A truly magnificent testament by one of the wisest leaders of any nation in the Great Asian War (1941-45), albeit one who is now almost wholly forgotten. As I put this marvellous book down, I felt what a great pity it was that Dr. Ba Maw’s sagacity and leadership wasn’t available to post-war Burma, particularly after the assassination of Aung San and his entire ‘rainbow coalition’ cabinet in July 1947, just six weeks after it had been formed following Aung San’s landslide election victory.
Ba Maw was the winner of both pre-war elections held in Burma in the 1930s. The first of these was conducted mainly around a single issue: whether or not Burma should be separated from British India. Ba Maw led the party that wanted to remain part of India (while retaining Burma’s distinctiveness; he felt Burma would be able to negotiate better with Britain as part of India than separately). He won overwhelmingly, but the British ignored the result, and separated Burma anyway.
Post-separation, Ba Maw won the next election in 1937 as well, and became Premier. Once WWII began, he was removed by the British (through classic parliamentary trickery). The passages describing his conversations with the British about the war are superb, showing how an Asian saw no reason to believe that a British victory would be the best result for his country. Eventually, his candour got him imprisoned.
Ba Maw describes how the young Thakins led by Aung San created a Burma Independence Army with the help of Col. Keiji Suzuki (who was called Bo Mogyo by the BIA, and became its effective leader by making himself thoroughly Burmese). The BIA played a key role in liberating Burma from British rule, winning several key victories — although the biggest ones were of course won against Britain and its allies by the Imperial Japanese Army. Ba Maw managed a perilous escape from his British prison during a crucial stage of the war, found refuge with a Shan noble friend, and eventually was able to meet up with the Japanese army.
Soon after the victory, Ba Maw was made the head of a Burma Independence Preparatory Committee, which took over the administration of the country from the inexperienced hands of the BIA, which had been rather hamhanded. On 1st August 1943, Burma became fully independent, with Ba Maw as Adipadi (or prime minister). He describes the challenges of dealing with the militarists of Japan, petty and brutal in their daily dealings, and the far better results he and his government always had when dealing with the senior Japanese generals — and the respect and honour (as visiting head of state) that was accorded to him in Japan by Tojo, who always showed a complete commitment to the genuine independence and socioeconomic development of Japan’s Asian allies.
Ba Maw describes the mistakes Aung San (his defence minister) made in allowing the reconstituted Burma Defence Army (which became the Burma National Army, BNA) to be trained in an excessively Japanese way, imbibing all the pros and especially the cons of Japan’s militarists (a factor that haunts Myanmar to this day). He describes his close comradeship with Netaji Subhas Bose (an honoured guest at the independence ceremony, later a key ally in trying to fend off the British reconquest). And of course the tragic mistake that Aung San made (my opinion) in switching to the British side in March 1945, leaving Ba Maw, U Nu and the rest of his cabinet colleagues bereft — and unable to stay in Burma once the British regained Rangoon.
This is a moving book, written by an Asian statesman from an Asian perspective, with scarcely any bitterness even toward the British. A book that must be widely read, as an antidote to the Western propaganda that passes for the history of the Great Asian War. And, for anyone with an interest in Myanmar’s place in contemporary Asia, this book provides illuminating insights about how decisions made in the 1930s and ‘40s continue to reverberate to this day.
Neither side wanted the Second Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese wanted to focus on the Soviet threat, while the KMT wanted to exert maximum pressure on the communists. Yet the war broke out. For a long time, I had no idea whom to blame, but now, I agree with Dr. Ba Maw that the Japanese were to be blamed due to their arrogance and racism stemming from their importation of racist and self-defeating eugenist ideas from the West.
Think about it: the Japanese empire stands out as the only major Asian empire that relied solely on a single ethnicity, the Japanese, for its fighting forces. In contrast, the Mongol Empire and its offshoots incorporated diverse groups such as the Mongols, Chinese (Guo Kan & his technicians), Turkic tribes, Christians (Kitbuqa), Muslims, and Buddhists under their banners. Similarly, the Manchu Empire enlisted the support of Mongols, Chinese (Wu Sangui's green standard troops), and Turkic tribes. Although the Japanese had Pu Yi, Wang Jingwei, and Bose's Indian National Army under them, they never fully trusted anyone due to their racist beliefs.
Why were others successful but not the Japanese? Well, other Asian empires were meritocracies. Genghis Khan was ruthless to those who resisted him, but once victory was achieved, he promoted strictly based on merits. The Japanese, due to their self-defeating racism, engaged in needless wars, and led to their defeat. Still, the independence of many Asian countries owes, in part, to the actions of the Japanese. However, their senseless brutality overshadowed any potential positive contributions they made, and deservingly so.