The challenges facing General Dwight Eisenhower before the Invasion of Normandy were not merely military but political as well. He knew that to liberate France, and to hold it, the Allies needed local help, which would necessitate coordinating with the highly independent French resistance groups known collectively as the maquis. The Allies' objective was to push the Germans out of France. The French objective, on the other hand, was a France free of all foreign armies, including the Allies. President Roosevelt refused to give full support to Charles de Gaulle, whom he mistrusted, and declined to supply the timing, location, and other key details of Operation Overlord to his Free French government. Eisenhower's hands were tied. He needed to involve the French, but without simultaneously involving them in operational planning.Into this atmosphere of tension and confusion jumped teams consisting of three officers each -- one from the British Special Operations Bureau, one from the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, one from the Free French Bureau Central de Renseignement -- as well as a radioman from any one of the three nations. Known as the Jedburghs, their primary purpose was to serve as liaisons to the maquis, working to arm, train, and equip them. They were to incite guerilla warfare.Benjamin Jones' Eisenhower's Guerrillas is the first book to show in detail how the Jedburghs -- whose heroism and exploits have been widely celebrated -- and the maquis worked together. Underscoring the critical and often overlooked role that irregular warfare played in Allied operations on the Continent, it tells the story of the battle for and liberation of France and the complexities that threatened to undermine the operation before it even began.
Benjamin Jones' book, "Eisenhower's Guerillas: The Jedburghs and the Liberation of France" is a milestone in that it places the reader into what is a little known area of WW II history for most people alive today.
The Jedburghs were the WWII guerillas. They were essential to the war effort and the planning of and liberation of France. Most were not expected to survive. The Jedburghs were, in effect, teams of three men who were to be placed all over France to work with the various resistance groups for the allies' invasion of France. These teams each consisted of one British soldier, one French soldier and one American soldier. All needed to speak French and one was trained in messaging logistics. All the teams were trained in England and dropped secretly into France.
Add to the mix a history of Eisenhower's outstanding leadership and military background and the emergence of Charles De Gaulle as the only military person both available and willing to lead the Free French in the liberation of his country.
Roosevelt and Churchill were anti-De Gaulle. They favored anyone else. Eisenhower met with De Gaulle and through these meetings finally stated that he understood the man and could work with him.
Both Eisenhower and De Gaulle became leaders of their countries after the war. They were the past soldier-statesmen and capable at this point of nation leadership.
What would have happened if both Eisenhower and De Gaulle were not involved as they were in WWII? Both the French people and De Gaulle wanted complete control of France after the war. Roosevelt and Churchill during the war wanted and expected some control of after-WWII France when the the allies emerged as victorious.
This is a fascinating book readable for non-historians that fills in the pages of this important time in history.
An interesting look at post D-Day special ops in Occupied France.
Operation Jedburgh was a clandestine operation during World War II, in which personnel of the SOE, the OSS , the Free French, the Dutch and Belgian Armies were dropped into occupied France, the Netherlands and Belgium to conduct sabotage and guerrilla warfare. The teams were normally dropped in uniform and were intended to lead the local resistance forces in actions against the Germans.
At approximately 260 pages excluding footnotes this book is not a big volume. It concentrates on the French operations and describes in detail some of the individual missions as well as the political conflicts where Eisenhower proved himself by managing to balance the demands of De Gaulle with the operational needs of the Allied forces. Amazingly of the 265 deployed only 18 were killed.
I did read this as a review copy so the finished article will hopefully contain some maps as it was sometimes difficult to follow the locations of the action described
The last chapter is a fascinating one where the “Jed’s” techniques were attempted to be applied in China, Indo-China and Vietnam.
The author has put together a useful addition to the history of unconventional forces and busts a few myths on the so called successes of the various operations.
All in all a useful addition to your World War 2 library.
I received this book for free from the publisher in exchange for an honest review. This does not affect my opinion of the book or the content of my review.
The title is really deceiving. A more accurate title would be: "FDR, Eisenhower, Churchill, and de Gaulle: Arguing in the Middle of WWII." I was excited to read this book as the history of special operations is a subject dear to me, and the Jedburgh concept is getting a lot of attention lately. Jones decided to focus on the political intrigue between the allied powers and France's government-in-exile. Overall, a disappointing read for someone wanting a closer read of SOE/OSS operations in Nazi-occupied France.
I received this book in exchange for an honest review. I really enjoyed this book. It gives us a look at a bit of little know history and is all together fascinating. General Eisenhower was simply a force to be reckoned with. This book is the perfect book for anyone that enjoys reading about history or anything to do with WWII. Great job.
It wasn't what I was after when I got it to read, but it delivers exactly what it sets out to do - explain the complex interactions of those higher up on the 'food chain'.
The target audience is probably World War II historians. I listened to this twice and took pages of notes! Great information I've never read anywhere else, though.
Benjamin F. Jones wrote a miraculous book about the country of France during WWII, and what it took to liberate it from German occupation. If we had to depend on Churchill and F. D. R. to win the war, from reading this book, I would seriously doubt the Allies would have. These two "Gentlemen" (the good ole' boys club) were too concerned with making America the next occupier of France, and making Eisenhower it's governor. France was having none of that. In the meantime, General Eisenhower was trying to work with the French to liberate their own country. He tried to get young de Gaulle (the leader of the Free French) to work with him to get the backing of the French people.
There are basically two halves to the liberation movement. During Normandy and around D-Day, the Free French volunteers were basically front and center for the fighting. Even though Churchill and Roosevelt did not want them knowing any plans before they happened. There were thousands of would be volunteers. This was to be considered the success story. They were basically used to sabotage the Germans, cut communication ties, and blow up bridges and railways, not get directly involved in the fighting. Then you have the team's who were set in place to do their duties as the Germans retreated back into Germany. This is what I found so fascinating. None of these teams received supplies for months. They did not have proper communication, as some radios were destroyed and others captured with radio operators by the Germans. The teams did not have proper weapons, ammunition, and other basic supplies to defend themselves. London blamed it on weather conditions, moon phases (where it couldn't be bright enough for planes going over the drop off sites to be seen at night) or knowledge of where German anti-aircraft weapons may be, among others. Some team leaders were captured, killed, or sent to prison camps in Germany. Mr. Jones tried to inform us if the guerrilla warfare tactics worked in France and why or why not. I was not a student of WWIi battles, etc. before I read this book. However, this book read like a novel after chapter six. Eisenhower did what no other even tried to do: work directly with the French people for the good of their nation. I was extremely impressed by that. It was no wonder the French did not like Americans for so long after the war. But, Eisenhower saved the day where Churchill and Roosevelt did not. This is a book for everyone who wants to learn about public relations.
Thank you Oxford University Press and NetGalley for giving me an ARC of this book to read and give my honest review.
Disclaimer - I received a free copy of this book from NetGalley in return for an honest review.
Eisenhower's Guerillas is a book which is dedicated to the stories of the group called the Jedburghs (aka Jeds) which were a multi-national force of guerillas who went into occupied France after D-Day to work alongside the French resistance, the Maquis.
A great majority of this book is given over to the politics of war, and the battles which occurred at the highest levels of the command structure, as well as between the political leaders who had very differing ideas about how the Jedburghs should be used.
I must say that I was slightly disappointed in the book, in that it was so focused on the chess game of the war, that it often failed to deliver on the individual stories of the men involved on the ground. At the end of the book, for instance, it reveals that there were some 190 teams of Jedburghs who were either deployed, or were trained for deployment, and I can respect that it would be an impossible task to capture all of these men's stories. Certainly there were highlights of the action on the ground in bits and pieces, but I felt like the fog of war had descended over the book, with intermittent descriptions of battle, which seemed - for all intents and purposes - to take place in a void.
Another aspect which I found difficult to parse was the often-dizzying array of acronyms which were obviously in use at the time. Having to jump back to a reference guide, or looking up on the internet while trying to read a book isn't the best thing in the world.
Much of the story of the German side of the conflict is glossed over. Probably the most cohesive and interesting section of the book for me was the final chapters and the epilogue, which nicely lifted the fog of war and actually tied it all together.
I have a serious level of interest in history and war; and as such am willing to give a book a bit of leniency, particularly where it is dealing with an aspect about which I was otherwise either unaware, or under-read. However, I came away from the book with only a limited increase in my understanding, due to the way that the information was presented. I fear that this is perhaps too dry a tome for the average reader, perhaps aimed at the academician.
Title: Eisenhower’s Guerrillas Author: Benjamin Jones ISBN: 978-0-19-994208-4 Publisher: Oxford University Press Year: 2016 Hardcover Pages: 384 Photos/Maps: 19/5
This is a fascinating book on the nature of the asymmetric warfare undertaken in the months and years leading up to the invasion of mainland Europe by Allied forces. It highlights clearly the challenges surrounding this form of operation including: the effects of multiple organizations with different goals trying to operate in the same region (the politics of resistance), the significant obstacles to logistically supporting these personnel and the subsequent impact on their efficacy and the effectiveness of the Germans at countering the Allied efforts (and how it changed as the war progressed). Worth a read.
I really wanted to love this book. I expected it to be stories of the French Resistance, OSS and British SAS sabotaging the Nazis in France, staging raids and disrupting the Nazi attempts to throw the allies back after they land in Normandy. Unfortunately the book does not have enough of that. It spends a lot more time immersed in the political picture that both Churchill and FDR, especially FDR were reluctant to involve or trust Charles De Gaulle and the Free French to any real degree and how this hampered the teams being sent into France in advance of D-Day and their supply and effectiveness after D-Day.
We’ve had many fine overviews of the Jedburgh program in the last several years to complement the memoirs by those brave veterans who lived it. Benjamin F. Jones has given us what might be the most thorough treatment. In addition, the background and politics surrounding the French Resistance is weaved in to this story. Academics or casual readers will find great value in this solid work on World War II unconventional warfare.