in command. As there are fewer overall than in World War Two (or the American Civil War), he is able to spare more time for each and for the overall flow of the war. Combined with Marshall and His Generals, this is excellent background material for those interested in the operational art in this timeframe. I do think Taaffe's evaluation of Almond is more positive than it might be; I would downgrade him more due to his inability to get along with divisional commanders and rate Milburn as the better overall corps commander.

[CASPER HILEMAN · Rating 5 out of 5]

Dr. Stephen Taaffe sheds light on the Generals of the "Forgotten War" warts and all. The infighting and ineptitude among the Marine Corp and the Army as well as between the Executive Branch and the Military. This is a fascinating study.