Philosophy in a Meaningless Life: A System of Nihilism, Consciousness and Reality

by James Tartaglia

This book is open access and available on www.bloomsburycollections.com. It is funded by Knowledge Unlatched.Philosophy in a Meaningless Life provides an account of the nature of philosophy which is rooted in the question of the meaning of life. It makes a powerful and vivid case for believing that this question is neither obscure nor obsolete, but reflects a quintessentially human concern to which other traditional philosophical problems can be readily related; allowing them to be reconnected with natural interest, and providing a diagnosis of the typical lines of opposition across philosophy's debates. James Tartaglia looks at the various ways philosophers have tried to avoid the conclusion that life is meaningless, and in the process have distanced philosophy from the concept of transcendence. Rejecting all of this, Tartaglia embraces nihilism ('we are here with nothing to do'), and uses transcendence both to provide a new solution to the problem of consciousness, and to explain away perplexities about time and universals. He concludes that with more self-awareness, philosophy can attain higher status within a culture increasingly in need of it.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

233 pages, Kindle Edition

First published December 17, 2015

Reviews

[Arran · Rating 4 out of 5]

Tartaglia’s book flows between three main themes that he views as intrinsically linked: 1) ‘nihilism’ and the meaningless of life, 2) the role oh philosophy and it’s relation to both religion and science, and 3) his hypothesis of ‘trancendence’ and his take on the major problems of metaphysics. (I will use these numbers to refer to these different themes)

I deeply enjoyed his discussion of 1), and found his view of the neutrality of nihilism refreshing and enlightening. Tartaglia mixes his personal reflections with strong theoretical claims to back up his arguments, and gives a comprehensive survey of how other philosophers have dealt with (or actively avoided dealing with) the ‘truth of nihilism’.

I found 2) to be similarly interesting, but felt the shift in topic quite jarring. I enjoyed Tartaglia’s take on the history of philosophical thinking, and I appreciate his viewpoint on it’s role in relation to science, but I ultimately wasn’t entirely convinced of anything, so while I don’t exactly disagree with his points I also don’t really feel moved by them enough to say I agree.

Tartaglia them bridges the gap between 2) and 3) with a survey of problems relating to consciousness. I found his discussion deeply fascinating, but by the conclusion of this section when he turned his focus on his reservation’s relating to ‘revisionism’ is where things started to get a little hairy for me.

Topic 3) is where I had the most issues. Tartaglia takes a ridiculously sharp dive around page 100 straight into unadulterated metaphysics, and while this was not my first exposure to the concepts discussed I found his dense writing style and constant referencing to conflicting views (it seemed like almost every sentence started with “Therefore… But… Thus…. However….”) made his line of reasoning far more difficult to follow that it reasonably should have been (for me, anyway). I also had a simialr conclusion to 2), in that his argument for transcendental reality is not really something I can say I disagree with, but I definitely don’t ascribe myself to his stance. Central to his hypothesis is the “fact of transcendance” and that “experience does not belong to the objective world”… ok, this may make sense, but given how difficult he made his major hypothesis to follow and the fact that I was never convinced that “revisionist philosophy” is wrong. I’m sure a lot of it was my own failure to fully grasps his points, but I’m also sure some of his strategies of argument were less than ideal (the dream example he repeatedly referred to was insightful and convincing, but I feel there could have been more of an effort to explain this in this way instead of retreating further into dense metaphysical territory). If the transcendence hypothesis really does solve the problem of consciousness, I wish it could do so with a bit more coherence (and less repetition). Of the topics within 3) (consciousness time and universals) the chapter on time was the high point for me as his views on block theory were particularly well articulated and here his theory of transcendence was more coherent. The chapter on universals I found tedious in the extreme; I just could not care about the so called ‘problems’ under discussion with the way they were presented.

The conclusion brought things back to 1) and again I must say I do love how Tartaglia tackles nihilism. The conclusion also gives a more clearer explanation of how the 3 main themes all add up to Tartaglia’s philosophical outlook, and while I had softened to his concept of transcendence by this point I still did not have enough of a reason to go with it. Similary with 2), his positioning of philosophy is very interesting, and I can’t fault him for it… but it just didn’t really sway me. I find my own views much more in line with philosophers like John Searle who, while arriving at a similar point that materialsm and dualism are both fundamentally flawed ways of thinking, then directs the inquiry towards human biology and neuroscience as opposed to grand metaphysics. Even if accepting Tartaglia’s transcendence hypothesis handily solves the metaphysical problems he details, I’d much rather pursue Searle’s line of thinking even when he freely admits the issues and unknowable aspects of the problems. I guess this comes back down to Tartaglia’s belief in philosophy’s role in relation to science. As far as he’s concerned there can be purely philosophical problems, the answers of which do not impede on science. Fair enough, but I believe the questions, and subsequently the answers, are more interesting and engaging when they are argued from a standpoint that science and philosophy are not a threat to each other when they are working on the same project. In short, it’s not weather I agree or disagreewith Tartaglia’s view on philosophy’s role, it’s just that I find that way of conceptualising philosophy, and therefore the questions it relates too, personally less interesting.

But, overall, I found the book enjoyable and intellectually stimulating. I would highly recommend the introduction and chapters 1 and 2 to anyone interested in nihilism and the meaninglessness of life. I’d recommend chapter 3 for anyone interested in a modern look-back at the history of philosophy with the ‘purpose’ of philosophy in mind. I’d recommend chapter 4 for anyone interested in the philosophy of Mind who wants to hear a wide range of modern views debated and explored. But I would only recommend chapters 5–7 to those with some solid background knowledge of metaphysical topics.

Tartaglia repeatedly ‘shows’ how transcendence doesn’t impact science, and doesn’t vindicate religion, and that it isn’t anything for philosophical thinkers to avoid, deny or fear. And he ‘shows’ how this meshes with nihilism, and smartly wraps up a wide range of seemingly impossible problems while doing so. While I agree with him on the truth of nihilism, I just think the ‘revisionist’ philosophy he supposedly showed to be wrong offers a much more plausible and understandable way out of these problems. Nevertheless, a fascinating and, on the whole, an engaging read.

[Arianne X · Rating 3 out of 5]

Transcendental-Nihilism: A Work of Irony

If the reader is seeking a work on nihilism, disappointment will follow. This must be the latest incarnation of hyphenated nihilism.

The Crucial Move: A Proper Grounding for Nihilism 😊:

James Tartaglia attempts to provide us with a coherent foundation for nihilism. The important move made in this book is to make clear the distinction between nihilism as a value proposition and nihilism as a fact of existence. As a value proposition (moral/ethical/political), the nihilist perspective is subjective, as a fact of existence (metaphysical/ontological), the nihilist perspective is objective. When nihilism is explored as a value, it becomes unworkable and lapses into existentialism or social value. Many books and writings on nihilism conflate the value proposition with the fact of existence and thus revert to existentialism and thus focus solely on the value question. Nihilism, as a fact of existence, can be compared to other objective facts of existence such as gravity, the heliocentric solar system or the fact that the earth is a sphere. The nihilist fact of existence is that existence qua existence has no meaning or purpose. All of our causal explanations only work within our extant framework of existence once established, they offer nothing in terms of an explanation for existence. In terms of the value proposition, nihilism changes beliefs but not necessarily values. We can still have our subjective hopes, wants, goals, plans, desire and values in life, with the understanding that they do not contribute to the achievements of any overarching grand goal and are not part of any grand plan, design or purpose because we can do nothing about nihilism, it is merely a brute fact of existence. With this, we should be able to dismiss all metaphysical claims for a meaning and purpose of existence provided by religion, new age superstition and transcendent philosophical systems – nothing but “misguided coping strategies”. Nihilism has been the truth about existence all along in the same manner as the non-existence of God has always been the truth all along. Tartaglia thus shows nihilism is just a good description of the objective reality of space and time as we encounter it in our experience of existence but when it comes to experience, and our awareness of it, Tartaglia goes off the deep metaphysical end – see next section.

Self-Refuting: Making the Case for Transcendence ☹:

In short, the author slips from nihilism into transcendentalism. The discussion on consciousness is curious and it is here that I depart with the author. Tartaglia lapses into dualism which undermines his argument for nihilism. Tartaglia rejects the notion that consciousness is reducible to a brain state. I disagree and will make the claim that consciousness is precisely that, a brain state. The belief in consciousness as non-reducible to the brain is dualism which entails a non-physical dimension to human existence from which then a transcendent meaning and purpose of human life are smuggled into the party. The nature and properties of this transcendent realm are conveniently not specified, we are just asked to accept its existence on faith. Tartaglia goes through great pains, and takes the reader through these pains, to avoid dualism while maintaining that consciousness is not reducible to the physical brain. This is a painful read because it is an impossible task. I believe that any notion of idealism, awareness, and experience comes from the brain itself, it is a brain state, not the other was around which is the logical conclusion of the author’s argument which must lapse into dualism. Self-awareness of experience just is a matter of brain states co-varying with the physical environment. There is a false dichotomy in claiming that experiences are somehow different from the brain’s interaction with the environment. This false dichotomy leads to dualism. There is no ‘elan vital’ that is consciousness. The only way out of dualism is argue for the independent existence of consciousness within the causally closed physical world. The only analogy that I can offer to assist the author, provided by Daniel Dennett, is in the existence of information as a force alongside many other physical forces. It can be said that consciousness exists in the world as does information in that both are real, and both are non-physical. But this still fails, information only exists within a physical medium and as a result of physical causes and with respect to physical objects, I submit the same is true of consciousness. Conscious is just what the brain does, it not something extra or in addition to the physical brain. Just because consciousness is the result of brain states, it does not follow that consciousness is an illusion or an extravagant metaphysical reality any more than it follows that digestion, which is just what the stomach does, is an illusion or an extravagant metaphysical reality. The continuous accretions to consciousness is the product of evolutionary development. This keeps the causal loop closed and set firmly within the nihilistic objective physical world. There is no ‘I’ in addition to the physical brain. The first-person subjective awareness of experience as we encounter the physical environment creates a cognitive bias to explain an imagined difference between the brain states and the mental states of experience.

Conscious experience, according to Tartaglia, transcends the objective world and thus itself is not part of the world of time and space. If this is true, then we have discover (invent) a context and ultimate meaning in a new framework that undoes nihilism. If there is a transcendent realm of meaning, then nihilism is undone as admitted by the author. For Tartaglia, experience itself, then, must exceed the objective world. As astounding as it is, the author argues for another world outside of space and time. It is difficult to see how this could be the case, our experience is simply that which takes place within the bounds of space and time. It is even more difficult to understand how is it that Tartaglia is able to get outside of space and time to observe and verify that experience transcends space and time. This is just a lot of gratuitous metaphysical baggage. After arguing that there is no ultimate framework for objective meaning, the author provides the argument for a transcendent framework for meaning. To conclude a book on nihilism with the possibility that existence really does have a transcendent meaning is at least ironic.

[Roy Kenagy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Best treatment of the old saw "why is there something rather than nothing" that I've ever encountered. After reading this, I'm happy to describe myself as a transcendental nihilist.