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Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World
Is Islam compatible with democracy? Must fundamentalism win out in the Middle East, or will democracy ever be possible? In this now-classic book, Islamic sociologist Fatima Mernissi explores the ways in which progressive Muslims--defenders of democracy, feminists, and others trying to resist fundamentalism--must use the same sacred texts as Muslims who use them for violent ends, to prove different views. Updated with a new introduction by the author written in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, Islam and Democracy serves as a guide to the players moving the pieces on the rather grim Muslim chessboard. It shines new light on the people behind today's terrorist acts and raises provocative questions about the possibilities for democracy and human rights in the Islamic world. Essential reading for anyone interested in the politics of the Middle East today, Islam and Democracy is as timely now as it was upon its initial, celebrated publication.
197 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1992
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About the author
Fatema Mernissi
48 books640 followersAKA فاطمة المرنيسي
Mernissi was born into a middle-class family. She received her primary education in a school established by the nationalist movement, and secondary level education in an all-girls school funded by the French protectorate. In 1957, she studied political science at the Sorbonne and at Brandeis University, where she earned her doctorate. She returned to work at the Mohammed V University and taught at the Faculté des Lettres between 1974 and 1981 on subjects such as methodology, family sociology and psycho-sociology. She has become noted internationally mainly as an Islamic feminist.
As an Islamic feminist, Mernissi was largely concerned with Islam and women's roles in it, analyzing the historical development of Islamic thought and its modern manifestation. Through a detailed investigation of the nature of the succession to Muhammad, she cast doubt on the validity of some of the hadith (sayings and traditions attributed to him), and therefore the subordination of women that she saw in Islam, but not necessarily in the Qur'an.
As a sociologist, Mernissi did fieldwork mainly in Morocco. On several occasions in the late 1970s and early 1980s she conducted interviews in order to map prevailing attitudes to women and work. She did sociological research for UNESCO and ILO as well as for the Moroccan authorities. In the late 1970s and in the 1980s Mernissi contributed articles to periodicals and other publications on women in Morocco and women and Islam from a contemporary as well as from a historical perspective.
In 2003, Mernissi was awarded the Prince of Asturias Award along with Susan Sontag.
Mernissi was a lecturer at the Mohammed V University of Rabat and a research scholar at the University Institute for Scientific Research, in the same city.
Mernissi was born into a middle-class family. She received her primary education in a school established by the nationalist movement, and secondary level education in an all-girls school funded by the French protectorate. In 1957, she studied political science at the Sorbonne and at Brandeis University, where she earned her doctorate. She returned to work at the Mohammed V University and taught at the Faculté des Lettres between 1974 and 1981 on subjects such as methodology, family sociology and psycho-sociology. She has become noted internationally mainly as an Islamic feminist.
As an Islamic feminist, Mernissi was largely concerned with Islam and women's roles in it, analyzing the historical development of Islamic thought and its modern manifestation. Through a detailed investigation of the nature of the succession to Muhammad, she cast doubt on the validity of some of the hadith (sayings and traditions attributed to him), and therefore the subordination of women that she saw in Islam, but not necessarily in the Qur'an.
As a sociologist, Mernissi did fieldwork mainly in Morocco. On several occasions in the late 1970s and early 1980s she conducted interviews in order to map prevailing attitudes to women and work. She did sociological research for UNESCO and ILO as well as for the Moroccan authorities. In the late 1970s and in the 1980s Mernissi contributed articles to periodicals and other publications on women in Morocco and women and Islam from a contemporary as well as from a historical perspective.
In 2003, Mernissi was awarded the Prince of Asturias Award along with Susan Sontag.
Mernissi was a lecturer at the Mohammed V University of Rabat and a research scholar at the University Institute for Scientific Research, in the same city.
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April 12, 2023
في مدينة العربية الجديدة ، مدينة مابعد حرب الخليج ، التي يمكن أن تكون أي شيء إلا مدينة السلام ، في هذه المدينة ماذا سيحدث للنساء المخوّفات لأنهن نقلن الحدود ورفضن الحواجز؟ كيف يمكن تصور بغداد الأمان الممكن على الرغم من اختفاء الدائرة الواقعية؟
في كتابها الإسلام والديمقراطية والتي كُتب على أنقاض حرب الخليج
تحاول فاطمة المرنيسي أن تشرح لنا لكي نستوعب الصدمة العميقة لما يمكن أن يسببه جمع مفهومين متنافرين،الإسلام والديمقراطية، وذلك من خلال الغوص عميقًا في عوالم الخوف وجوانبه على المستوى العربي:
الخوف من الغربب أولاً، فالغربب دائمًا عجيب، ومايسحرك هو نفسه الذي يمكن أن يؤرجحك بين الدهشة والتخريب، لكن ما تجهله يمكن أن يدرك وهذا المبدأ الأساس في الديمقراطية الغربية، فهي تحمل في داخلها أصول الحياة ومرتبطة ارتباكًا وثيقًا ببديهيات الموت
بالإضافة إلى الخوف من الإمام، ذلك الرجل الذي يقود الأمة والجماعة على الطريق السليم، ذلك الشخص الذي له صورة اسطورية في الإعلام لكنّه بنفس الوقت هش وضعيف من الداخل!!
الخوف من الديمقراطية، المسلمون عمومًا والعرب بشكل خاص لا يُعانون من خوفهم من الديمقراطية بمقدار خوفهم من خسارة ثقافية هي عدم الوصول إلى أهم مكتسبات القرون الأخيرة، وبخاصة التسامح كمبدأ وممارسة، أي الإنسانية العلمية التي سمحت بتألق المجتمع المدني
تضيف إلى ذلك الخوف من الفردية ، الماضي ، والحاضر
الكتاب مميز وفريد ، ويحمل نظرة أُنثوية حاذقة وجوهرية للعالم العربي الذي يجب عليه أن يتحمل تناقضاته ومخاوفه حتى يستطيع المضي قدمًا
الترجمة ممتازة جدًا
في كتابها الإسلام والديمقراطية والتي كُتب على أنقاض حرب الخليج
تحاول فاطمة المرنيسي أن تشرح لنا لكي نستوعب الصدمة العميقة لما يمكن أن يسببه جمع مفهومين متنافرين،الإسلام والديمقراطية، وذلك من خلال الغوص عميقًا في عوالم الخوف وجوانبه على المستوى العربي:
الخوف من الغربب أولاً، فالغربب دائمًا عجيب، ومايسحرك هو نفسه الذي يمكن أن يؤرجحك بين الدهشة والتخريب، لكن ما تجهله يمكن أن يدرك وهذا المبدأ الأساس في الديمقراطية الغربية، فهي تحمل في داخلها أصول الحياة ومرتبطة ارتباكًا وثيقًا ببديهيات الموت
بالإضافة إلى الخوف من الإمام، ذلك الرجل الذي يقود الأمة والجماعة على الطريق السليم، ذلك الشخص الذي له صورة اسطورية في الإعلام لكنّه بنفس الوقت هش وضعيف من الداخل!!
الخوف من الديمقراطية، المسلمون عمومًا والعرب بشكل خاص لا يُعانون من خوفهم من الديمقراطية بمقدار خوفهم من خسارة ثقافية هي عدم الوصول إلى أهم مكتسبات القرون الأخيرة، وبخاصة التسامح كمبدأ وممارسة، أي الإنسانية العلمية التي سمحت بتألق المجتمع المدني
تضيف إلى ذلك الخوف من الفردية ، الماضي ، والحاضر
الكتاب مميز وفريد ، ويحمل نظرة أُنثوية حاذقة وجوهرية للعالم العربي الذي يجب عليه أن يتحمل تناقضاته ومخاوفه حتى يستطيع المضي قدمًا
الترجمة ممتازة جدًا
February 10, 2017
Fascinating point of view regarding the shared fears of the Arab and Western worlds. The author refers to the first Gulf War, the rise of the Internet as a force in communication and education of young Muslims, the failures of the press in representing each culture, and the barriers to peace.
For me the book provides a challenge of languages, history and religion as well as to my understanding of the role of women and their struggles to remove the veils, literal and figurative, that protect and prevent them from participating in Islamic societies.
Recommended by a professor of French and history who herself specializes in post-Colonial history and issues.
I doubt that the imams or diplomats will take this book to heart, and the author's conclusion is too optimistic for me to place faith in it. However, I do hope that others, including a few people in high places, hear of this book and read it. One of the most difficult books for me to understand and yet so worth the effort for the insights that this author has offered.
For me the book provides a challenge of languages, history and religion as well as to my understanding of the role of women and their struggles to remove the veils, literal and figurative, that protect and prevent them from participating in Islamic societies.
Recommended by a professor of French and history who herself specializes in post-Colonial history and issues.
I doubt that the imams or diplomats will take this book to heart, and the author's conclusion is too optimistic for me to place faith in it. However, I do hope that others, including a few people in high places, hear of this book and read it. One of the most difficult books for me to understand and yet so worth the effort for the insights that this author has offered.
March 6, 2012
تنطلق الكاتبة من القوة الحضارية وتطور المعرفة و ماأنتجه الغرب من صياغة مفاهيم للإنسانية والحقوقية ومن نظريات سياسية وإقتصادية وصولاً الى مواطن الخلل والهوان عند العرب المسلمين بأنظمتهم المتهالكة!
باشرت المرنيسي في نقد سياسية القهر الديني بنرجسيتة الماضوية الذي خلف المسلمين الى الوراء وفي حال ماوصل إليه من فصام عن الواقع لعيشه في أوهام الحضارة والعلوم الإسلامية السابقة التي تسببت بتوفق الغرب " ومازل يتغني بذلك " !.
ايضا تطرقت لواقع الإسلام والمسلمين وخوفهم من الحداثة , والديمقراطية لما خلفته النصوص والتأويل وإجتهادات السلف , لآلية الفرض من الولي الفقيه كحاكم وماعلي المسلمين الا الطاعة والخنوع حسب التراث السلفي .
باشرت المرنيسي في نقد سياسية القهر الديني بنرجسيتة الماضوية الذي خلف المسلمين الى الوراء وفي حال ماوصل إليه من فصام عن الواقع لعيشه في أوهام الحضارة والعلوم الإسلامية السابقة التي تسببت بتوفق الغرب " ومازل يتغني بذلك " !.
ايضا تطرقت لواقع الإسلام والمسلمين وخوفهم من الحداثة , والديمقراطية لما خلفته النصوص والتأويل وإجتهادات السلف , لآلية الفرض من الولي الفقيه كحاكم وماعلي المسلمين الا الطاعة والخنوع حسب التراث السلفي .
March 19, 2017
Mernissi's lyrical prose is mesmerizing! I loved how she mingles bits and pieces of her personal history with the enfolding tragedy of the Gulf War that descended on the Arab world in 1990-1991, and helped expose how the Arabs suffer from, what Mernissi rightly calls, "mutilated modernity." Her pleas for democracy, pluralism and acceptance, which were later embraced by many youth during the Arab Spring, serve as a warning against the fascist camps of authoritarian rulers and fundamentalists who sometimes join forces and appeal for the application of shar'ia "in its meaning as a despotic caliphal tradition" to smother these calls in embryo. For Mernissi, women as well as the youth, are the avant-garde of this radical movement for change that must sooner or later sweep across the region, an observation that was correctly confirmed in 2011!
July 26, 2011
This book provides support to those who like to explore the ways in which politics, policies, religion, and culture are so inextricably linked that it is difficult to understand why politics and religion are often scary words. I appreciated the way in which Mernissi talks about issues within Islam and explains misconceptions, where they came from, and how to move on from them. I feel like I should read the book again. The dialogue is always interesting.
January 11, 2023
L’Islam ne sera jamais menacé par l’astronomie ni par la découverte de nouvelles galaxies, parce que sa vision est celle d’un cosmos en mouvement. Ce qui peut le menacer n’est pas situé à l’extérieur, mais à l’intérieur de l’être humain.
Les poètes seront, dans ces nouvelles galaxies, nos guides les plus sûrs.
Les poètes seront, dans ces nouvelles galaxies, nos guides les plus sûrs.
December 22, 2021
Fatema Mernissi Always deliver on term of style. her reflection on the current issues facing the islamic world. and how she connect that to it's History, theology and the philosophy of Islam and Pre Islamic Arabia is worth looking into. I think that she is one of the greatest sociologist of Islam.
July 31, 2022
Although somewhat dated (this book is slightly older than me, and discusses a part of the world in constant and dramatic flux), I thought this book was a helpful starting point for better understanding the reservations that Middle Easterners (she calls them Arabs, so I think I will too) have about Democracy, something seen as self-evidently good by most westerners. Of course it is partially the Islamic disdain for certain lifestyles that are protected in the West (homosexuality, alcohol, etc.), it is more a combination of that with deeper philosophical and theological issues, such as those Rene Guenon raises (he's at least nominally a Muslim).
One of the first things you'll notice about this book is that the author is very linguistically-oriented in her approach, which is quite fun. She doesn't sacrifice the precision of the existing Arabic words to describe what she wants to talk about, and she gives good explanations of each term. It does get to be a bit much at a couple points, but overall it adds a lot of flavor and legitimacy to the book. The first such term is one explained on the first page, gharb, which is the Arabic word for the West, and is very close to gharib the strange and foreign. I find this interesting because in a zoomed out view, I could call the Muslim world part of "The West", and everything to the east of it as "The East", but it seems that Arabs (and Russians, for that matter) see themselves as sitting on a border between two worlds, both in a geographical sense, as well as a socio-theological sense. Arabs are trapped in an in-between life in so many ways: they live in fear of America and the West, but they consume so many of their products, especially their weapons and their media; they live in anticipation of the Resurrection, but Middle-Eastern nations are among the most materialistic/consumeristic of any nations on earth, especially in terms of luxury goods.
Essentially, they attempt to live as Premoderns in a Modern (or Postmodern) world, and this causes a lot of tension. The author at one point criticizes Arabs for taking the technology that Modernism has produced but rejecting the social changes that she sees as corollary. I actually found myself agreeing with the Islamic approach a surprising amount of times throughout this book. I actually think perhaps the ideal moving forward is something like a premodern society (one which puts a heavy emphasis on morality, less emphasis on innovation) who can use the fruits of the industrial and technological revolutions, without being consumed by them. I, as a premodern-minded person, agree to a small degree with Ted K and others that Industrialization and Modernization have been catastrophic in many ways, and I thought the author's love and defense of Modernity was pretty one-sided. Perhaps we're both suffering from a case of "the grass is always greener", where those in a premodern society yearn for the emancipation of a modern society, while those in a [post]modern society yearn for the stability and enchantment of a premodern society. It seems like the obvious answer is to have some mixture of the two, to find a balancing point if possible (which many extremists claim is impossible).
It's this visceral reaction to "innovation" that Islam is so historically infamous for, as the start of the book explains two main groups who try to deal with imams: the falasifa (poets, philosophers, Sufis, etc.) and the Kharijites, who favored violence to depose anyone they disagreed with. Historically, it seems the latter has won out considerably more often than the former, and as a result the author argues that islam has favored the group over the individual, conformity over freedom. I would contest that these dichotomies that the author raised aren't so black and white: sometimes, the individual should be favored, sometimes the group; similarly, freedom as an end instead of a means ends in libertine insanity. The author, per her modernism, was all in favor of one, which seems to me to be an obvious over-correction; all premodern-minded people know that, though superficially good, reason ('aql) and personal opinion (ra'y) are all to often covers for atheist nihilism and subjectivist dissent, respectively. The problem I have is narrowing down exactly what caused the shift in Islam away from the philosophical and esoteric to the stagnated, exoteric nature of contemporary Islam. Muslims always brag about how they had some of the greatest philosophical minds of the middle ages, but how did we get to the point where they have almost no contemporary thinkers to speak of? The author explained the shift as that of a favoring of the Kharijites (those who violently killed any imams they disagreed with, instead of using intellectual argument) over the Mu'tazila, the Hellenized philosophers, who were repressed and condemned as agents of the gharb.
Another thing which aided that shift was Shahrastani's statement that, "Those who believe something or say something only have two choices: either to adopt a belief, that is, to adhere to a preexisting idea and borrow it, or to fabricate one from one's own arrogant personal opinion." Apart from the unnecessarily harsh ending ("arrogant" need not be there), I totally agree with this, and I think this is actually the root problem of the postmodern hopelessness that so many people feel; we are all told that we need to "be unique" and "not let anyone tell us what to do" and "make our own meaning", but those people direly underestimate the incredible willpower, intelligence, and wisdom required to create an entire worldview, i.e. to create a religion. Not even Friedrich Nietzsche was strong enough to hold up under the weight of his own demands, the classic "transvaluation of all values". This modern cliche is an overreaction to those who thoughtlessly accepted the religion/traditions of their forefathers. I would hope that it's evident to all thinking people that both routes are folly, that absolute rebellion against a system is just as stupid as unquestioningly following the system.
The unique problem that Islam faces is that when you take this (largely correct) statement of Shahristani's and you combine that with a religion which emphasizes absolute "submission" and "obedience" and "slavery" to God, you get a lot of problems, and society essentially freezes in place. On the Christian perspective, we are children of God, Christ is our Brother, and in families, of course there is obedience that is expected, but there is also a relationship, a maturation and kinship which is inaccessible to muslims who are forever separated from the divine One, who are forever lesser, forever slaves. Of course, we all are [ideological] slaves, we must all choose our masters, but some masters are willing to adopt their servants and make them heirs, while others are fine with slaves remaining slaves.
But let us return to the book. The author traces most of the issues in the Middle East to its heavy importation of weapons and goods from the west, while producing mostly just oil and gas. This means that ambitious scholars, students, and workers leave the region for more opportunities in Europe and elsewhere, but they face hostility in said emigration. The author complains that this lack of tolerance of scientific inquiry causes a dependency on the west and thus leaves large numbers of people unemployed and alienated. The most "avant-garde" thinking that is tolerated is that of Rafa'at al-Tahtawi, who wants freedom of belief and opinion, "with one sole condition: do not leave Islam." This of course is no real freedom of belief or opinion. This lack of freedom of religion is intrinsic to many of the countries in the region, as Mernissi points out: "The fundamentalists' argument is that if Islam is separated from the state, no one will any longer believe in Allah and the memory of the Prophet will dim... Such reasoning is in fact an insult to Islam, with its suggestion that Islam can succeed only if it is imposed on people in a totalitarian manner". I can't help but find this a very telling quote, especially in how much Christianity is its opposite; Christianity rose to power peacefully and has been relinquishing control peacefully since the enlightenment, whereas Islam took power through violence and maintains that power primarily through violence and coercion. Despite both being Abrahamic religions who make objective truth claims, one of them was open enough to engender a society that would write the United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights, while the other signs said declaration and flatly denies many of the rights guaranteed by it.
Perhaps the biggest reason the Arab world rejects those "rights" is how closely they resemble the jahiliyya, or "the chaotic pagan world before Islam"; in that pluralistic world, people insulted gods who didn't serve them, etc. When Muslims see charters like that, it reminds them of the pre-islamic era, which would mean a regression to a worse time if they accepted it. The irony of course is that Islam is itself a regression (which they are the first to admit, with Muslims repeatedly claiming that their religion is THE primordial religion, hence the term "revert" instead of "convert").
The author makes a compelling case linking the veiling of muslim women with a rejection of the pagan war goddesses which dominated the jahiliyya-era Mecca. Mernissi uses relevant arabic terms to link the destruction of these goddesses in the Ka'ba with the seeking for peace (salam) in that chaotic and swirling jahiliyya world. On the altar of this Peace were sacrificed all shirk, all deviation, all "joining with allah", i.e. absolute submission and conformity was the route chosen. There is something both wise and unwise about this. I would agree insofar that many people have as their god some idea of "freedom" or "liberty", however vaguely or ideologically warped, and that should always be secondary to following God ("We must obey God rather than men"). But we should not conflate the two like the woman Mernissi quoted (upon hearing Pres. Bush's State of the Union speech): "Is democracy a religion?"
Tied in with her case of [female goddesses > female hijabs] is a corresponding disdain for the material and the mortal due to the focus on resurrection (which she saw as a rejection of the birthing done by women). I see this as a one-sided look at afterlife, which can either neuter this life, or it can free this life so that you act more boldly than if you thought this was your only life. The latter is certainly what the early Muslim and Christian histories show, whereas today the former may be more common. This may be why the author (Mernessi) and Nietzsche both looked negatively on such phenomenon.
Though I think that her chasing after making a point about the present/temporality/time/calendars was kinda a stretch, I thought her remarks on the below were interesting:
Islam cannot be threatened by the discoveries of astronomy, such as the observation of new galaxies, because its vision is of a cosmos in movement. Threats to its authority do not come from outside, but from within human beings. It is imagination, and the irreducible sovereignty of the individual which engender disequilibrium and tension. A Galileo challenging the authority of Islam must be not a scientist but an essayist or a novelist, a Salman Rushdie, and exploration of the psyche will surely be the area of all future sedition.
And this quote I think goes somewhat against her earlier point about Islam fearing the mortal/material in the woman, since it's not the scientific that they're scared of, but the human (not unlike Communism in its high enforcement cost). As Mernessi pointed out later in the book "From the moment any crisis began, it was women and wine that were condemned. For centuries women and wine were regarded as the source of all our troubles." When you combine this disdain for women with finally educating them, it's no surprise that they routinely become modernists and feminists. I only wonder if they'll ever look back with longing on the Muslim world of yore if/when the middle east ever fully modernizes, like us in the post-Christian west.
One of the first things you'll notice about this book is that the author is very linguistically-oriented in her approach, which is quite fun. She doesn't sacrifice the precision of the existing Arabic words to describe what she wants to talk about, and she gives good explanations of each term. It does get to be a bit much at a couple points, but overall it adds a lot of flavor and legitimacy to the book. The first such term is one explained on the first page, gharb, which is the Arabic word for the West, and is very close to gharib the strange and foreign. I find this interesting because in a zoomed out view, I could call the Muslim world part of "The West", and everything to the east of it as "The East", but it seems that Arabs (and Russians, for that matter) see themselves as sitting on a border between two worlds, both in a geographical sense, as well as a socio-theological sense. Arabs are trapped in an in-between life in so many ways: they live in fear of America and the West, but they consume so many of their products, especially their weapons and their media; they live in anticipation of the Resurrection, but Middle-Eastern nations are among the most materialistic/consumeristic of any nations on earth, especially in terms of luxury goods.
Essentially, they attempt to live as Premoderns in a Modern (or Postmodern) world, and this causes a lot of tension. The author at one point criticizes Arabs for taking the technology that Modernism has produced but rejecting the social changes that she sees as corollary. I actually found myself agreeing with the Islamic approach a surprising amount of times throughout this book. I actually think perhaps the ideal moving forward is something like a premodern society (one which puts a heavy emphasis on morality, less emphasis on innovation) who can use the fruits of the industrial and technological revolutions, without being consumed by them. I, as a premodern-minded person, agree to a small degree with Ted K and others that Industrialization and Modernization have been catastrophic in many ways, and I thought the author's love and defense of Modernity was pretty one-sided. Perhaps we're both suffering from a case of "the grass is always greener", where those in a premodern society yearn for the emancipation of a modern society, while those in a [post]modern society yearn for the stability and enchantment of a premodern society. It seems like the obvious answer is to have some mixture of the two, to find a balancing point if possible (which many extremists claim is impossible).
It's this visceral reaction to "innovation" that Islam is so historically infamous for, as the start of the book explains two main groups who try to deal with imams: the falasifa (poets, philosophers, Sufis, etc.) and the Kharijites, who favored violence to depose anyone they disagreed with. Historically, it seems the latter has won out considerably more often than the former, and as a result the author argues that islam has favored the group over the individual, conformity over freedom. I would contest that these dichotomies that the author raised aren't so black and white: sometimes, the individual should be favored, sometimes the group; similarly, freedom as an end instead of a means ends in libertine insanity. The author, per her modernism, was all in favor of one, which seems to me to be an obvious over-correction; all premodern-minded people know that, though superficially good, reason ('aql) and personal opinion (ra'y) are all to often covers for atheist nihilism and subjectivist dissent, respectively. The problem I have is narrowing down exactly what caused the shift in Islam away from the philosophical and esoteric to the stagnated, exoteric nature of contemporary Islam. Muslims always brag about how they had some of the greatest philosophical minds of the middle ages, but how did we get to the point where they have almost no contemporary thinkers to speak of? The author explained the shift as that of a favoring of the Kharijites (those who violently killed any imams they disagreed with, instead of using intellectual argument) over the Mu'tazila, the Hellenized philosophers, who were repressed and condemned as agents of the gharb.
Another thing which aided that shift was Shahrastani's statement that, "Those who believe something or say something only have two choices: either to adopt a belief, that is, to adhere to a preexisting idea and borrow it, or to fabricate one from one's own arrogant personal opinion." Apart from the unnecessarily harsh ending ("arrogant" need not be there), I totally agree with this, and I think this is actually the root problem of the postmodern hopelessness that so many people feel; we are all told that we need to "be unique" and "not let anyone tell us what to do" and "make our own meaning", but those people direly underestimate the incredible willpower, intelligence, and wisdom required to create an entire worldview, i.e. to create a religion. Not even Friedrich Nietzsche was strong enough to hold up under the weight of his own demands, the classic "transvaluation of all values". This modern cliche is an overreaction to those who thoughtlessly accepted the religion/traditions of their forefathers. I would hope that it's evident to all thinking people that both routes are folly, that absolute rebellion against a system is just as stupid as unquestioningly following the system.
The unique problem that Islam faces is that when you take this (largely correct) statement of Shahristani's and you combine that with a religion which emphasizes absolute "submission" and "obedience" and "slavery" to God, you get a lot of problems, and society essentially freezes in place. On the Christian perspective, we are children of God, Christ is our Brother, and in families, of course there is obedience that is expected, but there is also a relationship, a maturation and kinship which is inaccessible to muslims who are forever separated from the divine One, who are forever lesser, forever slaves. Of course, we all are [ideological] slaves, we must all choose our masters, but some masters are willing to adopt their servants and make them heirs, while others are fine with slaves remaining slaves.
But let us return to the book. The author traces most of the issues in the Middle East to its heavy importation of weapons and goods from the west, while producing mostly just oil and gas. This means that ambitious scholars, students, and workers leave the region for more opportunities in Europe and elsewhere, but they face hostility in said emigration. The author complains that this lack of tolerance of scientific inquiry causes a dependency on the west and thus leaves large numbers of people unemployed and alienated. The most "avant-garde" thinking that is tolerated is that of Rafa'at al-Tahtawi, who wants freedom of belief and opinion, "with one sole condition: do not leave Islam." This of course is no real freedom of belief or opinion. This lack of freedom of religion is intrinsic to many of the countries in the region, as Mernissi points out: "The fundamentalists' argument is that if Islam is separated from the state, no one will any longer believe in Allah and the memory of the Prophet will dim... Such reasoning is in fact an insult to Islam, with its suggestion that Islam can succeed only if it is imposed on people in a totalitarian manner". I can't help but find this a very telling quote, especially in how much Christianity is its opposite; Christianity rose to power peacefully and has been relinquishing control peacefully since the enlightenment, whereas Islam took power through violence and maintains that power primarily through violence and coercion. Despite both being Abrahamic religions who make objective truth claims, one of them was open enough to engender a society that would write the United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights, while the other signs said declaration and flatly denies many of the rights guaranteed by it.
Perhaps the biggest reason the Arab world rejects those "rights" is how closely they resemble the jahiliyya, or "the chaotic pagan world before Islam"; in that pluralistic world, people insulted gods who didn't serve them, etc. When Muslims see charters like that, it reminds them of the pre-islamic era, which would mean a regression to a worse time if they accepted it. The irony of course is that Islam is itself a regression (which they are the first to admit, with Muslims repeatedly claiming that their religion is THE primordial religion, hence the term "revert" instead of "convert").
The author makes a compelling case linking the veiling of muslim women with a rejection of the pagan war goddesses which dominated the jahiliyya-era Mecca. Mernissi uses relevant arabic terms to link the destruction of these goddesses in the Ka'ba with the seeking for peace (salam) in that chaotic and swirling jahiliyya world. On the altar of this Peace were sacrificed all shirk, all deviation, all "joining with allah", i.e. absolute submission and conformity was the route chosen. There is something both wise and unwise about this. I would agree insofar that many people have as their god some idea of "freedom" or "liberty", however vaguely or ideologically warped, and that should always be secondary to following God ("We must obey God rather than men"). But we should not conflate the two like the woman Mernissi quoted (upon hearing Pres. Bush's State of the Union speech): "Is democracy a religion?"
Tied in with her case of [female goddesses > female hijabs] is a corresponding disdain for the material and the mortal due to the focus on resurrection (which she saw as a rejection of the birthing done by women). I see this as a one-sided look at afterlife, which can either neuter this life, or it can free this life so that you act more boldly than if you thought this was your only life. The latter is certainly what the early Muslim and Christian histories show, whereas today the former may be more common. This may be why the author (Mernessi) and Nietzsche both looked negatively on such phenomenon.
Though I think that her chasing after making a point about the present/temporality/time/calendars was kinda a stretch, I thought her remarks on the below were interesting:
Islam cannot be threatened by the discoveries of astronomy, such as the observation of new galaxies, because its vision is of a cosmos in movement. Threats to its authority do not come from outside, but from within human beings. It is imagination, and the irreducible sovereignty of the individual which engender disequilibrium and tension. A Galileo challenging the authority of Islam must be not a scientist but an essayist or a novelist, a Salman Rushdie, and exploration of the psyche will surely be the area of all future sedition.
And this quote I think goes somewhat against her earlier point about Islam fearing the mortal/material in the woman, since it's not the scientific that they're scared of, but the human (not unlike Communism in its high enforcement cost). As Mernessi pointed out later in the book "From the moment any crisis began, it was women and wine that were condemned. For centuries women and wine were regarded as the source of all our troubles." When you combine this disdain for women with finally educating them, it's no surprise that they routinely become modernists and feminists. I only wonder if they'll ever look back with longing on the Muslim world of yore if/when the middle east ever fully modernizes, like us in the post-Christian west.
July 30, 2008
Mernissi's writing style combined with her clarity in tackling often difficult subjects, made this a joy to read. I love this book.
September 19, 2017
Puoi trovare questa recensione anche sul mio blog, La siepe di more
Islam e democrazia sembra un libro superato: pubblicato all’indomani della Guerra del Golfo, nel 1992, è molto focalizzato sull’impatto della televisione sulle popolazioni di Stati a maggioranza musulmana e racconta di situazioni che ormai fanno parte del passato. Eppure l’ho divorato.
Infatti, Islam e democrazia non racconta il presente, ma sicuramente ci dà un’idea del punto di partenza dal quale ci siamo mossi per arrivare al caos attuale. Ho apprezzato moltissimo l’analisi di Mernissi, che prende inizio addirittura dagli esordi dell’Islam per aiutarci a contestualizzare specificità della cultura araba che altrimenti non avrebbero senso.
Alla fine della lettura mi girava quasi la testa tanto è enorme la complessità della materia trattata, piena di fili diversi che si intrecciano a formare una trama che già allora mostrava le prime avvisaglie del pericolo della radicalizzazione. Eppure poco o niente è stato fatto per sventarlo, sia da parte dei regimi “musulmani”, per niente inclini a educare i propri cittadini ai valori della Carta delle Nazioni Unite; sia da parte dell’Occidente, che si è intromesso a gamba tesa senza alcuna considerazione per le differenze culturali e il rispetto della popolazione civile.
Per certi versi siamo ancora allo stesso punto: ancora oggi vale quanto ho appena scritto sopra. Però oggi abbiamo Internet, che ha delle potenzialità nel diffondere informazioni di molto maggiori a quelle della televisione: l’impressione – spero troppo pessimista – è che i fondamentalisti ne siano i più consapevoli, mentre un sacco di persone che avrebbero gli strumenti per diffondere cultura e smontare gli assunti di chi diffonde merda estremista perda tempo a dimostrare che “gli altri” sono i cattivi, mentre “noi” siamo i buoni.
Lo ripeterò fino allo sfinimento: raffazzonare opinioni sull’Islam perché si è letto qualcosa qua e là serve solo a quelli che le sbandierano sui media o sui loro blog. Stiamo parlando di fenomeni complessi, dove entrano in gioco molteplici elementi (Mernissi cita addirittura il calendario e la difficoltà a trasporre in arabo alcune parole – e quindi concetti – della nostra cultura, come presidente) e nessuno di questi può essere compreso prendendo la via della banalizzazione. Prima lo si capisce, meglio è.
Islam e democrazia sembra un libro superato: pubblicato all’indomani della Guerra del Golfo, nel 1992, è molto focalizzato sull’impatto della televisione sulle popolazioni di Stati a maggioranza musulmana e racconta di situazioni che ormai fanno parte del passato. Eppure l’ho divorato.
Infatti, Islam e democrazia non racconta il presente, ma sicuramente ci dà un’idea del punto di partenza dal quale ci siamo mossi per arrivare al caos attuale. Ho apprezzato moltissimo l’analisi di Mernissi, che prende inizio addirittura dagli esordi dell’Islam per aiutarci a contestualizzare specificità della cultura araba che altrimenti non avrebbero senso.
Alla fine della lettura mi girava quasi la testa tanto è enorme la complessità della materia trattata, piena di fili diversi che si intrecciano a formare una trama che già allora mostrava le prime avvisaglie del pericolo della radicalizzazione. Eppure poco o niente è stato fatto per sventarlo, sia da parte dei regimi “musulmani”, per niente inclini a educare i propri cittadini ai valori della Carta delle Nazioni Unite; sia da parte dell’Occidente, che si è intromesso a gamba tesa senza alcuna considerazione per le differenze culturali e il rispetto della popolazione civile.
Per certi versi siamo ancora allo stesso punto: ancora oggi vale quanto ho appena scritto sopra. Però oggi abbiamo Internet, che ha delle potenzialità nel diffondere informazioni di molto maggiori a quelle della televisione: l’impressione – spero troppo pessimista – è che i fondamentalisti ne siano i più consapevoli, mentre un sacco di persone che avrebbero gli strumenti per diffondere cultura e smontare gli assunti di chi diffonde merda estremista perda tempo a dimostrare che “gli altri” sono i cattivi, mentre “noi” siamo i buoni.
Lo ripeterò fino allo sfinimento: raffazzonare opinioni sull’Islam perché si è letto qualcosa qua e là serve solo a quelli che le sbandierano sui media o sui loro blog. Stiamo parlando di fenomeni complessi, dove entrano in gioco molteplici elementi (Mernissi cita addirittura il calendario e la difficoltà a trasporre in arabo alcune parole – e quindi concetti – della nostra cultura, come presidente) e nessuno di questi può essere compreso prendendo la via della banalizzazione. Prima lo si capisce, meglio è.
February 9, 2023
This is the 4th book I've read from Morrocan Fatema Mernissi. This non fiction book showcases again the talent of the author as an sociologist and intellectual. The explicit title is the main theme of the book. The fear of modernity (and democracy) by the Arabs and Muslims, whether people or political leaders.
The author explains this Fear based on personal memories, annecdotes of society, political History and also mostly on religious History. The book was first published early 1990's. It refers many times of the 1st Gulf war as a traumatic experience by the Arab Muslims causing to highten the fear of modernity and democracy. She explains in great details the various origins of these fears and goes as far as the begining of Islam.
The author was born in early 1940's in Morocco during military occupation by both France and Spain. The psychological trauma of being born and raised during military occupation had stayed deep in the entire generation like the author. In early 1990's, this same generation, now adults with children, felt the full trauma of the 1st Gulf War because again a western country bases its military in an Arab country to destroy another Arab country.
I understand the explanations, political and religious, about the fear of modernity and democracy. I agree also with it. However, what is true for the author's generation is not necessarily true for the following generations (like mine born in 1970's and thereafter). Today's youth had never seen neither colonisation nor has same religious education than our ancestors. The economy and technology have more major impacts on the world than politics or religion. Knowledge and information is spread all over the world and quickly making everyone informed about everything immediately. Therefore, our youth is less scared of modernity and democracy than our parents and grand parents, but it doesn't mean they feel like they need to adopt another country's political system to solve their economic problems.
It is a great non fiction book I enjoyed reading and learned a great deal about religious History. However, I feel like this specific theme is true to a specific generation and will become obslete with time.
The author explains this Fear based on personal memories, annecdotes of society, political History and also mostly on religious History. The book was first published early 1990's. It refers many times of the 1st Gulf war as a traumatic experience by the Arab Muslims causing to highten the fear of modernity and democracy. She explains in great details the various origins of these fears and goes as far as the begining of Islam.
The author was born in early 1940's in Morocco during military occupation by both France and Spain. The psychological trauma of being born and raised during military occupation had stayed deep in the entire generation like the author. In early 1990's, this same generation, now adults with children, felt the full trauma of the 1st Gulf War because again a western country bases its military in an Arab country to destroy another Arab country.
I understand the explanations, political and religious, about the fear of modernity and democracy. I agree also with it. However, what is true for the author's generation is not necessarily true for the following generations (like mine born in 1970's and thereafter). Today's youth had never seen neither colonisation nor has same religious education than our ancestors. The economy and technology have more major impacts on the world than politics or religion. Knowledge and information is spread all over the world and quickly making everyone informed about everything immediately. Therefore, our youth is less scared of modernity and democracy than our parents and grand parents, but it doesn't mean they feel like they need to adopt another country's political system to solve their economic problems.
It is a great non fiction book I enjoyed reading and learned a great deal about religious History. However, I feel like this specific theme is true to a specific generation and will become obslete with time.
December 10, 2024
It is a common refrain amongst Islamists and Western observers alike that Islam and democracy are inherently incompatible- that due to religious commandments and/or some genetic glitch, representative democracy guaranteeing equal rights for all cannot flourish in Muslim societies. Mernissi argues that no other form of governance is more compatible with Islam; that is, before it was systematically stripped of reason, opinion and philosophy at the hands of zealots, monarchs and misogynists with unresolved trauma from the age of ignorance. She urges citizens, concerned with Western Imperialism, unemployment or individual rights, to educate themselves on their history in order to see that their leaders serve neither their constituents nor their God and that their liberation is not as incompatible with democracy as they’ve been told.
December 23, 2023
The book is disappointing. One expects a lot more given the rave reviews. But unfortunately, the book is pedestrian at best. First and foremost, the book is outdated - authored as it was in the early 1990s (and that explains the author's fixation with the Gulf War). A lot of water has flown since then. From the reader's point of view, Islam and Democracy is a curate's egg - there are gems here and there but they are spoilt by the utterly random rambling style of writing. Also in the latter part, the book reads more like a Feminist pamphlet. There ought to be some distinction between serious writing and penning pamphlets. Overall, a pedestrian work on what could actually have been a riveting subject.
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June 16, 2024Excellent livre de Mernissi 👏. Savoir d'où l'on vient peut nous guider considérablement dans le future et dans notre quête de connaissances personnelles.
Notre histoire : notre héritage, faire la paix avec elle est le seul moyen d'aller de l'avant.
Notre histoire : notre héritage, faire la paix avec elle est le seul moyen d'aller de l'avant.
October 15, 2020
Beautifully written book by Fatema Mernissi, (not quite surprised).
August 21, 2025
La recette de Fatima : le triomphe de la raison, l'esprit scientifique, et la Liberté.
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March 14, 2017i.m so interested in such field and such writer .
April 17, 2017
"Sta op, Halladj, de zahid, asceet en soefi, die benadrukte dat de mens de hoeder is van de haq, de waarheid, en dat elk mens de goddelijke schoonheid weerspiegelt en dus noodzakelijkerwijs een soeverein wezen is. Halladj werd in 390/1000 levend verbrand in Bagdad omdat hij zich afvroeg waarom de aarde en haar bewoners zo ver verwijderd zijn van het goddelijke: 'Welke aarde is van jou verlaten dat men je zo vurig in de hemel zoekt?'" (bladzijde 31-32)
"Anderzijds is de islam gebaseerd op het absolute verbod God te verwarren met de mens, dus mag men de gehoorzaamheid die men God is verschuldigd nooit gelijkstellen met die welke men de imam is verschuldigd. Deze laatste is nooit masoem (onfeilbaar) in de (orthodoxe) soennitische islam." (bladzijde 48)
"Het argument van de islamitische groepen is dat, bij een scheiding tussen islam en staat, niemand meer in Allah zal geloven en dat de herinnering aan de profeet Mohammed zal verdwijnen, omdat de mensen dan voortdurend bestookt zullen worden met buitenlandse culturele boodschappen via de satellieten. [...] Een dergelijke redenering is eigenlijk een regelrechte belediging van de islam, omdat men er daarbij vanuit gaat dat hij zich alleen kan handhaven wanneer hij de mensen wordt opgelegd als een totalitaire wet - waarbij ook hoort dat de rechtbanken worden aangemoedigd degenen te bestraffen die wijn drinken of die weigeren te vasten tijdens de ramadan. Volgens deze redenering heeft een islam zonder politie de moderne burger niets te bieden; hij zou zich ervan afwenden zodra het toezicht van de staat zou verdwijnen." (bladzijde 87-88)
"De islam zal zich nooit bedreigd voelen door de astronomie of door de ontdekking van nieuwe melkwegstelsels, omdat hij uitgaat van een kosmos in beweging. De bedreiging ligt niet buiten maar binnenin de mens. [...] De Galileï van de islam kan alleen maar een essayist of een romanschrijver zijn - zoals in het geval van Salman Rushdie - en de psychoanalyse is ongetwijfeld het terrein waar de opstand de kop zal op steken." (bladzijde 167-168)
"Het Westen kan alleen een universele cultuur creëren wanneer het afziet van zijn vlaggen." (bladzijde 182)
"Anderzijds is de islam gebaseerd op het absolute verbod God te verwarren met de mens, dus mag men de gehoorzaamheid die men God is verschuldigd nooit gelijkstellen met die welke men de imam is verschuldigd. Deze laatste is nooit masoem (onfeilbaar) in de (orthodoxe) soennitische islam." (bladzijde 48)
"Het argument van de islamitische groepen is dat, bij een scheiding tussen islam en staat, niemand meer in Allah zal geloven en dat de herinnering aan de profeet Mohammed zal verdwijnen, omdat de mensen dan voortdurend bestookt zullen worden met buitenlandse culturele boodschappen via de satellieten. [...] Een dergelijke redenering is eigenlijk een regelrechte belediging van de islam, omdat men er daarbij vanuit gaat dat hij zich alleen kan handhaven wanneer hij de mensen wordt opgelegd als een totalitaire wet - waarbij ook hoort dat de rechtbanken worden aangemoedigd degenen te bestraffen die wijn drinken of die weigeren te vasten tijdens de ramadan. Volgens deze redenering heeft een islam zonder politie de moderne burger niets te bieden; hij zou zich ervan afwenden zodra het toezicht van de staat zou verdwijnen." (bladzijde 87-88)
"De islam zal zich nooit bedreigd voelen door de astronomie of door de ontdekking van nieuwe melkwegstelsels, omdat hij uitgaat van een kosmos in beweging. De bedreiging ligt niet buiten maar binnenin de mens. [...] De Galileï van de islam kan alleen maar een essayist of een romanschrijver zijn - zoals in het geval van Salman Rushdie - en de psychoanalyse is ongetwijfeld het terrein waar de opstand de kop zal op steken." (bladzijde 167-168)
"Het Westen kan alleen een universele cultuur creëren wanneer het afziet van zijn vlaggen." (bladzijde 182)
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