The Campaigns of 1812 in Russia: A Prussian Officer's Account From the Russian Imperial Headquarters

by Carl von Clausewitz

On 23 June 1812 the French Grande Armee, over 600,000 strong and composed of men from the many nations that had become part of Napoleon s empire, poured over the Russian border. In defense of Russia, an army of approximately the same number faced them. The campaign was disastrous for Napoleon, and it marked the beginning of his decline in power.Amongst those who participated in the campaign was von Clausewitz. This renowned Prussian military strategist and historian defected from the French Army and joined the Russian Imperial headquarters where he spent the campaign close to the senior Russian officers who made the critical decisions.The campaign raised many questions which continue to be debated to this day and Clausewitz s considered account has long been regarded as a highly valuable source. His expert analysis of the Battle of Borodino indicates that he was heavily involved in the engagement as a staff officer, whose duties would have entailed his constant traveling round the battlefield. He was present at the secret Convention of Tauroggen, and his account of this important treaty and its effect in bringing about the defection of the Prussian corps from the French is unique."

Genres: History, Russia, Military Fiction, Military History, War

288 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1843

About the author

Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz was a Prussian soldier, military historian and military theorist. He is most famous for his military treatise Vom Kriege, translated into English as On War.

Clausewitz has served in the Rhine campaign (1793–1794), when the Prussian army invaded France during the French revolution and in the Napoleonic Wars from 1806 to 1815.

Clausewitz helped negotiate the Convention of Tauroggen where Russia, Prussia and the United Kingdom formed an coalition that later defeated Napoleon Bonaparte.

Reviews

[Jan-Maat]

The Prussian career soldier abandoned Prussian service and went to Russia in disgust at the Pruusian Monarchy's unwillingness to embrace reform and its lack of commitment to fighting against Napoleon. In this book Clausewitz analyses the campaign of 1812 in which he participated in Russian service. It is carefully and precisely written. The personal reflections when the author was involved in troop movements and discussions are the most interesting parts of the book, so for example the famous retreat from Moscow:

We mention all this to show that the march on Kaluga, which has since made so much noise in the world, and is become a sort of luminous point in the region of military speculations, in its conception and discovery did not start suddenly from the head of the commander or adviser, like a Minerva from that of Jupiter. It has become our general conviction that ideas in war are generally so simple, and lie so near the surface that the merit of their invention can seldom substantiate the talent of the commander who adopts them. Among five or six ideas which suggest themselves, the ability to choose the most promising, the acuteness which can pierce a cloud of obscure relations, and by the application of the judgement can decide among them on the instant, these may more properly be considered the cardinal virtues of a commander, but are something very different from mere invention.

The chief thing, however, is the relative difficulty of the execution. In war all is simple - but the most simple is still very difficult. The instrument of war resembles a machine with prodigious friction, which cannot, as in ordinary mechanics, be adjusted at pleasure, but is ever in contact with a host of chances.

Then at the end he returns to several of his key ideas which are expressed in greater depth in On War. His conception of strategy though I find compelling - it is not a question of genius or somersaults it is quite amusing to compare Tolstoy's vision of the decision to retreatwith Clausewitz's, for the latter it was the blatantly obvious thing to do but generally a choice out of a limited number of options out of which one will have more to commend itself than the others - in this case retreating to Kaluga where there was food and more men as opposed to hanging about to fight Napoleon again after Borodino.

[Betsy · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is divided in three parts. The middle section is an overview which tells the barebones of the Russian Campaign. Truthfully, it would have been better to leave it out, incorporating the material into one smooth-flowing chapter. Clausewitz was Prussian, serving with the Russians in 1812. He had !ots of opinions, but since he didn't speak Russian he was left more on the sidelines. He did do some staff work, but his narrative was rather rambling at times. I was rather surprised since he is known for his book, On War. Truthfully, I was not all that impressed by this book, and the Kindle version does not have maps.

[Olethros · Rating 3 out of 5]

-Fuente para generaciones posteriores.-

Género. Historia.

Lo que nos cuenta. Mezcla de detallado relato de los acontecimientos y breve valoración de los mismos relativa a la invasión de Rusia por parte de Napoleón y su Grande Armée, con especial hincapié en el bando ruso en el que militaba el autor en ese momento.

¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:

http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...

[Eurydicegirlgmail.Com · Rating 5 out of 5]

Highly recommended to readers familiar w 1812 French invasion

An Elegant work penned by the Author himself shortly after his immersion in the Russian response to French expansion.
Prior acquaintance w the Napoleonic era is suggested

[Christopher · Rating 4 out of 5]

If you're not a Clausewitz scholar, this one isn't going to blow your hair back. The first third of the book is stultifyingly dull, just a catalog of troop movements through a verbal map of anachronistic spellings. The middle portion is more interesting, as Clausewitz gives commentary on strategic thinking and tactical actions of the opposing forces and reveals the outlines of what would later appear in "On War." The final bit of the book is especially interesting as an autobiographical account of Clausewitz's role in the defection of his countryman Yorck, commanding Napoleon's Prussian corps. This act would help to define the part Prussia played in Napoleon's demise by permitting the Russian army to push all the way to Berlin; Frederick Wilhelm III was free now to endorse Yorck's unilateral act, renounce his "alliance" with Napoleon, and lead a German liberation movement that would climax at Waterloo.

Worth your time for perspective on the evolution of Clausewitz's thinking, but there are likely more comprehensive (and comprehensible) historical accounts of Napoleon's Russia campaign if that's what you're looking for.

[Lennart · Rating 3 out of 5]

Der größte Reiz dieses Buches ist die Tatsache, dass es sich um einen Augenzeugenbericht handelt. Außerdem ist es interessant, den Feldzug aus russischer Sicht zu sehen. Wie unkoordiniert der russische Rückzug erst stattfand und wie schwer es war den Zustand der französischen Armee einzuschätzen. Auch die Enttäuschung/Wut darüber, dass Moskau abgebrannt wurde, obwohl es wahrscheinlich von den eigene Leuten und zum Vorteil der Russen geschah.

Das Hauptproblem mit diesem Buch ist leider der Schreibstil. Er ist leider sehr altmodisch und klobig geschrieben. Man merkt schon, dass der Verfasser sehr gute militärische Kenntnisse besitzt und teilweise gelingt es ihm auch diese rüberzubringen. Aber zu oft werden einfach Namen von Personen und Orten genannt, mit denen man ohne Vorwissen nicht viel anfangen kann, zumal auch keine Karten eingebunden sind. Das ist für mich aber bei fast allen historischen Büchern ein Kritikpunkt.

Ich hatte mir etwas mehr von diesem Buch versprochen, aber es war auch nicht schlecht.

[Emma Richler · Rating 4 out of 5]

Elegant.