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Le indagini dell'ispettore Santoni #4
The Battle of the Atlantic: How the Allies Won the War
'Majestic. Truly gripping' Andrew Roberts The Battle of the Atlantic was the single most important - and longest - campaign of the Second World War. If Britain lost this vital supply route it lost the war. In Jonathan Dimbleby's brilliant and dramatic new account we see how this epic struggle for maritime mastery played out, from the politicians and admirals to the men on and under the sea and their families waiting at home. Filled with haunting and hair-raising stories of chases, ambushes, sinkings, stalkings, disasters and rescues, The Battle of the Atlantic is a monumental work of history as it was lived and fought. 'Recounts the horror and humanity of life on those perilous oceans' Independent 'Dimbleby moves with skill from scene to scene, eavesdropping on the great statesmen like Churchill, the merchant seamen who carried out their orders, the U-boat commanders who tried to sink them and the families of those who lost their lives at sea' Mail on Sunday
448 pages, Paperback
First published November 24, 2015
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1271 people want to read
About the author
Jonathan Dimbleby
22 books93 followersJonathan Dimbleby is a writer and filmmaker based in England. His five-part series on Russia was broadcast by BBC2 and accompanied by his book Russia: A Journal to the Heart of a Land and its People. Destiny in the Desert was recently nominated for the Hessell-Tiltman History Prize.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 117 reviews
June 3, 2020
I approached The Battle of the Atlantic with a certain amount of caution. Jonathon Dimbleby is best known as a TV and radio presenter, whose previous works have mainly been pedestrian biographies, and I was unaware of his having any great interest in naval history. What I found was a well-researched and thoughtful account of one of the most strategically important, and under appreciated campaigns of the Second World War.
Dimbleby combines some first-hand accounts with a reasonable sweeping review of the technological and economic elements of the U-boat campaign. At times he does lose focus, allowing himself to be drawn away into allied campaigns like the Mediterranean and the doings of the surface fleet, often for no discernible reason. I would also have liked a little more operation detail on the activities and pressures on both Derby House, and the German side, but that said this is a sound and enjoyable book. Those wishing for something more analytical would do better with John Terraine’s masterly Business in Great Waters.
Dimbleby combines some first-hand accounts with a reasonable sweeping review of the technological and economic elements of the U-boat campaign. At times he does lose focus, allowing himself to be drawn away into allied campaigns like the Mediterranean and the doings of the surface fleet, often for no discernible reason. I would also have liked a little more operation detail on the activities and pressures on both Derby House, and the German side, but that said this is a sound and enjoyable book. Those wishing for something more analytical would do better with John Terraine’s masterly Business in Great Waters.
January 25, 2016
Immensely readable account of probably the most critical campaign of World War 2
Well known British broadcaster and author Jonathan Dimbleby has produced a scholarly yet accessible account of the campaign that if won by the Germans would have forced the surrender of the UK and most likely either the defeat of the Soviet Union or a forced peace.
Whilst he visits many areas that are well known such as the sacrifice borne by the merchant navy’s 30,000 casualties and the 75% casualty rate amongst U-Boat crews he also challenges many of the received views.
Most notable is the part played by the Ultra decrypts where he claims that whilst they were useful, technological advances in airborne radar and the deployment of long range aircraft were more critical. He argues that the Ultra decrypts were negated to a significant degree by the lesser known German code breaking efforts which resulted in them reading the British and Allied Merchants Ships code and a breakthrough in February 1942 where they broke the code used for communication with many of the Atlantic convoys.
The Battle of the Atlantic is the subject of a number of books but Dimbleby has successfully added several refreshing new viewpoints and created a book that is readable for the general reader too.
I received this book for free from the publisher in exchange for an honest review. This does not affect my opinion of the book or the content of my review.
Well known British broadcaster and author Jonathan Dimbleby has produced a scholarly yet accessible account of the campaign that if won by the Germans would have forced the surrender of the UK and most likely either the defeat of the Soviet Union or a forced peace.
Whilst he visits many areas that are well known such as the sacrifice borne by the merchant navy’s 30,000 casualties and the 75% casualty rate amongst U-Boat crews he also challenges many of the received views.
Most notable is the part played by the Ultra decrypts where he claims that whilst they were useful, technological advances in airborne radar and the deployment of long range aircraft were more critical. He argues that the Ultra decrypts were negated to a significant degree by the lesser known German code breaking efforts which resulted in them reading the British and Allied Merchants Ships code and a breakthrough in February 1942 where they broke the code used for communication with many of the Atlantic convoys.
The Battle of the Atlantic is the subject of a number of books but Dimbleby has successfully added several refreshing new viewpoints and created a book that is readable for the general reader too.
I received this book for free from the publisher in exchange for an honest review. This does not affect my opinion of the book or the content of my review.
March 20, 2016
Roger Lancashire was a surgeon aboard the cruiser HMS Exeter in her confrontation with the German battleship Graf Spee. As his ship came under fire he described dealing with the injured:
“The casualties were pretty devastating. There were two or three who literally died in my arms. These were people I had been living with, as it were, for three years. There were cases where, if I’d had the facilities and an endless supply of blood transfusions, things might have been different, but it wasn’t like that. I did a quick assessment of who was most likely to benefit and then went to work on them”.
Powerful personal testimonies such as this are part of the delight of the new generation of military history, exemplified by Anthony Beevor’s work over the past few decades. British broadcaster Jonathan Dimbleby has taken this model and applied it to this important theatre of World War 2. Through a range of mostly secondary sources he successfully sweeps from the broad strategic view down to the experiences of those on board the merchant vessels, navy ships and submarines that bore the brunt of the battle. As he points out, the term “Battle of the Atlantic” is a misnomer. It “not only lasted from the very first to the very last day of the war but, so far from being a single battle, it involved hundreds of hostile encounters on a wide variety of fronts” - more of a campaign according to Dimbleby.
He portrays the importance of the battle well, both through the views of war leaders such as Roosevelt and Churchill and through the everyday experiences of (often quoted) Nella Last of Barrow-on-Furness, dealing with the consequences of rationing. The drama is not just portrayed through the life and death struggle of the participants, but also with the battles within the participant powers. Churchill recognised the strategic importance of the theatre, but at the same time allowed the RAF to diminish the importance of Coastal Command’s efforts, resulting in a diversion of long range aircraft to bombing instead of maritime duties which almost let the German’s win the battle of attrition. On the German’s side Raeder and Donitz competed for Hitler’s attention and undermined each other with their visions of the relative importance of the surface and submarine fleets. Overarching these conflicts were the disagreements between the war leaders, especially Stalin’s displeasure and distrust of the US and Britain and their ability to meet their commitments for equipment supply via the Arctic convoys.
Interestingly having recently read Enigma - The Battle for the Code and seen the film The Imitation Game it was fascinating how little coverage Dimbleby gives Enigma. After getting the impression that the reading of Ultra (or not) directly correlated with success in the war against the U Boats, this book gives more subtlety, pointing out the many other factors especially the fact that the German’s could also read the merchant navy’s codes. This meant that when the convoys were diverted as a result of intel from Ultra the German’s were able to move their U Boats in response. Dimbleby’s viewpoint does carry some weight, as it explains why Donitz in particular, although suspicious never worked out that his communications with U Boats were being intercepted. Arguably in this theatre the two side’s efforts in code breaking almost nullified each other.
If I have one criticism of the book it is that at times the context about other theatres of war (for example the Russian front) are given a bit more attention that is necessary. This felt a bit like filler at times, although for someone reading this book without a good knowledge of the Second World War I’m sure these passages will be welcome. Overall this book provides a sound explanation of this vital theatre which places it in its justified historical context, providing well balanced coverage of the personalities, strategic decisionmaking, importance of the Atlantic lifeline and most of all conveying the struggles, discomfort and danger confronted by the sailors on the high seas. A recommended book.
“The casualties were pretty devastating. There were two or three who literally died in my arms. These were people I had been living with, as it were, for three years. There were cases where, if I’d had the facilities and an endless supply of blood transfusions, things might have been different, but it wasn’t like that. I did a quick assessment of who was most likely to benefit and then went to work on them”.
Powerful personal testimonies such as this are part of the delight of the new generation of military history, exemplified by Anthony Beevor’s work over the past few decades. British broadcaster Jonathan Dimbleby has taken this model and applied it to this important theatre of World War 2. Through a range of mostly secondary sources he successfully sweeps from the broad strategic view down to the experiences of those on board the merchant vessels, navy ships and submarines that bore the brunt of the battle. As he points out, the term “Battle of the Atlantic” is a misnomer. It “not only lasted from the very first to the very last day of the war but, so far from being a single battle, it involved hundreds of hostile encounters on a wide variety of fronts” - more of a campaign according to Dimbleby.
He portrays the importance of the battle well, both through the views of war leaders such as Roosevelt and Churchill and through the everyday experiences of (often quoted) Nella Last of Barrow-on-Furness, dealing with the consequences of rationing. The drama is not just portrayed through the life and death struggle of the participants, but also with the battles within the participant powers. Churchill recognised the strategic importance of the theatre, but at the same time allowed the RAF to diminish the importance of Coastal Command’s efforts, resulting in a diversion of long range aircraft to bombing instead of maritime duties which almost let the German’s win the battle of attrition. On the German’s side Raeder and Donitz competed for Hitler’s attention and undermined each other with their visions of the relative importance of the surface and submarine fleets. Overarching these conflicts were the disagreements between the war leaders, especially Stalin’s displeasure and distrust of the US and Britain and their ability to meet their commitments for equipment supply via the Arctic convoys.
Interestingly having recently read Enigma - The Battle for the Code and seen the film The Imitation Game it was fascinating how little coverage Dimbleby gives Enigma. After getting the impression that the reading of Ultra (or not) directly correlated with success in the war against the U Boats, this book gives more subtlety, pointing out the many other factors especially the fact that the German’s could also read the merchant navy’s codes. This meant that when the convoys were diverted as a result of intel from Ultra the German’s were able to move their U Boats in response. Dimbleby’s viewpoint does carry some weight, as it explains why Donitz in particular, although suspicious never worked out that his communications with U Boats were being intercepted. Arguably in this theatre the two side’s efforts in code breaking almost nullified each other.
If I have one criticism of the book it is that at times the context about other theatres of war (for example the Russian front) are given a bit more attention that is necessary. This felt a bit like filler at times, although for someone reading this book without a good knowledge of the Second World War I’m sure these passages will be welcome. Overall this book provides a sound explanation of this vital theatre which places it in its justified historical context, providing well balanced coverage of the personalities, strategic decisionmaking, importance of the Atlantic lifeline and most of all conveying the struggles, discomfort and danger confronted by the sailors on the high seas. A recommended book.
September 17, 2016
This is a very accessible history of the Battle of the Atlantic. Jonathan Dimbleby's premise is that without Allied victory in the Battle, the entire war would have been lost, and he makes his point subtly throughout the book.
The narrative moves seamlessly between the diplomacy and back room tricks of Roosevelt and Churchill and the horror of night U-Boat attacks and sinking ships with an almost disturbing ease. The book itself is easy to read and provides all the information needed to understand the argument and events without any foreknowledge. My only complaints would be that the book to all intents and purposes ends in mid - 1943, and that while air attacks from the Luftwaffe are mentioned, the book is firmly rooted in the U-Boat as the main means of prosecuting the tonnage war.
Minor niggles though, I'd recommend this to one and all.
The narrative moves seamlessly between the diplomacy and back room tricks of Roosevelt and Churchill and the horror of night U-Boat attacks and sinking ships with an almost disturbing ease. The book itself is easy to read and provides all the information needed to understand the argument and events without any foreknowledge. My only complaints would be that the book to all intents and purposes ends in mid - 1943, and that while air attacks from the Luftwaffe are mentioned, the book is firmly rooted in the U-Boat as the main means of prosecuting the tonnage war.
Minor niggles though, I'd recommend this to one and all.
November 22, 2024
A Momentous Victory
Jonathan Dimbleby's "The Battle of the Atlantic: How the Allies Won the War" explores the war at sea against Germany during WW II and makes a strong case for its importance. Dimbleby, a British writer and broadcaster, has written several popular studies of WW II and its aftermath. He explains the goal of his book in his Preface, titled "A Momentous Victory":
"I have sought to weave the themes outlined above into a narrative about a sustained drama in which the motives and actions of every combatant -- from the most senior members of the competing high commands in London, Washington, Berlin and Moscow to the individuals who fought and died in the Battle of the Atlantic-- are crucial to a full appreciation of the epic scale of the campaign. To place the stories of those who fought and died at sea for either side against the background of the momentous dilemmas and decisions of those who sent them there is not to diminish but to illuminate the epic scale of their endeavor. I hope I have been able to establish that the Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic was a precondition for the defeat of Nazism and therefore as important as any other struggle on any other front between 1939 and 1945."
The book focuses upon the war in the Atlantic and the German U-boats. Dimbleby shows this conflict at both broad and specific levels. Dimbleby explains how Germany tried to win the war by cutting off food and materials to Britain from the United States and elsewhere by control of the ocean and how it came dangerously close to success. He follows the changing course of the Battle of the Atlantic from 1939 through the end of the War with many specific depictions of sea battles. He makes excellent use of the words of the combatants in the ships to the extent they are available. The battle depictions are graphic and exciting and capture the danger of the war at sea for the German U-boats and for the allied merchant fleets and combat vessels. The book shows the many changes of fortune in the sea war. Through early 1943, Germany held the upper hand and appeared to be increasing its advantage. British and American technology, including more sophisticated forms of radar detection, an increased mass-production of ships, and a better understanding of the use of convoys dealt a blow to the U-boats from which they could not recover. British control of the Atlantic led ultimately to D-day and to the winning of the War.
Dimbleby's book integrates the Battle of the Atlantic with other theaters of the War and explores the various ways the high commands of the combatants viewed the Battle. Dimbleby is critical of Churchill for not responding to the seriousness of the U-boat threat until it was nearly too late and concentrating instead on the heavy bombing of Germany and civilians. Dimbleby argues that this bombing was both ethically questionable and militarily ineffective. For its part, Germany missed an opportunity to inflict even more damage than it did with the U-boats early in the War. The German high command had its own internal disagreements about the emphasis to be given the U-boats as opposed to a large surface fleet and about the emphasis to be given to the war at sea as compared to the air war.
Dimbleby also offers a good, basic account of the diplomacy among Britain, the United States, and the USSR and how it related to the conduct of the war at sea. He shows the extensive disagreements in the Allied high command. Although high level contact between Britain and America and Stalin receives much attention, some of the best writing in the book is at the more specific level involving the treacherous voyages in the north Atlantic in which the Allies tried to send badly needed supplies to the USSR in furtherance of its resistance to the German invasion.
The book argues that the Allies might have won the Battle of the Atlantic and the War earlier than they did if they had properly focused on using convoys and on meeting the U-boat threat. Conversely, Germany, in hindsight, also had its chances early in the war to intensify its use of the U-boat before the Allies responded. Dimbleby offers good portraits of the high commands on both sides, particularly of Germany's Grand Admiral Karl Donitz who, he argues, had a better understanding of U-boat warfare than any other commander on either side. The book discusses the breaking of the German Enigma code and concludes that the importance of this factor to the Battle of the Atlantic frequently is overstated. It was neutralized in part by Germany's own breaking of the Allies code. Throughout the book, Dimbleby emphasis the courage and the valor shown by seafarers in the War on both sides and the extraordinarily high level of casualties they sustained.
Dimbleby writes well and eloquently. The book is absorbing and a pleasure to read. It is written for a non-specialist audience. I learned a great deal from this book about the Battle of the Atlantic and its importance to WW II and its aftermath. The book brings home the scope and the significance of the War.
Robin Friedman
Jonathan Dimbleby's "The Battle of the Atlantic: How the Allies Won the War" explores the war at sea against Germany during WW II and makes a strong case for its importance. Dimbleby, a British writer and broadcaster, has written several popular studies of WW II and its aftermath. He explains the goal of his book in his Preface, titled "A Momentous Victory":
"I have sought to weave the themes outlined above into a narrative about a sustained drama in which the motives and actions of every combatant -- from the most senior members of the competing high commands in London, Washington, Berlin and Moscow to the individuals who fought and died in the Battle of the Atlantic-- are crucial to a full appreciation of the epic scale of the campaign. To place the stories of those who fought and died at sea for either side against the background of the momentous dilemmas and decisions of those who sent them there is not to diminish but to illuminate the epic scale of their endeavor. I hope I have been able to establish that the Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic was a precondition for the defeat of Nazism and therefore as important as any other struggle on any other front between 1939 and 1945."
The book focuses upon the war in the Atlantic and the German U-boats. Dimbleby shows this conflict at both broad and specific levels. Dimbleby explains how Germany tried to win the war by cutting off food and materials to Britain from the United States and elsewhere by control of the ocean and how it came dangerously close to success. He follows the changing course of the Battle of the Atlantic from 1939 through the end of the War with many specific depictions of sea battles. He makes excellent use of the words of the combatants in the ships to the extent they are available. The battle depictions are graphic and exciting and capture the danger of the war at sea for the German U-boats and for the allied merchant fleets and combat vessels. The book shows the many changes of fortune in the sea war. Through early 1943, Germany held the upper hand and appeared to be increasing its advantage. British and American technology, including more sophisticated forms of radar detection, an increased mass-production of ships, and a better understanding of the use of convoys dealt a blow to the U-boats from which they could not recover. British control of the Atlantic led ultimately to D-day and to the winning of the War.
Dimbleby's book integrates the Battle of the Atlantic with other theaters of the War and explores the various ways the high commands of the combatants viewed the Battle. Dimbleby is critical of Churchill for not responding to the seriousness of the U-boat threat until it was nearly too late and concentrating instead on the heavy bombing of Germany and civilians. Dimbleby argues that this bombing was both ethically questionable and militarily ineffective. For its part, Germany missed an opportunity to inflict even more damage than it did with the U-boats early in the War. The German high command had its own internal disagreements about the emphasis to be given the U-boats as opposed to a large surface fleet and about the emphasis to be given to the war at sea as compared to the air war.
Dimbleby also offers a good, basic account of the diplomacy among Britain, the United States, and the USSR and how it related to the conduct of the war at sea. He shows the extensive disagreements in the Allied high command. Although high level contact between Britain and America and Stalin receives much attention, some of the best writing in the book is at the more specific level involving the treacherous voyages in the north Atlantic in which the Allies tried to send badly needed supplies to the USSR in furtherance of its resistance to the German invasion.
The book argues that the Allies might have won the Battle of the Atlantic and the War earlier than they did if they had properly focused on using convoys and on meeting the U-boat threat. Conversely, Germany, in hindsight, also had its chances early in the war to intensify its use of the U-boat before the Allies responded. Dimbleby offers good portraits of the high commands on both sides, particularly of Germany's Grand Admiral Karl Donitz who, he argues, had a better understanding of U-boat warfare than any other commander on either side. The book discusses the breaking of the German Enigma code and concludes that the importance of this factor to the Battle of the Atlantic frequently is overstated. It was neutralized in part by Germany's own breaking of the Allies code. Throughout the book, Dimbleby emphasis the courage and the valor shown by seafarers in the War on both sides and the extraordinarily high level of casualties they sustained.
Dimbleby writes well and eloquently. The book is absorbing and a pleasure to read. It is written for a non-specialist audience. I learned a great deal from this book about the Battle of the Atlantic and its importance to WW II and its aftermath. The book brings home the scope and the significance of the War.
Robin Friedman
April 6, 2022
Excellent. The author is a very gifted writer and a superb historian. Intelligently organized and lucidly presented, this naval history is as gripping and exciting to read as it is informative. If you enjoy military history, be sure to read this one.
August 19, 2017
Clearly written and deeply-researched history of the WW2 U-boat attacks on shipping, primarily from North America to Britain, the lifeline of the UK, which required huge imports (including food) to carry on the war effort. Dimbleby (and other historians) recognize the slow response to the submarine attacks as Churchill's biggest strategic blunder in WW2. The most effective weapons against the U-boats were long-range bombers. These were owned by the RAF and used for massive bombing raids into Germany, largely targeting cities (and civilians), under the direction of "Bomber" Harris, a strategy later discredited. The Royal Navy was unable to get bombers for anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and Churchill did not intervene. Massive losses of shipping (and lives) continued from early 1940 into 1942.
Even more shocking (for an American) were the large-scale U-boat attacks on American shipping off the East Coast in 1942. German submarines sank over 600 merchant ships, with the loss of thousands of lives, with no effective American defense. Even simple measures, such as blacking-out coastal cities, weren't done -- U-boats could easily target ships outlined by city lights. Dimbleby (and others) blame this poor response on Admiral Ernest King, then the Commander in Chief of the US Navy. King inexplicably resisted learning from the British ASW experience. Effective American response began later in 1942, with the loan of British anti-submarine trawlers and corvettes to the US Navy.
For both countries, it's striking how bad decisions (Adm. King, Bomber Harris ) and inter-service rivalries (Air Force vs Navy) damaged the war effort -- particularly in the UK, which was literally fighting for its life in the early years of WW2.
Recommended reading for those interested in WW2 and naval history. Don't be put off by the bulk (650 pp) -- it's a pretty fast read.
The review that led me to read it:
http://www.wsj.com/articles/water-bom...
Even more shocking (for an American) were the large-scale U-boat attacks on American shipping off the East Coast in 1942. German submarines sank over 600 merchant ships, with the loss of thousands of lives, with no effective American defense. Even simple measures, such as blacking-out coastal cities, weren't done -- U-boats could easily target ships outlined by city lights. Dimbleby (and others) blame this poor response on Admiral Ernest King, then the Commander in Chief of the US Navy. King inexplicably resisted learning from the British ASW experience. Effective American response began later in 1942, with the loan of British anti-submarine trawlers and corvettes to the US Navy.
For both countries, it's striking how bad decisions (Adm. King, Bomber Harris ) and inter-service rivalries (Air Force vs Navy) damaged the war effort -- particularly in the UK, which was literally fighting for its life in the early years of WW2.
Recommended reading for those interested in WW2 and naval history. Don't be put off by the bulk (650 pp) -- it's a pretty fast read.
The review that led me to read it:
http://www.wsj.com/articles/water-bom...
September 22, 2016
This is a good book. The only complaint I have is that Dimbleby mistakenly calls U.S. Secretary of War "Harold" Stimson. The man's real name was, of course, Henry L. Stimson.
April 17, 2024
The Battle of the Atlantic is not a great book on the campaign. It ignores recent historiography as to the significance of the U-Boat threat. It appears to occasionally misrepresent events, such as the reasonableness of the Royal Navy’s decision to withdraw its carriers from hunting groups following the sinking of Courageous, or that the Germans had torpedo problems from at least the time of the sinking of the Royal Oak. It also makes a bold claim in the introduction that an earlier victory in the Atlantic would have moved the Normandy invasion forward but caveats that to such an extent in the conclusion that it would have been better to have said nothing at all.
There is a clear reliance on a mix of individual memoirs of those who served along with biographies of the great and good and their memoranda, which is fine in principle but leaves the book lacking in detail on the force structure of both sides and their doctrines. Oh, and if you are Canadian, expect universally derogatory comments on the contribution of what became the world’s fourth largest navy.
Most of the material in this book would be acceptable in a book written around 1980, a breezy overview that waspishly lobs (quite) a few shells at Churchill. By 2024 though, it’s a marginal book that goes over well ploughed ground for little gain. The coverage is patchy and misses a number of events, particularly the actions of the surface raiders up to mid-1941, or the Canadian navy doing anything useful.
This book is fine (good even!) as a first introduction to the campaign. Dimbleby is an excellent writer who does not dramatically err on the facts. Yet its only advantage over earlier books is the newness of its cover… …which is frankly on me for being fooled by that.
There is a clear reliance on a mix of individual memoirs of those who served along with biographies of the great and good and their memoranda, which is fine in principle but leaves the book lacking in detail on the force structure of both sides and their doctrines. Oh, and if you are Canadian, expect universally derogatory comments on the contribution of what became the world’s fourth largest navy.
Most of the material in this book would be acceptable in a book written around 1980, a breezy overview that waspishly lobs (quite) a few shells at Churchill. By 2024 though, it’s a marginal book that goes over well ploughed ground for little gain. The coverage is patchy and misses a number of events, particularly the actions of the surface raiders up to mid-1941, or the Canadian navy doing anything useful.
This book is fine (good even!) as a first introduction to the campaign. Dimbleby is an excellent writer who does not dramatically err on the facts. Yet its only advantage over earlier books is the newness of its cover… …which is frankly on me for being fooled by that.
May 9, 2025
Borrow.
I didn't find anything new here. It was a bit dry as well and overly opinionated for a history.
I didn't find anything new here. It was a bit dry as well and overly opinionated for a history.
January 30, 2024
This is a very well written account that was interesting from start to finish. Is dense yet still very easy to read.
Would highly recommend
Would highly recommend
June 5, 2016
Sono 3 stelle e mezzo!
http://labibliotecadieliza.blogspot.i...
Ho sentito tanti pareri su questo libro, tutti molto positivi. Vado sul sicuro, mi sono detta. Si dai, lo leggo che ho proprio voglia di un bel giallo.
In realtà ho fatto un po' fatica a leggerlo. Per parlarvene lo voglio dividere in due parti. Tutta la prima metà è risultata la più ostica da affrontare. L'inizio è stato straziante, l'emotiva-amante-degli-animali-cuore-di-panna che in me è uscita fuori e si è pianta tutte le prime due pagine. La scena è stata questa: 2 minuti per leggerle, una serata per riprendersi (si c'era anche del cioccolato ma non è necessario sottolinearlo...). Ma ve beh, quella è tutta colpa mia, so che davanti a questo tipo di scene piango come una fontana e mi deprimo. Tuttavia continuando la lettura mi sono un po' arenata. Mi sembrava che l'indagine stagnasse. A causa di ciò spesso l'occhio mi cadeva su alcuni elementi poco convincenti. Ad esempio, in alcuni momenti, mi sono sentita un po' costretta ad arrivare a determinate conclusioni, come se l'autore si fosse imposto di arrivare ad un determinato punto e volesse portarci il lettore, però in maniera un po' forzata. O ancora poco mi sono piaciuti gli atteggiamenti di alcuni personaggi, come Krystal che come un girasole si muove e guarda unicamente il suo mito assoluto, l'ispettore Santoni, o lo stesso Santoni, detto Lupo Bianco, che ogni cinque minuti deve guardare verso Katia e rimarcarne l'assoluta necessità nell'indagine. Poi mi sono imbattuta in alcuni dubbi (miei) sullo svolgimento dell'indagine (che per carità, io mica ne so di indagini di polizia e soprattutto di competenze investigative... però...), insomma mi sono trovata davanti ad un insieme di piccole cose che però messe insieme mi hanno fatto procedere con lentezza.
Poi però da circa metà in avanti la storia si velocizza e si fa più succosa e soprattutto per me diventa un vero e proprio giallo, di quelli che devi proseguire assolutamente perchè vuoi sapere chi e perchè. Anche i personaggi e le motivazioni che li muovano mi sono sembrati più realistici e meno forzati nelle loro scelte. Quindi se l'inizio è un ni, la parte finale mi è piaciuta, tanto è vero che l'ho letta in un paio di ore scarse.
Ho apprezzato l'idea particolare, non siamo davanti ad un classico omicidio, di quelli oramai visti e rivisti in libri e telefilm, ma a qualcosa di un po' diverso dal solito, che incuriosisce sicuramente. Avrei voluto un po' più di sprint iniziale, questo si, ma nel complesso posso dire che è stata una bella lettura. Lo stile dell'autore rende bene l'anima del romanzo, asciutto, secco, senza tanti ghirigori, uno stile adatto al genere, al protagonista, un ispettore di polizia un po' musone e vecchio stampo, e all'ambientazione.
http://labibliotecadieliza.blogspot.i...
Ho sentito tanti pareri su questo libro, tutti molto positivi. Vado sul sicuro, mi sono detta. Si dai, lo leggo che ho proprio voglia di un bel giallo.
In realtà ho fatto un po' fatica a leggerlo. Per parlarvene lo voglio dividere in due parti. Tutta la prima metà è risultata la più ostica da affrontare. L'inizio è stato straziante, l'emotiva-amante-degli-animali-cuore-di-panna che in me è uscita fuori e si è pianta tutte le prime due pagine. La scena è stata questa: 2 minuti per leggerle, una serata per riprendersi (si c'era anche del cioccolato ma non è necessario sottolinearlo...). Ma ve beh, quella è tutta colpa mia, so che davanti a questo tipo di scene piango come una fontana e mi deprimo. Tuttavia continuando la lettura mi sono un po' arenata. Mi sembrava che l'indagine stagnasse. A causa di ciò spesso l'occhio mi cadeva su alcuni elementi poco convincenti. Ad esempio, in alcuni momenti, mi sono sentita un po' costretta ad arrivare a determinate conclusioni, come se l'autore si fosse imposto di arrivare ad un determinato punto e volesse portarci il lettore, però in maniera un po' forzata. O ancora poco mi sono piaciuti gli atteggiamenti di alcuni personaggi, come Krystal che come un girasole si muove e guarda unicamente il suo mito assoluto, l'ispettore Santoni, o lo stesso Santoni, detto Lupo Bianco, che ogni cinque minuti deve guardare verso Katia e rimarcarne l'assoluta necessità nell'indagine. Poi mi sono imbattuta in alcuni dubbi (miei) sullo svolgimento dell'indagine (che per carità, io mica ne so di indagini di polizia e soprattutto di competenze investigative... però...), insomma mi sono trovata davanti ad un insieme di piccole cose che però messe insieme mi hanno fatto procedere con lentezza.
Poi però da circa metà in avanti la storia si velocizza e si fa più succosa e soprattutto per me diventa un vero e proprio giallo, di quelli che devi proseguire assolutamente perchè vuoi sapere chi e perchè. Anche i personaggi e le motivazioni che li muovano mi sono sembrati più realistici e meno forzati nelle loro scelte. Quindi se l'inizio è un ni, la parte finale mi è piaciuta, tanto è vero che l'ho letta in un paio di ore scarse.
Ho apprezzato l'idea particolare, non siamo davanti ad un classico omicidio, di quelli oramai visti e rivisti in libri e telefilm, ma a qualcosa di un po' diverso dal solito, che incuriosisce sicuramente. Avrei voluto un po' più di sprint iniziale, questo si, ma nel complesso posso dire che è stata una bella lettura. Lo stile dell'autore rende bene l'anima del romanzo, asciutto, secco, senza tanti ghirigori, uno stile adatto al genere, al protagonista, un ispettore di polizia un po' musone e vecchio stampo, e all'ambientazione.
May 9, 2016
2016
“The Battle of the Atlantic: how the Allies won the war,” by Jonathan Dimbleby (Oxford, 2016). I should stop reading these damn WWII books already. So Richard Overy has explained Why the Allies won. Now Dimbleby describes how, to his thinking, they won. The argument: The crux of the war was fought at sea. It was all about whether the British could get enough food, water, ammo, ships, men, weapons, etc., across the Atlantic or whether the U-Boats could strangle them. Dimbleby does a good job describing all the different elements---how many submarines the Germans had, how the British were forced to ration more and more and more, how Roosevelt had to connive and finagle and almost trick the US into supporting the British, the development of the weapons and counter-weapons, the Air Gap and how it was eventually closed. For me, Dimbleby’s most important contribution is his clear-eyed, even cynical portraits of the leaders and what they contributed. The British---especially Churchill---did not realize how important just a few long-range planes were in defeating the U-Boats. He argues that if just a few planes had been diverted from Bomber Harris’ destructive crusade, just a few months or even a year sooner, the war would have been over more quickly because the Americans could have gotten more supplies across the ocean much more easily, and the cross-Channel invasion would have happened sooner. Churchill was a great war leader with a golden tongue, but he was also often wrong-headed and mistaken. Dimbleby presents Stalin as justified in his anger at the western Alllies’ refusal (in fact their inability) to open a second front when they said they would. Hitler interferes, as usual, and when Dönitz finally has the 300 boats he wanted, it’s too late: the antisubmarine forces are too strong. Roosevelt is canny, devious, clever---he knows exactly how far he can go in supporting the British, in the face of a strong isolationist movement in the US. The descriptions of equipment, battles, conditions in the North Atlantic in winter, convoys, tactics, development of ships, etc, are relatively quick but very clear. If you don’t know much about the war at sea, this is the book for you. Even if you do know a good deal about the war at sea, this ties things together and explicates events, tendencies and strategies in a very satisfying manner. The destruction of convoy PQ-17---grrrr how stupid the high command was.
https://global.oup.com/academic/produ...
“The Battle of the Atlantic: how the Allies won the war,” by Jonathan Dimbleby (Oxford, 2016). I should stop reading these damn WWII books already. So Richard Overy has explained Why the Allies won. Now Dimbleby describes how, to his thinking, they won. The argument: The crux of the war was fought at sea. It was all about whether the British could get enough food, water, ammo, ships, men, weapons, etc., across the Atlantic or whether the U-Boats could strangle them. Dimbleby does a good job describing all the different elements---how many submarines the Germans had, how the British were forced to ration more and more and more, how Roosevelt had to connive and finagle and almost trick the US into supporting the British, the development of the weapons and counter-weapons, the Air Gap and how it was eventually closed. For me, Dimbleby’s most important contribution is his clear-eyed, even cynical portraits of the leaders and what they contributed. The British---especially Churchill---did not realize how important just a few long-range planes were in defeating the U-Boats. He argues that if just a few planes had been diverted from Bomber Harris’ destructive crusade, just a few months or even a year sooner, the war would have been over more quickly because the Americans could have gotten more supplies across the ocean much more easily, and the cross-Channel invasion would have happened sooner. Churchill was a great war leader with a golden tongue, but he was also often wrong-headed and mistaken. Dimbleby presents Stalin as justified in his anger at the western Alllies’ refusal (in fact their inability) to open a second front when they said they would. Hitler interferes, as usual, and when Dönitz finally has the 300 boats he wanted, it’s too late: the antisubmarine forces are too strong. Roosevelt is canny, devious, clever---he knows exactly how far he can go in supporting the British, in the face of a strong isolationist movement in the US. The descriptions of equipment, battles, conditions in the North Atlantic in winter, convoys, tactics, development of ships, etc, are relatively quick but very clear. If you don’t know much about the war at sea, this is the book for you. Even if you do know a good deal about the war at sea, this ties things together and explicates events, tendencies and strategies in a very satisfying manner. The destruction of convoy PQ-17---grrrr how stupid the high command was.
https://global.oup.com/academic/produ...
July 28, 2016
Jonathan Dimbleby has written a masterful, interesting and very informative book about the longest campaign in World War II, The Battle of the Atlantic. It is a masterpiece of good research and informs the reader in a broad view about the horrific challenges and conflicts that made this such a difficult campaign for the Allies to win. Dimbleby's insights into the nature of the leadership of all sides of the conflict, British, German, Russian and United States, is revealing and highly thought provoking. The author gives a very profound look into attitudes and behaviors of Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, and how these set the tone within their distinct staffs for the actions and mindsets that bedraggled the Allies until they finally were able to get air cover across the entire Atlantic Ocean in 1944. This is a gripping account of the Allies’ hard won victory at sea. Anyone who is interested in military history at all of its multiple gratifications across a broad spectrum of politics and strategic decision making will find this well worth reading. Much of Dimbleby’s information is presented in a way that makes you step back and realize how little we really know about the complexities of global warfare. I found his insights into Franklin Roosevelt’s incredible intuition and political awareness some of the most interesting details and observations I have ever read. I learned a great deal about Franklin Roosevelt that I had never known or was never aware of. Roosevelt truly faced a most difficult time as he tried to move the isolationist attitudes that prevailed in the United States at the beginning of WWII into the recognition that the United States could not sit on the sidelines and not be a participant in protecting freedom.
February 10, 2018
Think of a word you’ve never heard of. Well, Dimbleby has an armful. Although entertaining, informative, and fascinating, I grew tired of having to read this and a dictionary at the same time. Being literary for literary’s sake is not clever, and merely distances the reader from the subject. In this case, the subject is a carefully researched and detailed account of possibly the most important battle of world war two. It’s just a shame it has been spoiled by the unnecessary use if overly wordy words!
July 17, 2025
All in all a very competent history of the six-year campaign to secure the vital sea lanes of the North Atlantic. Wait, no, sorry, the vital sea lanes of the South Atlantic, and the West African trades, and the Caribbean, and the Arctic route, and the Mediterranean Sea. *That* is the story which the author explicitly set out to tell, and that objective results in this book being about 75 pages too long. Not surprising for a university press release, Dimbleby was badly in need of an editor.
Apologies for the tangent. This *is* a quality history of the first British, then British and Canadian, and finally British, Canadian, and American victory over Hitler's attempts to sever Britain from its empire and from the eventual American men and materiel that would win the war in the West. It takes both a tactical and a strategic view of this mammoth contest, from the battles within the German Kriegsmarine about how to win the war, not just at sea but in general, to the head-scratching decisions, neither rational in the moment nor defensible to history, within the British high command to delay for years the convoy system and the deployment of long-range combat aviation to the anti-submarine mission, opting instead for isolated voyages and the ineffective high-altitude bombing of German population and industrial centers. Borrowing from extensive personal accounts, above, on, and below the frigid waters of the Atlantic, we see the first-hand narratives of U-boat captains dodging depth charges, destroyer skippers pushing their bobbing craft into the teeth of an attack, and terrified civilians whose ships were just hulled by a German torpedo.
Thousands, indeed tens of thousand, of lives and millions of tons of valuable shipping were lost in this battle. It caused severe hardship on the British people, likely contributed to delays in the decision to land at Normandy, and caused significant, at times nearly fatal, strain to both the transatlantic relationship and the West's relations with Stalin. Victory had many fathers, and depending on who you read you will find singular attribution, but Dimbleby to his credit takes a broad view of who and what deserve credit for turning the tide. An intermixed web of mass-as the Allies finally transitioned to large convoys accompanied by sizable, tactically aggressive escorts; technology-from the breaking of German naval codes to aerial radar and more proficient depth charges and sonar; and airpower-as long-range bombers and carrier-based aviation proved the U-boat's ultimate predator. All ultimately combined to prove decisive.
It is impossible to not consider the denouement of Churchill's speech to the Commons on the Fourth of June, 1940. He bears some personal culpability for the strategic decisions that prolonged the Allied victory in the North Atlantic, but his words were true that day, even as he knew not the full sorrow and challenge that would be required to fulfill them. The empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, carried on the struggle, and finally, in God's good time, the New World, in all her power and might, did step forward to the rescue and liberation of the Old.
Apologies for the tangent. This *is* a quality history of the first British, then British and Canadian, and finally British, Canadian, and American victory over Hitler's attempts to sever Britain from its empire and from the eventual American men and materiel that would win the war in the West. It takes both a tactical and a strategic view of this mammoth contest, from the battles within the German Kriegsmarine about how to win the war, not just at sea but in general, to the head-scratching decisions, neither rational in the moment nor defensible to history, within the British high command to delay for years the convoy system and the deployment of long-range combat aviation to the anti-submarine mission, opting instead for isolated voyages and the ineffective high-altitude bombing of German population and industrial centers. Borrowing from extensive personal accounts, above, on, and below the frigid waters of the Atlantic, we see the first-hand narratives of U-boat captains dodging depth charges, destroyer skippers pushing their bobbing craft into the teeth of an attack, and terrified civilians whose ships were just hulled by a German torpedo.
Thousands, indeed tens of thousand, of lives and millions of tons of valuable shipping were lost in this battle. It caused severe hardship on the British people, likely contributed to delays in the decision to land at Normandy, and caused significant, at times nearly fatal, strain to both the transatlantic relationship and the West's relations with Stalin. Victory had many fathers, and depending on who you read you will find singular attribution, but Dimbleby to his credit takes a broad view of who and what deserve credit for turning the tide. An intermixed web of mass-as the Allies finally transitioned to large convoys accompanied by sizable, tactically aggressive escorts; technology-from the breaking of German naval codes to aerial radar and more proficient depth charges and sonar; and airpower-as long-range bombers and carrier-based aviation proved the U-boat's ultimate predator. All ultimately combined to prove decisive.
It is impossible to not consider the denouement of Churchill's speech to the Commons on the Fourth of June, 1940. He bears some personal culpability for the strategic decisions that prolonged the Allied victory in the North Atlantic, but his words were true that day, even as he knew not the full sorrow and challenge that would be required to fulfill them. The empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, carried on the struggle, and finally, in God's good time, the New World, in all her power and might, did step forward to the rescue and liberation of the Old.
May 4, 2024
All in all a good read for an overarching narrative of the Atlantic War. The book encompasses a wide range of points, covering the ships themselves, the political aspects of the tonnage war, the inter departmental bickering over priorities and also other areas such as the Artic convoys so there's a lot in there including points which are probably less well known. As a starting point for the topic, it's first rate. The focus of the tale is very much on the early war, with it trailing off as the balance of power shifts. That's fine and all but it felt like something was missing as time went on. It would have been nice to hear more from the uboat commanders as they found themselves fighting a hopeless task but then... maybe there's not many first hand accounts because of the life expectancy of the crews?
Side note: the author does the narration for the audio book and I found him to have issues at times. At times he actually said the wrong thing and started again. Quite unusual to not see that edited out. He also felt a bit "wet" at times whilst speaking. Not the worst thing, but after listening to a large number of books, it stood out.
Side note: the author does the narration for the audio book and I found him to have issues at times. At times he actually said the wrong thing and started again. Quite unusual to not see that edited out. He also felt a bit "wet" at times whilst speaking. Not the worst thing, but after listening to a large number of books, it stood out.
June 5, 2023
Dimbleby has written a masterpiece. His book has convinced me that the most crucial campaign of World War II took place not on land but on and under the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans in the fight against the destruction wreaked on Allied shipping by Donitz's U-boats. This book weaves together an insightful analysis of the perplexing failure by Britain and the U.S. to meet this strategic challenge early and directly with eyewitness accounts of the calamities and misery caused on the high seas by these hidden and deadly marauders. By early 1943, the U-boats came perilously close to knocking Britain out of the war (can you imagine?!) and certainly caused considerable delay in the liberation of Europe, prolonging the inestimable suffering of the victims of Nazi occupation. This is the best book I have read concerning the development of Allied strategy in World War II since Max Hastings's Armageddon.
September 4, 2016
Unlike some historians, the author does not confine his coverage to the U-boat narrative, although the Allied campaign against German submarines makes up the bulk of the Atlantic War and this book. He relates in detail the political and as well as military history of the surface battles early in the war which decimated the bulk of the German surface fleet and rendered the remaining fraction irrelevant. Dimbleby also accurately places military events in their political context. For example, Dimbleby relates the stupid and inept attempts Churchill made to attack the Nazis after their invasion of Norway. After another failed attempt in early May 1940 caused a respected retired Admiral in the House of Commons to deliver a blistering attack on the government, to which Chamberlain made a shallow and stupid rebuttal, costing Chamberlain support in the House of Commons and among the people. On May 10, Germany invaded Belgium and within days, Churchill became Prime Minister.
I recommend you skip the Preface (see comments at the end of this review) and go directly to Chapter I where Dimbleby demonstrates the “Phony War” was anything but phony in the Atlantic. Admiral Donitz’s small U-boat fleet sunk a large amount of tonnage, because the British distained operating in convoys, somehow forgetting the hard-won lessons of World War I. Dimbleby shows how it was not only United States Admirals who failed to appreciate the battleships were obsolete – Churchill, Hitler and Reader all caused many military blunders for their slow appreciation that WWII Navies would best consist of submarines, aircraft carriers and their screens.
It was interesting to see how both Churchill and Roosevelt appreciated the strategic significance of the island nation of Iceland [Tom Clancy illustrated this powerfully in what I believe is his best novel, “Red Storm Rising.”] Having failed to convince the government to invade Norway until it was too late, in May 1940 while First Sea Lord, in clear violation of international law, Churchill had the Royal Navy land at Reykjavik, occupy the city, intern the German consul, and garrisoned 25,000 British and Canadian troops. A year later with America still at peace, Roosevelt offered to replace UK troops with American, which Churchill gladly accepted. American troops landed in July and eventually numbered 40,000. Churchill delighted to put his soldiers to other efforts and understood the American decision nudged the reluctant United States closer to war.
I read histories of the Atlantic battles with reluctance because the early years of the war were disastrous for the Allies and Merchant Marine crews. Dimbleby covers this ground in detail and his history and analysis is excellent. The terrible early years of WWII were due in part to the lack of Navy escort ships by both the USN and the Royal Navy, but the death toll on ships and crews continued thru April 1943 because of almost criminal stubbornness by UK and the US military and civilian leaders. A 300 mile wide ‘Atlantic gap’ was fertile harvest ground for German U boats due to the obstinacy of the Allied Air Forces, Roosevelt and Churchill in failing to provide long range bomber coverage in favor of area bombing of mostly civilian targets in Germany. Bombing of municipal areas was shown after the war to be ineffective in shortening the war, and it always had dubious morality. Other terrible decisions in the early years included America’s failure to require a blackout along the Atlantic coast (which back-light targets for submarines) until mid-1942. And somehow both the U S Navy and the Royal Navy failed to remember the importance of the convoy system which cost the Allies hundreds of merchant vessels and thousands of lives. By necessity, any history of the Battle of the Atlantic must focus on the years 1939-1943 where the U boat war came close to starving the United Kingdom, literally. The U boat campaigned turned on a dime in early May 1943 when the Allies finally allotted long range bomber coverage, introduced ‘escort’ aircraft carries and began equipping escort ships with improved and accurate radar. From May 1943 until the end of the war, German submarine commanders went to sea knowing the probability of living thru a single voyage was less than 50%.
Dimbleby is English so the bulk of the book addresses efforts by the Royal Navy. This is not much of a draw-back because the majority of the U-boat campaign was undertaken by the Royal Navy and Canadian Navy.
Excellent book – highly recommended. JHE -9-3-2016 (Kindle Edition)
The Preface: (Written after reading only the Preface) I’ll retain confidence this book will get better. In the Preface, Dimbleby spins out his criticism of the politicians and admirals on both sides for failing to make the perfect decisions only revealed after the war by perfect historical hindsight. He accuses Churchill of almost losing the war by allocation of bombers to German cities when they could have won the Battle of the Atlantic – true enough. Hitler and Raeder were insane, he maintains, for not diverting the entire war production into submarines. What!?! Political and military leaders live and operate in the world of real-politic where conflicting interests are always at odds and all solutions are imperfect compromises. He criticizes Admiral King (USN) for diverting any effort to the Pacific when the U-boat threat in the Atlantic was so critical; seemingly forgetting that the American people wanted Japanese blood after Pearl Harbor and Roosevelt would have undoubtedly been impeached if he’d ignored the Pacific campaign. Many of Dimbleby’s claims in the Preface are simplistically absurd.
I recommend you skip the Preface (see comments at the end of this review) and go directly to Chapter I where Dimbleby demonstrates the “Phony War” was anything but phony in the Atlantic. Admiral Donitz’s small U-boat fleet sunk a large amount of tonnage, because the British distained operating in convoys, somehow forgetting the hard-won lessons of World War I. Dimbleby shows how it was not only United States Admirals who failed to appreciate the battleships were obsolete – Churchill, Hitler and Reader all caused many military blunders for their slow appreciation that WWII Navies would best consist of submarines, aircraft carriers and their screens.
It was interesting to see how both Churchill and Roosevelt appreciated the strategic significance of the island nation of Iceland [Tom Clancy illustrated this powerfully in what I believe is his best novel, “Red Storm Rising.”] Having failed to convince the government to invade Norway until it was too late, in May 1940 while First Sea Lord, in clear violation of international law, Churchill had the Royal Navy land at Reykjavik, occupy the city, intern the German consul, and garrisoned 25,000 British and Canadian troops. A year later with America still at peace, Roosevelt offered to replace UK troops with American, which Churchill gladly accepted. American troops landed in July and eventually numbered 40,000. Churchill delighted to put his soldiers to other efforts and understood the American decision nudged the reluctant United States closer to war.
I read histories of the Atlantic battles with reluctance because the early years of the war were disastrous for the Allies and Merchant Marine crews. Dimbleby covers this ground in detail and his history and analysis is excellent. The terrible early years of WWII were due in part to the lack of Navy escort ships by both the USN and the Royal Navy, but the death toll on ships and crews continued thru April 1943 because of almost criminal stubbornness by UK and the US military and civilian leaders. A 300 mile wide ‘Atlantic gap’ was fertile harvest ground for German U boats due to the obstinacy of the Allied Air Forces, Roosevelt and Churchill in failing to provide long range bomber coverage in favor of area bombing of mostly civilian targets in Germany. Bombing of municipal areas was shown after the war to be ineffective in shortening the war, and it always had dubious morality. Other terrible decisions in the early years included America’s failure to require a blackout along the Atlantic coast (which back-light targets for submarines) until mid-1942. And somehow both the U S Navy and the Royal Navy failed to remember the importance of the convoy system which cost the Allies hundreds of merchant vessels and thousands of lives. By necessity, any history of the Battle of the Atlantic must focus on the years 1939-1943 where the U boat war came close to starving the United Kingdom, literally. The U boat campaigned turned on a dime in early May 1943 when the Allies finally allotted long range bomber coverage, introduced ‘escort’ aircraft carries and began equipping escort ships with improved and accurate radar. From May 1943 until the end of the war, German submarine commanders went to sea knowing the probability of living thru a single voyage was less than 50%.
Dimbleby is English so the bulk of the book addresses efforts by the Royal Navy. This is not much of a draw-back because the majority of the U-boat campaign was undertaken by the Royal Navy and Canadian Navy.
Excellent book – highly recommended. JHE -9-3-2016 (Kindle Edition)
The Preface: (Written after reading only the Preface) I’ll retain confidence this book will get better. In the Preface, Dimbleby spins out his criticism of the politicians and admirals on both sides for failing to make the perfect decisions only revealed after the war by perfect historical hindsight. He accuses Churchill of almost losing the war by allocation of bombers to German cities when they could have won the Battle of the Atlantic – true enough. Hitler and Raeder were insane, he maintains, for not diverting the entire war production into submarines. What!?! Political and military leaders live and operate in the world of real-politic where conflicting interests are always at odds and all solutions are imperfect compromises. He criticizes Admiral King (USN) for diverting any effort to the Pacific when the U-boat threat in the Atlantic was so critical; seemingly forgetting that the American people wanted Japanese blood after Pearl Harbor and Roosevelt would have undoubtedly been impeached if he’d ignored the Pacific campaign. Many of Dimbleby’s claims in the Preface are simplistically absurd.
October 29, 2021
No single book can capture the full scope of the Battle of the Atlantic, but Dimbleby certainly tried. My biggest takeaway from the book was that the greatest enemy in this battle for the Royal Navy was the Royal Air Force! Air Marshal “Bomber” Harris and his boss, Air Marshal Portal, kept the Royal Navy and Coastal Command from having very long range bombers to attack the U-Boats until May 1943. Once sufficient bombers were made available, the massacre of cargo ships stopped and the massacre of U-Boats started. At the end of the war, of the 38,000 U-Boat crewman who went to sea, 30,000 of them died!
August 16, 2020
Excellent assessment of one of the most poorly appreciated theatres of World War 2.
September 2, 2022
Picked up this book on a recommendation from The Duchess of Cornwall's Reading Room. This is an engaging narrative of the war on the high seas and the personalities involved on both sides.
October 31, 2020
Both Winston Churchhill and Franklin Roosevelt (once Roosevelt saw the immediacy of coming to the aid and support of Britain in the war against the Nazis) made a remarkable strategical and tactical mistake, a mistake which likely prolonged WWII even after the U.S. officially entered the War after the December 7, 1941 bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese government.
Churchill had repeatedly been beseeched by Lord Pound of the Admiralty to provide adequate air cover for the Royal Naval escorts that plied the Atlantic together with merchant vessels bringing goods and military personnel to Britain from America and other points, including support of the Russian defense against the Nazi invasion. Nazi U Boats were sinking both military and merchant ships at a rate that caused the supply line to evaporate. British losses in the Atlantic were measurable and were not good: In the first 3 months of 1940, more than 1Millions tonnage of commodities, imports, and merchandise, not to mention people, were sent to the bottom of the Atlantic. Admiral Donitz, late in the War named by Hitler to become the second Nazi Fuhrer destined to succeed Hitler when his demise occurred, had successfully implored Hitler to increase the U Boat presence in the Atlantic relying on the successes wrought in demolishing these Allied supply lines. Donitz and Roosevelt both also knew Britain had a money problem. At the start of 1940, Britain had about 2Billion pounds left in its Treasury. This motivated Churchill to implore Roosevelt to produce war materials and give them to Britain on credit, the initial overture that resulted in Lend-Lease, an obvious creation of Wall Street lawyers and New York financial savvy.
Added to all of this was the disastrous decision not to bomb the home port for German U-Boat while its impenetrable underwater mooring site at Lorient. This homeport provided at Lorient was so well built that when the Allies finally decided to destroy it, the task was impossible even with repeated Allied bombings. After the war, it was concluded that this impenetrable underwater fortress housing U Boats undergoing maintenance and repair could easily have been destroyed had the Allied bombings occurred during construction.
Churchill's mistake, joined by Roosevelt, was that both saw the air war as the condition required to end Nazi dominion of Europe. Both Britain and the US believed domination of Germany meant the obliteration of German cities and strategic sits along the Ruhr and German ports located in the North Atlantic. The case made to the leaders resounded in the highest echelons of the American and British councils. The critical mistake, though, a mistake that Dimbleby succeeds in making, was that both Churchhill and Roosevelt saw protection of the convoys as a defensive measure while both believed bombing German strategic sites and cities was an offensive measure, and militarily, being on offense was a sign that the war was being won. What they and their war councilors failed to understand was that air protection of the sea lanes permitted the Allies to be on the offensive, since without the strategic materials required for supplying the soldiers, the nation, and production, neither nation could produce military supplies, equipment, and transport them to Europe where they were required to conduct an offense.
Britain got the benefit of an own goal, through a major military mistake made by Adolph Hitler. Gross Admiral Erich Raeder and Admiral Karl Donitz remained continually at odds, each seeking to ascend the other in the attention and affection of the Fuhrer. Raeder, against the protests to Hitler by Donitz, was able to convince Hitler that U-Boat production should be limited in favor of other naval needs, a strategic error of significant proportion early in the Atlantic naval operations. The U-Boats were successful beyond anyone's calculations but Raeder convinced Hitler that production of U-Boats should be limited to 25 per year. Had Hitler granted Donitz's requests the number of U-Boats which could be produced and put to sea quickly would have starved Britain into capitulation.
It remains a mystery to me why Churchill and Roosevelt, and the military leaders could not see this, and the sad fact is that hundreds of thousands of lives and millions of pounds of tonnage were lost until Roosevelt and Churchill recognized this vital need. Dimbleby's case is well presented, fact-based, and evaluation of military strategy sound.
The success of the U Boats and the submariners who manned them were impressive. What is impressive is that every submariner knew that the likelihood of them surviving the War was small. By the end of WWII, of the 38,000 submariners in the Nazi UBoat service, more than 30,000 of them had died at sea or in conflicts at sea by depth charge or an inability to submerge quickly. For a couple of years during the early 1940s, UBoat activity along the Atlantic seaboard from Boston to Key West sunk more than 400 vessels. U-boats were just a few offshore, and not even pleas from the White House were able to get businesses and municipalities along the Eastern seaboard to turn off their lights at night to prevent German watchers from observing activities along the shore. The U-boats were that close that the lights from amusement parks from New Jersey through Florida provided illumination permitting UBoats to successfully complete their deadly missions. Even Donitz remarked the ease with which German U-Boats plowed the eastern seaboard of the US from Atlantic City and the Florida Keys, picking off naval and merchant vessels without contest.
There also were two other occurrences that shaped the Atlantic sea battles. Early in their engagement with the Nazis, the German code machine was captured from a sunken German vessel. The well-known work of the Bletchley Park codebreakers made a significant difference early in the sea battles, but directly the Admiralty's tracking of German scores against British merchant, corvettes, battle carriers, and other ships were being met with U Boat attacks almost immediately when those vessels reached the Artic and Atlantic shipping lanes. Dimbleby lays it out for the reader so clearly that it is hard to avoid recognizing that the German codebreakers had cracked British encrypted signals giving them, if not the upper hand, at least a leveling of the significance of the Enigma find. Once the British realized that their codes had been cracked, they modified their signals, and slowly began to take a forceful hand at sea.
A third factor--perhaps the most subtle and maybe most important next to the late but ultimate decision to provide air support to the convoys--was the improvement in radar available to Allied naval and merchant ships at sea. By Spring 1943, a device known as the Metox 600 was in use giving destroyers and other battlecruisers the ability to detect U-Boat conning towers 12 miles away, giving the Allies, for the first time, the opportunity to wage war at sea as the aggressor and not simply the object of U-Boat destruction. This, more than anything else, seems to have given the Allies the superiority to reduce UBoat efficacy and the ability to destroy them. By late 1944, Admiral Donitz who governed the UBoat operations and held the submariners is the highest esteem, had begun to wonder whether the UBoats would ever be able to sink another Allied vessel or whether the German ability to manufacture UBoats at an unbelievable rate made any difference. As fast as the German U-boats and battleships slipped off the way, they were being sunk.
Because Churchill and Roosevelt finally recognized the "offensive" nature of protecting the merchant ships and convoys, US production of military goods and exports were reaching Britain in record amounts and paved the way for the June 1944 Overlord operation at D Day. With the way clear across the Atlantic and through the Arctic and Mediterranean into North Africa, supplies and military procurement were finding their ways to Russia and North Africa where Rommel's Afrika Corps was finally put down after an unparalleled and seemingly unchallenged run of successes. With the D-Day invasion in sight, the end of the War in Europe was envisioned.
Dimbleby is a BBC "presenter" as the BBC calls them and is known in Britain for his political discussions and presentations. The son of a war correspondent, Dimbleby writes with sensitivity and empathy for the brave sailors of the Allied and British naval and merchant marine services, and the submariners in the German U-Boat service. His descriptions of men clamoring in the icy waters of the Atlantic and Arctic, and the respect shown by personnel at sea for their adversaries kept me reading raptly. Having an ability to display that empathy requires an understanding well beyond the intensive research in naval archives required to write a 460 history with an additional 80 or so pages of endnotes and bibliography. The completion took me a while because I was constantly looking to the endnotes and reviewing the bibliography for clues to his research and conclusions.
I found this a remarkable history which opened for me, the son of a WWII naval intelligence operative, the door to a better understanding of war, but also the tough and sometimes miserable work men and women at sea--even when not at war--must endure securing our society. Life at sea is tough even in the best of circumstances. Life at sea during wartime is perilous, lonely, dangerous, and unpredictable at all times. Dimbleby sensitized me to this, and reading this book made me better understand a lot of things that are not always explainable.
It also illustrated what I believe to be the folly of Churchill's decision-making. Dimbleby makes the case well that Churchill was aligned with his Air Corps leadership because he believed that bombing German cities, civilians, and strategic sites would demonstrate beyond doubt the resolve of the British people to defeat Nazism on its own terms. He lost sight of the fact that when the merchant fleet and convoy escorts together with the 33,000 members of the Merchant Navy are lost at sea with their millions of tons of commodities, supplies, and foodstuffs, producing 6,000 new fighter aircraft is meaningless if the fuel is not available to fuel the bombing runs. And, because of the early U-Boat destruction, the effort was held up until good strategic sense was able to prevail.
Churchill had repeatedly been beseeched by Lord Pound of the Admiralty to provide adequate air cover for the Royal Naval escorts that plied the Atlantic together with merchant vessels bringing goods and military personnel to Britain from America and other points, including support of the Russian defense against the Nazi invasion. Nazi U Boats were sinking both military and merchant ships at a rate that caused the supply line to evaporate. British losses in the Atlantic were measurable and were not good: In the first 3 months of 1940, more than 1Millions tonnage of commodities, imports, and merchandise, not to mention people, were sent to the bottom of the Atlantic. Admiral Donitz, late in the War named by Hitler to become the second Nazi Fuhrer destined to succeed Hitler when his demise occurred, had successfully implored Hitler to increase the U Boat presence in the Atlantic relying on the successes wrought in demolishing these Allied supply lines. Donitz and Roosevelt both also knew Britain had a money problem. At the start of 1940, Britain had about 2Billion pounds left in its Treasury. This motivated Churchill to implore Roosevelt to produce war materials and give them to Britain on credit, the initial overture that resulted in Lend-Lease, an obvious creation of Wall Street lawyers and New York financial savvy.
Added to all of this was the disastrous decision not to bomb the home port for German U-Boat while its impenetrable underwater mooring site at Lorient. This homeport provided at Lorient was so well built that when the Allies finally decided to destroy it, the task was impossible even with repeated Allied bombings. After the war, it was concluded that this impenetrable underwater fortress housing U Boats undergoing maintenance and repair could easily have been destroyed had the Allied bombings occurred during construction.
Churchill's mistake, joined by Roosevelt, was that both saw the air war as the condition required to end Nazi dominion of Europe. Both Britain and the US believed domination of Germany meant the obliteration of German cities and strategic sits along the Ruhr and German ports located in the North Atlantic. The case made to the leaders resounded in the highest echelons of the American and British councils. The critical mistake, though, a mistake that Dimbleby succeeds in making, was that both Churchhill and Roosevelt saw protection of the convoys as a defensive measure while both believed bombing German strategic sites and cities was an offensive measure, and militarily, being on offense was a sign that the war was being won. What they and their war councilors failed to understand was that air protection of the sea lanes permitted the Allies to be on the offensive, since without the strategic materials required for supplying the soldiers, the nation, and production, neither nation could produce military supplies, equipment, and transport them to Europe where they were required to conduct an offense.
Britain got the benefit of an own goal, through a major military mistake made by Adolph Hitler. Gross Admiral Erich Raeder and Admiral Karl Donitz remained continually at odds, each seeking to ascend the other in the attention and affection of the Fuhrer. Raeder, against the protests to Hitler by Donitz, was able to convince Hitler that U-Boat production should be limited in favor of other naval needs, a strategic error of significant proportion early in the Atlantic naval operations. The U-Boats were successful beyond anyone's calculations but Raeder convinced Hitler that production of U-Boats should be limited to 25 per year. Had Hitler granted Donitz's requests the number of U-Boats which could be produced and put to sea quickly would have starved Britain into capitulation.
It remains a mystery to me why Churchill and Roosevelt, and the military leaders could not see this, and the sad fact is that hundreds of thousands of lives and millions of pounds of tonnage were lost until Roosevelt and Churchill recognized this vital need. Dimbleby's case is well presented, fact-based, and evaluation of military strategy sound.
The success of the U Boats and the submariners who manned them were impressive. What is impressive is that every submariner knew that the likelihood of them surviving the War was small. By the end of WWII, of the 38,000 submariners in the Nazi UBoat service, more than 30,000 of them had died at sea or in conflicts at sea by depth charge or an inability to submerge quickly. For a couple of years during the early 1940s, UBoat activity along the Atlantic seaboard from Boston to Key West sunk more than 400 vessels. U-boats were just a few offshore, and not even pleas from the White House were able to get businesses and municipalities along the Eastern seaboard to turn off their lights at night to prevent German watchers from observing activities along the shore. The U-boats were that close that the lights from amusement parks from New Jersey through Florida provided illumination permitting UBoats to successfully complete their deadly missions. Even Donitz remarked the ease with which German U-Boats plowed the eastern seaboard of the US from Atlantic City and the Florida Keys, picking off naval and merchant vessels without contest.
There also were two other occurrences that shaped the Atlantic sea battles. Early in their engagement with the Nazis, the German code machine was captured from a sunken German vessel. The well-known work of the Bletchley Park codebreakers made a significant difference early in the sea battles, but directly the Admiralty's tracking of German scores against British merchant, corvettes, battle carriers, and other ships were being met with U Boat attacks almost immediately when those vessels reached the Artic and Atlantic shipping lanes. Dimbleby lays it out for the reader so clearly that it is hard to avoid recognizing that the German codebreakers had cracked British encrypted signals giving them, if not the upper hand, at least a leveling of the significance of the Enigma find. Once the British realized that their codes had been cracked, they modified their signals, and slowly began to take a forceful hand at sea.
A third factor--perhaps the most subtle and maybe most important next to the late but ultimate decision to provide air support to the convoys--was the improvement in radar available to Allied naval and merchant ships at sea. By Spring 1943, a device known as the Metox 600 was in use giving destroyers and other battlecruisers the ability to detect U-Boat conning towers 12 miles away, giving the Allies, for the first time, the opportunity to wage war at sea as the aggressor and not simply the object of U-Boat destruction. This, more than anything else, seems to have given the Allies the superiority to reduce UBoat efficacy and the ability to destroy them. By late 1944, Admiral Donitz who governed the UBoat operations and held the submariners is the highest esteem, had begun to wonder whether the UBoats would ever be able to sink another Allied vessel or whether the German ability to manufacture UBoats at an unbelievable rate made any difference. As fast as the German U-boats and battleships slipped off the way, they were being sunk.
Because Churchill and Roosevelt finally recognized the "offensive" nature of protecting the merchant ships and convoys, US production of military goods and exports were reaching Britain in record amounts and paved the way for the June 1944 Overlord operation at D Day. With the way clear across the Atlantic and through the Arctic and Mediterranean into North Africa, supplies and military procurement were finding their ways to Russia and North Africa where Rommel's Afrika Corps was finally put down after an unparalleled and seemingly unchallenged run of successes. With the D-Day invasion in sight, the end of the War in Europe was envisioned.
Dimbleby is a BBC "presenter" as the BBC calls them and is known in Britain for his political discussions and presentations. The son of a war correspondent, Dimbleby writes with sensitivity and empathy for the brave sailors of the Allied and British naval and merchant marine services, and the submariners in the German U-Boat service. His descriptions of men clamoring in the icy waters of the Atlantic and Arctic, and the respect shown by personnel at sea for their adversaries kept me reading raptly. Having an ability to display that empathy requires an understanding well beyond the intensive research in naval archives required to write a 460 history with an additional 80 or so pages of endnotes and bibliography. The completion took me a while because I was constantly looking to the endnotes and reviewing the bibliography for clues to his research and conclusions.
I found this a remarkable history which opened for me, the son of a WWII naval intelligence operative, the door to a better understanding of war, but also the tough and sometimes miserable work men and women at sea--even when not at war--must endure securing our society. Life at sea is tough even in the best of circumstances. Life at sea during wartime is perilous, lonely, dangerous, and unpredictable at all times. Dimbleby sensitized me to this, and reading this book made me better understand a lot of things that are not always explainable.
It also illustrated what I believe to be the folly of Churchill's decision-making. Dimbleby makes the case well that Churchill was aligned with his Air Corps leadership because he believed that bombing German cities, civilians, and strategic sites would demonstrate beyond doubt the resolve of the British people to defeat Nazism on its own terms. He lost sight of the fact that when the merchant fleet and convoy escorts together with the 33,000 members of the Merchant Navy are lost at sea with their millions of tons of commodities, supplies, and foodstuffs, producing 6,000 new fighter aircraft is meaningless if the fuel is not available to fuel the bombing runs. And, because of the early U-Boat destruction, the effort was held up until good strategic sense was able to prevail.
May 2, 2025
I really enjoyed reading this very informative book about the long-drawn battle that was valiantly fought above and below the bitterly cold, cold waves of the Atlantic and North Sea from the very first day of World War II by the brave men and women on both sides
However, the reason I have not given it five stars is that I had just read Simon Parkin's excellent book "A Game of Birds and Wolves:
The Ingenious Young Women
Whose Secret Board Game
Helped Win World War Il" and I was shocked finding barely a mention made of the hard work of thousands of WRENs plotting convoy and U-boat movements day and night; a couple photos barely explained in the caption and random mentions of "Western Approaches" without delving into the literally deep depths of their installations and organisation, and their crucial work devising ways to improve cohesion between the ships escorting the convoys to triangulate on submarines, then teaching those methods to hundreds of captains in a valuable way, the fine points of why ASDIC was imperfect and the life or death duels between Coastal Command's lone planes (at the beginning of their campaign, before it was FINALLY understood that greater numbers of planes keeping uninterrupted cover could harass the U-boats into uselessness) and U-boats that stayed on the surface to fight back.
Even the shocking tactic developed by daring submarine commanders of attacking from within the convoy by letting it pass overhead is barely mentioned for what it meant in lost shipping, nor when it was discovered and countered.
What else didn't make it into this book?
However, the reason I have not given it five stars is that I had just read Simon Parkin's excellent book "A Game of Birds and Wolves:
The Ingenious Young Women
Whose Secret Board Game
Helped Win World War Il" and I was shocked finding barely a mention made of the hard work of thousands of WRENs plotting convoy and U-boat movements day and night; a couple photos barely explained in the caption and random mentions of "Western Approaches" without delving into the literally deep depths of their installations and organisation, and their crucial work devising ways to improve cohesion between the ships escorting the convoys to triangulate on submarines, then teaching those methods to hundreds of captains in a valuable way, the fine points of why ASDIC was imperfect and the life or death duels between Coastal Command's lone planes (at the beginning of their campaign, before it was FINALLY understood that greater numbers of planes keeping uninterrupted cover could harass the U-boats into uselessness) and U-boats that stayed on the surface to fight back.
Even the shocking tactic developed by daring submarine commanders of attacking from within the convoy by letting it pass overhead is barely mentioned for what it meant in lost shipping, nor when it was discovered and countered.
What else didn't make it into this book?
January 23, 2019
This is a very well researched book on a subject that has been extensively written about, but not from this point of view. Beyond general knowledge I first read about the battle for the Western Approaches as a lad when I read Nicholas Monsarrat’s excellent book The Cruel Sea which like most books was based upon personal accounts of the terror and horror of the U boat war in arctic waters. Dimbleby’s book certainly covers that but foremost it is an analysis of Strategy and a pretty thorough one at that. He includes German reports to balance Allied reports of specific events and, more importantly command level views from both sides. Critically this demonstrates the challenge for war leaders in making decisions with incomplete intelligence, with the gaps filled with best-guessing, knowing that lives depend on it.
Where I find myself at odds with Dimbleby is in his opinion of the performance of the three main Allied war leaders evolving strategies. It is almost like he considers their individual situations as equal. He is easy on Stalin, lukewarm on FDR and pretty critical of Churchill. He basically argues the majority of the naval effort should have been invested into protecting the supply routes through the Atlantic against the U Boats and implies that Churchill’s failure to do this cost around 600,000 tons of sunken shipping per month for three years.
He does not consider that the three leaders each had different strategies because although they shared a common enemy they each had a different end-game for their Nation and no matter how challenging their problems Churchill’s were by far the most complex. Stalin came into the war late having signed a pact early with Hitler and when attacked by Hilter (Barbarosa) his focus was singular, the defence of Russia. FDR was isolationist until slowly Churchill dragged the USA into the war through Lend/Lease then after Pearl Harbour the Europe First Strategy. Britain on the other hand had multiple strategies including the defence of Britain, the supply route across the Atlantic, Malta protecting operations in Egypt without which Suez would fall and provide free access to the Far East and the dominions, and Treaty with Greece which was no less disastrous than Britain’s treaty with France from a military point of view, but had to be honoured. Further, strategies shift over time. Churchill could not have known that Russia would ultimately be drawn into the War and when it did much of Britain’s war supplies would need to be deflected to Russia. The fact that the war ended with Britain and Europe saved and Germany/Japan/Italy conquered shows that ultimately the strategies were correct. Undoubtedly it would have been better to have achieved that quicker with less loss of life however that is easy in retrospect. Churchill was constantly making these decisions with incomplete information and extremely limited resources. Dimbleby even points out that the game-changer in the U boat war was the technical developments in 1944 before which additional aircraft and ships would not have made a substantial difference. The failure in strategy was entirely Hitler’s first in invading Russia before finishing off Britain and second in focusing so much effort into the surface fleet instead of U boats.
Despite my slight reservations of Dimbleby’s treatment of Churchill there were some new insights for me on this complex campaign. A good read and I commend this book to you.
Where I find myself at odds with Dimbleby is in his opinion of the performance of the three main Allied war leaders evolving strategies. It is almost like he considers their individual situations as equal. He is easy on Stalin, lukewarm on FDR and pretty critical of Churchill. He basically argues the majority of the naval effort should have been invested into protecting the supply routes through the Atlantic against the U Boats and implies that Churchill’s failure to do this cost around 600,000 tons of sunken shipping per month for three years.
He does not consider that the three leaders each had different strategies because although they shared a common enemy they each had a different end-game for their Nation and no matter how challenging their problems Churchill’s were by far the most complex. Stalin came into the war late having signed a pact early with Hitler and when attacked by Hilter (Barbarosa) his focus was singular, the defence of Russia. FDR was isolationist until slowly Churchill dragged the USA into the war through Lend/Lease then after Pearl Harbour the Europe First Strategy. Britain on the other hand had multiple strategies including the defence of Britain, the supply route across the Atlantic, Malta protecting operations in Egypt without which Suez would fall and provide free access to the Far East and the dominions, and Treaty with Greece which was no less disastrous than Britain’s treaty with France from a military point of view, but had to be honoured. Further, strategies shift over time. Churchill could not have known that Russia would ultimately be drawn into the War and when it did much of Britain’s war supplies would need to be deflected to Russia. The fact that the war ended with Britain and Europe saved and Germany/Japan/Italy conquered shows that ultimately the strategies were correct. Undoubtedly it would have been better to have achieved that quicker with less loss of life however that is easy in retrospect. Churchill was constantly making these decisions with incomplete information and extremely limited resources. Dimbleby even points out that the game-changer in the U boat war was the technical developments in 1944 before which additional aircraft and ships would not have made a substantial difference. The failure in strategy was entirely Hitler’s first in invading Russia before finishing off Britain and second in focusing so much effort into the surface fleet instead of U boats.
Despite my slight reservations of Dimbleby’s treatment of Churchill there were some new insights for me on this complex campaign. A good read and I commend this book to you.
April 2, 2016
One of a large collection of retrospectives on World War II that prove extremely valuable -- even if you think that you know the story of submarines vs. destroyers during the war. It provides a more-detailed analysis of the strategic and tactical decisions than histories written by participants immediately after the war. The sub-title of this book could well have been "How the Allies Lost the War", had different choices been made on either side.
Dimbleby makes it clear that portions of the close-run disaster in keeping shipping lanes open to England happened because of English, rather than German mistakes. The Naval Ministry -- run by Churchill at the very start of the conflict -- refused to organized ships into convoys, resulting in a larger loss of shipping than necessary. Nor did the British provide adequate air coverage to merchant shipping. Those were only a pair of the many mistakes made in the early days of the war. I'll leave the others and the reasoning behind the often selfish blunders to the prospective reader.
The author also makes the point that German failure to adequately build submarines for the war limited the effectiveness of their campaign. Again, strategic decisions at the top were the reason. But the Germans also shared a problem that American submariners would have early in the war: torpedoes that failed to explode. Failures of German torpedoes during the Norwegian campaign meant a British battleship and six troopships were unharmed and the author notes that "had they done so, it is hard to imagine that Churchill would have survived the political storm which would have followed the demise of another great battleship on his watch" (as First Lord of the Admiralty).
The book tracks the war chronologically, so we the changes in tactics and strategy can be appreciated. The author is highly critical of the management of long-range bombers which could have been used to save merchant shipping years before it was finally deployed correctly. The excuse was the attraction of using bombers to attack the enemy: "Like almost all their political and military lieutenants, both Western leaders had been imprisoned by a false distinction between 'offence' and 'defence,'" Dimpleby writes.
Maps and pictures in the book are well-selected but this is one story where charts of month-by-month losses; categories of ships lost; U boats deployed, would be among the data that would be valuable to the reader.
Dimbleby makes it clear that portions of the close-run disaster in keeping shipping lanes open to England happened because of English, rather than German mistakes. The Naval Ministry -- run by Churchill at the very start of the conflict -- refused to organized ships into convoys, resulting in a larger loss of shipping than necessary. Nor did the British provide adequate air coverage to merchant shipping. Those were only a pair of the many mistakes made in the early days of the war. I'll leave the others and the reasoning behind the often selfish blunders to the prospective reader.
The author also makes the point that German failure to adequately build submarines for the war limited the effectiveness of their campaign. Again, strategic decisions at the top were the reason. But the Germans also shared a problem that American submariners would have early in the war: torpedoes that failed to explode. Failures of German torpedoes during the Norwegian campaign meant a British battleship and six troopships were unharmed and the author notes that "had they done so, it is hard to imagine that Churchill would have survived the political storm which would have followed the demise of another great battleship on his watch" (as First Lord of the Admiralty).
The book tracks the war chronologically, so we the changes in tactics and strategy can be appreciated. The author is highly critical of the management of long-range bombers which could have been used to save merchant shipping years before it was finally deployed correctly. The excuse was the attraction of using bombers to attack the enemy: "Like almost all their political and military lieutenants, both Western leaders had been imprisoned by a false distinction between 'offence' and 'defence,'" Dimpleby writes.
Maps and pictures in the book are well-selected but this is one story where charts of month-by-month losses; categories of ships lost; U boats deployed, would be among the data that would be valuable to the reader.
January 15, 2018
A very detailed account of this pivotal battle (war-long battle really) that went a long way, at least in Dimbleby's assessment, to deciding the war. I think the case is fairly well made, but I have studied this arena of WW2 and I was familiar with the closeness that Germany came to winning this battle and the sacrifices made my men on both sides who fought it. "The Cruel Sea" remains one of my favorite books.
This is a book well worth reading since this battle has probably not been given the recognition it deserves in the annals of ww2 history, perhaps because it went on so long and was very much a war of attrition that was eventually, and narrowly won by the allies with improvements in technology and tactics as well as increased machinery available. The most revealing element to me was probably the fact that there was a considerable debate between the Admiralty and Bomber command about the use of aircraft (u-boat patrols vs. bombing of Germany). It was clear that Arthur Harris was much more persuasive in his desire for large raids on German cities than the First Lord of the Admiralty was in his aims. This cost the Allies significant men and ships and the tide very much turned when long range aircraft became available.
I very much enjoyed the book and it added to my knowledge of, and interest in this battle. There was a lot on the ebb and flow of which side had the upper hand at any given time and that balance seemed to shift quite dramatically in 1943. There was good coverage of the relationships between the Allies as well as that between the main protagonists on the German side. Doenitz seems to have been dedicated, but particularly unpleasant character, very much a Hitler loyalist. An interesting account indeed, well written too.
This is a book well worth reading since this battle has probably not been given the recognition it deserves in the annals of ww2 history, perhaps because it went on so long and was very much a war of attrition that was eventually, and narrowly won by the allies with improvements in technology and tactics as well as increased machinery available. The most revealing element to me was probably the fact that there was a considerable debate between the Admiralty and Bomber command about the use of aircraft (u-boat patrols vs. bombing of Germany). It was clear that Arthur Harris was much more persuasive in his desire for large raids on German cities than the First Lord of the Admiralty was in his aims. This cost the Allies significant men and ships and the tide very much turned when long range aircraft became available.
I very much enjoyed the book and it added to my knowledge of, and interest in this battle. There was a lot on the ebb and flow of which side had the upper hand at any given time and that balance seemed to shift quite dramatically in 1943. There was good coverage of the relationships between the Allies as well as that between the main protagonists on the German side. Doenitz seems to have been dedicated, but particularly unpleasant character, very much a Hitler loyalist. An interesting account indeed, well written too.
January 4, 2018
The longest campaign of the Second World War and the most destructive naval campaign in all history. more than 3,000 merchant ships were sunk in the Atlantic and more than 30,000 seamen died. On the German side, some 27,000 officers and crew died or 75% of those who went to war.
A very readable account of the battle to maintain the the supply of food, oil, and war materials to Great Britain and Russia. While the emphasis was on bombing Germany, maintaining a presence in the Mediterranean and subsequently invading North Africa, then Italy and eventually the Normandy landing, none of this could have happened if the toll that the U boats were having on shipping to Great Britain, Iceland and Russia had not been reduced and finally marginalized.
While Churchill is frequently cited as championing the demands of the Battle of the Atlantic, his actions frequently emphasized other aspects of the war effort, including bombing of German cities and military targets. The battle was won by improved strategy, including improvements in the use of conveys, technical developments permitting the discovery and tracking of submarines, the sharp increases in the production of merchant ships, naval vessels, airplanes and submarines.
One aspect that I was surprised by was the disregard of basic security measures along the eastern seaboard of the United States when there was no dimming of lights so that the ships steaming north along the coast were targets for the German submarines. Apparently, the seaside business was more important.
A very readable account of the battle to maintain the the supply of food, oil, and war materials to Great Britain and Russia. While the emphasis was on bombing Germany, maintaining a presence in the Mediterranean and subsequently invading North Africa, then Italy and eventually the Normandy landing, none of this could have happened if the toll that the U boats were having on shipping to Great Britain, Iceland and Russia had not been reduced and finally marginalized.
While Churchill is frequently cited as championing the demands of the Battle of the Atlantic, his actions frequently emphasized other aspects of the war effort, including bombing of German cities and military targets. The battle was won by improved strategy, including improvements in the use of conveys, technical developments permitting the discovery and tracking of submarines, the sharp increases in the production of merchant ships, naval vessels, airplanes and submarines.
One aspect that I was surprised by was the disregard of basic security measures along the eastern seaboard of the United States when there was no dimming of lights so that the ships steaming north along the coast were targets for the German submarines. Apparently, the seaside business was more important.
December 30, 2018
A very readable account of the U boat menace and its threat to the Allied war effort in Europe. Very much in the style of popular war histories.
The positive aspects of the book are the obvious extensive use of biographies of those involved, and the very good efforts to place the campaign in its political and strategic context.
The downsides of the book are that it is highly opinionated and largely ignores objective data except on tonnage or lives lost.
Most participants are labelled as either good or bad based on whether they contributed to more resources being thrown into the U boat war (good), or not (bad). Some time is given to the competing strategic perspectives of Harris or King, but mainly as a platform to demonise them with personal attacks. Bizarrely Doenitz almost becomes a “good” Nazi through this simplistic weighing. The subjectivity reaches a crescendo in the last chapter which is substantially off topic.
Although the contribution of analytical techniques (operations research is never given its name), very long range planes and the development of location technologies are mentioned, we are given little explanation about the development of these crucial elements in the battle. They simply appear. More photos portraying these elements, and ideally graphical displays illustrating the progress of the battle, were sorely needed.
Overall the book is interesting, but also a bit annoying for its conscious subjectivity.
The positive aspects of the book are the obvious extensive use of biographies of those involved, and the very good efforts to place the campaign in its political and strategic context.
The downsides of the book are that it is highly opinionated and largely ignores objective data except on tonnage or lives lost.
Most participants are labelled as either good or bad based on whether they contributed to more resources being thrown into the U boat war (good), or not (bad). Some time is given to the competing strategic perspectives of Harris or King, but mainly as a platform to demonise them with personal attacks. Bizarrely Doenitz almost becomes a “good” Nazi through this simplistic weighing. The subjectivity reaches a crescendo in the last chapter which is substantially off topic.
Although the contribution of analytical techniques (operations research is never given its name), very long range planes and the development of location technologies are mentioned, we are given little explanation about the development of these crucial elements in the battle. They simply appear. More photos portraying these elements, and ideally graphical displays illustrating the progress of the battle, were sorely needed.
Overall the book is interesting, but also a bit annoying for its conscious subjectivity.
November 6, 2016
Fascinating book about the crucial "tonnage war." Dimbleby makes a good case that the Battle of the Atlantic was the crucial factor in defeating the Nazis. The vital supply lines across the Atlantic were what kept Britain able to fend off the Germans and keep the allies from defeat during the early years of the war - keeping Britain supplied with food and war materials. The book describes the turf wars between the British Admiralty and Bomber Command over the supply of long range bombers. Dimbleby portrays Churchill as a powerful war leader except for his conviction that the terror bombing of German cities was the key to winning the war, thus depriving the Atlantic convoys of needed air protection from Donitz' fleet of U-boats. This was Churchill's Achilles heel and Sir Arthur Harris, head of Bomber Command, was a much more persuasive advocate than Pound, the head of the Admiralty. Finally in May of 1943 when long-range bombers were finally freed to protect the convoys the situation changed dramatically and the tide of the war changed in the allies' favor, but not before massive losses of men and materials. Donitz' own role in the turf wars with Admiral Raeder over the importance of the U-boats (Donitz) or surface ships (Raeder) is effectively detailed. The writing is vivid and rich with personal anecdotes.
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