Forging The Sword: Doctrinal Change In The U.S. Army

by Benjamin M. Jensen

As entrenched bureaucracies, military organizations might reasonably be expected to be especially resistant to reform and favor only limited, incremental adjustments. Yet, since 1945, the U.S. Army has rewritten its capstone doctrine manual, Operations , fourteen times. While some modifications have been incremental, collectively they reflect a significant evolution in how the Army approaches warfare―making the U.S. Army a crucial and unique case of a modern land power that is capable of change. So what accounts for this anomaly? What institutional processes have professional officers developed over time to escape bureaucracies' iron cage? Forging the Sword conducts a comparative historical process-tracing of doctrinal reform in the U.S. Army. The findings suggest that there are unaccounted-for institutional facilitators of change within military organizations. Thus, it argues that change in military organizations requires "incubators," designated subunits established outside the normal bureaucratic hierarchy, and "advocacy networks" championing new concepts. Incubators, ranging from special study groups to non-Title 10 war games and field exercises, provide a safe space for experimentation and the construction of new operational concepts. Advocacy networks then connect different constituents and inject them with concepts developed in incubators. This injection makes changes elites would have otherwise rejected a contagious narrative.

217 pages, Hardcover

First published February 1, 2016

Reviews

[John · Rating 3 out of 5]

Probably a 3.5 star. A very insightful examination of four phases of doctrinal innovation in the US Army. Jensen introduces the idea of advocacy networks (allowing new ways of thinking to disseminate throughout the service) and incubators (places of innovation removed from the bureaucratic tug-and-pull of headquarters) providing the avenues for innovative behaviors to be carried out. In examining Active Defense of the 1970s, AirLand Battle of the '80s, Full Spectrum Operations of the 1990s, and Counterinsurgency of the 2000s, Jensen challenges his theory against the conventional way of thinking of exogenous shocks or civilian intervention. In the end, Jensen successfully tests his theory that at least in the important case of the modern US Army, innovation occurs because influential officers are able to theorize, test, and implement a new way of victory that fundamentally changes the way the Army functions on the battlefield; most importantly, these changes mostly occur independent of outside pressures.

[Hj Reichen · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book gives a good overview of doctrinal change in the US Army from Active Defense to COIN. Some very interesting insights on the vectors of change.