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424 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2013
Year Zero itself has been rather eclipsed in the world’s collective memory by the years of destruction that preceded it, and new dramas that still lay in store, in Korea, Vietnam, India-Pakistan, Israel, Cambodia, Rwanda, Iraq, Afghanistan, and on and on. But for those who came of age after Year Zero, when so much was created amidst the ruins of war, it was perhaps the most important year of all. Those of us who grew up in western Europe, or indeed in Japan, could easily take for granted what our parents had built: the welfare states, economies that just seemed to grow, international law, a “free world” protected by the seemingly unassailable American hegemon.In the book’s epilog it is suggested that the real end of WWII occurred in 1989 when the last of the eastern European countries were freed from Soviet domination. It’s ironic to remember that WWII in Europe started when Briton entered the war because Poland had been invaded by Germany. In 1945 the Germans were driven out of Poland, but Poland wasn’t exactly free. So in a sense the reason for the start of the war wasn’t resolved until the 1980s when Soviet domination ceased.
It wouldn’t last, of course. Nothing ever does. But that is no reason not to pay tribute to the men and women who were alive in 1945, to their hardships, and to their hopes and aspirations, even though many of these would turn to ash, as everything eventually does.
All wars displace people; the war in Iraq, beginning with the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, severed up to 5 million people from their homes. The scale of displacement because of World War II was especially horrendous because so much of it was deliberate, for ruthlessly practical as well as ideological reasons: slave labor programs, population exchanges, "ethnic cleansing," shifting national borders, emigration in search of Lebensraum for the German and Japanese master races, the civil wars ignited, entire populations deported to be killed or to languish in exile, and so on.
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The Cossacks were just one of the orphaned peoples, battered and in the end decimated by history. In fact, "history" is too abstract. The were destroyed by men, who acted on ideas, of revolution, of purified ethnic states. There were others who fell victim to these ideas, some of whom may have been among the believers themselves.
"sump of Europe," filled with people, civilians, and soldiers who either did not wish to return to their countries, or had no home to go back to. [British intelligence officer] Nigel Nicolson observed: "There seemed to be no limit to the number of nationalities which appealed to us for our protection. The Germans wanted to be safeguarded against Tito, the Cossacks against the Bulgarians, the Chetniks against the Croats, the White Russians against the Red Russians, the Austrians against the Slovenes, the Hungarians against everybody else, and vice-versa throughout the list….The Brits played out this same scenario again and again: in Greece (albeit tipping the scales ever so slightly against the Greek communists), in Palestine/Israel (where the Balfour Declaration was set in opposition to the White Paper, inevitably leading to the UN's partitioning of the territory with militarily indefensible borders), in Malaysia (where Japanese forces were encouraged to remain in a failed attempt to supplant or suppress an independence movement), and in greater India-Pakistan (where their reluctant release of the crown jewel split the country into mutually antithetical Hindu and Mughal states). Ever the shortsighted pragmatists, the feckless British sought pacification, not peace, with little room for diplomacy where no direct national interest indicated a preferred outcome. In the postwar pressure cooker, expedience dictated a quarantine until the deck could be cleared of combatants, and if a given faction was willing to complete the job by brute violence, well, the less said about the outcome the better.
How was a British soldier, faced with former Chetniks and [Titoist] Partisans, both of whom had been allies against the Germans at one point or another, to know whom to treat as a friend or enemy? In the end this choice… was decided by force. Harold Macmillan, the British plenipotentiary in the Mediterranean, put it like this: 'By December, 1943, the most informed British opinion was that the Partisans would eventually rule Yugoslavia and that the monarchy had little future and had ceased to be a unifying element…. The Chetnik royalists had the misfortune of being on the losing side of the civil war. (quoting from pages p. 146 & 150)
An American soldier wrote a letter home about his encounter with a Polish Jew "fresh out of Dachau." The man "was crying like a child," cowering in the corner of a public toilet in Munich. "I didn't have to ask him why he cried; the answers were all the same anyway, and go like this: parents tortured to death; wife gassed to death and children starved to death, or any combination of such three." (pp. 160-1)Eisenhower, rightly horrified by first-hand encounters with Nazi concentration camps, was determined that the horrors be openly and widely published.
He wanted reporters to visit the camps so that no one could ever pretend that these horrendous crimes were figments of propaganda… the piles of rotting corpses, the crematoria and torture rooms… [were] something "beyond the American mind to comprehend." … [And so n]ot only were local German citizens forced to walk through the camps… but people in Allied cities too were meant to see what the Germans had done…. In London, moviegoers "unable to stomach atrocity newsreels" tried to walk out of the Leicester Square Theatre, only to be blocked at the door by British soldiers. The Daily Mirror reported that "people walked out of cinemas all over the country, and in many places there were soldiers to tell them to go back and face it." (p. 227)In the immediate flush of victory, the temerity of Axis aggression coupled with evidence of savagery on a gross scale sparked both outrage and a quandary. How to exact justice yet ensure submission? Per Buruma at page 235, "You cannot try millions of people…. Too much zeal would have made the rebuilding of societies impossible. Too little effort to call the worst criminals to account would undermine any sense of decency." Long before the term "Holocaust" would be coined or the Rape of Nanking became a matter of public record, Nuremberg and similar proceedings in Japan helped to publish -- and establish -- such wartime atrocities as "crimes against humanity." According to the author, "The other thing to be said in Nuremberg's favor is that the trial was, for the most part, extraordinarily boring… This was not a quick trial driven by popular rage. Everything had to take its course, and so it went on, and on, and on, turning boredom into a sign of probity…. Tedium spiked the guns of vengeance. That was the whole point."
Hitler's project, based on ideas...of ethnic purity and nationhood, was completed by people who hated Germany.... [But] we shouldn't forget that the real destroyers of German culture in the center of Europe were the Germans themselves. By annihilating the central European Jews, many of whom were fiercely loyal to German high culture, they started the process. (p. 159)
Why should the Chinese Communists have insisted on trials at all? Why not simply shoot the rascals? Clearly they wanted the executions to appear lawful. Establishing a form of legality is a necessary condition of legitimacy, even in a dictatorship, or perhaps especially in a dictatorship. But the concept of the law in show trials is entirely political. (p. 204)
plagued in the 1970s by revolutionary extremists whose acts of violence were inspired by a zealous conviction that their countries had never changed, that fascism was still alive in a different guise, carried on by some of the same people who had waged war in the 1940s (p. 236)