I don’t understand the actual meaning of Pocock’s contextualism, and I have heard that his contextualism is different from skinner’s version. Insofar I will only give my impression of his version. It is first of all historical, historical in the sense of intellectual history that is occasionally accompanied by sporadic episodes of historical events, consisting of mostly bibliographical accounts of specific writers or important political events at that particular moment. Skinner clearly believes in the continuity of intellectual history, and that is fine with me. Wittgenstein has once commented, though I remember neither the exact location of the quotation nor the exact phrasing, that all thoughts essentially provoke thoughts, and that is all what they are going to accomplish. I mostly agree with this diagnosis, to use another word of his, of philosophical history, which is why I always hold a more pessimistic and gloomier view of philosophy as a vocation, that there are no innovations in the strict sense but only elucidations, as pointed out by both continental philosopher like Bergson and analytical philosophers such as Rafael Ferber or Wittgenstein (more pessimistically), but that interpretation might be enough for us humans in this life anyway. Or as Marx pointed out, philosophy gave no solution. It is from this starting point that I agree with this methodology of taking the theorists out of their general historical context and put into an arena where they battle for fame, armed with their political theories (the advice books for princes, the educational schemes (beginning of liberal arts), mirror-for-princes, state over citizens or otherwise, who has more power (who should have power, pope vs secular vs emperor), and so on). And those who don’t comply end up like the author of Utopia, which only becomes more so in recent years. The central theme of this first half of a great project is the interpretation of the concept virtus, the ancient Greco-Roman concept that is discovered and rediscovered for a myriad of times in Renaissance, both Northern and Southern Renaissance. It begins with the fights of the legal theorists to pre-humanists and all the way extend to the scholasticists, the humanists, and others. Like many other concepts in Greek and Roman thoughts, they are singular but always polysemic and, sometimes worse, contradictory, to quote the beginning of Bergson’s Metaphysics. In the Platonic fashion, and this is a clue that can be traced from the beginning, or prior to, of the Renaissance all the way to the ending of the first half—Utopia’s revolutionary force in completing the journey of Plato in eliminating all “degrees,” something that would be unthinkable to most Renaissance writers. It is then all the more interesting that the political theorists look to the ancient theories, as suggested by Machiavelli and his, of course, coming from Livy himself in the preface to his histories as monumentum, to arrive at the kind of conclusions of utopia, whereas Machiavelli who championed the studying of history, especially successful ones as against the failures, later followed by Nietzsche who talked about the use and misuse of history (who treated histories as changing modalities of different values), chose to be least theoretical in his writing, talking about metaphors, allegories, and historical precedents. Is Skinner hinting at Utopia as the final development a fully fledged ideology as he mentioned earlier when talking about how new blood (philological studies that was extended to philosophical, legal, moral, and finally political sphere) from Hebrew-Greco-Roman studies demystifies the old beliefs and prompted the scholars to look into the “customs” to form laws and political theories.
“This in turn meant that discussions about legal and political principles tended to resolve increasingly into discussions about historical precedents. Correspondingly, history became ideology: the conduct of political argument came to be founded to an increasing extent on the presentation of rival theses about the alleged dictates of various ‘ancient constitutions’.” (from the last paragraph of chapter “Humanism and Legal Scholarship”)
For him, there was a time when history was historia and not ideology. The making of political thoughts is the making of ideology. This is rather evident in the different thinkers’ treatment of classical thinkers/politicians/philosophers for use. In this case, the recovering the virtus becomes not only difficult but also irrelevant. The focus was always the human itself. The transition from the studia virtutis to vir virtutis in Renaissance is then only natural.
“One effect of this immensely influential argument was that, in all orthodox discussions about man’s nature and capacities throughout the Middle Ages, the possibility of aspiring to the attainment of virtus ceased to be mentioned, just as the representation of the concept is wholly absent (so Panofsky assures us) from medieval art (Panofsky, 1960, p. 177).”
(from chapter “THE CONCEPT OF ‘VIRTUS”)
The treatment of Machiavelli and Machiavellian thoughts then become an interesting phenomena. He is too fervent in his pursuits from the advice books to princes in the Prince to the later republican dreams in discourses on Livy, so much so that it would be bad faith for us to say his thoughts are ideology, even after learning about his initial attempts of appeasing the Medici family for “fame and glory.” But it is the double irony as pointed out by Skinner with respect to More who disliked the position the scholars took to advise kings when they cannot be kings themselves, those who dreamt of actually making a difference. Once you are a scholar, you are stranded in this grand irony of scholarship, that it has to rely on some kind of bureaucracy, some kind of degree, some kind of distinction. Or in another aspect, are we able to distinguish a fancier version of ideology, one provided by Machiavelli if we believe that he understands the mechanism of politics, as supposed to the more simple and straightforward ideologies provided by the lesser, less prominent political theorists? But I guess Skinner would object to this perspective: there is no degrees in ideology. Not clearly spelt out but Skinner has hinted that Machiavelli most likely already understood how ideology and the production of politics through stasis works. A friend of mine once told me that the whole political philosophy of Machiavelli is the state as machina. A similar point was made by Agamben.
“So they failed to attain what Machiavelli clearly regarded as a fundamental political insight: that ‘all legislation favourable to liberty is brought about by the clash’ between the classes, and thus that class-conflict is not the solvent but the cement of a commonwealth (p. 113)” (from chapter "The Contribution of Machiavelli").
The prejudice against political thinkers no longer hold when sometimes they wish for the best in the worse of the time and sometimes frankly they don’t give a fuck about the time they live in and just want to find targets from previous thinkers, only hoping that their theories will hit the target of appeasing someone on the way. Myopic and innocent at the same time. If one has learnt anything from this first half journey, that is the fancier ideologies are made of the same historical materials which are used to make the lesser ideologies, favored more or less because of the tempus not because of their innate superiority. Thus has Skinner always avoided the more extreme interpretations of these thinkers and attempted to construct a continuous line of thoughts. Ironically then, the Straussian methodology then proves legitimate in its most classical meaning, taking the serving of the sovereign as the fundamental goal. Even if there are ruptures (debate, imitation, and deviation) in continuities, it does not hurt his thesis of political thought as ideology because those points of departure only strengthens the original narrative by correcting it. Shakespeare can be interpreted in two ways as to agree both with the firmest upholding of hierarchies and with the harbinger of shattering of degrees, so can most of the Roman politicians(good or bad Caesar), biblical teachings (St. Augustine’s opponents), and legal histories (interpretation of Roman laws in the strict same sense vs. the more adaptive ones). As Skinner pointed out when discussing how the new philological studies influenced society that “philology is capable of determining doctrine” (Humanism and Biblical Scholarship). Of course, here he is mostly talking about the influence of philological studies on the interpretation of the Bible, but the saying still rings true and alarming for all times. To philosophize is to nit-pick the words. Philosophy is Philology in its most inward manifestation. Just as people look back to Aristotle for the correct interpretation of their politics, to steal Benjamin’s words, a weak Messianic force is endowed with the historians philosophers to salvage the broken, lost episodes of history.