The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State

by William McCants, Stephen McLaughlin (Narrator)

The so-called Islamic State, or ISIS, has inspired young men and women all over the world to commit horrible atrocities in its name. By the thousands, they have flooded into the Islamic State's stronghold in Syria and Iraq and carried out attacks under its black banner in nearly every continent. How has the Islamic State surpassed al-Qaeda to become the most popular jihadist group on the planet? Its chilling mission is very specific: bring the immediate return of the Islamic empire and look ahead to the imminent end of days. These two powerful religious ideas, combined with a highly intelligent, meticulously organized membership, account for its popularity and shape its behavior. Its goal is not only to revive this Islamic empire but also usher in the End of Times--a concept that means ISIS anticipates a final battle that will restore the Muslim community to its medieval glory days. And they will not stop until they achieve their mission.

Based almost entirely on primary sources in Arabic-including exclusive al-Qaeda memos that have not been made public before-The ISIS Apocalypse by William McCants explores how these two powerful ideas shaped the Islamic State's past and foreshadows its dark future, as well as seeks to explain the popularity of the Islamic State and its violent, terrifying behavior.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Politics, Middle East, Terrorism, Religion, Islam

Audiobook

First published September 1, 2015

About the author

William McCants is a fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy and director of its Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution. He is also adjunct faculty at Johns Hopkins University and has held various government and think tank positions related to Islam, the Middle East, and terrorism.

From 2009 to 2011, McCants served as a U.S. State Department senior adviser for countering violent extremism. He has also held positions as program manager of the Minerva Initiative for the Department of Defense; an analyst at the Institute for Defense Analyses, the Center for Naval Analyses and SAIC; and a fellow at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center.

He is the founder of Jihadica.com, an academic group blog focused on the global jihadi movement. The blog has been featured on the cover of The New York Times, and described by Wired magazine’s Danger Room as “the gold standard in militant studies.” In 2011 and 2012, he was named by Foreign Policy magazine as one of its FP's Top 100 "Twitterati.”

McCants is the author of numerous articles on Islamist politics and terrorism, including the headlining article of Foreign Affairs’ 9/11 Tenth Anniversary Edition. He also edited the Militant Ideology Atlas, which identified the key ideologues in the global jihadi movement, and also translated, from Arabic into English, a book written by an al-Qaida strategist. Much of his current writing is devoted to Salafi parliamentary politics in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

His book, Founding Gods, Inventing Nations: Conquest and Culture Myths from Antiquity to Islam (Princeton University Press, 2011), traces the history of cultural debate in the Middle East after the Greeks, Romans and Arabs conquered the region. He is also working on a book about the scriptural history of the Quran.

McCants has a doctorate from Princeton University and has lived in Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon.

Reviews

[Bill Kerwin · Rating 4 out of 5]

One of the surprising effects of reading this book was to make me nostalgic for the good old days of Bin Laden.

William McCants makes it clear that—compared to The Islamic State—al-Quaeda had an enlightened, humane view of jihad. Just like the U.S. in Vietnam (my comparison, not McCants') al-Quaeda was concerned with winning the “hearts and minds” of the occupied territories. It stressed the importance of public welfare as well as public order, and advocated merciful judges who would enforce Islamic law with warnings and mild penalties—at least at first. (How can these people be expected to obey the law—al Quaeda argued—when they have not yet learned to pray?) They aspired to create a caliphate, but assumed that the orderly maintenance of a territory and the ability to foster a stable community with widespread popular support were essential to its proclamation. Moreover, these 'baby boomer” jihadists hesitated to speak forthrightly about apocalypse. Part of this was snobbery (elite Sunnis like Bin Laden and Zawahiri viewed apocalyptic alarmism as a lower-class obsession), but they also vividly recalled the 1979 occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca--a fiasco which ended with the fanatics' “Mahdi” (the Islamic Messiah) shot to pieces by the Saudis and the French—and how it set back the cause of radical jihad for years.

The upcoming generation, however—the young warriors who first formed al-Quaeda-in-Iraq and later The Islamic State--had a different attitude. Capture some ground, proclaim your caliph, prophesy the coming Mahdi, and—although you must meet people's elementary needs—don't worry about hearts and minds: enforce Islamic law in all its rigor, adding extra laws and penalties if you wish. That way you will show them that the Caliphate is here.

At first, this new attitude failed to catch on; a little later, it just failed. But now it has given birth to ISIS. So what changed?

The most important factor was America's involvement in Iraq, for which the Bush/Cheney regime bears great responsibility. The return of the Crusader to the land of Harun-al-Rashid, radical alliances formed in American prisons, the resulting domestic chaos and growing Sunni resentment against a Shiite government: all of these excited apocalyptic expectations, expectations only intensified by the Arab spring. Then Obama called home the troops, Syria imploded, and a vacuum—and an opportunity--were created.

So what should we be doing now? According to McCants, pretty much what we are doing. He is convinced The Islamic State “will crumble,” for “no modern jihadist statelet has provoked international intervention and survived.”

But what about the jihadists? Well, that's a different story. So long as there is violence and instability, particularly in areas mentioned in Islamic prophecy, jihadists will be waiting to fill the vacuum. And ISIS has furnished them all with a new, more radical playbook.

[Dmitri · Rating 4 out of 5]

As William Faizi McCants notes in his introduction, making sense of ISIS propaganda "requires a guide proficient in Islamic theology and history, modern jihadism, clandestine bureaucracies and Arabic", all of which he is. This book is a worthy companion to a good narrative account (such as Warrick's "Black Flags"). It focuses on foundations and philosophy rather than only events on the ground.

ISIS recycles the psychological warfare themes of early Muslim wars, from dark banners to the coming of the Islamic messiah. Medieval avengers of Muhammad's family are paradoxically transformed into present day persecutors of Shia. These are not scholars of Islam who appeal faithfully to its history. They are rebels who recruit the victims and outcasts of regime change for their end of days caliphate.

The apocalyptic prophecies they exploit date from the death of Muhammad's grandson in 680 to the Abbasid revolution of 750. Future sectarian struggles between Sunni and Shia will purge heretics from Muslim ranks before final battles with the West. Jesus will return to help defeat the Jewish Anti-Christ. The Mahdi, a descendent of Muhammad, will rule over Muslims until Judgement Day.

The practical story begins in 2004 with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Jordanian terrorist and ISIS forefather. Driven by hatred of Shia as well as the West, he began to transform his Iraq al-Qaeda franchise into an aspiring apocalyptic state. At this point he transgressed the moral boundaries of al-Qaeda's bin Laden and al-Zawahiri by leading sectarian attacks on Muslims and espousing fanatical theology.

After Zarqawi's death in 2006, Eqyptian Ayyub al-Masri declared the Islamic State founded, and assumed leadership until killed in a 2010 raid. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, an Iraqi cleric, elevated himself from Abu Ghraib prisoner to Emir and Caliph. Baghdadi is rumored to have been killed in various air strikes since 2015, but his body hasn't been found. Recent sightings and recordings have surfaced.

Sharia law is believed to establish state legitimacy and so the beatings and beheadings began upon the birth of ISIS. The draconian punishments affronted local tribes, and armed resistance ensued. By 2008 US and Iraqi forces had weakened ISIS while internet snuff films kept their legacy alive. Al-Qaeda was now the kinder, gentler terrorist group, courting hearts and minds and swearing to codes of conduct.

In 2014 the Syrian civil war offered renewed opportunities for ISIS retrenchment and expansion. Assad released jihadis from prison to provide a plausible excuse for suppression of his political opposition. In doing so he replenished the ISIS ranks and strengthened insurgents in Iraq. Staffed by Saddam's purged military and government personnel they had the experience needed to establish a state.

Although covering somewhat esoteric subject matter, McCants explains things in ways easily understood. The footnotes show much of the information comes from primary and contemporary sources. The strength of this book lies in its discussion of the theoretical basis of ISIS. Published in late 2015 it is still reasonably up to date but obviously cannot cover the final denouement.

[Anand Gopal · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book stands out in the ISIS-hysteria genre because it relies extensively on primary sources, particularly on captured documents from al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq, and others. The author demonstrates convincingly that the key difference between ISIS and al Qaeda central appears to be strategic, not ideological: AQ believes (or has come to believe) that hearts and minds must be won prior to construction of an Islamic state, whereas ISIS believes in establishing such a state by fiat and using it as pole to attract the world's Muslims.

Despite this strength, the book has many weaknesses. The author's attempts to cast ISIS as uniquely eschatologically driven is unconvincing, and the book's utter lack of political context is shocking. There is hardly a mention of the US occupation or the Arab spring, and instead the implication is that ISIS simply springs forth from the mind of its proponents, unrelated the political, social, or structural conditions that those individuals find themselves in. I'm sure there are all sorts of reasons why the author chose to ignore social reality, but an important one seems to be that he has not, as far as I can tell, set foot in Iraq or Syria. Relying entirely on internal correspondences to understand a phenomenon as complex as this may yield some interesting insights, but it is not sufficient for serious or honest scholarly engagement.

[Murtaza · Rating 4 out of 5]

A meticulously sourced history of the "Islamic State" from its beginnings during the Iraq War til today, taking a look at its origins, operations, as well as its apocalyptic motives and justifications. It is certainly a superior book to Hassan and Weiss's offering on the subject, as it appears admirably free of overt partisan motive. McCants is a great scholar of Arab Islam generally, he would've simply been described as an Arabist were it not for the GWOT, and seemingly every line of this book is referenced in detail to primary documents and accounts.

Having unfortunately already read much about this disgusting group there wasn't too much new to me here. Some interesting notes there were however about the "Yellow Banners vs Black Banners" prophecies, the notes on the ISIS flag's origin (it was not the Prophet (pbuh)'s flag but was an invention, even the ragged script was digitally created I guess for a sense of faux-authenticity), and the random note that the Abbassids had apparently minted coins with the Prophet (pbuh)'s image on them.

I would recommend this book above any other for someone looking to get a grasp on the subject. I respect the scholar behind it a lot, and it's written in an informal and engaging style that renders rather light what would otherwise be heavy content. Although I'm trying to avoid filling my mind with too much more garbage about these groups and their revolting practices and beliefs, I made an exception for this author and would recommend it to anyone with an interest in learning about them and who they are.

[Doreen Petersen · Rating 5 out of 5]

Received this book from Netgalley in exchange for an honest review. I really, really liked this book. I learned so much I didn't know before. The author did a magnificient job laying out the material and information about ISIS. I would definitely recommend this book to all!

[Steven Z. · Rating 4 out of 5]

Since 2014 a number of interesting works have appeared that try to explain the background history of the rise of the Islamic State(ISIS) and why it has been successful to date. William McCants, the Director of the Project on U.S. relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution has added his new book, THE ISIS APOCALYPSE: THE HISTORY, STRATEGY AND DOOMSDAY VISION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE to that genre. What separates McCants monograph from the others is his emphasis on the role of Islamic messianism in the policies pursued by the Islamic State, and the differences between the Islamic State and Osama Bin-Laden’s al-Qaeda’s view of jihadism, and how and when to establish an Islamic caliphate.

In his introduction McCants presents himself with a challenge as he takes the reader on a tour of the Islamic State. He tells the reader that they will be exposed to explanations concerning obscure allusions to Islamic history and theology, in addition the reader will be able “to appreciate how the Islamic State thinks of itself, and how its self-understanding has affected its political fortunes, and what will happen if those fortunes change again.” (2) Having completed McCants’ tour, as a reader I believe he has accomplished his goals. At the outset he does a nice job explaining the origins of ISIS by exploring the relationship and differences that existed between Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawri and Osama bin-Laden, and the creation and failure of ISIS by 2008. McCants discusses the different historical figures and events that influenced ISIS as well as the current leadership in the different jihadi movements.

The most important aspect of the book is how McCants delves into the role of messianism in Islam and how it affected the rise of ISIS and the policies it pursues. The prophecies of Islam play a major role for ISIS. The concept of the Mahdi, “the rightly guided one,” is important because according to Islamic prophecy he would appear at the end of time to lead the final battle against the infidels. The similarities between the Abbasid Dynasty and ISIS is treated carefully and presents an interesting dichotomy for the reader. The popularity of the Dabiq prophecy attracted foreign fighters as the prophecy called for the conquering and cleansing of this small town near the Syrian-Turkish border before a caliphate flag could be raised. Aspects of Islamic prophecy hold today that before the final apocalypse, sectarian conflict must precede it, as it took place following the death of Mohammad. Each sect is trying to complete the task of killing the infidel, but first they must destroy each other to achieve the honor of doing so. The apocalyptic message that ISIS employed along with the restoration of the caliphate that ended after World War I, and revolution are the core of its principles. However, Osama Bin-Laden refused to accept this. The al-Qaeda leader believed that the needs of the people must be taken care of first and the United States had to leave Iraq and Afghanistan before a caliphate could be declared, something he believed would not take place in his lifetime.

McCants is accurate in his explanation as to why ISIS was able to expand so easily and acquire the territory that would provide legitimacy to its restoration of the caliphate. Bashir al-Assad’s policies in Syria facilitated ISIS’ task by funneling hundreds of jihadists into Iraq to fight the U.S., and releasing numerous prisoners to foster the chaos that allowed him to crack down on opposition to his rule. Assad chose not to fight ISIS but concentrate on domestic opposition thus allowing ISIS to expand into eastern Syria, and with the issues attendant to Iraq they could easily capture western Iraq giving them a stronghold that encompassed Mosul to Aleppo. McCants is also on firm ground as he detailed the rise of Abu Umar al-Bahgdadi within ISIS and the announcement of the restoration of the “caliphate in accordance with the prophetic method,” in addition to declaring himself caliph. McCants explores the opposition by al-Qaeda and others to this move explaining that the trappings of a caliphate do not make it a caliphate.

The book is a slim volume, but McCants certainly maximizes the space. He explores events in Yemen and the rise of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as well as other al-Qaeda affiliates in North Africa and the Horn of Africa. He points to their differences with ISIS, but also areas of support. The influence of the Arab Spring is discussed in relation to ISIS ideology and its role in the apocalyptic narrative that ISIS spins.

Everyone seems to want to know why ISIS was so successful between 2013 and 2014 - it is a simple answer - they were pretty much left alone. When Sunni rebels try to overthrow Assad, ISIS concentrated on setting up a state in the Syrian hinterland. It filled its leadership with ex-Ba’athists from Saddam Hussein’s military and intelligence branches and attracted thousands of foreign fighters “by using a propaganda mix of apocalypticism, puritanism, sectarianism, ultraviolence, and promises of a caliphate.” (153) all of these aspects of ISIS are fully explored by the author in creating an important addition in trying to understand the success of ISIS and where we go in the future.

[Hamza · Rating 4 out of 5]

My review of this book is for the "advance uncorrected proof" that I won in a Goodreads giveaway.

This book is good, no doubt, and will offer a lot of behind-the-scenes info about the founding of the so-called Islamic State, how it relates to al-Qaeda and other groups, and lots of other juicy stuff. One big appeal of the book is the fact that it contains translations of many documents that were previously available only in Arabic, including those between leaders of ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other related groups. The book describes pretty clearly what draws young Muslims, already infected by Wahhabi ideology, to this awful abomination.

The problem is that the author is a former U.S. State Department official, and thus is not without his biases. For one, he claims that Prophet Muhammad (SAWS) used partly "violence and intimidation" to unite the tribes of Arabia, a claim that makes little sense considering how small the Muslims were in number compared to said tribes, along with the fact that the early Muslims were oppressed by said tribes. I almost stopped reading the book after that point. Many claims have been made by Orientalist types about the Prophet's methods, but to say that he used questionable tactics simply to unite the tribes is extremely strange.

Another issue I took is with the constant Assad-baiting. Bashar al-Assad is a polarizing figure in Middle East politics today, but the author of this book just seemed to tick off every box when it came to blaming him for all the evils in the world. Repeat shaky claims that he attacked Ghouta with sarin gas in 2013? Check. Claim that he essentially aids ISIS in their goals? Check. Refer to the Syrian government as "Shi'a" simply because its President is 'Alawi? Check. After a while, it becomes tiring to read these claims, no matter how horrible the situation in Syria may be right now.

There are other issues that come up in the concluding chapter, but all in all, I did like the book. It's a bit short, and will probably need some revised editions given the extremely current nature of the events discussed, but it's a great primer on the origin of ISIS. I just wish it didn't have such clear political and religious biases, even from an author so familiar with Arabic. Read it, but not if you don't know much about Islam and what's been going on in the Middle East since before 9/11.

[مروان البلوشي · Rating 4 out of 5]

تمتلئ المكتبة العالمية بالعديد من الكتب التي تحلل نشأة وبزوغ وسمتقبل تنظيم داعش الإرهابي. ما يميز هذا الكتاب الرصين أن تركيزه لا ينصب فقط على السرد السريع للظروف السياسية والأمنية وراء صعود داعش، بل يغوص الكتاب عميقاً نحو الجذور الثقافية والدينية والتاريخية وراء قصة داعش. ولا يكتفي الكتاب بذلك، بل يقوم أيضاً وبشكل دقيق بتفكيك خطاب تنظيم داعش وتفسيره وتحليله وربطه مع خطاب حركات السلفية الوهابية والإسلام السياسي وحزب البعث في العراق.

ويرى الكاتب، أن مستقبل داعش لا يزال غامض، ولكنه غير متفائل حول آثار خطاب التنظيم على المنطقة العربية وعقول الشباب العربي، كما يتناول الكتاب بالتحليل علاقة داعش مع الصراع والخلاف السني والشيعي، ومستقبل هذا الصراع.

الكتاب مكتوب بطريقة سهلة الفهم للقارئ العادي، مع احتفاظه على أصول الدراسة العلمية الرصينة والشاملة.

[Παύλος · Rating 3 out of 5]

Μια μελέτη της ανάπτυξης του λεγόμενου Ισλαμικού Χαλιφατου.

Ο συγγραφέας ξεκινά απο την δεκαετία του '90 όταν ακόμη δεν είχε σχηματιστεί ολοκληρωμένο ισλαμικό κίνημα με σκοπο την εγκαθίδρυση κράτους και φτάνει μέχρι τις μέρες μας.

Ειναι πράγματι εντυπωσιακό να βλέπεις πως αυτοί οι ακραία βίαιοι ισλαμιστες κινητοποιούνται. Με πλήρη χειραγώγηση κάτω απο το πέπλο της Σαριας και της ερμηνείας του Κορανίου έχουμε φτάσει στη σημερινή κατάσταση με σφαγές αμάχων και τιμωρίες μεσαιωνικών πρακτικών σε παιδιά και γυναίκες.

Πολυ ενδιαφέρον το παράρτημα του βιβλιου που παραθέτει ο συγγραφέας κάποιες απο τις προφητείες που αποδίδονται στον Μωαμεθ και βάση των οποίων κινητοποιούνται οι μάζες.

[Nazmi Yaakub · Rating 3 out of 5]

Saya berbelah bahagi dalam menilai buku ini, antara penelitian terperinci mengenai gerakan salafi-jihadi yang mengubah takrif keganasan begitu dahsyat dengan salah faham dan salah tafsir yang berterusan terhadap konsep Islam yang diteruskan daripada orientalisme. Bagaimanapun, saya boleh menutup mata terhadap fakta silap mengenai kedudukan hadis atau kefahaman sebenar terhadap hadis akhir zaman yang penilaian dalam tradisi Islam tidak serigid hadis berkait akidah dan hukum fiqh, sebaliknya memberi tumpuan bagaimana pengarang menyusur perkembangan gerakan ISIS yang asalnya memberikan wala’ kepada al-Qaeda tetapi menjarak dan kemudian berpisah daripada gerakan ekstremis berkenaan, malah bermusuh dengan semua kumpulan ekstremis lain.

Buku ini boleh membantu dalam memahami kronologi gerakan yang cuba mengubah beberapa sisi selepas kegagalan gelombang pertama pada dekad lalu tetapi kembali menghantui dunia pada dekad ini tetapi tidak dapat mengubah DNA sebenarnya yang bersifat ekstrem, takfiri dan ganas. Membaca buku ini menjadikan kita faham mengapa Barat mengambil masa untuk berdepan dengan ISIS kerana dipengaruhi geopolitik dan perbezaan mazhab serta etnik setempat - selain gagal memahami ISIS bukanlah daripada aliran majoriti dalam Islam, iaitu Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah hingga mengubah cara berfikir dan bertindak terhadap umat Islam secara keseluruhan.

[Zahra · Rating 2 out of 5]

به طور کلی از صفر تا صد تاسیس دولت اسلامی و القاعده و رهبران با سمت هاشون را ارائه داده.
بیشتر جنبه بیوگرافی داره چون نویسنده از آمریکاس و مطالب یافتها و پژوهش در این حوزه و خاورمیانه را به رشته تحریر کتاب درآورده.
اما کتاب دختری که از دست داعش گریخت، آخرین دختر و... سرگذشت دختران ایزدی هستش که از نزدیک وقایع و لمس کردن و توضیح میدن که حس معنوی از خودشون منتقل میکنند که رئال تر حس میشه

[Chad Kohalyk · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was an interesting short introduction to the history of the formation of ISIS. Much of the story of their motivation was covered in Graeme Wood's excellent article What ISIS Really Wants, but McCants sheds light on the formation of ISIS, its relation to Nusra and other AQ franchises, and also positions ISIS in the constellation of jihadist organizations.

It has been pointed out in other reviews that this book breezes over the local political environment (aka the US-backed leaders and US-lead wars) which is entirely true. But this short book has a very narrow focus: how did the Islamic State come together, what is its motivation, and how is its strategy different from other groups.

Overall I found it very informative, especially since it draws from original sources in the form of captured documents, online forum posts, Twitter, and the magazines and other publications of the State itself.

Well worth the read... but I feel I must follow it up with something that gives more context.

[Elizabeth · Rating 4 out of 5]

After recently reading books based in the middle east, about the war in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and hearing of all of the recent terror attacks all over the world --which ISIS claimed responsibility, I was interested in learning more about Muslim history in the world ... where each terror group came from and why they seem set on destroying humanity. I learned a lot--I had no idea there were so many different prophecies or that the Muslim history was so long and bloody. That some prophecies contradict each other, that caliphs and caliphates have been declared many times since Muhammad and that most Muslims don't know the prophecies or believe them. It gives me hope that ISIS (and other similar terror groups) will soon be defeated and a scary relic of history that won't be repeated.

[Kanishka Sirdesai · Rating 4 out of 5]

A really good take on the advent and rise of the Islamic State aka ISIS. Scholarly in some parts but with the subject it's addressing, it's bound to be. Now waiting for the sequel chronicling the demise!

[Joseph Stieb · Rating 4 out of 5]

The title might promise a little more than what was delivered, but overall this is a very interesting book that people should read even if they have already read a bunch of IS stuff. McCants is an expert on militant Islamism who speaks ARabic, and he is a judicious guide to the often confusing debates between IS and other factions. The main objective of this book is to situate the IS apocalyptic vision in the broader tradition of messianism and end-times prophecies in Islam. It is really Shia Islam that has the stronger apocalyptic tradition, as many in that sect believe a Mahdi or savior will return and usher in the end of days. Despite being Sunni, the Islamic State tried to appropriate the apocalyptic tradition, believing that the formation of their state and their wars against the infidels would bring about the apocalypse itself. AQ, for all its extremism, was not millenarian in this sense, but IS took advantage of a growing sense of crisis and disruption in the ME to build a following at least in part on the belief in this pending ending.

Another major theme of this book is the struggle of radical Islamists to declare a caliphate and their ongoing disputes about the best way to do so. IS is in a sense more radical than AQ because they believed they should simply declare a state (they declared a state in the mid2000s and the caliphate in 2014) without trying to overthrow apostate regimes (pretty much any state in the world) whereas AQ envisioned declaring a caliphate way in the future after overthrowing regimes and uniting the ummah after erasing national boundaries. AQ was much more concerned with building popular legitimacy, and it criticized both AQ-Iraq and IS for their brutality toward Muslims. McCants helpfully charts other failed efforts to build Islamic states by AQ affiliates in Somalia, Mali, and Yemen, all of which failed because a mixture of brutality, disrespect for regional traditions, and outside interventions. What IS proved, at least for a while, was that brutality could be an asset and that the sheer gumption of declaring a caliphate and murdering thousands of infidels could garner flocks of people to join their ranks. In a weird way, McCants shows that AQ was both more conservative and eventually just less relevant that IS.

My main concern about this book is whether you could use it for an undergrad text for a class on terrorism. It is very inside baseball on Quranic disputes and squabbles within terrorist groups without setting too much of a larger context. Overall, Joby Warrick's book is less insightful about IS's relationship to various Islamic tradition but more narrative and accessible, at least about the rise of IS. This book is excellent, but specialized.

[Seyed-Koohzad Esmaeili · Rating 3 out of 5]

روایتی از پیشینه تاریخی و الهیاتی گروه دولت اسلامی عراق و شام (داعش) و همچنین الهیات سیاسی و آخرالزمانی گروه‌های بنیادگرای جهادی اسلامی. به نظرم نویسنده به خوبی توانسته بود الهیات جهادی و آخرالزمانی و مبانی خشونت هولناک این گروه‌ها را نشان دهد. به باور من تلاش نویسنده برای توضیح تفاوت میان گروه‌های جهادی نسل پیشین، مانند القاعده با نسل جدید جهادی‌ها، مانند دولت اسلامی، موفق بود. همچنین نویسنده توانسته بود که مسئله تشکیل خلافت اسلامی و موافقان و مخالفان آن در درون گفتار سیاسی- الهیاتی جهادی را به خوبی نشان بدهد. نقطه ضعف کتاب، مانند بسیاری دیگر از کتاب‌هایی که در حوزه مطالعات اسلامی در غرب نوشته می‌شود، حذف آگاهانه یا ناآگاهانه ایران و تشیع از موضوع تحقیق بود. به هر دلیلی ایران و تشیع عملا از این تحقیق هم تقریبا کنار گذاشته شده است.

[BabyLunLun · Rating 3 out of 5]

It was a tons of fun reading this and learning about ISIS . But I would have enjoy it more if more historical context is given for some part because I was a little lost at the last chapter.

I would to pick up some other books to learn more about it

[j3z7Gt · Rating 3 out of 5]

اگر به دنبال تاریخ تحلیلی تر و عمیق تری از طبیعت دولت اسلامی میگردید پاسخ را در این کتاب نمیابید.
این کتاب بیشتر روایت گر تاریخ وقایع و اتفاقات دولت اسلامی است. بعد از این کتاب ما به عنوان پدیده، شناختی از دولت اسلامی و افرادی که آنگونه فکر میکنند نداریم. ما صرفا شناخت بیشتری نسبت به اشخاص حقیقی مربوطه پیدا میکنیم.

[Jarosław · Rating 3 out of 5]

William McCants’ history and analysis of Daesh highlights just how unique Daesh is among Islamic jihadist movements. Whereas Al-Qaeda and other jihadist movements sought to foster popular support among local populations before declaring a caliphate, McCants shows how Daesh disregarded this conventional thinking and opted for extreme brutality instead. McCants also stresses just how incredibly important apocalyptic prophecy is to Daesh, and he shows how this goal of fulfilling prophecy is driving many of Daesh’s actions, including the capture of militarily low-value targets (Dabiq) to its dreams of reviving the Abbasid Caliphate and implementing the hudud. McCants concludes that despite disregarding conventional thinking about jihadist insurgency, Daesh has managed to expand and consolidate its power and holdings. Despite this, the so-called Islamic State’s continued survival is unlikely, and the author argues that the current coalition strategy against the jihadi militia, while imperfect, is the best option available.
One of the key questions of the reading is whether or not the coalition strategy as McCants lays out is the best one available. It seems highly suggestive that is ineffective, since over the course of a year, the air bombing-campaign hardly seemed to slow its advance nor successfully target the long convoys of tanker trucks going into Turkey to finance Daesh’s operations.

The latter half of William McCants’ book examines the resurgence of Daesh and the apocalyptic prophecies which pervade much of the group's ideology. McCants shows how Daesh, has succeeded in attracting foreign fighters from myriad countries much better than any other Islamic terrorist group. These foreign fighters, men and women, exhibit extreme conviction and belief, and are some of the most vocal supporters of Daesh and they actively seek to fulfill apocalyptic prophecy. They await the imminent return of the Mahdi and the Sufyani, eagerly anticipate the climactic battle-to-be at Dabiq, and even point to scriptures which state that Jesus the Prophet will descend from the heavens and fight on their side. (McCants, 106-11)
Daesh has throughout its lifespan sought to explain events as fulfillment of prophecies, and they have used this is as an effective recruiting tool; even their almost-defeat in 2008 to their meteoric resurgence in 2014 has been explained as prophecy fulfilled. McCants’ in his conclusion notes several ways at tackling the upstart ‘caliphate’, but neglects to mention attacking the underlying prophecy. McCants argues that “reducing the mass appeal of [Daesh] is pointless,” however, it can be argued that attacking the apocalypticism of the group may prove fruitful in stemming the tide of recruits or at least diminishing its legitimacy-through-prophecy. McCants is correct when he says “the ideological fight is an actual fight.” (McCants, 156) Furthermore, McCants notes that Daesh ideology is not immutable: having been modified post-2008 to focus more on state-building rather than preparing for the Mahdi. (McCants, 154) Could its ideology be further altered as time goes on, perhaps as a result of new ‘caliphs’ or internal instability?

What is the best way to deal with the Islamic State? While McCants argues against a renewed presence of American land forces, and for good reason, the alternative: a long-term bombing campaign to contain and degrade, will not destroy Daesh. McCants also argues that the best way to undermine Daesh is to directly assault its two slogans: “enduring and expanding”. McCants argues that this can be done only when the “Shi’i governments in Syria and Iraq reach an accommodation with their Sunni citizens.” (McCants, 157) McCants’s argument, while superficially sound, ignores the fact that such accommodations are unlikely to be reached due to the tribalist and sectarian views in the Islamic world, and the fact that such a policy is based on continuing the artificial borders set up by the Sykes-Picot agreement, which artificially created the boundaries that Daesh disdains and which contribute to sectarian violence. (McCants, 124) One question which can be asked is whether or not undermining the spurious prophecies Daesh relies on may contribute to undermining its influence. Finally, McCants argues that disrupting Daesh’s finances “will be difficult because the group does not rely much on outside funding,” however, it may certainly help undermine the fiscal health of the Islamic State to destroy the illicit oil trade into Turkey and target its internal funding and disrupt the utilities and services it provides to erode support.

[Preetam Chatterjee · Rating 5 out of 5]

Perfect and complete in every way possible. Undoubtedly the best book I've read on this subject. Blaring 5 on 5.

[Nicholas · Rating 4 out of 5]

The books about ISIS can be broadly divided by the question of whether it can be attributed to a (religious) ideology, or whether other driving forces are more accountable. This book belongs to the former. I don’t see an issue with the divide because I have read convincing books on both sides. It’s the execution that matters.

To make a case that ISIS’s ideological foundations matter, one will have to consult ample primary materials. Dabiq, their publication in English, alone will not be enough. You can’t just read ISIS’s communications with the world. One must also dive into the communications amongst themselves. There must also be a historical sensibility that locates both the parables ISIS cited and Muslim millenarianism in history and Islamic theology. Given the criteria, very few people can pull this off, but McCants as an Arabist could. And he did.

The primary sourcing in this book is simply remarkable. A special note of thanks to the author on the Appendices as I genuinely enjoyed reading the End Times prophecies in their own words. The decision to display them shows that the author cares about the source material and cares that we should read them. The book takes seriously doomsday visions as a driving force for ISIS’s strategy and separation from Al-Qaeda, and I find that quite appealing.

McCants also shows that doomsday is not just a strategy alone but rather forms a part of it, with visions guiding actions, and the consequences of those actions subsequently revising what the vision meant for the ISIS decision-makers and sympathizers. The concluding chapter also took particular effort to explain how such mixture of strategic acumen and apocalyptic beliefs work, as well as when it stops working. These perspectives are important as the rationalist ethos in political science often takes political actors a tad too cynically; that whatever they said are just lies for power.

McCants counters that by demonstrating how ISIS’s state building is dependent on myth-making (albeit with an ultra-violent mindset), and it’s through myth-making one gets to power-making. In that sense, ISIS’s caliphate project isn’t very different from other modern state building projects. The founding myth is important, and how important it was to the founders personally will be a second-order question if our interest is in why it succeeded, or more specifically, why so many people joined ISIS?

My minor issue with the book is about organisation. The book largely follows a chronological order, but there were plenty of skipping between timelines. More importantly, I hope the author could have been more upfront about the book’s heavier preoccupation with the apocalyptic visions as one of the main driving forces of ISIS’s strategising, which is actually its distinctive selling point. Maybe this is not needed for a book targeting a general audience, but I thought having one chapter that explicitly set out why analysing ISIS’s millenarianism is important in the beginning would have been helpful. In a way, that will help explain why the book is organised this way, and also makes a case for the methodology, i.e., why certain empirics matter more than others?

As the caliphate fades away (for now), McCants’s book will be one of the most definitive accounts that captures the essence of the group. It highlights ISIS as a political experiment that combines war-making and state-making, fueled by fringe theories that appeals to general Muslim beliefs about the End Times (given the post-Arab Spring geopolitical juncture). McCants’s contribution lies in his unpacking of how such an experiment straddles the exceptional and the mundane. ISIS’s exceptionally violent methods are not historically unique, but it did entail a lot of risk-taking appetite in the current international order where states are analogues for order and stability. At the same time, this monstrosity of a project was also bogged down by a lot of infighting, personality politics, and egos with a flair for the dramatic. By giving us a tour of it all, McCants successfully tipped open the black box of the enterprise of the black flags.

[Ben · Rating 4 out of 5]

Much of the discussion about ISIS seems to be framed in terms of good and evil: we're the good guys, they're the bad guys, so we need to figure out what to do to destroy them. I relate to this characterization; it is certainly how I feel at an instinctual, emotional and moral level.Yet I don't think this will be productive in truly understanding the nature of the enemy, and it is only through such deep understanding that victory can be won in any meaningful sense.

McCants' book is a step in that direction. Beginning from the premise that jihad, establishment of the caliph, and paving the path to the apocalypse are legitimate political goals, McCants sets out to reconstruct the history of Islamic State, using the criterion of how successful the organization has been in achieving these ends. With the benefit of access to many of the correspondence among IS and its affiliated organizations (including its parent Al Qaeda), McCants succeeds in demonstrating the nuanced differences among Islamists, particularly in their conceptions of the most politically expedient method of the founding of the caliphate. As it turns out, Al Qaeda is the moderate organization, advocating a measured, careful path, in which jihadists focus on providing goods and services to the Sunni people they claim to represent. Through this gradual process of winning the hearts and minds of the citizenry, establishment of the caliphate should occur on an almost organic basis.

ISIS, however, has unabashedly discarded the way of the fox for the way of the lion. Through use of sheer force and terror, ISIS has been successful in conquering a massive tract of land in Syria and Iraq. The support of the inhabitants has been won, sometimes because the people genuinely believe in ISIS's message, and, more often I would expect, out of abject fear of what will happen if they do not subject themselves to the terrorists' will. Indeed, ISIS has enthusiastically pursued a program of highly publicized murders of anyone perceived to be their enemies: Shi'a, disloyal Sunnis, Christians, foreign workers and tourists.

It is in the highly effective use of YouTube, social media and other internet resources that ISIS truly reveals its political genius. They are providing visual evidence to the Islamic faithful that they do not need to be patient in waiting for the gradual realization of the Islamic State; look at us, the prophecies are already coming to fruition, we are expanding our empire and killing the infidels. The Islamic State is here now, and all good Muslims will join us. And they do. Thousands of young men, disillusioned and marginalized by secular society, are flocking to ISIS's geographic stronghold, or plotting terrorism in their own neighborhoods. What has happened, in other words, is that by completely disregarding the need to win the voluntary support of the people they conquer, they have been successful in winning the support of the ultraconservative Muslims of the entire world.

While ISIS acted decisively and effectively, Damascus and Baghdad ignored them, focusing on the civil strife in their own immediate vicinity, rather than the territory occupied by ISIS in the hinterlands of the respective nations. The rest of the world, meanwhile, dithered; it watched and waited, it enacted band aid solutions to specific acute crises, but generally forged no opposition as ISIS ballooned in popularity and strength. Of course, this is with the benefit of hindsight; the fact is this is an extremely complicated,multi-faceted problem, and the politicians who now boast confidently of their three-point plan to defeat ISIS are dangerously misleading their constituents. The only way to find a solution to a highly complex problem is to first understand the complexities we are dealing with. McCants is part of the solution of identifying facts and evidence, from which a meaningful and effective discourse can commence.

[Chris Buckham · Rating 4 out of 5]

Title: The ISIS Apocalypse
Author: William McCants
ISBN: 978-1-250-08090-5
Publisher: St Martin’s Press
Year: 2015
Hardcover
Pages: 242
Photos/Maps: 0

The War on Terror has prompted the drafting of hundred’s of books covering all facets of the cause and personalities surrounding ISIS, Al-Qaeda, the Taliban etc; however, one area that has received little to no ‘accessible – to the layman’ interpretation has been a religious analysis of the driving doctrine behind the various groups. McCant’s book covers the background and history of ISIS but he also pays a significant amount of attention to the Islamic canon, drawing upon his expertise in Islamic religious studies (he has a PhD in Near Eastern Studies and speaks and reads Arabic fluently).

Islam as a religion is an extremely complex and confusing faith; subject to interpretation by scholars going back hundreds of years. As McCants points out if you want to find text promoting peaceful co-existence you will find it just as you will find text advocating violent extremism against non-believers. The author’s primary strength lies in his ability to quote primary-source Arabic text to assist in his explanation of this to the layman. Further, his talent at presenting this text within the context of the greater narrative in such a way as to facilitate easy interpretation lends both credence and accessibility to his account.

The challenge of dealing with the myriad of organizations that make up the adversaries in the War on Terror, is exacerbated by the underlying motivators that drive them and set the tone for their conduct and goals. Thus it is that the extremists are not a homogeneous organization but deeply fractured and, as often as not, fighting one another rather than secular forces. McCants goes to great lengths in explaining this and underlying the fact that the goals and methods of ISIS are neither condoned nor in common with those of Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden. This is critical to understand because the West tends to lump these organizations together in error as their means and methods are fundamentally different.

He also goes on to explain how the population of the Middle East’s perspective on the war has changed over the course of the conflict. Many secular Muslims who initially viewed the war in terms of power politics have now come to see the conflict in terms of the religious interpretation of the Islamic “End Times” prophecy. The significant upheavals of the last decade combined with the deep divide between Shia and Sunni as well as the ongoing role of the “New Crusaders” have heralded, for many, the coming apocalypse. This message resonates with the international Muslim community as well as locals due the violence and tyranny in the very regions prophesized in the Muslim texts.

McCants book fills a void missing in many of the narratives on ISIS and its rise: that of the religious underpinnings justifying its actions and the connection this has with the local population. His book is reasoned and balanced. His deep understanding of Islam combined with his third person perspective make for a book well worth the time to read and ponder.

Maj Chris Buckham, a member of the RCAF, is seconded with the Kenyan Defence Force in Nairobi, Kenya. He maintains a blog of his reviews at www.themilitaryreviewer.blogspot.com.

[Steven H · Rating 2 out of 5]

A FINE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF ISIS

Author William McCants wrote in the Preface to the new edition of this 2015 book, “Though reluctant to use the future tense when writing the book, I ventured my own predictions about the fortunes of the Islamic State. I anticipated its government in Syria and Iraq would collapse and its ‘provinces’ abroad would multiply and spread. Both are proving true… It was obvious to anyone who has watched how capably the Islamic State capitalizes on the chaos roiling the region. If I am right that the Islamic State pushed to expand its territory and terror network in response to Western nations attacking its lands in Syria and Iraq, then we should anticipate more expansion to compensate for fresh setbacks on the battlefield… The more the United States and its allies succeed in destroying the Islamic State’s government, the more terrorism it will face.” (Pg. xiii-xiv)

He explains, “I am going to take you on a tour of the Islamic State. We will explore its origins, meet its leaders, boo its fans, and cheer its detractors. You will read its propaganda, study its strategies, eavesdrop on its internal debates, and follow its tweets… I will explain its obscure allusions to Islamic history and theology so you can understand the ways the Islamic State uses and abuses Islam… its extreme brutality defies the convention al jihadist playbook. We’re used to thinking of al-Qaeda’s former leader Osama bin Laden as the baddest of the bad, but the Islamic State is worse… the Islamic State’s members… stir messianic fervor rather than suppress it. They want God’s kingdom now rather than later. This is not Bin Laden’s jihad.” (Pg. 2-3)

He observes, “the Islamic State was destined to fall out with al-Qaeda from the start. Al-Qaeda… wanted to build popular Muslim support before declaring the caliphate. The Islamic State wanted to impose a caliphate regardless of what the masses thought. The dispute that divided parent from child was there from the Islamic State’s conception.” (Pg. 7) Later, he adds, “It is a major taboo in Islam to kill a fellow Muslim. But the Islamic State argued that those who defied its rules were apostates or rebels so it could kill them without blame.” (Pg. 34)

He notes, “The jihadist discussion boards were … friendly territory for the Islamic State and its predecessor al-Qaeda in Iraq, where they had pioneered the distribution of propaganda. They opted for snuff films rather than al-Qaeda’s usual pedantry… Extreme violence attracted eyeballs to the propaganda, and … decentralized distribution kept it online. The Islamic State would use many of the same techniques a few years later to recruit on Twitter.” (Pg. 43)

He comments, “just as the flag of the Islamic State was trampled underfoot in Iraq, jihadist fanboys and al-Qaeda’s own affiliates began to lift it up, keeping the dream of the caliphate alive during a bleak period… preceding the chaos of the Arab Spring, which would renew the fortunes of the global jihadist movement.” (Pg. 45)

He points out, “all the al-Qaeda affiliates failed to create durable governments. The jihadists could interpret the failure as proof that al-Qaeda’ leaders were right all along. Had the affiliates hewed more closely to the hearts-and-minds strategy advocated by Bin Laden… they would have succeeded… But the jihadists could also interpret the failures as proof that the al-Qaeda affiliates hadn’t been brutal enough… that’s pretty much what the Islamic State would decide, although it would do better than it had in its first attempt at providing government services and co-opting the tribes.” (Pg. 68-69)

He summarizes, “the Islamic State consolidated its hold over eastern Syria… Its strategy of going it alone to capture and control territory may have alienated everyone, but it had paid off. The Islamic State now had a vast war chest… and President Assad had turned a blind eye, happy to see the Islamic State threaten his domestic and foreign enemies as long as it didn’t threaten him… Thousands of fighters left… other rebel groups to join the Islamic State. Some wanted to play for the winning team, some believed it was doing God’s work, some saw it as the Sunnis’ only hope… and some just wanted to make a little money… The Islamic State welcomed them all.” (Pg. 98)

He states, “the Islamic State had the money, fighters, weapons, and land to make a plausible case that it was the caliphate reborn. It helped that its caliph had more religious training than any political leaders in the Muslim world. Most Sunni Muslims may have rejected the Islamic State as a travesty and a sham, but they could not easily dismiss it as a joke when it declared itself a caliphate in 2014. The Islamic State was too powerful.” (Pg. 123) He adds, “The Islamic State had once been an object in what NOT to do. Its critics… attributed its defeat in 2008 to its brutality, zealotry, and arrogant belief that it was a state. But by 2014, those were the very qualities that made the Islamic State so successful. While other rebel groups worked together to overthrow governments, the State was busy creating its own.” (Pg. 126)

He points out, “the Islamic State has deliberately provoked the anger of Muslims and non-Muslims alike with its online videos of outrageous and carefully choreographed violence. It showcases the beheading of prisoners … and dumps enemy soldiers in mass graves while the camera is rolling. The State revels in gore and wants everyone to know it. And yet it has been remarkably successful at recruiting fighters, capturing land, and subduing its subjects, and creating a state. Why? Because violence and gore work.” (Pg. 148) Later, he adds, “The hands of thieves were severed, adulterers were stoned, bandits were shot and crucified, all in full public view. The Islamic State’s harsh punishments subdued the locals as effectively as massacring its enemies had.” (Pg. 152)

He summarizes and concludes, “The international coalition … can… support proxies to fight against the Islamic State… The coalition should provide air cover and intelligence to Sunni tribal militias and rebel groups that fight against the Islamic State… the coalition should consider arming them with light weaponry…If you think all of that sounds a lot like the coalition’s current military strategy, you’re right. It’s not a great plan, but it’s the best option at the moment. I’m confident that the Islamic State’s government in Syria and Iraq will crumble. No modern jihadist has provoked international intervention and survived…. The question is how will the jihadists evaluate the demise of the Islamic State? Will it prove to then that Bin Laden was right? Or will it prove that the State just needed to double down on its strategy? … there’s no obvious answer to the question…” (Pg. 157-158)

This book will be of great interest to those studying the Islamic State, and terrorist movements.

[Michael Mcadoo · Rating 4 out of 5]

An insightful study on an emerging threat to the region in which it grows and--as evidenced by recent events in Europe and perhaps in America--to the greater Western World.

The author blends his knowledge of middle eastern culture, Islamic theology, language, and diplomatic analysis, with well-referenced research and declassified Jihadist communications to present a thorough, although somewhat one-dimensional description of the prophetic genesis and apocalyptic goals of ISIS.

While understanding the religious history and nature of the movement's founders, current leadership, and foot soldiers is critical, the analysis seems to stop there. As one who has worked in the past against those who exercise religious- and ethnic-based fervor to attain their own ends, I have to wonder if there is not some other, more earthly motivation in the minds of those who steer this movement. While religion may be the driving force behind some core of IS's clerical leadership, and while religious zeal may drive some of the fighters to take up the black flags and uniforms, what motivates those former Iraqi military and intelligence officers, who came to their power and knowledge under the largely secular dictatorship of Saddam Hussein?

A well-written, well-researched work which does an excellent job of detailing the religious motivations--and perhaps vulnerabilities--of the Islamic State. I only wish the author had done more to explain the backgrounds of, and thereby the more human motivations of the group's operational/tactical leadership.

[Doichin Cholakov · Rating 5 out of 5]

The book follows the evolution of ISIS ideology and strategic thinking, providing rich historic and scriptural background. It does not dwell on gory details, extravagant theories or geopolitical musings. On the contrary - it takes a very somber and minimalistic approach, mostly excavating the digital dust generated by jihad - mails between jihadi leaders, social media posts by mujahed fan-boys, trendy books on insurgence and capturing and ruling territories, etc.
The essential debate (mostly among well versed, educated leaders of ISIS and Al Quaeda) is on the possibility to establish a state without winning (or even caring for) the hearts and minds of the people. Paradoxically to our (and Al Quaeda's)expectations the Caliphate seems to be winning on this one. William McCants provides examples of other instances of state-building being based on violence rather than than consent. A striking parallel that he comes short of making is Lenin's notion of the revolutionary avant-garde. Similarities are uncanny, also when it comes to other concepts like borders, nationality, ideological purity, interpretation of scriptures, etc.
The book is a valuable contribution since it allows us to take a look beyond the paralyzing uniqueness of what is happening currently in the Middle East as well as the futile debate on whose fault it was. Integrating ISIS back within our "normal" frame of historic and political references makes it possible to come up with more rational expectations regarding its development and better responses to it.

[Prince William Public Libraries]

William McCants traces the genesis of Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda and the jihadist factions that arose as affiliate groups in Africa, Somalia, the Arabian Peninsula, and Syria. The author examines how internal leadership tensions, lack of real communication lines, and conflicts over financing and levels of acceptable violence, in addition to American interventions, lead to the weakening of al-Qaeda. The book details how the failures of al-Qaeda, the rise of the Arab Spring, and the increased resentment of Western presence led to the eventual formation of The Islamic State.

The narrative requires time and attention by the reader but the reward is a much better understanding of the increased threat of terrorism and the motivations, often Islamic apocalypticism, that drive jihadist groups to promote and carry out extreme acts of violence.

The author is a former U.S. State Department senior adviser for countering violent extremism and currently directs the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution. His authoritative work is based on primary sources in Arabic including religious texts and secret letters seldom seen.

Highly recommended for anyone trying to better understand the origins of today's terror groups.

~Denise F.

Click the link to find the book and check availability at the Prince William Public Library System:
http://librarycatalog.pwcgov.org/pola...

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kniha popisuje nástup Islamského štátu, akým spôsobom dokázal získavať popularitu medzi zahraničnými mudžahídmi a akým spôsobom získal a ovládol dobyté územie.

Zaoberá sa historickým vývojom k vzniku tohto zoskupenia aj jeho ideologickými zdrojmi. Najmä myšlienka apokalypsy a ako je vnímaná cez rôzne zdroje Islamu je tu veľmi dobre popísaná. Z týchto hľadísk dokázal autor posúdiť východiská a ciele IS a porovnať ich s východiskami a cieľmi jeho pomyselných "otcov" z Al-Káidy.

Zaujme aj analýza vzťahov jednotlivých aktérov v oblasti a udalosti fakticky vedúce k občianskej vojne v Sýrii a Iraku. V akom vzťahu a akým spôsobom sa do tejto vojny zapájali regionálne i svetové veľmoci. Zároveň prináša aj osobné postoje jednotlivých vedúcich postáv medzinárodného džihádu, čím dodáva dielu ďalšiu dôležitú úroveň.

Autor správne načrtol aj možný scenár konca IS, ktorý v čase vydania knihy ovládal veľké územia Sýrie a Iraku. Zároveň vyslovil odôvodnené obavy, kam sa potom podejú vojnou zocelení mudžahídi. Isté je, že o nich ešte budeme počuť.

Toto dielo sa podrobne venuje najmä vzťahom a dejom, ktoré definovali formu a spôsob vládnutia v IS. Ak chce niekto čítať reportáže z dobytého územia, svedctvá vrážd a genocídy, do pozornosti možno udať dielo Denníky z Rakky - Útek z Islamského štátu.

[Margie · Rating 4 out of 5]

Despite its slightly over-egged title, this is a straightforward, easy-to-read account of what IS is, how it came about, and what it hopes to do. I was looking for something that didn't take a left/right view on IS and this filled the bill. There is so much hyperbole surrounding IS - our own former PM relished using his self-coined epithet "the Daesh death cult" at every possible opportunity. But while many of our freedoms and much of our privacy is being lost as governments take cynical advantage of the existence of IS, I wanted to try to find out the realities, and I think this book is a good place to start. Frankly, IS doesn't need any exaggeration. Even Al Qaeda severed all ties with IS because they didn't want IS "tarnishing Al Qaeda's brand" (!) a phrase that had me momentarily musing upon Bin Laden and the boys, in their caves, rapping about "leveraging their stakeholders" and "drilling down on their competencies". A small moment of levity (for me) in an otherwise uncheerful, but fascinating read.

[Michael Stark · Rating 5 out of 5]

Well informed and highly relevant. If you want to understand wtf is going on you need to read this. Certainly changed some of my well entrenched views on the topic. I never really brought into the highly divided Muslim world line, but after reading this I do understand how divided it is, and why. I also begrudgingly have changed my mind on blowing them up with overwhelming military firepower. That is exactly what they want, and will only exasperate the whole situation. An absolute dogs breakfast of a situation. No easy answers.

My view? Religion is still screwing us over as a human race and people everywhere need to harden up and morally stand on their own two feet. Believe in God by all means, but keep it as a personal relationship. Religion, any religion, is only ever about humans controlling other humans, has nothing to do with God, and is utterly evil.