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Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power
Book by Beale, Professor Georgia
600 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1956
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About the author
Howard K. Beale
10 booksA specialist in the Reconstruction era and American foreign policy in the early 20th century, Howard Kennedy Beale earned his PhB in English from the University of Chicago and an M.A. and Ph.D, from Harvard University. Beale taught at the University of North Carolina from 1935 until 1948, and at the University of Wisconsin from 1948 until his death in 1959.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
January 8, 2022
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, a small but growing number of influential Americans sought to redefine their country’s place in the world order. Up to that point American foreign policy was focused primarily on maintaining or expanding commercial opportunities abroad for its citizens. With Western nations increasingly claiming territory throughout the world, however, several prominent writers and politicians argued that the United States needed to shed its traditional stance of non-involvement and assert a global presence commensurate with its status as the world’s largest economy.
Among the foremost advocates of this change was Theodore Roosevelt. During the 1890s, the rising young politician emerged as one of the leaders of a group within the Republican Party pushing for greater assertiveness abroad. After becoming president in 1901 Roosevelt became the nation’s first chief executive to embrace the idea of America as a world power, addressing international issues with an extraordinary degree of comprehension and skill. Through a mixture of boldness and personal diplomacy, he established a role for the United States by addressing a number of issues relating to what he regarded as the country’s expanding national interests. This respect culminated in the awarding of a Nobel Peace Prize in 1906 for his role in negotiating an end to the Russo-Japanese War, a sign of the esteem in which he was held as a world leader.
Yet for all of Roosevelt’s gifts and the acclaim he received from his contemporaries, Howard Beale concludes that in the end Roosevelt failed to achieve his most important foreign policy objectives. It’s a judgment that may seem contrarian given Roosevelt’s stature in American history today, yet it’s one that Beale demonstrates successfully in this book. An expansion of a series of talks Beale gave in 1953 at Johns Hopkins University for their Albert Shaw Lectures series, they provide an examination of Roosevelt’s foreign policy and the ideas on which it was based. In them he focused on how Roosevelt conducted foreign relations, the influence of his policies on America’s relationship with key powers in Europe and Asia, and their legacy after he left office.
Beale sees Roosevelt’s world view as premised on a series of nationalist and racialist assumptions. While rejecting the overt racism of contemporaries such as Houston S. Chamberlain, Roosevelt nonetheless believed that different races had different characteristics, which he saw as a consequence of geographical differences and acquired characteristics. Nor did he believe that the inferiority of certain races was permanent, and he was always willing to make exceptions for individuals of a race who demonstrated qualities he admired. Nevertheless, such categorization shaped his views towards the rest of the world, and led him in particular to underestimate the challenge the subject populations of the Western empires posed to their ongoing rule.
These attitudes had a practical impact on Roosevelt’s ideas about his nation’s foreign policy. Beale views Roosevelt’s failure to appreciate the signs of budding Chinese nationalism (evidenced in the protests against exclusionary laws adopted in the United States) as fueling the decline the relations between the two countries. Instead, the president prioritized the interests of the Western powers over those of the local populace. Roosevelt’s primary goal in relations with the latter, however, was in maintaining a stable balance of power, one that would allow the United States the maximum freedom of action with a minimal amount of effort. This influenced his response to both the Russo-Japanese War (in which he favored privately the Japanese), the Franco-German controversy over Morocco, and the 1907 Hague Conference, all of which involved efforts to establish enduring settlements in international disputes. Yet within a few short years after Roosevelt left office the stability he had pursued was replaced by the chaos of revolution and war, followed by a dissolution of Western empires that exposed the erroneousness of many of the assumptions on which he had based his policies.
Though dated and less than comprehensive in its coverage, Beale’s book remains a standard text on American foreign relations at a turning point in its history. That it has endured is due to the author’s extensive archival research and the lucidity of his analysis. Its greatest flaw is in the nature of its presentation, as the lecture format results in a degree of repetition that would have been better addressed had the book been a monograph from the start. This is a minor issue, though, when compared to the value of the overall work both as an analysis of Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign policies and their role in shaping America’s emergence as a world power at the dawn of the twentieth century. It’s a work that should be read by anyone interested in either subject.
Among the foremost advocates of this change was Theodore Roosevelt. During the 1890s, the rising young politician emerged as one of the leaders of a group within the Republican Party pushing for greater assertiveness abroad. After becoming president in 1901 Roosevelt became the nation’s first chief executive to embrace the idea of America as a world power, addressing international issues with an extraordinary degree of comprehension and skill. Through a mixture of boldness and personal diplomacy, he established a role for the United States by addressing a number of issues relating to what he regarded as the country’s expanding national interests. This respect culminated in the awarding of a Nobel Peace Prize in 1906 for his role in negotiating an end to the Russo-Japanese War, a sign of the esteem in which he was held as a world leader.
Yet for all of Roosevelt’s gifts and the acclaim he received from his contemporaries, Howard Beale concludes that in the end Roosevelt failed to achieve his most important foreign policy objectives. It’s a judgment that may seem contrarian given Roosevelt’s stature in American history today, yet it’s one that Beale demonstrates successfully in this book. An expansion of a series of talks Beale gave in 1953 at Johns Hopkins University for their Albert Shaw Lectures series, they provide an examination of Roosevelt’s foreign policy and the ideas on which it was based. In them he focused on how Roosevelt conducted foreign relations, the influence of his policies on America’s relationship with key powers in Europe and Asia, and their legacy after he left office.
Beale sees Roosevelt’s world view as premised on a series of nationalist and racialist assumptions. While rejecting the overt racism of contemporaries such as Houston S. Chamberlain, Roosevelt nonetheless believed that different races had different characteristics, which he saw as a consequence of geographical differences and acquired characteristics. Nor did he believe that the inferiority of certain races was permanent, and he was always willing to make exceptions for individuals of a race who demonstrated qualities he admired. Nevertheless, such categorization shaped his views towards the rest of the world, and led him in particular to underestimate the challenge the subject populations of the Western empires posed to their ongoing rule.
These attitudes had a practical impact on Roosevelt’s ideas about his nation’s foreign policy. Beale views Roosevelt’s failure to appreciate the signs of budding Chinese nationalism (evidenced in the protests against exclusionary laws adopted in the United States) as fueling the decline the relations between the two countries. Instead, the president prioritized the interests of the Western powers over those of the local populace. Roosevelt’s primary goal in relations with the latter, however, was in maintaining a stable balance of power, one that would allow the United States the maximum freedom of action with a minimal amount of effort. This influenced his response to both the Russo-Japanese War (in which he favored privately the Japanese), the Franco-German controversy over Morocco, and the 1907 Hague Conference, all of which involved efforts to establish enduring settlements in international disputes. Yet within a few short years after Roosevelt left office the stability he had pursued was replaced by the chaos of revolution and war, followed by a dissolution of Western empires that exposed the erroneousness of many of the assumptions on which he had based his policies.
Though dated and less than comprehensive in its coverage, Beale’s book remains a standard text on American foreign relations at a turning point in its history. That it has endured is due to the author’s extensive archival research and the lucidity of his analysis. Its greatest flaw is in the nature of its presentation, as the lecture format results in a degree of repetition that would have been better addressed had the book been a monograph from the start. This is a minor issue, though, when compared to the value of the overall work both as an analysis of Theodore Roosevelt’s foreign policies and their role in shaping America’s emergence as a world power at the dawn of the twentieth century. It’s a work that should be read by anyone interested in either subject.
November 5, 2014
This is, in many ways, a scathing rebuke of 'Teddy' Roosevelt's foreign policy by focusing on how the 26th President's worldview prompted him to commit the blunder, Beale would argue, of latching the United States onto the back of European imperialism in its dying days, only for it to take much of the 'heat' from the embittered post-colonial world once European empires eventually expired.
November 20, 2018
This is one of my favorite books about Theodore Roosevelt and his ideology in the world. Though the author credits Roosevelt with errors such as imagining he could counter- balance the imperial ambitions of European Powers careening towards World War, his book is in many ways a great vindication of Roosevelt's accomplishments. Theodore Roosevelt recognized the impending crisis of World War 1 and when he took over from McKlinley, even during his days as Assistant Secretary of the Navy during McKinley's First Term pre-dating his Rough Rider ventures into Cuba, Theodore Roosevelt recognized the greatness that awaited America, and knew that we had to exert ourselves more forcibly in the world. One can argue that Theodore Roosevelt was the President who turned our country from an isolationist trading nation into a Global Superpower. This book is a balanced and impartial view of Roosevelt's policies and their effect on the greater world.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews