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The Punic Wars
Examines the causes, events, successes, and reversals of the Punic Wars as well as discusses leaders like Hannibal and the Scipiones.
308 pages, Hardcover
First published April 24, 1980
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
February 21, 2024
All the Hasdrubals were crap.
May 23, 2012
Review by Charles R. King
The Punic Wars by Brian Caven is an examination of the three monumental struggles between Rome and Carthage from 264 to 148 B.C. The book is in annalistic narrative form and intentionally confined to military matters alone. The author states his intended audience and purpose, “This book is intended to offer to the general reader who has a taste for history a detailed narrative of the conflict between Rome and Carthage…” (ix).
Caven’s work begins with a brief forward which primarily discusses pertinent and recommended sources for the Punic Wars. He not only identifies the traditional primary sources, but numerous secondary sources which provide useful and critical analysis of this time period. Caven also provides and introduction which summarizes the Carthaginian Empire as well as its history, military, political, and cultural aspects. The introduction is fairly unique and useful since so little is known of Carthage and most works which cover the war stress the Romans and their country.
Caven also makes an interesting and unusual assessment of military genius. He states that both Scipio and Hannibal fall into this category and how rare it was in history for two such individuals to face each other. He states that for a military genius to exist, five circumstances have to exist. The first is a war of some magnitude for the military genius to be exercised. The second is a swift elevation to high command. The third is tenure of command extending over several years. The fourth is complete freedom of action and the fifth is an adequate supply of human raw material from which to forge an army. Caven states that if any of these five circumstances do not exist then a military genius is unable to display that genius and is lost to history. This is very interesting and unique analysis examining why certain military geniuses rise while other periods of history seem devoid of any superior military thought.
The end of the work contains a good appendix summarizing the Roman Constitution as well as a bibliography, index, and glossary. Although Caven’s work is excellent for amateur historians and laymen, there are several areas that make his work less useful for scholars. The first is that he has a habit of accepting or rejecting the accounts of primary sources without explanation. The second is that he does not list specific references in the body of his text or in notes. He simply lists general sources saying they apply throughout his work. This is frustrating to the serious scholar especially when confronted with a unique, interesting, or confrontational description or analysis.
Despite these few weaknesses, Caven’s work is excellent and presents a very interesting and compelling study of this important period. He recognized that the key struggle in this series of conflicts was the Second Punic War and summarizes Carthage’s failure thus, “In Carthage’s case the unwillingness to make the sacrifices, physical and economic, that would have to be made if an adversary such as Rome was to be defeated meant that she opposed Rome with only part of her strength as well as only with half a heart” (292-3). This unwillingness is what destroyed Carthage forever.
The Punic Wars by Brian Caven is an examination of the three monumental struggles between Rome and Carthage from 264 to 148 B.C. The book is in annalistic narrative form and intentionally confined to military matters alone. The author states his intended audience and purpose, “This book is intended to offer to the general reader who has a taste for history a detailed narrative of the conflict between Rome and Carthage…” (ix).
Caven’s work begins with a brief forward which primarily discusses pertinent and recommended sources for the Punic Wars. He not only identifies the traditional primary sources, but numerous secondary sources which provide useful and critical analysis of this time period. Caven also provides and introduction which summarizes the Carthaginian Empire as well as its history, military, political, and cultural aspects. The introduction is fairly unique and useful since so little is known of Carthage and most works which cover the war stress the Romans and their country.
Caven also makes an interesting and unusual assessment of military genius. He states that both Scipio and Hannibal fall into this category and how rare it was in history for two such individuals to face each other. He states that for a military genius to exist, five circumstances have to exist. The first is a war of some magnitude for the military genius to be exercised. The second is a swift elevation to high command. The third is tenure of command extending over several years. The fourth is complete freedom of action and the fifth is an adequate supply of human raw material from which to forge an army. Caven states that if any of these five circumstances do not exist then a military genius is unable to display that genius and is lost to history. This is very interesting and unique analysis examining why certain military geniuses rise while other periods of history seem devoid of any superior military thought.
The end of the work contains a good appendix summarizing the Roman Constitution as well as a bibliography, index, and glossary. Although Caven’s work is excellent for amateur historians and laymen, there are several areas that make his work less useful for scholars. The first is that he has a habit of accepting or rejecting the accounts of primary sources without explanation. The second is that he does not list specific references in the body of his text or in notes. He simply lists general sources saying they apply throughout his work. This is frustrating to the serious scholar especially when confronted with a unique, interesting, or confrontational description or analysis.
Despite these few weaknesses, Caven’s work is excellent and presents a very interesting and compelling study of this important period. He recognized that the key struggle in this series of conflicts was the Second Punic War and summarizes Carthage’s failure thus, “In Carthage’s case the unwillingness to make the sacrifices, physical and economic, that would have to be made if an adversary such as Rome was to be defeated meant that she opposed Rome with only part of her strength as well as only with half a heart” (292-3). This unwillingness is what destroyed Carthage forever.
October 9, 2017
The Punic Wars were perhaps the most critical conflicts in the history of the Roman Republic. The first war started innocuously when Rome sought to protect a band of pirates who lived on the northeast coast of Sicily. Carthage took the other side and the war was on. In order to combat the Carthaginians, Rome had to build a navy and by the time the twenty year conflict ended, Rome was in control of Sicily. The second war is famous for Hannibal's attack on the Roman peninsula after crossing the Alps. Hannibal spent fourteen years there, winning many battles, before he was forced to return home to defend Carthage against an invasion by Rome. The third war saw the complete destruction of Carthage in 146 B.C. at the hands of Scipio Aemilianus. These three wars over one hundred and twenty years led to the destruction of Carthage and achievement of supremacy over the Mediterranean Sea by the Roman Republic.
February 1, 2009
A very readable introduction to the Punic Wars. For a non-fiction book, it was a fast read.
May 29, 2025
Caven has written a informative book and if you are anti-Roman you will like it a lot. If you are more pro-Roman the like level is less. The work is fair to both sides. But, it points out many of Carthage's foibles. One, they were merchants and tried to put a price tag on war. Any government that try's a cost benefit analysis of war has lost before the first fight, and since Carthage started the first Punic war with just such an analysis over the island of Sicily, all the Punic wars were doomed. Also the Carthaginians never changed their mercantile thought process. The never created a professional army, relying on mercenaries through out all three wars. Mercenaries are loyal to their commander as long as he wins and plunder is plenty, and pay on time. Other wise the commander has to be exceptional to keep his forces under the flag. Rome 's Legions were professional. Citizen soldiers are loyal to the country or city of their birth. They will stay with the colors despite defeat, lack of pay, and,in the ancient world, lack of plunder. Also they will more likely put up with the tedium of drill, winter hardships, and summer campaigning. Not because they are loyal to the state, but because they are loyal to each other and mostly no one wants to be shown a coward to their friends and to their loved ones back home. SO thecitizen army will stay in the field and follow orders.
Second: Carthage had as many bad generals as Rome, but Carthage had Hannible. Hannible gets all the credit in the Punic war but he was a severely flawed general. His hated of Rome for what the Romans had done to his father drove his invasion of the Italian Peninsula. If I may digress to Sun Tzu, and I paraphrase here, Land is the only reason to go to war, Anything else is not worth the men's lives. So as a contemporary of Hannible Sun Tsu would have listed Hannible as a criminal in the lose of his soldiers lives. Second, Hannible brought NO engineers to Italy. Now since to defeat Rome the city itself must be taken, a lack of engineers is a criminal oversight,. Caven is very specific that both Scipio Africanus and later Scipio Aemilianus both brought engineers to lay siege to cities that they could not take in a rush. The result, Hasnnible's sieges were mostly unsuccessful, he could starve the Roman's out. But both Scipio's sieges were successful and short by the use of siege engines and engineering works. Third: although Hannibles army was made up of mercenaries pay and plunder were always a problem for him especially during the 16 year time he was bottled up in the southern instep area. Finally, coming back to hate and mercantilism. The Italian peninsula and Rome may have been Hannibles main objective, but Carthage's main objective was to protect the silver mines in Spain and maybe retake Sicily or Sardina and at best Rome was a third or even fourth objective. Hannible never understood this basic truth. And it cost him.
Looking at Rome the biggest problem that Rome had in fighting Carthage was the Command issue and the way they picked Commanders. One year and then elect a new army command is a real dumb way to run an Army. But it was the Roman Republic system. It is horrid and is the main reason that Hannible won and Rome lost at Cannan and a host of other fights in Italy. Where Rome had competent Commanders they mostly won or fought Carthaginian forces to a draw.. The Fabian plan of attacking Carthage where ever Hannible wasn't worked brilliantly. Scipio's fights in. Spain cut off Carthage's silver and added it to the Roman treasury worked well. All this forced Carthage to sue for peace, but after 50 years they broke that peace and were finally destroyed by a very p*&%@d off Rome.
All in all this is a very good read for a first blush at Roman History from 225 BCE to 150 BCE.
Second: Carthage had as many bad generals as Rome, but Carthage had Hannible. Hannible gets all the credit in the Punic war but he was a severely flawed general. His hated of Rome for what the Romans had done to his father drove his invasion of the Italian Peninsula. If I may digress to Sun Tzu, and I paraphrase here, Land is the only reason to go to war, Anything else is not worth the men's lives. So as a contemporary of Hannible Sun Tsu would have listed Hannible as a criminal in the lose of his soldiers lives. Second, Hannible brought NO engineers to Italy. Now since to defeat Rome the city itself must be taken, a lack of engineers is a criminal oversight,. Caven is very specific that both Scipio Africanus and later Scipio Aemilianus both brought engineers to lay siege to cities that they could not take in a rush. The result, Hasnnible's sieges were mostly unsuccessful, he could starve the Roman's out. But both Scipio's sieges were successful and short by the use of siege engines and engineering works. Third: although Hannibles army was made up of mercenaries pay and plunder were always a problem for him especially during the 16 year time he was bottled up in the southern instep area. Finally, coming back to hate and mercantilism. The Italian peninsula and Rome may have been Hannibles main objective, but Carthage's main objective was to protect the silver mines in Spain and maybe retake Sicily or Sardina and at best Rome was a third or even fourth objective. Hannible never understood this basic truth. And it cost him.
Looking at Rome the biggest problem that Rome had in fighting Carthage was the Command issue and the way they picked Commanders. One year and then elect a new army command is a real dumb way to run an Army. But it was the Roman Republic system. It is horrid and is the main reason that Hannible won and Rome lost at Cannan and a host of other fights in Italy. Where Rome had competent Commanders they mostly won or fought Carthaginian forces to a draw.. The Fabian plan of attacking Carthage where ever Hannible wasn't worked brilliantly. Scipio's fights in. Spain cut off Carthage's silver and added it to the Roman treasury worked well. All this forced Carthage to sue for peace, but after 50 years they broke that peace and were finally destroyed by a very p*&%@d off Rome.
All in all this is a very good read for a first blush at Roman History from 225 BCE to 150 BCE.
April 9, 2025
The Punic Wars-Rome v Carthage (280-146 BC) is a solid history of this epic conflict(s) of the ancient world, one that ensured the dominance of Rome for nearly the next half-millennium. I read this in anticipation of my impending trip to Sicily where it all started with the so-called Mamertine Incident in Messina (Messana). Although as Brian Craven points out the clash may have been inevitable. With the defeat of Carthage in the first Punic War, fought mainly in western Sicily, that island became Rome's first overseas colony. Sicily also became the focus of the very confusing siege of Syracuse (213-212 BC) in the 2nd War, remembered partially for the presence of the Greek polymath Archimedes who apparently invented numerous weapons in defense of that famous city.
There is lot of history here packed into under 300 pages, momentous decisions, massive land and sea battles, sieges, betrayals, untimely acts of nature (especially at sea). It is a bit of an unrelenting narrative with only brief pauses for taking a wider or more detailed view. I suppose the book presupposes a decent knowledge of the Roman Republic political system and the military terminology. The author does not pause often to give detailed explanations of such matters which detracts a bit from a clear understanding. In addition, it seems that all Carthaginian generals had one of four names--Hannibal, Hasdrubal, Hanno and Mago. There were multiple versions of each and the Romans were not much better with multiple Scipios, Fabians, Claudii, Sempronni, and others. Of course, the two most famous from the entire wars were Hannibal Barca and P. Cornelius Scipio (Africanus) perhaps the only two that might be recognized by an average bloke today, if that.
Anyway, I'd say 3.5 stars but I'll round up despite a very scant bibliography. The Historical Commentary on Polybius by F.W. Walbank might be the most interesting looking reference--a used copy can be had for a cool $1,534 on Amazon! Buy now before they all go!
There is lot of history here packed into under 300 pages, momentous decisions, massive land and sea battles, sieges, betrayals, untimely acts of nature (especially at sea). It is a bit of an unrelenting narrative with only brief pauses for taking a wider or more detailed view. I suppose the book presupposes a decent knowledge of the Roman Republic political system and the military terminology. The author does not pause often to give detailed explanations of such matters which detracts a bit from a clear understanding. In addition, it seems that all Carthaginian generals had one of four names--Hannibal, Hasdrubal, Hanno and Mago. There were multiple versions of each and the Romans were not much better with multiple Scipios, Fabians, Claudii, Sempronni, and others. Of course, the two most famous from the entire wars were Hannibal Barca and P. Cornelius Scipio (Africanus) perhaps the only two that might be recognized by an average bloke today, if that.
Anyway, I'd say 3.5 stars but I'll round up despite a very scant bibliography. The Historical Commentary on Polybius by F.W. Walbank might be the most interesting looking reference--a used copy can be had for a cool $1,534 on Amazon! Buy now before they all go!
July 10, 2009
Another very good book. Obviously I lean toward military history.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews