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Pivotal Moments in American History
The Bay of Pigs
In The Bay of Pigs , Howard Jones provides a concise, incisive, and dramatic account of the disastrous attempt to overthrow Castro in April 1961. Drawing on recently declassified CIA documents, Jones deftly examines the train of missteps and self-deceptions that led to the invasion of U.S.-trained exiles at the Bay of Pigs.
Ignoring warnings from the ambassador to Cuba, the Eisenhower administration put in motion an operation that proved nearly unstoppable even after the inauguration of John F. Kennedy. The CIA and Pentagon, meanwhile, both voiced confidence in the outcome of the invasion, especially after coordinating previous successful coups in Guatemala and Iran. And so the Kennedy administration launched the exile force toward its doom in Cochinos Bay on April 17, 1961. Jones gives a riveting account of the battle--and the confusion in the White House--before moving on to explore its implications. The Bay of Pigs, he writes, set the course of Kennedy's foreign policy. It was a humiliation for the administration that fueled fears of Communist domination and pushed Kennedy toward a hardline "cold warrior" stance. But at the same time, the failed attack left him deeply skeptical of CIA and military advisers and influenced his later actions during the Cuban missile crisis.
Ignoring warnings from the ambassador to Cuba, the Eisenhower administration put in motion an operation that proved nearly unstoppable even after the inauguration of John F. Kennedy. The CIA and Pentagon, meanwhile, both voiced confidence in the outcome of the invasion, especially after coordinating previous successful coups in Guatemala and Iran. And so the Kennedy administration launched the exile force toward its doom in Cochinos Bay on April 17, 1961. Jones gives a riveting account of the battle--and the confusion in the White House--before moving on to explore its implications. The Bay of Pigs, he writes, set the course of Kennedy's foreign policy. It was a humiliation for the administration that fueled fears of Communist domination and pushed Kennedy toward a hardline "cold warrior" stance. But at the same time, the failed attack left him deeply skeptical of CIA and military advisers and influenced his later actions during the Cuban missile crisis.
256 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2008
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About the author
Howard Jones
132 books15 followersA specialist in the history of American foreign policy, Howard Jones was Distinguished University Research Professor Emeritus at the University of Alabama.
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Displaying 1 - 22 of 22 reviews
July 21, 2016
You could read this book as a guide to what goes on in Washington D.C. today. This book gives a great narrative of a fiasco over 50 years old but the arrogance, bungling, finger-pointing, “plausible denial” dance, epidemic of memory loss and blame game is timeless. For me, this book takes its place alongside The Best and the Brightest, The Power Game: How Washington Works and All the President's Men in opening my eyes to the way the political world works.
The Bay of Pigs gets 4..no make it 5 Stars as I learned how things really happened. I think over the years I bought the Kennedy propaganda that the new president was steamrolled into approving, against his best judgment, a turnkey operation that all set to go. Practically on the beach already. Well not so. A few weeks before the invasion date, Kennedy moved the landing site to the Bay of Pigs, 80 miles from the original location. He also made critical changes in timing and reduced air support that had a mortal effect on the operation. Many aspects of the plan were known and impacted by the new administration in such a way as to guarantee failure. Jones makes clear that President Kennedy had misgivings and only reluctantly gave the go signal at the last moment. But he also wanted a big win early in the term to show how tough he was and gain some Cold War cred. The book is harsh on all sides but is very fair. He seems to back everything up.
Jones gives a thorough background on how “regime change” came to be so aggressive. Eisenhower’s administration had achieved regime changes in several countries, either through direct action or influencing actors. “Plausible deniability” runs throughout the various operations. With Castro’s rise, a more forceful and direct operation was conceived by the “grandfatherly” Eisenhower’s guys (remember he ran WWII in Europe and was no pansy). Parallel ops featuring assassination of the top Cuban leadership with a landing of freedom fighters would result in a glorious uprising and Cuba would be free. Jones follows all the twists and turns of this strategy and how it is never put together in a coherent way.
Eisenhower’s boys first get the Mafia involved in trying to kill Castro but the Kennedys and, later, Johnson, don’t have a problem with this when they get control.
The New York Times and the administration mouthpieces act the same way back then as they do today. No problem reporting on secret operations and the State Dept spokesman is just as “clueless” as ever.
Furthermore, it appeared that the entire world knew of the imminent secret invasion. “U.S. Helps Train an Anti-Castro Force at Secret Guatemalan Air-Ground Base,” ran the headlines of a New York Times front-page article on January 10. The administration, however, continued to deny the undeniable. In response to a news correspondent’s question about Guatemala that same day, the State Department’s press officer bluntly asserted, “As to the report of a specific base, I know absolutely nothing about it.”
A real problem throughout was that some people got way too much information and others did not get key information they needed to adequately plan.
The President had advice that should have made him stop and rethink. Both Allan Dulles and Senator Fulbright made some good points:
The invasion went ahead with the US leadership vainly trying to maintain a figleaf “we aren’t involved, these are indigenous freedom fighters.” Everyone knew we were behind it and the forces on the ground were absolutely positive, we wouldn’t let them fail. Many others thought that too. But we let them get slaughtered on the beaches, mauled by airpower, infantry against Castro’s tanks.
I highly recommend this book. As I said, you can watch the same “dance” going on in our time, whenever the “guvmint” gets involved and fails. Classic.
The Bay of Pigs gets 4..no make it 5 Stars as I learned how things really happened. I think over the years I bought the Kennedy propaganda that the new president was steamrolled into approving, against his best judgment, a turnkey operation that all set to go. Practically on the beach already. Well not so. A few weeks before the invasion date, Kennedy moved the landing site to the Bay of Pigs, 80 miles from the original location. He also made critical changes in timing and reduced air support that had a mortal effect on the operation. Many aspects of the plan were known and impacted by the new administration in such a way as to guarantee failure. Jones makes clear that President Kennedy had misgivings and only reluctantly gave the go signal at the last moment. But he also wanted a big win early in the term to show how tough he was and gain some Cold War cred. The book is harsh on all sides but is very fair. He seems to back everything up.
Jones gives a thorough background on how “regime change” came to be so aggressive. Eisenhower’s administration had achieved regime changes in several countries, either through direct action or influencing actors. “Plausible deniability” runs throughout the various operations. With Castro’s rise, a more forceful and direct operation was conceived by the “grandfatherly” Eisenhower’s guys (remember he ran WWII in Europe and was no pansy). Parallel ops featuring assassination of the top Cuban leadership with a landing of freedom fighters would result in a glorious uprising and Cuba would be free. Jones follows all the twists and turns of this strategy and how it is never put together in a coherent way.
Eisenhower’s boys first get the Mafia involved in trying to kill Castro but the Kennedys and, later, Johnson, don’t have a problem with this when they get control.
The New York Times and the administration mouthpieces act the same way back then as they do today. No problem reporting on secret operations and the State Dept spokesman is just as “clueless” as ever.
Furthermore, it appeared that the entire world knew of the imminent secret invasion. “U.S. Helps Train an Anti-Castro Force at Secret Guatemalan Air-Ground Base,” ran the headlines of a New York Times front-page article on January 10. The administration, however, continued to deny the undeniable. In response to a news correspondent’s question about Guatemala that same day, the State Department’s press officer bluntly asserted, “As to the report of a specific base, I know absolutely nothing about it.”
A real problem throughout was that some people got way too much information and others did not get key information they needed to adequately plan.
The President had advice that should have made him stop and rethink. Both Allan Dulles and Senator Fulbright made some good points:
The invasion went ahead with the US leadership vainly trying to maintain a figleaf “we aren’t involved, these are indigenous freedom fighters.” Everyone knew we were behind it and the forces on the ground were absolutely positive, we wouldn’t let them fail. Many others thought that too. But we let them get slaughtered on the beaches, mauled by airpower, infantry against Castro’s tanks.
I highly recommend this book. As I said, you can watch the same “dance” going on in our time, whenever the “guvmint” gets involved and fails. Classic.
November 26, 2023
The Bay Of Pigs
On April 17, 1961, approximately 1500 Cuban exiles trained and supported by the United States launched an ill-fated invasion against Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs in southwest Cuba. The Bay of Pigs invasion occurred early in the presidency of John F. Kennedy and constituted one of the great foreign policy missteps of the United States during the Cold War. In his new book in the "Pivotal Moments in American History" series of Oxford University Press, Howard Jones offers a succinct and sobering account of the Bay of Pigs and its aftermath. Written with quiet restraint, Jones's book has much to teach about American interventionist tendencies in Cuba and elswhere. Howard Jones is University Research Professor of History at the University of Alabama. He has written extensively on American history.
Jones shows the many tangled threads in the Bay of Pigs story. Following Castro's ascension to power in Cuba and his increasing hostility to the United States, the Eisenhower Administration authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to plan and conduct what became the Bay of Pigs invasion. With the momentum the plan had gathered, the new president, Kennedy, allowed the proposed overthrow of Castro to continue. Kennedy was indeed an active participant and changed the original plan in several respects. In addition to the invasion by the Cuban exiles, the plan had several components that Jones documents well in his study. The CIA engaged in dealings with the Mafia in a plan to assassinate Castro before the invasion. The invasion also relied popular insurrection in Cuba to displace the Castro regime after the exile force had established a beachhead. In the event the initial landing did not immediately succeed, the plan was for the invading force to assume guerilla tactics by joining with local fighters in the Escambray Mountains of Cuba.
Jones details how and why the plan failed at every level. He is critical of the plan at the outset for its interference with the internal affairs of a foreign nation, including the assassination of its leader, which had not committed acts of war against the United States. He also shows well how various parts of the Executive Branch, from the President and his immediate advisors, to the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the State Department tended to work against each other and to avoid responsibility for the unfortunate events that occurred in Cuba in April, 1961. The United States badly underestimated the resolve of the Castro regime, overestimated the likelihood of a popular uprising, and did not know the strength of Castro's air force.
Beyond these concerns, Jones points to other factors which doomed the invasion from the outset. The primarily failing was the confusion between political and military goals in the invasion. Eisenhower had entrusted planning to the CIA rather than to the military in an attempt to minimize the public exposure of the United States. Through Kennedy, the policy was one of "plausible deniablity" of the United States's activites. This "plausible deniability" proved impossible to maintain for an operation of the scope of the Bay of Pigs. Furthermore, political considerations irreparably compromised the military aspects of the plan. The invasion site was moved to the Bay of Pigs from a site about 100 miles east in the interest of secrecy. With its coral reefs, swamps, and lack of access to the mountains, the Bay of Pigs proved a poor alternative site. Probably more importantly, President Kennedy called off and limited supportive United States air strikes which were designed to neutralize Castro's air force. Castro's planes performed well during the invasion. Without air support, the amphibious landing, difficult at best, was doomed. Without support from the United States, the Cuban invasion quickly failed.
Jones also describes the aftermath of the failed invasion, with further attempts by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to assassinate Castro and to mount a direct United States military attack on Cuba. The Bay of Pigs invasion led directly to the Cuban Missile Crisis in the autumn of 1962, which came perilously close to nuclear confrontation between the United States and the USSR. In 1975, following the investigations of a Senate Committee, President Gerald Ford issued an Executive Order forbidding at last the use of assassination as a political weapon of the United States. Jones sees parallels between the Bay of Pigs invasion and subsequent attempts by the United States to intervene in the internal affairs of nations unfriendly to the United States. He writes at the conclusion of his study (p. 174):
"[A]s history has repeatedly shown, intervention is far more complicated than it appears at the outset. The United States in April 1961 had embarked on the slippery slope toward a high-risk policy of forceful regime change that did not work in Cuba, nor in Vietnam, nor in Iraq, and remains shaky in Afghanistan."
Jones has written a thoughtful detailed study of the Bay of Pigs that will be of interest to readers who wish to reflect upon and understand the foreign policy of the United States.
Robin Friedman
On April 17, 1961, approximately 1500 Cuban exiles trained and supported by the United States launched an ill-fated invasion against Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs in southwest Cuba. The Bay of Pigs invasion occurred early in the presidency of John F. Kennedy and constituted one of the great foreign policy missteps of the United States during the Cold War. In his new book in the "Pivotal Moments in American History" series of Oxford University Press, Howard Jones offers a succinct and sobering account of the Bay of Pigs and its aftermath. Written with quiet restraint, Jones's book has much to teach about American interventionist tendencies in Cuba and elswhere. Howard Jones is University Research Professor of History at the University of Alabama. He has written extensively on American history.
Jones shows the many tangled threads in the Bay of Pigs story. Following Castro's ascension to power in Cuba and his increasing hostility to the United States, the Eisenhower Administration authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to plan and conduct what became the Bay of Pigs invasion. With the momentum the plan had gathered, the new president, Kennedy, allowed the proposed overthrow of Castro to continue. Kennedy was indeed an active participant and changed the original plan in several respects. In addition to the invasion by the Cuban exiles, the plan had several components that Jones documents well in his study. The CIA engaged in dealings with the Mafia in a plan to assassinate Castro before the invasion. The invasion also relied popular insurrection in Cuba to displace the Castro regime after the exile force had established a beachhead. In the event the initial landing did not immediately succeed, the plan was for the invading force to assume guerilla tactics by joining with local fighters in the Escambray Mountains of Cuba.
Jones details how and why the plan failed at every level. He is critical of the plan at the outset for its interference with the internal affairs of a foreign nation, including the assassination of its leader, which had not committed acts of war against the United States. He also shows well how various parts of the Executive Branch, from the President and his immediate advisors, to the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the State Department tended to work against each other and to avoid responsibility for the unfortunate events that occurred in Cuba in April, 1961. The United States badly underestimated the resolve of the Castro regime, overestimated the likelihood of a popular uprising, and did not know the strength of Castro's air force.
Beyond these concerns, Jones points to other factors which doomed the invasion from the outset. The primarily failing was the confusion between political and military goals in the invasion. Eisenhower had entrusted planning to the CIA rather than to the military in an attempt to minimize the public exposure of the United States. Through Kennedy, the policy was one of "plausible deniablity" of the United States's activites. This "plausible deniability" proved impossible to maintain for an operation of the scope of the Bay of Pigs. Furthermore, political considerations irreparably compromised the military aspects of the plan. The invasion site was moved to the Bay of Pigs from a site about 100 miles east in the interest of secrecy. With its coral reefs, swamps, and lack of access to the mountains, the Bay of Pigs proved a poor alternative site. Probably more importantly, President Kennedy called off and limited supportive United States air strikes which were designed to neutralize Castro's air force. Castro's planes performed well during the invasion. Without air support, the amphibious landing, difficult at best, was doomed. Without support from the United States, the Cuban invasion quickly failed.
Jones also describes the aftermath of the failed invasion, with further attempts by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to assassinate Castro and to mount a direct United States military attack on Cuba. The Bay of Pigs invasion led directly to the Cuban Missile Crisis in the autumn of 1962, which came perilously close to nuclear confrontation between the United States and the USSR. In 1975, following the investigations of a Senate Committee, President Gerald Ford issued an Executive Order forbidding at last the use of assassination as a political weapon of the United States. Jones sees parallels between the Bay of Pigs invasion and subsequent attempts by the United States to intervene in the internal affairs of nations unfriendly to the United States. He writes at the conclusion of his study (p. 174):
"[A]s history has repeatedly shown, intervention is far more complicated than it appears at the outset. The United States in April 1961 had embarked on the slippery slope toward a high-risk policy of forceful regime change that did not work in Cuba, nor in Vietnam, nor in Iraq, and remains shaky in Afghanistan."
Jones has written a thoughtful detailed study of the Bay of Pigs that will be of interest to readers who wish to reflect upon and understand the foreign policy of the United States.
Robin Friedman
November 1, 2012
A very good history of the Bay of Pigs fiasco.
On April 17, 1961, approximately 1500 Cuban exiles trained and supported by the United States launched an ill-fated invasion against Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs in southwest Cuba. The Bay of Pigs invasion occurred early in the presidency of John F. Kennedy and constituted one of the great foreign policy missteps of the United States during the Cold War.
Jones shows the many tangled threads in the Bay of Pigs story. Following Castro's ascension to power in Cuba and his increasing hostility to the United States, the Eisenhower Administration authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to plan and conduct what became the Bay of Pigs invasion. With the momentum the plan had gathered, the new president, Kennedy, allowed the proposed overthrow of Castro to continue. Kennedy was indeed an active participant and changed the original plan in several respects. In addition to the invasion by the Cuban exiles, the plan had several components that Jones documents well in his study. The CIA engaged in dealings with the Mafia in a plan to assassinate Castro before the invasion. The invasion also relied popular insurrection in Cuba to displace the Castro regime after the exile force had established a beachhead. In the event the initial landing did not immediately succeed, the plan was for the invading force to assume guerilla tactics by joining with local fighters in the Escambray Mountains of Cuba.
Jones details how and why the plan failed at every level. He is critical of the plan at the outset for its interference with the internal affairs of a foreign nation, including the assassination of its leader, which had not committed acts of war against the United States. He also shows well how various parts of the Executive Branch, from the President and his immediate advisors, to the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the State Department tended to work against each other and to avoid responsibility for the unfortunate events that occurred in Cuba in April, 1961. The United States badly underestimated the resolve of the Castro regime, overestimated the likelihood of a popular uprising, and did not know the strength of Castro's air force.
Beyond these concerns, Jones points to other factors which doomed the invasion from the outset. The primarily failing was the confusion between political and military goals in the invasion. Eisenhower had entrusted planning to the CIA rather than to the military in an attempt to minimize the public exposure of the United States. Through Kennedy, the policy was one of "plausible deniablity" of the United States's activites. This "plausible deniability" proved impossible to maintain for an operation of the scope of the Bay of Pigs. Furthermore, political considerations irreparably compromised the military aspects of the plan. The invasion site was moved to the Bay of Pigs from a site about 100 miles east in the interest of secrecy. With its coral reefs, swamps, and lack of access to the mountains, the Bay of Pigs proved a poor alternative site. Probably more importantly, President Kennedy called off and limited supportive United States air strikes which were designed to neutralize Castro's air force. Castro's planes performed well during the invasion. Without air support, the amphibious landing, difficult at best, was doomed. Without support from the United States, the Cuban invasion quickly failed.
Jones also describes the aftermath of the failed invasion, with further attempts by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to assassinate Castro and to mount a direct United States military attack on Cuba. The Bay of Pigs invasion led directly to the Cuban Missile Crisis in the autumn of 1962, which came perilously close to nuclear confrontation between the United States and the USSR. In 1975, following the investigations of a Senate Committee, President Gerald Ford issued an Executive Order forbidding at last the use of assassination as a political weapon of the United States. Jones sees parallels between the Bay of Pigs invasion and subsequent attempts by the United States to intervene in the internal affairs of nations unfriendly to the United States. He writes at the conclusion of his study (p. 174):
"[A]s history has repeatedly shown, intervention is far more complicated than it appears at the outset. The United States in April 1961 had embarked on the slippery slope toward a high-risk policy of forceful regime change that did not work in Cuba, nor in Vietnam, nor in Iraq, and remains shaky in Afghanistan."
Jones has written a thoughtful detailed study of the Bay of Pigs that will be of interest to readers who wish to reflect upon and understand the foreign policy of the United States.
However, he claims Castro wasn't a communist? What? Castro wasn't a communist? Who then was First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party from 1961 on? White House tapes show clearly no USG agency murdered Ngo Dinh Diem during a coup in Vietnam. Jones thinks so. The assassination plots against Fidel Castro are well known and admitted to by the CIA. Nothing new there. True, the CIA admitted a connection with the plotters who killed Dominican dictator, Rafael Trujillo. But, according to released internal Agency memoranda, there was no direct connection to Trujillo's assassination.
Also, Jones writes that all CIA covert operations are some sort of rogue operation and deviate from the CIA's "original" mission of intel collection. But this argument is misleading.Many critics mistakenly assert that President Harry Truman never wanted the CIA to engage in covert action. But he signed NSC directives assigning responsibility for covert action to the CIA—at a time when CIA officials were skeptical about taking on this mission.
The book points out that covert actions are undertaken at the behest of the President to achieve specific ends at specific times. To Jones, those objectives are illegitimate, to be viewed solely through the prism of events decades later, as though you can draw a simple, straight, decisive line of causation through years of complicated history.
Also, Jones asserts that Ngo Dinh Diem was killed oin 1962, but it was actually 1963.
On April 17, 1961, approximately 1500 Cuban exiles trained and supported by the United States launched an ill-fated invasion against Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs in southwest Cuba. The Bay of Pigs invasion occurred early in the presidency of John F. Kennedy and constituted one of the great foreign policy missteps of the United States during the Cold War.
Jones shows the many tangled threads in the Bay of Pigs story. Following Castro's ascension to power in Cuba and his increasing hostility to the United States, the Eisenhower Administration authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to plan and conduct what became the Bay of Pigs invasion. With the momentum the plan had gathered, the new president, Kennedy, allowed the proposed overthrow of Castro to continue. Kennedy was indeed an active participant and changed the original plan in several respects. In addition to the invasion by the Cuban exiles, the plan had several components that Jones documents well in his study. The CIA engaged in dealings with the Mafia in a plan to assassinate Castro before the invasion. The invasion also relied popular insurrection in Cuba to displace the Castro regime after the exile force had established a beachhead. In the event the initial landing did not immediately succeed, the plan was for the invading force to assume guerilla tactics by joining with local fighters in the Escambray Mountains of Cuba.
Jones details how and why the plan failed at every level. He is critical of the plan at the outset for its interference with the internal affairs of a foreign nation, including the assassination of its leader, which had not committed acts of war against the United States. He also shows well how various parts of the Executive Branch, from the President and his immediate advisors, to the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the State Department tended to work against each other and to avoid responsibility for the unfortunate events that occurred in Cuba in April, 1961. The United States badly underestimated the resolve of the Castro regime, overestimated the likelihood of a popular uprising, and did not know the strength of Castro's air force.
Beyond these concerns, Jones points to other factors which doomed the invasion from the outset. The primarily failing was the confusion between political and military goals in the invasion. Eisenhower had entrusted planning to the CIA rather than to the military in an attempt to minimize the public exposure of the United States. Through Kennedy, the policy was one of "plausible deniablity" of the United States's activites. This "plausible deniability" proved impossible to maintain for an operation of the scope of the Bay of Pigs. Furthermore, political considerations irreparably compromised the military aspects of the plan. The invasion site was moved to the Bay of Pigs from a site about 100 miles east in the interest of secrecy. With its coral reefs, swamps, and lack of access to the mountains, the Bay of Pigs proved a poor alternative site. Probably more importantly, President Kennedy called off and limited supportive United States air strikes which were designed to neutralize Castro's air force. Castro's planes performed well during the invasion. Without air support, the amphibious landing, difficult at best, was doomed. Without support from the United States, the Cuban invasion quickly failed.
Jones also describes the aftermath of the failed invasion, with further attempts by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to assassinate Castro and to mount a direct United States military attack on Cuba. The Bay of Pigs invasion led directly to the Cuban Missile Crisis in the autumn of 1962, which came perilously close to nuclear confrontation between the United States and the USSR. In 1975, following the investigations of a Senate Committee, President Gerald Ford issued an Executive Order forbidding at last the use of assassination as a political weapon of the United States. Jones sees parallels between the Bay of Pigs invasion and subsequent attempts by the United States to intervene in the internal affairs of nations unfriendly to the United States. He writes at the conclusion of his study (p. 174):
"[A]s history has repeatedly shown, intervention is far more complicated than it appears at the outset. The United States in April 1961 had embarked on the slippery slope toward a high-risk policy of forceful regime change that did not work in Cuba, nor in Vietnam, nor in Iraq, and remains shaky in Afghanistan."
Jones has written a thoughtful detailed study of the Bay of Pigs that will be of interest to readers who wish to reflect upon and understand the foreign policy of the United States.
However, he claims Castro wasn't a communist? What? Castro wasn't a communist? Who then was First Secretary of the Cuban Communist Party from 1961 on? White House tapes show clearly no USG agency murdered Ngo Dinh Diem during a coup in Vietnam. Jones thinks so. The assassination plots against Fidel Castro are well known and admitted to by the CIA. Nothing new there. True, the CIA admitted a connection with the plotters who killed Dominican dictator, Rafael Trujillo. But, according to released internal Agency memoranda, there was no direct connection to Trujillo's assassination.
Also, Jones writes that all CIA covert operations are some sort of rogue operation and deviate from the CIA's "original" mission of intel collection. But this argument is misleading.Many critics mistakenly assert that President Harry Truman never wanted the CIA to engage in covert action. But he signed NSC directives assigning responsibility for covert action to the CIA—at a time when CIA officials were skeptical about taking on this mission.
The book points out that covert actions are undertaken at the behest of the President to achieve specific ends at specific times. To Jones, those objectives are illegitimate, to be viewed solely through the prism of events decades later, as though you can draw a simple, straight, decisive line of causation through years of complicated history.
Also, Jones asserts that Ngo Dinh Diem was killed oin 1962, but it was actually 1963.
June 20, 2023
It's a good and quick read on the whole thing. Jones goes into a good review of what happened in those days but doesn't get bogged down in an hour by hour coverage. That is not necessary.
Jones gives a good review on what happened after the whole fiasco. I did not know that the Kennedy administration continued to try to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs. They seemed to have learned nothing.
Do I think Oswald killed JFK on orders from Castro? Yes I do. Is it that ridiculous to consider?
Jones gives a good review on what happened after the whole fiasco. I did not know that the Kennedy administration continued to try to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs. They seemed to have learned nothing.
Do I think Oswald killed JFK on orders from Castro? Yes I do. Is it that ridiculous to consider?
December 15, 2020
The second half of the book does an excellent job detailing the battle and fallout from the Bay of Pigs, connecting those decisions to the covert wars often fought today.
I had difficulty following the book initially, in part due to my unfamiliarity with the players. A guide at the beginning with names and titles would be helpful.
Definitely learned a lot and a pretty quick read on a well known but misunderstood chapter in US history.
I had difficulty following the book initially, in part due to my unfamiliarity with the players. A guide at the beginning with names and titles would be helpful.
Definitely learned a lot and a pretty quick read on a well known but misunderstood chapter in US history.
March 22, 2021
"The Bay of Pigs" authored by Howard Jones,
This book provides an excellent knowledge into the inner details of what made The Bay of Pigs tick, and the many troubles of re-locations that took place in the early developmental conceptualizations of the operation.
This book provides an excellent knowledge into the inner details of what made The Bay of Pigs tick, and the many troubles of re-locations that took place in the early developmental conceptualizations of the operation.
March 30, 2023
Historian Howard Jones published the book entitled The Bay of Pigs in 2008. The book is part of the Pivotal Moments in American History series. The book contains black-and-white illustrations and a map of Cuba. The book also contains a section of notes along with an index. The book focused on the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion by American-supported Cuban exiles in the early days of the presidential administration of John Kennedy. Jones wrote the book during the presidential administration of George W. Bush. Jones only mentions the Iraq War twice directly in the book’s “Epilogue” but the Iraq War is in the background of Jones’s book (Jones 173-174). One of the editors of the Pivotal Moments in American History series, the Historian David Hackett Fischer writes in the “Editor’s Note” that “Howard Jones draws on primary sources-some of which have only recently been made available [as of 2008 when the Jones’ book was published]-to reconstruct the history of the invasion itself.” Fidel Castro was still the leader of Cuba when Jones’ book was published in 2008. I read the book on my Kindle. The book also covers President John Kennedy and his brother Robert Kennedy obsession with removing Fidel Castro as the leader of Cuba. I thought Howard Jones’s book was an interesting book about the failed Battle of Pigs invasion in April 1961.
Work Cited:
Gjelten, Tom. 2016 “Former Cuban Leader Fidel Castro Dies At Age 90.”
” National Radio Program, November 26. Retrieved: March 2023. Former Cuban President Fidel Castro Dies At Age 90 : NPR.
Gathman, Sandra. “Iraq War: 20 years on from the US invasion | Start Here.” Al Jazeera English. March 16, 2023. Educational video, 12:14 minutes. Iraq War: 20 years on from the US invasion | Start Here | Digital Series | Al Jazeera
Work Cited:
Gjelten, Tom. 2016 “Former Cuban Leader Fidel Castro Dies At Age 90.”
” National Radio Program, November 26. Retrieved: March 2023. Former Cuban President Fidel Castro Dies At Age 90 : NPR.
Gathman, Sandra. “Iraq War: 20 years on from the US invasion | Start Here.” Al Jazeera English. March 16, 2023. Educational video, 12:14 minutes. Iraq War: 20 years on from the US invasion | Start Here | Digital Series | Al Jazeera
May 1, 2025
Howard Jones' The Bay of Pigs was thoroughly researched and the hard work by the author is apparent in the quality of this book. Every assertation that Jones makes is supported by evidence that is cited at the end of the book. This book is reletively short and concise, which allows for this dense and complex topic to be easily digestible. I would highly reccommend this book to anyone who wants to learn more about the Bay of Pigs invasion and the politics that surrounded it.
September 15, 2021
Interesting take on the debacle that became the thorn in Kennedy's side. He inherited the plan for this operation and was obviously not prepared for it. He took ownership and overall responsibility which is more than you can say for most politicians.
July 25, 2022
fire as hell, america got clapped
December 15, 2023
Great overview of the Bay of Pigs Invasion.
January 4, 2025
A story I knew really very little about. Just an unbelievable story that honestly I don’t think anyone could make up.
July 1, 2009
Howard Jones, Research Professor of History at the University of Alabama, has written a concise account of one of the USA’s infamous projects. The latest volume in the Pivotal Moments in American History series gives an informative, delightful true tale of the Bay of Pigs debacle. The people in power during this episode come to life as we see President John F. Kennedy and Fidel Castro engage in a personal struggle while the CIA takes control and fails.
Prof. Jones’ nonfiction work reads as smooth as a novel. Beginning with Castro’s rise to power in the late 1950s towards the end of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency and ending during Lyndon B. Johnson’s term, a series of misinformation, no information and general ineptitude marked our relations with Cuba.
The Cold War bred fear of overthrow by Communists and this caused our leaders to freeze unable to make decisions. In order to solidify power and turn his country into an agrarian Socialist society, Castro expelled Americans and refused help of any kind. US officials couldn’t understand anyone who repulsed our money so labeled Cuba a Soviet stronghold. This moniker started the “us vs. them” mentality that continued until Johnson was forced to turn his attention to Viet Nam.
Eisenhower held his breath until he could pass the reins to Kennedy. This inexperienced leader didn’t ask or receive correct information regarding Cuba and ended up creating the proverbial mountain from the molehill. The President’s advisors, aides, Cabinet, and heads of various agencies ignorantly tried to gain favor by agreeing to any scheme from poisoning wet suits for Castro to invasion of a country that didn’t bow to the USA. This allowed the CIA to head a plan far beyond their power.
A vivid picture and, why it failed, emerges leading up to the invasion of Cuba and the sorrowful event itself. Chapter 5 headed D-Day ends with this sentence which sums up the entire episode: “According to a sailor on the scene, ‘The Americans started crying.’” A disaster foisted on the Cubans and, the Americans, by people who believed they were invincible.
Two standard operations of procedure make this incident pivotal in history. One is the concept of plausible deniability whereby the highest office can deny any knowledge of what is happening and the other is forceful regime change which we feel allows us to invade a country that doesn’t agree with our way of life.
Students of history and anyone else who wants a glimpse at how people act and react to problems will enjoy “The Bay of Pigs.” It should be required reading for those in power and those who want to be. History does repeat itself and all of us should be forewarned.
originally published on www.ijustfinished.com.
Prof. Jones’ nonfiction work reads as smooth as a novel. Beginning with Castro’s rise to power in the late 1950s towards the end of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency and ending during Lyndon B. Johnson’s term, a series of misinformation, no information and general ineptitude marked our relations with Cuba.
The Cold War bred fear of overthrow by Communists and this caused our leaders to freeze unable to make decisions. In order to solidify power and turn his country into an agrarian Socialist society, Castro expelled Americans and refused help of any kind. US officials couldn’t understand anyone who repulsed our money so labeled Cuba a Soviet stronghold. This moniker started the “us vs. them” mentality that continued until Johnson was forced to turn his attention to Viet Nam.
Eisenhower held his breath until he could pass the reins to Kennedy. This inexperienced leader didn’t ask or receive correct information regarding Cuba and ended up creating the proverbial mountain from the molehill. The President’s advisors, aides, Cabinet, and heads of various agencies ignorantly tried to gain favor by agreeing to any scheme from poisoning wet suits for Castro to invasion of a country that didn’t bow to the USA. This allowed the CIA to head a plan far beyond their power.
A vivid picture and, why it failed, emerges leading up to the invasion of Cuba and the sorrowful event itself. Chapter 5 headed D-Day ends with this sentence which sums up the entire episode: “According to a sailor on the scene, ‘The Americans started crying.’” A disaster foisted on the Cubans and, the Americans, by people who believed they were invincible.
Two standard operations of procedure make this incident pivotal in history. One is the concept of plausible deniability whereby the highest office can deny any knowledge of what is happening and the other is forceful regime change which we feel allows us to invade a country that doesn’t agree with our way of life.
Students of history and anyone else who wants a glimpse at how people act and react to problems will enjoy “The Bay of Pigs.” It should be required reading for those in power and those who want to be. History does repeat itself and all of us should be forewarned.
originally published on www.ijustfinished.com.
November 21, 2015
The Bay of Pigs by Howard Jones tells the story of the American government’s attempts at overthrowing Fidel Castro. The book focuses on the failed invasion of Cuba, which was suppose to eliminate Fidel Castro.
In 1960 the CIA wanted to find a way to overthrow Fidel Castro, the leader of Cuba. President Eisenhower wanted the CIA to find ways to take out Castro. The CIA started an invasion plan and assassination plan. Once Kennedy was elected president he didn’t like the CIA’s plan and changes the location from Trinidad to Zapata and the time to night. The goal was for the american’s to deny involvement in the invasion. The US trained Cubans to fight and set up plans. The training camps were found by many people and the plan was leaked. The US media and Russian intelligence learned about the invasion and when it was going to happen. Some parts that were important for success for the invasion were canceled. When the invasion happened, many things went wrong, the US lost the ability to deny the invasion and element of surprise when nearby Cubans saw what was happening. The invasion was still carried out but didn’t end up as suspected.
This book is an excellent book for people who want to learn more about history and have more background about the Cold War. This book isn’t very long but has action and is very interesting. The reader gets to know about what happened in the CIA that wasn’t acceptable for them to do. Overall this is a really good book.
In 1960 the CIA wanted to find a way to overthrow Fidel Castro, the leader of Cuba. President Eisenhower wanted the CIA to find ways to take out Castro. The CIA started an invasion plan and assassination plan. Once Kennedy was elected president he didn’t like the CIA’s plan and changes the location from Trinidad to Zapata and the time to night. The goal was for the american’s to deny involvement in the invasion. The US trained Cubans to fight and set up plans. The training camps were found by many people and the plan was leaked. The US media and Russian intelligence learned about the invasion and when it was going to happen. Some parts that were important for success for the invasion were canceled. When the invasion happened, many things went wrong, the US lost the ability to deny the invasion and element of surprise when nearby Cubans saw what was happening. The invasion was still carried out but didn’t end up as suspected.
This book is an excellent book for people who want to learn more about history and have more background about the Cold War. This book isn’t very long but has action and is very interesting. The reader gets to know about what happened in the CIA that wasn’t acceptable for them to do. Overall this is a really good book.
August 29, 2012
Howard Jones adds a great installment to the Pivotal Moments in American history series by exploring how the United States character changed during the lead up to Bay of Pigs and the impact it had on policy decisions in the United States. From assassination as an acceptable tool of foreign policy to the need to feel the good guy there were conflicting emotions that created the perfect storm for the debacle we know today as Pay of Pigs. Jones clearly articulates what factors led to the government decision to plan an invasion and then choose not to support it militarily in the 11th hour. He also does not make blanket excuses for Kennedy who knew what he was doing was wrong. It is another book on the brain trust that failed to advise Kennedy properly and this is the warm up for what would become that group’s greatest failure: the Vietnam War. This book also does a decent military history of the actual invasion itself but without going into exhaustive detail on every troop movement. In short it is a nice overview of the Bay of Pigs with just enough information on the political, military, and diplomatic implications of the event. A great summary of the event and a quick read for those wanting to learn more about the height of the Cold War.
March 4, 2015
Not exactly what I was hoping for, though a decent account of the buildup and actions surrounding this massive blunder and disaster, especially for the men who died, both on the American side and the thousands of Cubans who perished. Although one can lay a lot of blame on the White House, the levels of poor planning and blatant lies, inadequate training, and halfhearted measures and decision making, doomed so many, and really amazes a reader at the amateurishness of or intelligence services, particularly the CIA. And everyone in the world knew, the denials of participation made us look even that much more foolish to the world. I wanted to know about the experiences of the individual men, if possible, who fought it out on the ground. Who were these guys? I did find a paper that listed the deceased at OSU. I know there is an oral history out there, and might try that, or see if there is an account closer to my desires. This account is solid, but dry, and I think most readers here will not find it a great read.
November 5, 2012
i enjoy reading this book because it goes to show that the crucial decisions that John F. Kennedy had to under go in order to keep Fidel castro from overtaking cuba were not all very smart, it basiclly panned out to be huge hell whole with C.I.A coverup wriitten all over it. as we can see now Fidel Castro was never taken down from power and continued to be tyrant until late 2004 when he was no-longer a dictator from what was interpited.
May 7, 2016
No surprises in this book, but it provides chapter and verse on just what an immense screw-up the invasion of Cuba, coupled with plans to assassinate Castro, truly was. Jones argues, accurately I think, that the Bay of Pigs is the tipping point between the relatively cautious American foreign policy of the Eisenhower era (though Ike was the one who shaped the Bay of Pigs plan JFK inherited) and the interventionist who-gives-a-damn-about-legality foreign policy of the subsequent half century.
April 30, 2025
Cuba, 1961. One of the most embarrassing failures of the Kennedy administration takes place when the poorly-conceived, badly-planned and woefully-supported Bay of Pigs invasion begins failing even before the anti-Castro forces hit the beaches - and ends with international disgrace and the waste of many lives.
This interesting history details the several reasons why this grim event should never have happened, but did.
This interesting history details the several reasons why this grim event should never have happened, but did.
January 12, 2009
Lots of names and details, but you never get bogged down. Researched very well. The author really thinks about the facts and, though written very professionally and neutrally, you know he's ultimately asking, "What the hell were they thinking?"
June 21, 2011
Note to self: helpful for paper, order it again.
January 26, 2012
The bay of Pigs deals with political factors of the invasion at the Bay off Pigs in Cuba. The author tells of deceit and half-hearted US support.
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