In my sight, a well-told story but spent a little too long expressing its displeasure at the administration of John F. Kennedy and the US Department of State for my taste. I understand the neither was or is a shining beacon of freedom.
The author wants to present US government bureaucrats as villains. I can understand why. It is surely a sincerely held opinion for the author, with plenty of evidence to back it up. In addition, nobody wants to read a book about how US government bureaucrats, for once, got something right. Where's the drama in that?
On the other hand, journalists, while no longer possessing the unalloyed saintly aura of former days, can still be believably presented as relatively selfless seekers of truth. Unfortunately, I found the story could be subject to various interpretations. The author's interpretation is, I concede, one of them. But another could easily be that ambitious journalists placed personal advancement over the safety of their sources, egging heartbroken innocents (meaning, the tunnel diggers and prospective escapees) on to risk their lives for the sake of obtaining dramatic film footage and a handful of Deutchmarks. Meanwhile, the government bureaucrats spoke tedious and undramatic truth to a bunch of knuckleheaded adventurers and self-seeking careerists. For their trouble, the bureaucrats are portrayed as a bunch of spineless cookie-pushers who were insufficiently interested in freedom.
I'm going to describe a story that occurs up through Chapter 9 of this 18-chapter (plus epilogue) book, but I don't think that my description will contain any pleasure-ruining spoilers.
A bunch of idealistic and well-meaning amateurs (not only not professional spies, but also not possessing relevant skills in engineering or construction) start an elaborate tunnel project with the laudable goal of freeing captive East Berliners. The elaborate tunnel project runs into various delays, including leaking water mains. Meanwhile, the number of people who wish to get out using the as-yet-uncompleted tunnel grows, leading to the project become a less-and-less-tightly-held secret on both sides of the wall. Inevitably, one of the growing number of people who know something about the operation includes an informant for the Stasi, the famously deadly and humorless East German secret police (who, while certainly not portrayed as heroes, do not seem to inspire the same level of high dudgeon in the author).
Meanwhile, interest by US television has caused the operation to come to the attention of the diplomats and spies at the US diplomatic mission. The naive informants are shocked that the diplomats are less than thrilled at the news, and are not ready to throw shovels and buckets at the project. This is where the author can intimate a lack of interest in freedom compared with bureaucratic posterior-covering. The author can also maintain that, since US diplomats and spies did not know the specific identities of those involved in the plot, they could not possibly have anticipated that the plot would fail spectacularly (which it did). Therefore, their objections revealed the dips and spies to be mendacious hypocrites.
I maintain that the diplomats may or may not have entertained a healthy interest in freedom but they probably knew what a disaster looked like when it was speeding toward them. The diplomats and spies did not need to know the specific identities and political leanings of conspirators to know that, once a conspiracy gets big enough, the chance of a weak link becomes great enough that failure is almost certainly guaranteed. It doesn't take dramatic spywork or mysterious informants to know this. Knowing it is simply actuarial knowledge, like knowing that, while the time of any individual's death is unpredictable, a certain number of people within a group are likely to die in a set period of time.
Unsurprisingly, once the diplomats and spies knew this disaster was in the works, they tried to stop it. I like to think that they actually cared about lambs being sent to the slaughter in this fashion. However, in addition, I'm sure they also knew that a major diplomatic incident in their bailiwick would doubtlessly result in unpleasant late nights and weekends at the office.
And, while we're speculating about the motives of long-dead people who are not in a position to confirm or deny, let's remember that they did not have the benefit of hindsight. It's easy from this distance to make the reader think that government operatives were cowardly, because we know that a nuclear holocaust will not happen. They didn't. It wasn't unreasonable to suppose, at that time, that some Berlin-Wall-jumper could end up being the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of the end of the world.
Our selfless and baser motives are often mixed thus, I have found.
In any event, the US government's intervention eventually led, via the old-boy Ivy-League network back in the US, to the TV network getting leaned on, which is presented as an outrageous affront to liberty. Although it is not the nation's proudest moment, I was not outraged. I felt that, if it might save someone's life, the USG could crap all over a network's correspondent's big scoop for all I cared. My sleep would remain undisturbed.
As stated above, it's not just the US Mission in Berlin that gets abuse here – the entire Kennedy administration seems to get the same treatment. Sometimes I felt as if the author thought the reader was too dense to get the point, and had to engage in name-calling to make sure the reader maintained the right attitude. For example, at one point (Kindle location 2668), the author felt then-Secretary of State Dean Rusk was “peeved”, a word choice that I think does not put Rusk in the most flattering light. In fact, it makes him seem like a spoiled child. Did he act like a spoiled child? Show me, don't tell me. I don't like to be told what to think.
One day later: oh yeah, forgot to include that this was a free ebook galley proof. Thanks to the publishers and Netgalley.