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Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage
Describes tactical theory in the 1850s and suggests how each related to Civil War tactics Why did the Confederacy lose so many men? The authors contend that the Confederates bled themselves nearly to death in the first three years of the war by making costly attacks more often than the Federals. Offensive tactics, which had been used successfully by Americans in the Mexican War, were much less effective in the 1860s because an improved weapon—the rifle—had given increased strength to defenders. This book describes tactical theory in the 1850s and suggests how each related to Civil War tactics. It also considers the development of tactics in all three arms of the service during the Civil War. In examining the Civil War the book separates Southern from Northern tactical practice and discusses Confederate military history in the context of Southern social history. Although the Southerners could have offset their numerical disadvantage by remaining on the defensive and forcing the Federals to attack, they failed to do so. The authors argue that the Southerners’ consistent favoring of offensive warfare was attributable, in large measure, to their Celtic they fought with the same courageous dash and reckless abandon that had characterized their Celtic forebears since ancient times. The Southerners of the Civil War generation were prisoners of their social and cultural they attacked courageously and were killed—on battlefields so totally defended by the Federals that “not even a chicken could get through.”
230 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1982
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December 24, 2009
The focus of this book is boldly stated on page xv: "How and why the Confederates lost so many men is the burden of this book. We contend that the Confederates bled themselves nearly to death in the first three years of the war by making costly attacks more often than did the Federals."
One theme of the book is that warfare had been changed by the outset of the Civil War, with the development of rifled guns. Masses of troops firing at one another at close range made some sense with the inaccurate muskets of the Revolutionary War or the Napoleonic Wars. However, such formations made much less sense as rifles increased accuracy and range.
Among specific arguments that the book makes is that the romance of the bayonet was pretty much done; evidence suggests that rather few casualties came from bayonet thrusts? Why not? It was difficult for attacking soldiers to get close enough to defenders because of the rifle fire and the use of defensive positioning. Fieldworks thwarted many massed charges; soldiers on the defensive were ordinarily better placed for victory than those who attacked. Just so, the value of cavalry with sabers bared, charging. The bulk of cavalry combat came with troopers fighting as infantry did, not fighting from atop their horses.
Doctrine lagged behind facts-on-the-ground. Only a few officers began to redefine how to carry out an offensive against entrenchments (e.g., Emory Upton). And, according to the authors, Confederates appeared less willing to give up the tactical offensive. Why? Here comes the rather bizarre part of the book. The authors content that southerners were more Celtic and Northern troops more English. And, the contention goes, Celtic warriors fought on the offensive (there is even an effort to tie the Rebel yell to Celtic warriors). At this point, the argument, to me, falls to pieces.
Nonetheless, up to that point, the analysis makes some sense. Other books have explored this thesis, too, but--until the end--this book compares well.
One theme of the book is that warfare had been changed by the outset of the Civil War, with the development of rifled guns. Masses of troops firing at one another at close range made some sense with the inaccurate muskets of the Revolutionary War or the Napoleonic Wars. However, such formations made much less sense as rifles increased accuracy and range.
Among specific arguments that the book makes is that the romance of the bayonet was pretty much done; evidence suggests that rather few casualties came from bayonet thrusts? Why not? It was difficult for attacking soldiers to get close enough to defenders because of the rifle fire and the use of defensive positioning. Fieldworks thwarted many massed charges; soldiers on the defensive were ordinarily better placed for victory than those who attacked. Just so, the value of cavalry with sabers bared, charging. The bulk of cavalry combat came with troopers fighting as infantry did, not fighting from atop their horses.
Doctrine lagged behind facts-on-the-ground. Only a few officers began to redefine how to carry out an offensive against entrenchments (e.g., Emory Upton). And, according to the authors, Confederates appeared less willing to give up the tactical offensive. Why? Here comes the rather bizarre part of the book. The authors content that southerners were more Celtic and Northern troops more English. And, the contention goes, Celtic warriors fought on the offensive (there is even an effort to tie the Rebel yell to Celtic warriors). At this point, the argument, to me, falls to pieces.
Nonetheless, up to that point, the analysis makes some sense. Other books have explored this thesis, too, but--until the end--this book compares well.
April 24, 2013
Until the last chapter, I had planned to give this book a fourth star. The authors wandered far afield with a pet theory in the final chapter.
The bulk of the book is a good analysis of the failings of the Confederate command structure to adapt to the technological changes in warfare. Too often, Confederate attacks were made in ways that might have worked against the weapons of the 1770s or even the 1840s, but which were suicidal against the actual weapons of the 1860s. In addition, generals on both sides of the war failed to come up with successful methods for attacking prepared positions. Instead, many lives were lost attacking positions which were simply too strong to assault. The difference, according to the authors, is that the North could afford those losses, and the South could not.
That part of the book is well-reasoned, and includes a host of footnotes and resources for further study and analysis.
Then, there's the final chapter about the wild Celts. For some reason, the authors spent the final chapter comparing Confederate leadership and the overall population to the Celtic warriors, from Roman times up through Bonnie Prince Charlie. While it's true that some of the Southern population self-identified as "Scots-Irish" or other such Celtic origin, many of them were of English or French descent, especially the leadership classes. A better argument was that the culture of the South idolized the kind of society in which individual combat was a noble thing, and that death was better than defeat. Pushing that argument to say that Gettysburg and Cullodden were the same kind of battle is a bit much, though. That reasoning just doesn't explain Grant's attack at Cold Harbor, and ignores other Union attacks that were just as bad an idea as Pickett's Charge.
Still, the book is worth reading for the information on relative casualties in different kinds of combat, and for the studies of the different schools of thought about various kinds of maneuver and combat.
The bulk of the book is a good analysis of the failings of the Confederate command structure to adapt to the technological changes in warfare. Too often, Confederate attacks were made in ways that might have worked against the weapons of the 1770s or even the 1840s, but which were suicidal against the actual weapons of the 1860s. In addition, generals on both sides of the war failed to come up with successful methods for attacking prepared positions. Instead, many lives were lost attacking positions which were simply too strong to assault. The difference, according to the authors, is that the North could afford those losses, and the South could not.
That part of the book is well-reasoned, and includes a host of footnotes and resources for further study and analysis.
Then, there's the final chapter about the wild Celts. For some reason, the authors spent the final chapter comparing Confederate leadership and the overall population to the Celtic warriors, from Roman times up through Bonnie Prince Charlie. While it's true that some of the Southern population self-identified as "Scots-Irish" or other such Celtic origin, many of them were of English or French descent, especially the leadership classes. A better argument was that the culture of the South idolized the kind of society in which individual combat was a noble thing, and that death was better than defeat. Pushing that argument to say that Gettysburg and Cullodden were the same kind of battle is a bit much, though. That reasoning just doesn't explain Grant's attack at Cold Harbor, and ignores other Union attacks that were just as bad an idea as Pickett's Charge.
Still, the book is worth reading for the information on relative casualties in different kinds of combat, and for the studies of the different schools of thought about various kinds of maneuver and combat.
December 2, 2009
Sun Tzu and his “Art of War” would never have been able to reconcile the stature of General Robert E. Lee with the several disastrous decisions he made at Gettysburg in July, 1863. Lee negligently gave up the strategically superior high ground and impulsively ordered frontal assaults on two successive days against secure defensive positions which literally tore his Army to pieces and left carnage never to be forgotten.
A very narrow and single minded theory of warfare -- dictated from the top by Confederate President Jefferson Davis and inculcated into every West Point cadet from which most of the Civil War Commanders graduated -- was ardently followed by the South throughout the War. This doctrine called for traditional close order formations in offensive frontal assaults typically employed against entrenched and fortified breastworks and always with horrendous results. Its successful precepts followed by the US Army in the War with Mexico in the late 1840’s only gave false bravado to the young officers who would later become high level Commanders in the Civil War. To be sure the North began the War following the same dictum but more quickly identified the drastic shortcomings to men and materiel and adapted their mind set and tactics accordingly; the South just never did. Admittedly, General Grant too employed similar offensive operations with similar results. However, Grant increasingly took advantage of his opponent’s propensities by incorporating strategies that induced and maneuvered them into attacking his forces in fortified positions rather than the other way around.
From “This Mighty Scourge” James McPherson reiterates, “Of the Seventeen Civil War Army Commanders on both sides Sherman had the second-lowest percentage of casualties in his armies and Robert E. Lee’s Army had the highest.” Even to the bitter end neither Jefferson Davis nor his Commanders were ever able to successfully conceive of an alternative approach and in reality had no desire to so. Those that did try such as Joseph E. Johnston and P. G. T. Beauregard were summarily relieved by Davis. The Southern Armies, already possessing fewer men than the Northern Armies, simply bled themselves to death until there were too few to carry on.
Students or non students of the Civil War would find the various charts in this concise book compelling and easy to follow and there is plenty of material here for future reference and study.
A very narrow and single minded theory of warfare -- dictated from the top by Confederate President Jefferson Davis and inculcated into every West Point cadet from which most of the Civil War Commanders graduated -- was ardently followed by the South throughout the War. This doctrine called for traditional close order formations in offensive frontal assaults typically employed against entrenched and fortified breastworks and always with horrendous results. Its successful precepts followed by the US Army in the War with Mexico in the late 1840’s only gave false bravado to the young officers who would later become high level Commanders in the Civil War. To be sure the North began the War following the same dictum but more quickly identified the drastic shortcomings to men and materiel and adapted their mind set and tactics accordingly; the South just never did. Admittedly, General Grant too employed similar offensive operations with similar results. However, Grant increasingly took advantage of his opponent’s propensities by incorporating strategies that induced and maneuvered them into attacking his forces in fortified positions rather than the other way around.
From “This Mighty Scourge” James McPherson reiterates, “Of the Seventeen Civil War Army Commanders on both sides Sherman had the second-lowest percentage of casualties in his armies and Robert E. Lee’s Army had the highest.” Even to the bitter end neither Jefferson Davis nor his Commanders were ever able to successfully conceive of an alternative approach and in reality had no desire to so. Those that did try such as Joseph E. Johnston and P. G. T. Beauregard were summarily relieved by Davis. The Southern Armies, already possessing fewer men than the Northern Armies, simply bled themselves to death until there were too few to carry on.
Students or non students of the Civil War would find the various charts in this concise book compelling and easy to follow and there is plenty of material here for future reference and study.
August 4, 2020
This is almost theory years old now and its theory that the rifled musket made assaults in the Civil War a losing proposition has been challenged for awhile. Still, this is valuable to read to see the original argument that may have been exaggerated. Incidentally, it includes some interesting details on tactics, line versus column, details on operations of infantry/cavalry/artillery that greatly enhance understanding when reading other accounts of the war.
November 14, 2015
They attacked a lot against rifled muskets. And that was because of their Celtic heritage. I'm not convinced it was a simple as that. I think the Rebs had to attack in many cases to defend Richmond and drive the Yanks from Southern soil. You don't win a war by holding still. And in several cases, such as at Second Manassas, Chancellorsville, and Chickamauga, massing the forces at the right place paid off. Not so much at Shiloh and Gettysburg. The book describes the confidence in the attack Americans had as a result of successes in the Mexican War. From there, the development of tactical doctrine and the impact of cavalry, artillery, and fortifications is discussed. It's only in the last chapters of the book that the premise is covered and I wasn't totally convinced. The numbers are good, but more detail--exactly how and where did the decline in manpower come to influence the end is what I'd like to know.
November 23, 2021
McWhiney and Jamieson argue that the South lost the Civil War because it lost too many men through frontal assaults, and that the frontal assaults were actuated by the South's aggression-prone Celtic culture.
I thought the book established effectively that the defender had the advantage in the Civil War and discussed cogently the role of current tactical thought and Mexican War experience in encouraging offensive tactics despite the changes wrought by the rifled musket.
The authors claim that when Confederate soldiers attacked they suffered more casualties than Federals did when they attacked, but do not seem to give an explanation. If this is true, and the problematic nature of exact numbers and losses in the Civil War should be acknowledged, I suspect it has to do with artillery fuses.
A major claim, that Confederate troops attacked more often than Federals did, is never, in my view, substantiated. The evidence offered, which includes accounts of Grant's attacks in 1864, actually supports the idea that neither side really learned the dangers of the tactical offensive.
I am, in particular, not convinced by any aspect of the "Celtic" theory. The evidence of a Southern preference for the offensive seems shaky, and the evidence for Southern cultural aggressiveness comes mostly from anecdotal and/or unfriendly sources. A newspaper editor ranting about war to the knife, or similar sources, shouldn't be taken as representing a culture as a whole.
Nor am I convinced that the South was "Celtic", and the argument put forward by the authors is circular -- the South fought aggressively and that proves they were Celtic because Celts are aggressive. Actually, a quick look at the surnames of Northern and Southern generals and politicians doesn't give me any sense that the North, with its Sheridan and Grant, was any less Celtic in ancestry than the South with its Davis and Stuart. Irish immigrants were more common in Northern than Southern armies, though both sides had their Irish Brigades.
The idea that the Celts were aggressive convinces me least of all. To support this claim, the authors mix primary sources and literary references, often from unfriendly and not necessarily expert authors (Caesar) and skip wildly from one cultural and historical setting to the next, giving a deep analysis of none and appearing to choose evidence tendentiously. Bannockburn, for example, appears, but Scots defensive schiltron formations do not.
The authors use overgeneralized and stereotypical "racial" arguments -- Romans, Englishmen and Yankees were "practical, materialistic, tenacious, machine-like", and Celts and Confederates were "emotional, foolhardy, romantic, undisciplined". That theory is obviously oversimplified at best and is reminiscent of pretexts used by imperialist England to minoritize Celtic peoples across the centuries. The idea that the American Civil War represented "a continuation of the centuries-old conflict between Celts and Englishmen..." not only strikes me as specious, but underemphasizes slavery as a cause to a degree with which I am uncomfortable.
The idea that there's some meaningful tactical or cultural link between Pickett's Charge, say, and Vercingetorix, or for that matter Bonnie Prince Charlie, beggars my belief -- the popularity of Scott's novels notwithstanding. The book descends to its silliest level when it attempts to draw a serious parallel between a Union soldier's quite possibly wild claim of having found Union skulls in a Confederate camp and the beheading activities of the medieval Irish literary/mythological hero Cu Chulainn.
I can't recommend this as serious scholarship.
I thought the book established effectively that the defender had the advantage in the Civil War and discussed cogently the role of current tactical thought and Mexican War experience in encouraging offensive tactics despite the changes wrought by the rifled musket.
The authors claim that when Confederate soldiers attacked they suffered more casualties than Federals did when they attacked, but do not seem to give an explanation. If this is true, and the problematic nature of exact numbers and losses in the Civil War should be acknowledged, I suspect it has to do with artillery fuses.
A major claim, that Confederate troops attacked more often than Federals did, is never, in my view, substantiated. The evidence offered, which includes accounts of Grant's attacks in 1864, actually supports the idea that neither side really learned the dangers of the tactical offensive.
I am, in particular, not convinced by any aspect of the "Celtic" theory. The evidence of a Southern preference for the offensive seems shaky, and the evidence for Southern cultural aggressiveness comes mostly from anecdotal and/or unfriendly sources. A newspaper editor ranting about war to the knife, or similar sources, shouldn't be taken as representing a culture as a whole.
Nor am I convinced that the South was "Celtic", and the argument put forward by the authors is circular -- the South fought aggressively and that proves they were Celtic because Celts are aggressive. Actually, a quick look at the surnames of Northern and Southern generals and politicians doesn't give me any sense that the North, with its Sheridan and Grant, was any less Celtic in ancestry than the South with its Davis and Stuart. Irish immigrants were more common in Northern than Southern armies, though both sides had their Irish Brigades.
The idea that the Celts were aggressive convinces me least of all. To support this claim, the authors mix primary sources and literary references, often from unfriendly and not necessarily expert authors (Caesar) and skip wildly from one cultural and historical setting to the next, giving a deep analysis of none and appearing to choose evidence tendentiously. Bannockburn, for example, appears, but Scots defensive schiltron formations do not.
The authors use overgeneralized and stereotypical "racial" arguments -- Romans, Englishmen and Yankees were "practical, materialistic, tenacious, machine-like", and Celts and Confederates were "emotional, foolhardy, romantic, undisciplined". That theory is obviously oversimplified at best and is reminiscent of pretexts used by imperialist England to minoritize Celtic peoples across the centuries. The idea that the American Civil War represented "a continuation of the centuries-old conflict between Celts and Englishmen..." not only strikes me as specious, but underemphasizes slavery as a cause to a degree with which I am uncomfortable.
The idea that there's some meaningful tactical or cultural link between Pickett's Charge, say, and Vercingetorix, or for that matter Bonnie Prince Charlie, beggars my belief -- the popularity of Scott's novels notwithstanding. The book descends to its silliest level when it attempts to draw a serious parallel between a Union soldier's quite possibly wild claim of having found Union skulls in a Confederate camp and the beheading activities of the medieval Irish literary/mythological hero Cu Chulainn.
I can't recommend this as serious scholarship.
July 19, 2025
Things really start to fall apart toward the end. If the Celtic military tradition of the Confederacy was a poor logistical planning, a preference for death before defeat, and a tendency to reckless charges while screaming, does that mean that the Japanese troops of World War II were Celts?
The top quote from the blurbs on the back of the copy that I read starts with "This book is a veritable kaleidoscope, showing pictures ranging from the seemingly hyperbolic to those that are clearly representative of the finest scholarship to be found anywhere". So basically, a book that contains both solid scholarship and a tendence to go off the rails, which certainly describes Attack and Die.
Everything but the last chapter is of much better quality, although I think some more modern writers such as Earl Hess would dispute some of the stronger claims about the effects of the rifle on the battlefield. Those earlier chapters are more of a four star work, with the last chapter being where the reasoning collapses like a failed Highland charge.
The top quote from the blurbs on the back of the copy that I read starts with "This book is a veritable kaleidoscope, showing pictures ranging from the seemingly hyperbolic to those that are clearly representative of the finest scholarship to be found anywhere". So basically, a book that contains both solid scholarship and a tendence to go off the rails, which certainly describes Attack and Die.
Everything but the last chapter is of much better quality, although I think some more modern writers such as Earl Hess would dispute some of the stronger claims about the effects of the rifle on the battlefield. Those earlier chapters are more of a four star work, with the last chapter being where the reasoning collapses like a failed Highland charge.
February 24, 2023
A highly insightful book which truly brought into perspective how general’s Mexican War experiences allowed outdated tactics to permeate into the Civil War. It also did a great job explaining just how obsolete the offensive was in this era while also justifying why civil war generals still believed in its power. The last chapter is just blatantly wrong (Confederates always took to the offensive because of their Celtic traditions??) yet the rest of the book is phenomenal and is a must read for anybody interested in the American civil war and its tactics.
February 22, 2020
McWhiney and Jamieson squander what had been a superb examination of military tactics and equipment at the time of the American Civil War with an abhorrent final chapter indulging in the worst sort of pseudo-ethnography imaginable in a bizarre defense of Confederate Celticness.
November 29, 2025
interesting exploring how officers learning from the mexican war and the war in crimea manifested on civil war battlefield, but the argument this book is most famous for about how the celtic heritage of some Southerners does not land
March 31, 2021
The book is a dry read, and the arguments that the authors were not convincing for me.
February 11, 2022
Oof, big yikes with that last chapter, McWhiney.
September 26, 2023
Lost Causism
November 10, 2019
McWhiney and Jamieson have an interesting and compelling initial hypothesis: The South lost because they used antiquated Napoleonic era tactics in a struggle against the rifle, a weapon far superior to the muskets that preceded the Civil War era. They acknowledge that the North used the same tactics, but the South could never make good on their losses due to a lack of manpower. The North could.
The authors mention, but don't credit enough, other logistical factors impacting the outcome. The North often had repeating rifles, whereas the South struggled to arm their men with any weapon. They mention that half of the 44th Mississippi charged at Murfreesboro armed with nothing more than clubs, and the 9th's rifles wouldn't function as they were too wet from the previous night's rain. The latter suggests either inferior weaponry or poor leadership. No other units were handicapped by wet rifles, apparently.
All this is plausible, but the authors lost me when in the final chapter they put forth the ridiculous proposition that Southern aggressiveness was rooted in a "Celtic" culture and traditions going back thousands of years. The authors then cherry pick through contemporary anecdotal observations of Southern culture to support this idea. The North, they say, was Anflo-Saxon and Teutonic...therefore calculating, business-like, efficient. The Southerners were Celtic and impetuous, brave, warlike.
This ignores that there were 150,000 Irish immigrants in the Northern army...six times the number found in the South. The North had been a major immigration point for Northern Europeans. The Irish Brigade was one of the North's elite units. The Welsh index reports that 90% of Welsh immigrants lived in the North and fought against slavery.
http://www.welshamericanindex.talktal...
Likewise the South had divisions of Poles and Mexicans. Had they been immersed in Southern Celtic culture? The authors would have us believe so.
Frankly, there is a prejudice here that has a scent of racialism. The authors seem to think there is a nature to a demographic group that imparts certain qualities to them, setting them apart from other groups.
McWhiney was one of the founding members of "the League of the South", a Neo-Confederate group that advocates the banning of Islam and celebrated the death of Abraham Lincoln in 2015, posting to their Facebook page: "Join us in April to celebrate the great accomplishment of John Wilkes Booth. He knew a man who needed killing when he saw him!”
McWhiney broke from the group before his death. Let's hope it was because of statements like these.
So is it worth reading? Yes. It is useful, and I agree with the notion that the rifle had made the tactics of Jomini and Napoleon obsolete. It was a lesson that took awhile to learn, however. When machine guns and massed indirect fire dominated Europe fifty years later, the same type of arthritic thinking that afflicted the North and South plagued the Gallic French and their Anglo-Saxon allies....as well as their Teutonic opponents.
Funny how heritage didn't have a sole claim on stupidity back then....
The authors mention, but don't credit enough, other logistical factors impacting the outcome. The North often had repeating rifles, whereas the South struggled to arm their men with any weapon. They mention that half of the 44th Mississippi charged at Murfreesboro armed with nothing more than clubs, and the 9th's rifles wouldn't function as they were too wet from the previous night's rain. The latter suggests either inferior weaponry or poor leadership. No other units were handicapped by wet rifles, apparently.
All this is plausible, but the authors lost me when in the final chapter they put forth the ridiculous proposition that Southern aggressiveness was rooted in a "Celtic" culture and traditions going back thousands of years. The authors then cherry pick through contemporary anecdotal observations of Southern culture to support this idea. The North, they say, was Anflo-Saxon and Teutonic...therefore calculating, business-like, efficient. The Southerners were Celtic and impetuous, brave, warlike.
This ignores that there were 150,000 Irish immigrants in the Northern army...six times the number found in the South. The North had been a major immigration point for Northern Europeans. The Irish Brigade was one of the North's elite units. The Welsh index reports that 90% of Welsh immigrants lived in the North and fought against slavery.
http://www.welshamericanindex.talktal...
Likewise the South had divisions of Poles and Mexicans. Had they been immersed in Southern Celtic culture? The authors would have us believe so.
Frankly, there is a prejudice here that has a scent of racialism. The authors seem to think there is a nature to a demographic group that imparts certain qualities to them, setting them apart from other groups.
McWhiney was one of the founding members of "the League of the South", a Neo-Confederate group that advocates the banning of Islam and celebrated the death of Abraham Lincoln in 2015, posting to their Facebook page: "Join us in April to celebrate the great accomplishment of John Wilkes Booth. He knew a man who needed killing when he saw him!”
McWhiney broke from the group before his death. Let's hope it was because of statements like these.
So is it worth reading? Yes. It is useful, and I agree with the notion that the rifle had made the tactics of Jomini and Napoleon obsolete. It was a lesson that took awhile to learn, however. When machine guns and massed indirect fire dominated Europe fifty years later, the same type of arthritic thinking that afflicted the North and South plagued the Gallic French and their Anglo-Saxon allies....as well as their Teutonic opponents.
Funny how heritage didn't have a sole claim on stupidity back then....
November 2, 2011
I thought the book was worth reading even though I wasn't convinced their theories were totally correct. While I agree with their premise that the offensive was more costly especially against earthworks, they didn't address what other options the South could use to win the war. I also had trouble with the last chapter which made the south into a land of Celts. They made a nice comparison between the ancient Celts and the Rebs of the nineteenth century but it was only a comparison. I'm still wondering if the South was really populated from Celtic-based countries (like Scotland).
Overall, a good book that makes you look at the Civil War with a new perspective.
Overall, a good book that makes you look at the Civil War with a new perspective.
Want to read
April 17, 2010"But Southerners, imprisoned in a culture that rejected careful calculation and patience, often refused to learn from their mistakes. They continued to fight, despited mounting casualties, with the same courageous dash and reckless abandon that had characterized their Celtic ancestors for two thousand years. The Confederates favored offensive warfare because the Celtic charge was an integral part of their heritage".
November 28, 2014
Dry but informative. Mostly useful as a lit review - the only original conclusions it draws (in the last chapter) are tendentious, to say the least. But everything before that is very interesting, and supports the general thesis that Southern culture was at least partially (and perhaps significantly) responsible for the Confederacy's defeat.
July 7, 2008
yes I acually read this book in college, it is as dry as the cover states it.
December 10, 2011
Interesting, but the Celtic-Confederate link in the final chapter was a bit startling to me.
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