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Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied
If we think there is a fast solution to changing the governance of Iraq, warned U.S. Marine General Anthony Zinni in the months before the United States and Britain invaded Iraq, "then we don't understand history." Never has the old line about those who fail to understand the past being condemned to repeat it seemed more urgently relevant than in Iraq today, with potentially catastrophic consequences for the Iraqi people, the Middle East region, and the world. Examining the construction of the modern state of Iraq under the auspices of the British empire―the first attempt by a Western power to remake Mesopotamia in its own image―renowned Iraq expert Toby Dodge uncovers a series of shocking parallels between the policies of a declining British empire and those of the current American administration.
Between 1920 and 1932, Britain endeavored unsuccessfully to create a modern democratic state from three former provinces of the Ottoman Empire, which it had conquered and occupied during the First World War. Caught between the conflicting imperatives of controlling a region of great strategic importance (Iraq straddled the land and air route between British India and the Mediterranean) and reconstituting international order through the liberal ideal of modern state sovereignty under the League of Nations Mandate system, British administrators undertook an extremely difficult task. To compound matters, they did so without the benefit of detailed information about the people and society they sought to remake. Blinded by potent cultural stereotypes and subject to mounting pressures from home, these administrators found themselves increasingly dependent on a mediating class of shaikhs to whom they transferred considerable power and on whom they relied for the maintenance of order. When order broke down, as it routinely did, the British turned to the airplane. (This was Winston Churchill's lasting contribution to the British enterprise in the concerted use of air power―of what would in a later context be called "shock and awe"―to terrorize and subdue dissident factions of the Iraqi people.)
Ultimately, Dodge shows, the state the British created held all the seeds of a violent, corrupt, and relentlessly oppressive future for the Iraqi people, one that has continued to unfold. Like the British empire eight decades before, the United States and Britain have taken upon themselves today the grand task of transforming Iraq and, by extension, the political landscape of the Middle East. Dodge contends that this effort can succeed only with a combination of experienced local knowledge, significant deployment of financial and human resources, and resolute staying power. Already, he suggests, ominous signs point to a repetition of the sequence of events that led to the long nightmare of Saddam Hussein's murderous tyranny.
Between 1920 and 1932, Britain endeavored unsuccessfully to create a modern democratic state from three former provinces of the Ottoman Empire, which it had conquered and occupied during the First World War. Caught between the conflicting imperatives of controlling a region of great strategic importance (Iraq straddled the land and air route between British India and the Mediterranean) and reconstituting international order through the liberal ideal of modern state sovereignty under the League of Nations Mandate system, British administrators undertook an extremely difficult task. To compound matters, they did so without the benefit of detailed information about the people and society they sought to remake. Blinded by potent cultural stereotypes and subject to mounting pressures from home, these administrators found themselves increasingly dependent on a mediating class of shaikhs to whom they transferred considerable power and on whom they relied for the maintenance of order. When order broke down, as it routinely did, the British turned to the airplane. (This was Winston Churchill's lasting contribution to the British enterprise in the concerted use of air power―of what would in a later context be called "shock and awe"―to terrorize and subdue dissident factions of the Iraqi people.)
Ultimately, Dodge shows, the state the British created held all the seeds of a violent, corrupt, and relentlessly oppressive future for the Iraqi people, one that has continued to unfold. Like the British empire eight decades before, the United States and Britain have taken upon themselves today the grand task of transforming Iraq and, by extension, the political landscape of the Middle East. Dodge contends that this effort can succeed only with a combination of experienced local knowledge, significant deployment of financial and human resources, and resolute staying power. Already, he suggests, ominous signs point to a repetition of the sequence of events that led to the long nightmare of Saddam Hussein's murderous tyranny.
288 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 2003
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
January 22, 2019
I wanted to enjoy this book because I am an inveterate Middle Eastern history nerd, but unfortunately can't really recommend it highly. It's not awful or erroneous in its historical facts, but it's a struggle trying to slog through the writing (and I say this as a person who reads history books for at least 50% of my reading and almost never finds this "dry" or "boring"). Dodge's main argument seems to be that the major reason for the failures of the British mandate of Iraq was that the British created a top-down ideology and methods that didn't necessarily reflect structural or social fact on the ground. However, Dodge's own argument is written in this very same way, starting with almost incomprehensible sociological/economic theories using ridiculous vocabulary that I haven't encountered since my early college days (I sadly don't have the book on me right now to give a good example; suffice it to say that I have a very rich vocabulary already, didn't know these words, but also didn't bother to look most up because they are very clearly words that only professors and over-eager students use to make their writing sound more important). Dodge then moves from these dense paragraphs to dropping real-life examples and dates without much context, which is unhelpful if you're not already an absolute expert who has memorized all historical facts and dates of Iraqi history between 1914 and 1932.
I understand this is a preference, but I think it is much wiser to write history more as a narrative, explaining in relative chronological order what happened, and then proceeding to analyze causes, effects, explanations, and trends. Starting with some sort of high falutin socio-economic theory and then justifying it with one brief example each from 1931, then from 1916, then from 1924, means that unfortunately to most readers the history will go in one ear and out the other.
I also don't find myself 100% convinced his analysis is entirely on point, given that he seems to fall in the camp of believing that most if not all of current Middle Eastern affairs are attributed to European colonization. I think they of course had a great effect and repercussions are still present because this is still relatively very recent history, but I always find it short-sighted and patronizing when Middle Eastern history is written in this way. It gives the impression that you believe Middle Easterners or Arabs or others in the region were blank slates that colonization wrote on, as if the region doesn't have thousands of years of rich history before that. It absolves Iraqis of their own input and successes and failures, and gives way too much credit to the British and Europeans in general.
That being said, I actually did find intriguing his discussion of air power as military strategy and retaliation method. But I find I'm more interested in exploring this concept in general through another book I have purchased.
I understand this is a preference, but I think it is much wiser to write history more as a narrative, explaining in relative chronological order what happened, and then proceeding to analyze causes, effects, explanations, and trends. Starting with some sort of high falutin socio-economic theory and then justifying it with one brief example each from 1931, then from 1916, then from 1924, means that unfortunately to most readers the history will go in one ear and out the other.
I also don't find myself 100% convinced his analysis is entirely on point, given that he seems to fall in the camp of believing that most if not all of current Middle Eastern affairs are attributed to European colonization. I think they of course had a great effect and repercussions are still present because this is still relatively very recent history, but I always find it short-sighted and patronizing when Middle Eastern history is written in this way. It gives the impression that you believe Middle Easterners or Arabs or others in the region were blank slates that colonization wrote on, as if the region doesn't have thousands of years of rich history before that. It absolves Iraqis of their own input and successes and failures, and gives way too much credit to the British and Europeans in general.
That being said, I actually did find intriguing his discussion of air power as military strategy and retaliation method. But I find I'm more interested in exploring this concept in general through another book I have purchased.
November 15, 2014
This monograph is a very sharp expose of the history of British suzerainty over Iraq in the aftermath of the First World War, written by the author at precisely the time Iraq fell to U.S. invasion forces in 2003, containing remarkably prescient insight into what the British record of state-building in Iraq portends for the American effort toward the selfsame goal. Readers of this text in 2013 and after will be struck by the accuracy of Dodge's prognostications. I usually avoid George Santayana's famous maxim - about the danger of history being 'repeated' by the ignorant - as something of an academically-unsound cliche, but in the instance of Dodge's subject material it is a strikingly apt saying.
April 1, 2008
Interesting. A little too conceptual-- could be more factually rigorous. Dodge's generalization about privatization in the British Empire is off base.
July 10, 2020
Inventing Iraq reveals how the British Mandate transformed the social foundations of Iraq based on what the administrators imagined Iraqi society to be. The British colonial administrators divided Iraqi populations into rural (simple, honest, and pure, operating through tribal shaikhs) and urban (decadent, corrupt, divisive). This understanding was anachronistic and false, and ignored the local complexities and all other forms of social groupings. What resulted were concentration of power and land tenure on tribal shaikhs who were believed to have social power; ignoring of local complexities and all other forms of social groupings; and development of ossified legal code for rural areas that were deemed to be. Part of that reasoning and modeling came from colonial administrators' experiences India's North West and Baluchistan, where they viewed tribal populations as honest and simple, and thus governable by a simple code of law. Trajectories on the role of rural nobility in Europe, as well as Orientalist notions on Ottoman rule and the image of effendi as harbingers of 'bastardized' modernity also did their part. Post-WWI, the British colonial officials also lacked empirical data on Iraq and financial resources. Another way that the British Mandate violently transformed Iraqi society was the deployment of airpower as a supposedly legitimate tool of governance, as politicians and public back home wanted to cut costs related to Iraqi administration while retaining the Mandate for its strategic importance. There even emerged a discourse on the morality of airpower as it was believed to be targeted on specific properties rather than individuals, when in reality it was an utter failure that killed 100 persons in one attack. Governance from 200 feet above obviously accompanied no engagement or negotiation on the ground, and needless to say, the tribal shaikhs could not bring order in the aftermath of the bombing as the administrators had hoped.
The conclusion draws parallels between US and British forces in Iraq post-2003 and the British Mandate years in the 1920s and 30s. Without reliable empirical data and troops on the ground, but with pressure to cut costs, US forces resorted to using 'members of the shadow state' who had been a part of Saddam's power base that operated through patronage networks and violence. British forces even went back to examine examples from the Mandate years to look for potential models (!). Saddam Hussein, Dodge points out, was more of a symptom than a cause of Iraqi sociopolitical structures that had origins in Mandate years. Iraq's structural political problems from the end of World War I to 2003 are: "first, the deployment of extreme levels of organized violence by the state to dominate and shape society; second, the use of state resources—jobs, development aid, and patronage—to buy the loyalty of sections of society; third, the use of oil revenue by the state to increase its autonomy from society; and, finally, the exacerbation and re-creation by the state of communal and ethnic divisions as a strategy of rule." (169)
The book is revealing in terms of colonial forms of knowledge and circulations, and their long-lasting impact on society/state. But there's little discussion about what alternative social categories could have been (or could be) employed instead of what the British Mandate authorities/21st-century occupation forces perceived them to be. If pressed for time, Preface, Chapters 5, 7, and Conclusion are particularly strong.
The conclusion draws parallels between US and British forces in Iraq post-2003 and the British Mandate years in the 1920s and 30s. Without reliable empirical data and troops on the ground, but with pressure to cut costs, US forces resorted to using 'members of the shadow state' who had been a part of Saddam's power base that operated through patronage networks and violence. British forces even went back to examine examples from the Mandate years to look for potential models (!). Saddam Hussein, Dodge points out, was more of a symptom than a cause of Iraqi sociopolitical structures that had origins in Mandate years. Iraq's structural political problems from the end of World War I to 2003 are: "first, the deployment of extreme levels of organized violence by the state to dominate and shape society; second, the use of state resources—jobs, development aid, and patronage—to buy the loyalty of sections of society; third, the use of oil revenue by the state to increase its autonomy from society; and, finally, the exacerbation and re-creation by the state of communal and ethnic divisions as a strategy of rule." (169)
The book is revealing in terms of colonial forms of knowledge and circulations, and their long-lasting impact on society/state. But there's little discussion about what alternative social categories could have been (or could be) employed instead of what the British Mandate authorities/21st-century occupation forces perceived them to be. If pressed for time, Preface, Chapters 5, 7, and Conclusion are particularly strong.
August 12, 2016
An excellent, concise, albeit stiffly written account of British imperial nation-building in IQ. Dodge builds a number of interesting theses in this book as he gets into the cultural and ideological mindsets of the Brits in Iraq in from 1914-1932.
One remarkable aspect of this book is how different British imperialism in Iraq was than other episodes of imperialism. The British were under a number of major constraints that shaped their policies. Woodrow Wilson's critique of traditional imperialism and the introduction of the mandate system meant that the British couldn't simply take Iraq over. Moreover, they probably were incapable of doing this given how broke, demoralized, and militarily weak they were post WWII. Lastly, the Iraqis themselves strongly wanted independence from the British and frequently resisted their commands and/or advice. The British only directly controlled Iraq for a couple of years before they took an advisory role to Faisal's government. In this capacity, they still held a lot of power in terms of providing $ to Faisal and using air power to control the country, but they never really exercised much executive authority over IQ. Nevertheless, their period of influence had important consequence for IQ's future.
One important dispute among the British authorities dealt with whom to empower in Iraqi society as a way to build a new, modern state. Most Brits believed that the tribes should be empowered to resist the machinations of the urban elites, who had gained their power through the oppressive, inefficient, and effete Ottoman empire. They believed that the tribes represented the moral and physical health of Iraq. They ostensibly possessed more vigor than the urban elites and could protect IQ society and further British interests. The British therefore funneled largesse and military aid to many tribal leaders, which weakened the writ of the central government. Most of the supporters of this approach to nation-building came from the Old India school of imperialism in which reform comes second to control, even if that means bolstering "traditional structures" like the tribe. Some more modern Brits challenged this approach and tried to build a centralized state with a large army, but the "traditionalist" camp won out in the end. By the time the Brits left, the Iraqi state was still small, weak, and ruled on a largely patrimonial basis. Dodge's account helps show why Iraqi civil society was so weak even before the Baathists took over and destroyed it completely.
Dodge begins and ends the book with two fascinating chapters on the relevance of the British experience to the present. The similarities are rife, but there are also important differences. The British, like the Bush administration, knew very little about Iraq and based their policies on universalist or orientalist assumptions about nation building or their own understanding of British history. For example, many of them saw the rationalization of land holdings in individuals as a means of modernization but didn't know enough about Iraqi society to execute those plans. Other similarities include the pressure from home to get out ASAP, the resistance of IQ nationalists, and feuds within the government about how or whether to change the society. Still, the differences of the US and British experiences are just as significant. The US occupied Iraq at the height of its global power and had a far greater ability to project force into various parts of society. The US didn't rely on air power to police the country as the British did. Lastly, the US didn't share the preference for "noble savage" tribes over urban elites in its own nation-building.
The remarkable thing about this history is it should have brought up so many pitfalls the US would face in Iraq that they weren't even aware of. Dodge shows how Iraq never developed much of a civil society to mediate between the state and society. These kind of non-governmental social institutions were simply assumed to exist as they do in the US, allowing the US to work with them and support them in the interest of democratic change. Instead, the levers of power, even after de-Baathification, remained in the hands of people inimical to democratic change: ex-Baathists, religious authorities, the most ruthless tribesmen. American support funneled into these groups only recreated the problems IQ politics has long faced.
This discussion shows how facile and irresponsible Rumsfeld's concept of the unknown unknown is. He would claim that this point about the hollow civil society and the weak bureaucracy of IQ was an unknown unknown, but clearly experts in academia, the CIA, State, and elsewhere knew about this problem and spoke up on it to. Their failure to even ask the question about civil society speaks to their hubris, ignorance, and irresponsibility as leaders. Bush and company needed to have many hours long chats about IQ society and history before they pulled the trigger, but he was far too incurious and certain on this matter to do that.
This book is short and interesting, but it's also a difficult read. Dodge uses a lot of unnecessary social/political theory (Foucault bingo, anyone?) and some language that clutters up the story. The evidence of on the ground happenings is actually quite thin, so you learn a lot more about what the Brits thought than what they did. Still, this book is a necessity for any scholar of Iraq, and the British experience in Iraq deserves a far wider popular and scholarly audience than it has received.
One remarkable aspect of this book is how different British imperialism in Iraq was than other episodes of imperialism. The British were under a number of major constraints that shaped their policies. Woodrow Wilson's critique of traditional imperialism and the introduction of the mandate system meant that the British couldn't simply take Iraq over. Moreover, they probably were incapable of doing this given how broke, demoralized, and militarily weak they were post WWII. Lastly, the Iraqis themselves strongly wanted independence from the British and frequently resisted their commands and/or advice. The British only directly controlled Iraq for a couple of years before they took an advisory role to Faisal's government. In this capacity, they still held a lot of power in terms of providing $ to Faisal and using air power to control the country, but they never really exercised much executive authority over IQ. Nevertheless, their period of influence had important consequence for IQ's future.
One important dispute among the British authorities dealt with whom to empower in Iraqi society as a way to build a new, modern state. Most Brits believed that the tribes should be empowered to resist the machinations of the urban elites, who had gained their power through the oppressive, inefficient, and effete Ottoman empire. They believed that the tribes represented the moral and physical health of Iraq. They ostensibly possessed more vigor than the urban elites and could protect IQ society and further British interests. The British therefore funneled largesse and military aid to many tribal leaders, which weakened the writ of the central government. Most of the supporters of this approach to nation-building came from the Old India school of imperialism in which reform comes second to control, even if that means bolstering "traditional structures" like the tribe. Some more modern Brits challenged this approach and tried to build a centralized state with a large army, but the "traditionalist" camp won out in the end. By the time the Brits left, the Iraqi state was still small, weak, and ruled on a largely patrimonial basis. Dodge's account helps show why Iraqi civil society was so weak even before the Baathists took over and destroyed it completely.
Dodge begins and ends the book with two fascinating chapters on the relevance of the British experience to the present. The similarities are rife, but there are also important differences. The British, like the Bush administration, knew very little about Iraq and based their policies on universalist or orientalist assumptions about nation building or their own understanding of British history. For example, many of them saw the rationalization of land holdings in individuals as a means of modernization but didn't know enough about Iraqi society to execute those plans. Other similarities include the pressure from home to get out ASAP, the resistance of IQ nationalists, and feuds within the government about how or whether to change the society. Still, the differences of the US and British experiences are just as significant. The US occupied Iraq at the height of its global power and had a far greater ability to project force into various parts of society. The US didn't rely on air power to police the country as the British did. Lastly, the US didn't share the preference for "noble savage" tribes over urban elites in its own nation-building.
The remarkable thing about this history is it should have brought up so many pitfalls the US would face in Iraq that they weren't even aware of. Dodge shows how Iraq never developed much of a civil society to mediate between the state and society. These kind of non-governmental social institutions were simply assumed to exist as they do in the US, allowing the US to work with them and support them in the interest of democratic change. Instead, the levers of power, even after de-Baathification, remained in the hands of people inimical to democratic change: ex-Baathists, religious authorities, the most ruthless tribesmen. American support funneled into these groups only recreated the problems IQ politics has long faced.
This discussion shows how facile and irresponsible Rumsfeld's concept of the unknown unknown is. He would claim that this point about the hollow civil society and the weak bureaucracy of IQ was an unknown unknown, but clearly experts in academia, the CIA, State, and elsewhere knew about this problem and spoke up on it to. Their failure to even ask the question about civil society speaks to their hubris, ignorance, and irresponsibility as leaders. Bush and company needed to have many hours long chats about IQ society and history before they pulled the trigger, but he was far too incurious and certain on this matter to do that.
This book is short and interesting, but it's also a difficult read. Dodge uses a lot of unnecessary social/political theory (Foucault bingo, anyone?) and some language that clutters up the story. The evidence of on the ground happenings is actually quite thin, so you learn a lot more about what the Brits thought than what they did. Still, this book is a necessity for any scholar of Iraq, and the British experience in Iraq deserves a far wider popular and scholarly audience than it has received.
March 15, 2017
Had to read this one for a college course. The last chapter concerning the building of the Iraqi army and the use of airpower to police the state was very compelling.
February 6, 2011
Dodge's book is about the British Mandate over the newly created Iraqi state. But the lessons are obvious for the American invasion and subsequent nation-building effort in Iraq. The result reminds one of the statement by Marx, attributing to Hegel the statement that history repeats itself, first as tragedy then as farce. This book should be read in conjunction with several others, the totality of these sending a strong message that not even a superpower can fully anticipate and control events.
It will be interesting to see how the history books treat the American war and occupation of Iraq. And the Dodge book can help inform that discussion. I would have preferred that the author had done more reflection on the relevance of the British adventure in Iraq to the current American nation building effort in Iraq.
It will be interesting to see how the history books treat the American war and occupation of Iraq. And the Dodge book can help inform that discussion. I would have preferred that the author had done more reflection on the relevance of the British adventure in Iraq to the current American nation building effort in Iraq.
January 17, 2008
A concise look at Britain's role in the nation building of Iraq post World War I. Dodge uses some great evidence to show how the British outlook toward the Middle East was so fundamentally flawed and analyzes how that impacted their policy decisions during the Mandate period.
He also makes some great parallels between US policy toward Iraq today and Britain's past policy. It's not entirely gloom and doom as he does offer up a possible solution for establishing a working government in Iraq but also reminds the reader that thus far nation building has had a pretty bleak record.
He also makes some great parallels between US policy toward Iraq today and Britain's past policy. It's not entirely gloom and doom as he does offer up a possible solution for establishing a working government in Iraq but also reminds the reader that thus far nation building has had a pretty bleak record.
July 27, 2008
Compares the U.S. mission in Iraq today with the British mandate in the 1920s. It makes a good case to send more troops and get the job done right or we won't be able to get it done at all (assuming the job is to establish order and unity within the nation). I don't believe the book touches on all of our current circumstances, but it is a useful historical lesson nonetheless.
April 11, 2007
read this if you wish to have a better understanding of the situation in Iraq.
July 6, 2008
Assigned for class - Found myself inventing reasons not to go one after the first chapter.
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May 22, 2010good critique of british occupation/reconstruction during turn of 20th century
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews