Jihad Academy

by Nicolas Hénin

L’invasion de l’Irak en 2003 et la non-intervention en Syrie depuis 2011 ont alimenté la radicalisation. Que ce soit par nos compromissions diplomatiques avec des dictateurs ou par notre indifférence, nous continuons de la nourrir. Quelle est notre responsabilité dans la fabrique de ces nouveaux djihadistes ? Comment se forment-ils ? Comment avons-nous fait le jeu de l’État islamique ? Dans cette édition entièrement mise à jour, Nicolas Hénin livre une analyse éclairante et donne des pistes pour réparer ce qui peut encore l’être.

Genres: Nonfiction, Religion, History, Politics, Islam, War, Terrorism

256 pages, Mass Market Paperback

First published February 25, 2015

Reviews

[Ina Cawl · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book was so amazing but am am not here to talk how amazing it was
well the Author was prisoner of ISIS and he was in the same cell with James foley and others who ISIS behead them so you would expect that Author would talk about the terrifying experience he had there
but no he barely talks about his life in the ISIS prison Cell
almost all the book talks about how Assad killing of Civilians and Western Impasse has lead to the creation of this group
well as the Author shows that Assad regime has killed more than ISIS victims for 150 times
i mean for every ISIS victim there will be 150 Syrian children and Women will be killed
at the first chapter Marketing Secularism the Author destroys the Myth of Assad regime secularism as it is secularism based on sectarian lines as the majority of the population are denied access to higher military officers
here is some questions which a Druze Journalist asked

series of questions, which is also a potent list of grievances:

Why does the defection of an ordinary Alawi citizen undermine the foundations of your regime more than that of a high-ranking officer, for example, a general from any other religious community?
Why do Hezbollah and the Jaysh al-Mahdi (Iraq’s Mahdi army, founded by Muqtada al-Sadr) rush to the rescue of your ‘secular’ regime, when they are among the movements most violently opposed to secularism?
Why has the defection of the Prime Minister [Riyad Hijab] not provoked the slightest reaction at the top of the regime, while anywhere else such an event might have led to regime collapse?
Why did the victims of the explosion of the Alawi neighbourhood Mezzeh 86 in Damascus receive compensation, but not the inhabitants of other neighbourhoods subjected to attacks?
Why did your ‘secularist’ regime kidnap the (Alawi) dissident Abdel-Aziz al-Khayyer, when his demands are so mild that other Syrian dissidents in Cairo once pelted him with eggs because of them?
Why have your media conducted such a massive and concerted smear campaign against the (Alawi) actress Fadia Suleyman, although she is just a peaceful artist who would be totally unable to handle a weapon even if she wanted to?
Why did you appoint a Christian defence minister after the outbreak of the revolution, and why did you discreetly tell your media which religious community he belongs to?
Why do your ‘secular’ regime’s media focus mainly on terrorist attacks committed in regions inhabited by ‘minorities’?
Why has your regime not killed a single demonstrator in Suwaida and Salamiya, which are respectively Druze and Ismaili strongholds, and has limited itself to frightening its opponents there by jailing a few of them, while elsewhere live ammunition has been used on demonstrators?
Why were the only neighbourhoods which avoided destruction in Homs those inhabited by people from your religious community?
Why has the regime of Nouri al-Maliki, who maintains he is ‘Shia before Iraqi’, become an essential ally of your ‘secular’ regime?
Why do Sunnis make up 99.99 per cent of those killed by your ‘secular’ army?

You can, if you wish, treat these questions as a test of secularism and intelligence
there is no regimes in Syria but Assad, Inc which he and his Tribe controls all Syria
i hope you read this excerpt and wonder why the Sunnis hate the Regime
"nd’. When subduing a neighbourhood or retaking a village from the revolutionaries, they would not only attack the locals, but also loot and plunder. This was even shown live on television.

The day after the fall of the town of Al-Qusayr, on 5 June 2013, the BBC’s special correspondent Lyse Doucet got permission from the authorities to visit this city recently ‘retaken from the terrorists’. The regime was so pleased with its success, a real turning point in the revolution, that it granted access to an international TV channel to maximise publicity for its victory. The television crew had satellite technology, which meant Doucet could broadcast live from the streets and describe what she saw. Of course, the regime had planted a few residents to express their joy at the army’s return. However, what was noticeable was the number of armed men, dressed in scruffy, unmatched fatigues, some with the yellow insignia of Hezbollah, laughing as they carried off everything they could load onto their motorbikes: furniture, televisions, computers, household appliances.

Later a market opened in Homs nicknamed souq as-sunna (the Sunnis’ market), because its purpose was to sell the goods looted from this community" and you wonder why many Sunnis will not reconcile with the regime no matter what Washington or Moscow says
reading this story is far more better in understanding why many Mslim are seduced to Jihad Call
"t is the story of a schoolboy who, at each break, gets beaten up by another child. The pupil dutifully goes to the teacher to complain. She immediately says, ‘Oh, you poor boy, what’s happening to you is wrong.’ She scolds the bully, saying, ‘You’re bad, stop at once or I’ll punish you …’ Except that each day, at each break, our child continues to get pummelled. The teacher, the headmaster and the supervisors of course reprimand the bully, but do nothing to stop him.

This goes on for some five years. That’s how long the pupil has been getting beaten up. So he decides to join a gang to protect himself. A real gang of properly nasty characters. So everyone on the school staff jumps on him to criticise him. And the bully who used to beat him up now goes to see the teacher and brags, ‘You see, I told you that boy was a violent thug'
who is the bully and who is the victim you will have to answer
well i can go on talking about this book
but i want to tell one last thing
people who died and still dying in Syria are Human like Belgium and the French so i hate listening to ju suis paris or je suis brussels but why i cant hear je suis Syria
i guess Muslim are inferio beings they look like Human but not worth the global sympathy for Humans
Before you say why Muslim ae fighting i believe you should ask whom is killing whon and how many
i really laugh at how many Government kills so many Muslims and still wonder why they fight back
do any one know how many heads are lost during French and Belgium Bombardment of Syria
i guess no because they were bombarding Animals not Humans

[Sneha · Rating 4 out of 5]

A French journalist gets kidnapped by the ISIS. Unlike those with him, James Foley included, he comes out alive.

And then proceeds to write a book about the ISIS. He could've written about his 10 months in captivity. He could have written about the heartbreak and helplessness of being in the ISIS version of Guantanamo. It would've been read in greater numbers. He could've become a Malala.

Instead, he wrote about the geopolitics that led him, as well as his captors, there. Because understanding the disease is more important than describing the symptoms. Because for the millions displaced, the thousands dead, and the thousands endangered, the latter story is more important.

That's fucking selfless. And that's fucking brave.

[Raghu Nathan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Images of tens of thousands of refugees from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan fleeing in search of safety bombard our senses these days and it is rather clear that it is not going to find resolution anytime soon. There are so many players involved in this human catastrophe - ISIS, al-Nusra, al-Qaeda, the Free Syria rebels, the Kurdish militia, the US, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Russia, France, the Assad government .......Depending on who one follows, it is not even clear as to who the good guys and who the bad guys are. Western governments tell us that the Assad govt and ISIS are the principal bad guys. The liberal media says that the West is responsible for the human tragedy that we see unfolding today by creating power vacuums in Iraq and Libya. Should we protect only the Sunni civilians in Syria? Or should we protect all civilians in Syria, even those under control of the Assad govt? In spite of all the 'experts' on the subject, the simple answer perhaps is that we really are at a loss as to what the correct course of action is. Author Nicolas Hénin is a freelance journalist who spent much of his career in Syria and Iraq and was a prisoner of ISIS for ten months recently. In this book, he takes a shot at helping us understand the crisis and the players better because of his close encounters with ISIS.

At the outset, Hénin says that his being a captive of ISIS is unimportant and that there are bigger issues on the ground. In fact, he is very critical of the Western world waking up with outrage only when his fellow cell-mate and journalist James Foley was beheaded by ISIS. He points out that 200000 civilians in Iraq and Syria had already been slaughtered over five years when Foley's beheading happened but there was little action against the Assad regime, which caused most of those deaths. Hénin's thesis is that the West, by invading Iraq in 2003 and then not opting to intervene in Syria in 2011, has contributed to this human disaster and creation of ISIS. The book goes on to suggest what we can do to repair the damage and how to go forward from here.

Henin's conclusions on the various aspects of the crisis can be summed up as follows:
a)The Assad govt is not fighting ISIS and neither the ISIS is fighting the Syrian govt. Just as the Russians supported the Islamists among the Chechen guerillas to split them or the Israelis allowing Hamas to prosper in order to reduce the hold of the PLO, Assad also has infiltrated ISIS sufficiently. So, the West is seriously mistaken in even thinking of fighting ISIS by aligning with Assad.
b)Both the Syrian regime and all the armed opposition are basically fighting for the resources and revenues of the region, not just ideology.
c)The main causes for ISIS's success are: The West's reluctance to intervene to protect the Syrian civilians; ISIS being more organized and disciplined than the Free Syrian Army; ISIS paying its fighters much better than FSA; the international community's hostility towards moderate Islamist factions and its reservations on the Islamic dimension of the revolution.
d)The West has been self-centered in obsessing with the security threat posed by the ISIS. In reality, the regions' civilians have been the major target of both the regime and the jihadists. The unhealthy focus on protecting just the minorities like the Kurds, Yazidis and the Christians is a form of communalism and sectarianism and smacks of colonial rhetoric of the 19th century. All the regions' civilians are entitled to security.
e)International intervention has made the rise of ISIS a self-fulfilling prophecy. It has weakened the moderate Syrian opposition and strengthened the sectarian forces.

One interesting aspect of this book is that it does not summarily dismiss ISIS as a 'bunch of monsters' or terrorists. It gives a background to the organization and says that the Islamic State is simply implementing a political programme devised ten years ago by Abu Bakr al-Naji, a Saudi. It was widely disseminated in jihadist forums in many languages. Al-Naji's plan is as follows: "Exploit the authoritarian nature of the Arab regimes and use it against them, turn their strength - violence - back against them, make use of local frustrations, use propaganda and political violence among the people and provoke an escalation of savagery. The Arab States will respond with even more violence and eventually they will lose all legitimacy in the eyes of the people. In this chaos, jihadists must intervene by presenting themselves as the alternative and rapidly consolidate by taking over surrounding areas". Seen in this light, the actions of ISIS make more sense.

The book offers some suggestions on the way forward for the West, but they seem too generic and non-specific by way of immediate action items. One cannot disagree with the author that the West must gain the trust of the Syrian and Iraqi people and that diplomacy is crucial and that all stakeholders including Iran and Hezbollah must be included and that they all must pay attention to the economy and reform governance. However, all this is still only a Western viewpoint. Perhaps the Shias, Sunnis, Alawites, the Druze and Christians of the region have an entirely different vision of how they want to live and be governed. Perhaps, they just want to be left alone to sort it out among themselves in a way that is not acceptable to the world outside.

The book is an honest effort to see the Syrian crisis from the viewpoint of the people of the region instead of how it threatens the security of the West.

[Ahmad Al khatib · Rating 5 out of 5]

En tant que syrien, je trouve que ce livre représente une version très proche de la réalité. Un livre rempli des émotions humaines de l'auteur, ex-otage de Daech, qui a des connaissances du terrain acquises lors de ses missions en Syrie et en Irak. L'auteur prend sa responsabilité de décrire la situation sans déformation. Il montre les crimes du régime de Bachar Al-assad comme ceux de Daech. Une vrai solidarité avec le peuple syrien.

[Maria · Rating 4 out of 5]

French journalist Nicolas Hénin's career is centered in the Middle East, mainly Iraq and Syria. He was kidnapped in June 2013 and spent 10 months in captivity. This is his explanation of the circumstances that brought about the Islamic State. How the West's actions and mainly inaction has lead to the refugee crisis, the bloody civil war and the strength of terrorists.

Why I started this book: It was the shortest audio book in my collection.

Why I finished this book: I knew that I was lacking key pieces of the Syrian civil war story... but it was humbling to read this book and still be missing pieces that Hénin thought were so basic that he didn't need to explain. And it was very interesting to see his French examples, as opposed to the usual American government examples.

[CSJ · Rating 4 out of 5]

Going into this book, I knew absolutely nothing about Syria's history. Initially I was actually disappointed because I thought the book would be about Henin's time captured by IS (the book was wrapped in plastic when I purchased it). I am now so grateful that it wasn't, that he chose to write about a country that has been absolutely devastated by conflict, because some things are more pressing and devastating than our experiences as individuals. This was really well written and SO informative, both easy to read/follow and completely devastating.

[Luisa نور · Rating 5 out of 5]

De part mes études (doctorante en littérature arabe), mes croyances (allons pour "musulmane freestyle de culture laïque"), ma vie (ayant vecu en Jordanie, Liban, etc), j'ai toujours suivi de près la généralement triste actualité du proche orient, et particulièrement ce phénomène de Daesh. Et de tous les articles, livres et interviews vus et lus jusqu'à maintenant, voilà l'un des meilleurs documents sur le sujet, sinon le meilleur. Clair, juste, précis ... et triste. Hautement recommandé.

[Justin Tapp · Rating 4 out of 5]

(I finished this book concurrently with other books examining Al Qaeda and the rise of ISIS in the Middle East and this review should be read in the context of the other books. A list of many of the books is at the bottom of this post.)

While the author was held captive by ISIS in Raqqa for 10 months and witnessed the murder of his friends/colleagues and is well-qualified to comment on the behavior of ISIS, he instead finds it more imperative to write about the larger tragedy in Syria that has taken over 200,000 lives and displaced millions. His story goes untold in favor of making a plea to the world about greater understanding about this conflict. The book is a history of the war from the vantagepoint of Syria's failed state. Syria and Iraq are forever linked, they are both in the vicinity of the "cradle of civilization" and the political solution to ISIS must be implemented simultaneously between Iraq and Syria. Henin offers observations as well as opinionated recommendations. His ultimate aim is to "drain the swamp" of myths that feed both ISIS' and Assad's power thus the ongoing war.

Henin quotes most frequently from Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan's co-authored book. Being French, he quotes heavily from French sources and is able to criticize the work of French intelligence in collaborating with the Assad regime. He also frequently cites the work of James Glassman. Beyond those, I would recommend reading Jessica Stern and JM Berger's book ISIS along with Joby Warrick's Black Flags as complementary, particularly on events in Iraq. Reese Erlich's Inside Syria is also helpful on the corruption of the Assad regime and the early days of the Syrian uprising.

Henin's first goal is to counter Syrian government propoganda, produced by well-paid marketing firms, that Bashar al-Assad is somehow running a secular state akin to Turkey; Syria is sectarian, not secular. His father had a long history of murdering Sunnis, and Assad has maintained a policy of doling out favoritism to minority groups in exchange for tacit support. He writes that Assad's regime was likely more corrupt than his father's, his own family further consolidating the oligarchic economic structure to enrich the Assads. He cites specific examples of this, including a contract over a cellphone monopoly. He gives a quick bio of Bashar and cites others that there have been three major transformations in Assad's life: The first was when his older brother died, the second was his military training to make him look more manly upon return from the UK (where he earned his doctorate in opthomalogy; a field he chose because, he claimed, he "could not stand the sight of blood"), and the last was when his father died and he assumed power and began to think of himself "as God."

Assad's state has proven "fundamentally incapable of reforming itself." Early Assad concessions to give greater rights and ostensibly freer speech were met with harsh crackdowns, reversals, and disappointment. The "mafia state" that has been erected will not share power or profit, and much of this war is about who controls the resources to enrich themselves. Before the Arab Spring, there had been a two-year drought that left the wider peasantry outside the major centers of Damascus and Aleppo impoverished and angry. These joined the uprisings, first peacefully, then were met with bullets. In 2013, Assad released thousands of radical Islamists from prison at the behest of Syria's security services because now they could be justified in saying they were fighting criminals and terrorists. That was an opening of Pandora's Box that gave fledgling radical groups the manpower they needed. As groups like ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front formed, the Assad regime began collaborating with them. Nusra was allowed control of certain oil fields, providing they send shipments to regime-held territories. (Not mentioned by the author, but Russia would later accuse Turkey of being similarly involved in these deals-- support for Al Nusra against Assad in exchange for oil). Henin cites evidence that Assad and ISIS have collaborated at some points, Assad is able to play groups off each other to his own advantage. It is a "symbiotic relationship," ISIS needs Assad as a foil and recruitment tool, Assad needs ISIS to maintain the support of minorities.

Perhaps it all started Assad seized on the the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 to export potential threats to his regime from Islamic fundamentalists. He ostensibly paid fundamentalist clerics to identify and recruit jihadi fighters to send across the border. His intelligence services saw this "honeypot" as a good way to rid the country of young potential terrorists; they would either die or be arrested in Iraq. As terrorists flowed from around the world down the Syrian "jihad highway" they could be identified. ISIS is partly blow-back from this. A cleric who had engaged in this traffiking was later found mysteriously assassinated, perhaps by government cover-up or revenge by those who got wise.

It became all too easy once Colin Powell made his speech to the UN claiming that al-Zarqawi was the magic link between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, elevating Zarqawi to a status that caused recruits to flock to him. Henin retells those days of Iraq (he was there), the near civil war that had unfolded by 2006, and noting that US officials were largely ignorant of Sunni-Shiia rivalry. When Bremmer disbanded the army and banned the Baathist party, the stage was set for Sunni insecurity. Henin notes the support ISIS got in Northern Iraq in 2014 from Baathist strongholds, once again responding to what they saw. ISIS and Baathists both essentially share a goal of "Sunnistan" free of Shiia threat. Gen. David Petraeus was the first to incorporate sectarian recognition into his strategy, based on his reading of French strategy in colonial Algeria. Petraeus' greatest contribution was the brilliant idea to pay insurgents not to fight-- people forget that this is essentially what COIN is about. But Henin explains setting up city councils with proportionate representation from all sects lessened the value of the title "Iraqi," and succeeded in dividing rather than uniting. The Iraqi army doesn't need military training today, it needs allegiance to a state; that is unlikely anytime soon and Henin concedes a united Sunni-Shia-Kurd Iraq is probably unrealistic going forward. Henin cites psychological studies of various cultures in making his point that it is stability what people crave. They will always trade individual freedom for stability. Hence, villages could embrace ruthless ISIS because they at least established a law and order.

After Zarqawi was killed, COIN succeeded in getting insurgents to lay down arms, and relative order was established, the Islamic fundamentalists either moved on to other countries or faded into the Iraqi background. When al-Maliki consolidated power among the Shia and replaced competent Sunni officials (particularly in the army) with cronies, Sunnis looked to themselves for security. Once the Syrian uprising created a power vaccuum in Syria and thousands of jihadis were released from Syrian prisons, the stage was set. Once Iraq responded to the ISIS threat by inviting the Iranian government into the country, giving up sovereignty, it confirmed Sunni suspicious and likely ended any hope of reconciliation.

Henin maintains that Assad exacerbated sectarian tensions in Syria by historically doling out favors and tax breaks to non-Sunni minorities. If Syria is a "secular" regime, why was Hezbollah invited in and supported to attack Syrian civilians of all stripes? Why are non-Alawite neighborhoods left untouched by bombs? Even before the war, Christian clergy got cars and tax breaks. He cites some evidence that stories of ISIS' persecution of Christians may have been exaggerated by Assad's apparatus in order to gain Western support, indeed Western Christians immediately signed petitions calling for further attacks on ISIS and mentioning very little about Assad. This may be the most controversial of Henin's book. He does not discuss the mass kidnappings and rapes of Yezidi Kurds, for example, and writes that while ISIS' deeds are indefensible, they pale compared to the bombings, chemical weapons attacks, and systematic dismemberment of Syria by Assad while the West stands by and watches. Christians must pay the Islamic head tax and are forbidden to proscelytize, display crosses, pray publicly, or ring church bells, but is that so bad, asks Henin?

Henin writes favorably of the Free Syrian Army and a missed opportunity by the West to arm them. He would seem to side with the Petraeus-Clinton-Panetta side circa 2012 that the US should have armed them. He notes the agreements that FSA affiliates signed in Europe committing themselves to peaceful coexistence and no reprisals after the war as a better alternative than whatever we'll get now. But the rebels face a few problems that weaken this argument: First, Henin admits they do not want to be seen as Western puppets. Second, the Gulf states and Iranians have vested interests in controlling the outcome of this war and who gets the upper hand. They have influenced rebel groups and will continue to do so. Third, Henin writes that much of the war is now about who controls the commanding heights of the economy. In Iraq and Syria, tribes and warlords are fighting for their own self-interest and not some united end result. There has obviously been a massive "brain drain" in the millions who have fled the country as well.

Henin is critical of support and hype for the Kurdish PYD; they are weak, widely unpopular, and are avowed Marxists. He seems to resent how the fight for Kobane was portrayed as a heroic turning point while the rest of Syria was continually ignored.
Some of the Free Syrian Army and other groups were seemingly easily radicalized because they had to parade themselves like devoutly religious peacocks in order to compete for Gulf money and weapons. It was a show. Arms went to the most devout, and recruits went with whatever group was best equipped. Henin wishes we could go back in time to when Assad crossed Obama's "red line" and Obama did nothing about it. (Former Ambassador Ford and others have also pointed to this moment as what demoralized the resistance and kept anti-Assad forces within the government from betraying Assad.)

What can/should the West do, according to Henin? First, recognize Assad for what he is: the head of a mafia state seeking to enrich himself as much as any totalitarian dictator ever has. Henin applauds John Kerry on this point. Second, the media needs to stop feeding into ISIS' hype and meeting its objective of getting attention for itself. ISIS was too small and lacked the support to ever take Baghdad, such fears were ridiculously unfounded. Even at its height, it could not support a very large swathe of territory. (Henin would probably have underestimated what it is taking for the coalition to drive ISIS out of Northern Iraq today.) The media needs to stop making such a big deal of small-scale attacks in Europe and the US when hundreds are dying daily in Syria. Henin is critical of media coverage of his journalist friends' death and how ISIS exploited Western outrage. Henin is outraged that the West suddenly started bombing once an American was beheaded rather than when thousands had been gassed by Assad. As Stern and Berger wrote in their book, the US needs to not "rush into war every time someone waves a black flag" because this is also what ISIS wants. ISIS' magazine is called Dabiq because of the prophecy of an endtimes battle that will take place there; ISIS desperately wants US boots on the ground to fulfill that prophecy and cause recruits to flock to its side. Henin further recommends looking into "humanitarian corridors" and a no-fly zone intent on protecting civilians from the one-sided bombardment. (I'm sympathetic to a tit-for-tat no fly zone that many others have proposed and Turkey has been calling for since 2011.) The war would still take place on the ground, but it would be much less tilted toward Assad and less costly in terms of human life. Assad would be more likely to quit than he is now, at least. As it is, Syrians see US fighter planes flying sorties while Assad and the Russians are flying sorties bombing civilians and see obvious coordination in the air. Lastly, the West should treat citizens who leave to join ISIS differently than today; it should look to deradicalized those who return home (particularly disgruntled ones) rather than promising to imprison them. Some truly regret their decisions after living a day in ISIS territory and need psychological help rather than a jail cell which has shown only to further embitter and radicalize.

Henin warns that, ultimately, any solution to the Syrian conflict must be political, include both Iraq and Syria entirely, and must have everyone at the table-- from Hezbollah to democrats. How we get from now to then is impossible to see. In all, I give this book 4.5 stars out of 5. I've found there is not one book you can read on ISIS that tells the whole story. This should definitely be part of any collection of books looking at the problem from all angles. It does not delve much into IS theology or practice.

------------------------------
Other Al Qaeda and ISIS-related books reviewed in 2016:
The Siege of Mecca - Yaroslav Trofimov (5 stars)
The Bin Ladens - Steve Coll (4 stars)
Growing Up Bin Laden - Najwa and Omar Bin Laden (4.5 stars)
Guantanamo Diary - Mohamedou Ould Slahi (4.5 stars)
The Black Banners - Ali Soufan (5 stars)
Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS - Joby Warrick (4.5 stars)
Jihad Academy: The Rise of the Islamic State - Nicholas Henin (4.5 stars)
ISIS: The State of Terror - Jessica Stern and JM Berger (4 stars)
ISIS Exposed - Eric Stakelbeck (2.5 stars)
The Rise of ISIS - Jay Sekulow (1 star)

[Kenza · Rating 3 out of 5]

Je donne 3 étoiles car je suis restée sur ma faim. Le titre annonce "Nos erreurs face à l'état islamique" or le texte est plutôt une étude de l'état islamique. L'auteur cite une ou deux erreurs puis il s'enfonce dans la genèse du conflit sunni-chiite. Il annonce l'hypocrisie et les contradictions de l'Occident puis il nous plonge dans un autre sujet sans apporter des réponses tangibles. Pour le moment devant l'Occident qui se désigne comme héros et sauveur du monde il n'y a que Nicolas Hénin qui a eu le courage de souligner quelques erreurs notamment en France !! Le livre n'ajoute rien a ce qui a été déjà constaté, je n'ai pas eu de réponses. Pourquoi l'Occident reste inerte face à ces massacres? Pourquoi les bombardements qui coûtent des millions de dollars et éradiquent le peuple syrien n'ont pas été envoyé en aide humanitaire ? Pourquoi il ne cible pas l'armée d'El Assad? Pourquoi les USA place El Maliki au pouvoir plus dictateur que Saddam alors que l'invasion était pour assurer la paix, la sécurité et la démocratie? Pourquoi, pourquoi, pourquoi ??
Très déçue le livre ne m'ajoute absolument rien !!

[Adrian]

French reporter Henin was a captive of ISIS for ten months but this book is not about that. His topic is what the West should do about ISIS. This short book details Syrian political history pretty thoroughly. One thing is made clear nothing is going to change with Bashir al-Assad in power. Henin effectively shows how his rule feeds off ISIS. There is lots in here on the tenuous struggle for power in Iraq between Sunni and Shia, why ISIS is popular to the young and much else. As for his prescription for what the West should do it would be easy to criticize but he suggests a military-political-legal strategy which would mean arming the Free Syrian army, making contact with NGOs and volunteer groups in Iraq and Syria and at the very least handicapping Bashir's air force. Well worth reading.

[Mark McKenny · Rating 5 out of 5]

If you want to know a little more about Daesh, forget listening to politicians who will tell you what they want you to hear, instead, read Henin, a guy who has been there and done that. Thank you for sharing this Nicolas.

[Fredrick Danysh · Rating 3 out of 5]

The author spent three years as a prisoner of ISIS. He writes of his captivity and the execution of of other Westerners by the group that held him. A history of ISIS and their political aims is also included as well as blame on the Western powers. This is a look at todaay's major terror group.

[Tobias Lindberg · Rating 2 out of 5]

Didn't really like this. He could have written a hundred pages more going more into the development of ISIL and their mentality and explaining their inner workings.

Was disappointed with the book.

[Ray · Rating 3 out of 5]

The author, French journalist Nicolas Henin, has a unique perspective on ISIS, having been held captive by them for approximately 10 months. In his book, "Jihad Academy", he makes the point that we in the West are playing into the hands of ISIS in Syria, basically because we don’t understand the players. There's the Assad forces, which we oppose, and the ISIS forces, which we oppose, and the various rebel groups who we struggle to support. To many Syrians, Assad's troops are as bad as or worse than the ISIS fighters. And the various rebel groups don't appear to be receiving much support in terms of much needed weapons, money, intelligence, training, or ammunition.

When we do strike at ISIS targets, Henin believes our air strikes either hit the wrong people, or cause too much collateral damage. Add to that the fact that the Russians air strikes throughout Syria are taking a toll on all except Assad's military. As a result, the local people suffer and are forced to flee. They feel that we are ignoring their plight, and our opponents point to our policy failures as proof that we're unwilling or unable to help them. To the people in the region, our policies often make it appear as if we're really supporting the regime, and left with two bad choices, ISIS may appear to be the lesser of two evils.

To prevail in the region, we need to work harder to win the hearts and minds of the people. According to Henin, our practices and policies are, more often than not, adding to the misery and disaster for the local people, and fueling our enemies. If we can provide security for the people, and provide hope for a political solution, ISIS would be weakened substantially.

Henin's book provides an understanding of the current crisis in Syria, and how ISIS has grown during the crisis. He did not go into as much detail looking into who the key ISIS leaders are, and how ISIS began and grew to such a force in the area. For that background, I recommend Joby Warrick's book "Black Flags".

[Andra · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book really puts everything into perspective. It is quite full of details, at times I even felt overwhelmed and started to take notes.

Now I understand that at the very base of Islamic State stands a totally defective political system, where equality is merely a term in the dictionary, not a right or a principle of living. I can understand how beaten down population, having no other option, turns to the less oppressive side - be it the Bashar regime for the Shia or the Islamic State for the Sunni. I can see how a totalitarian leader can sow the seeds of frustration, anger, envy and fear within the population simply by favoring a certain group.

I am in awe of people like Riad Seif. That is a person whose strength is something I cannot fathom. How can a person who is put to the ground so many times come back every time with energy and patience to continue to struggle in a country where he is like a rare bird?! It is beyond me what kind of feelings and beliefs make him stay there and not simply run as far as his legs will take him.

It seems unreal to me the struggles that people in those regions go through, it was almost like reading a dystopian novel.

[Pramble · Rating 2 out of 5]

Dare I be the only reader who did not like this book ?
It struck me as both superficial and narrow. I wanted to learn more about ISIS, but you will not do so here.
The group is portrayed as working-class buffoons, but this is too simple. In other sources, you can read about ISIS' particular interpretation of the koran to understand their motives and goals. There is not a word about that here. I have read about the role of Iraqi ex-Batthists. They hardly get a mention here.
Are ISIS the only salafists ? No, but the alternative interpretations do not exist in this book.
After reading this book, will you better understand the attacks on the west ? Not really. You definitely will not better understand the relationship between core ISIS and the groups that have declared themselves to be affiliated with ISIS.
There is still room for a better book, with a better explanation of their philosophy, motivation and belief structure.

[Carolyn Sunseri · Rating 5 out of 5]

On the gorgeous and exhilarating drive to Bakersfield today (sarcasm), I listened to "Jihad Academy", by Nicolas Hénin. I highly recommend it.

As hard as it is to engage in the darker aspects of life sometimes, I encourage everyone to read Jihad Academy to get a deeper perspective on the multi-faceted situation in the middle east. The media is one source of information, but can often perpetuate wrong conclusions or support dangerous ideas. It is only through greater understanding, you individually can contribute to starving the dangerous rhetoric and weight the future militaristic intervention being discussed today. It is so important that we are HELPING the people of Syria, not hurting them by a tunnel focus on ISIS.

[Anna · Rating 4 out of 5]

"Instead of analyzing Islamic State's strengths and weaknesses factually, we fall for its propaganda by considering it evil incarnate. We surrender to easy anathema and provide it with propaganda points, rather than thinking about exposing and denouncing its contradictions."

If you've ever wondered how ISIS got to where it did and how it can effectively be fought, this is the book for you. Hénin clearly explains the rise of ISIS and the situation in Syria, including pointing out how actions by Western powers often played right into ISIS's game. It's a short, powerful book that will leave you with a much better understand of (and greater empathy for) the people and the situation in Syria.

[Enviedelecture · Rating 5 out of 5]

Remarquable travail de Nicolas Henin, journaliste français qui a été capturé en Syrie pendant presque 1 ans. Il démontre tout au long de l'ouvrage grâce à de nombreux témoignages, comment les états occidentaux ont contribué à l'apparition d’extrémistes religieux, une véritable "Jihad academy" dont Bashar Al assad à aussi très largement contribué.
Moi qui me suis toujours posée la question à propos de daech "mais d'où est-ce qu'ils sortent ceux-là !?" J'ai eu la réponse en lisant ce livre et je peux vous dire que ça donne vachement à réfléchir, on comprend vraiment mieux les choses. A lire de toute urgence, excellente analyse sur ce qui se passe en Syrie.

[Daniel Simmons · Rating 3 out of 5]

Kudos to Hénin for not writing a look-at-me-I-was-stuck-in-ISIS-hell memoir but instead training his journalistic eye on the reasons why he ended up stuck in an ISIS holding cell in the first place. Just who are these ISIS guys, anyway? For that matter, who is Bashar al-Assad? Who makes up the forces trying to support him, and who marches among the forces trying to topple him? Hénin clears a lot of the fog here, for which he earns my thanks. But he is better at explaining the problem than he is at offering any practical solutions, which makes for an ultimately frustrating read. We know, thanks to Hénin and others, how we got here. Now how do we go forward?

[Allison Cleveland · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent primer on ISIS from a reporter who has spent most of his career on this subject. He is also a former ISIS hostage. He doesn't go in to detail about his time in captivity but he answered a lot of questions for me about the terrorist group's history and funding. It's a complicated series of events but is written in understandable terms. Although, keep track of the names and groups. It gets confusing.

[Adel Hakimi · Rating 2 out of 5]

Though I am not a supporter of the Assad's regime in any way and surely I m not a supporter of ISIS, the author seems biased in many aspects of his story and he seems to even contradict himself in many subjects. There is a clear absence of the Gulf and Turkish involvement in the Syrian crisis as the author barely mentions about them. However, the book does state some actual facts at one side, but on the other side it clearly takes a biased standpoint which cannot reflect the actual reality.

[Gabrielle · Rating 3 out of 5]

My relatively low rating is not to do with the information provided or really the writing itself. It simply wasn’t what I hoped. I thought Henin would reveal more about his own captivity — the things that led to it and that allowed for his eventual release. I also thought it would be a bit easier to follow. I’m not sure I understand the information better now, but it isn’t the book’s fault.

“The radicalization of the Syrian revolution is the natural result of our inaction” (p. 39).

[Winnielou · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent documentaire sur Daesh et son développement. L'auteur (journaliste, ex-otage du groupe) revient sur la création du groupe terroriste, l'histoire de la zone géographique du Proche-Orient et les "solutions" que l'on peut apporter au problème. Très complet et éclairant. Lucide sans être desespérant.

[Anıl Karzek · Rating 4 out of 5]

the book contains fundamental information about Isis. however I must admit that I'm a bit dissapointed because the writer did not mention anything about isis leader Baghdadi. maybe he did intend to avoid any possible threat but still he could write more. the number of pages not enough to satisfy me.

[Sandeep Ravivanshi · Rating 4 out of 5]

Just finished reading this really nice work. I particularly liked the reasons cited by author about what fuels the survival of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. His insights into the probable course of action to abate the tide of 'Jihad' are worth considering at international level. Thank you very much Henin!

[Aurélie · Rating 4 out of 5]

Certains passages obscurs à cause de ma mauvaise connaissance de la situation en Syrie et des groupes impliqués dans le conflit, mais une lecture qui reste intéressante et instructive. La présentation facilite la compréhension : chaque titre de chapitre est suivi d'une synthèse en quelques lignes des idées qui y sont exposées.

[R C · Rating 4 out of 5]

A great book that dove into a lot of the historic reasons of this conflict. Would certainly recommend this book for anyone wanting to understand more about the whole situation. The only hold back is that despite the great historical context, the writer doesn't seem to delve as much into the make up or the matriculation from just an average Joe to a Jihad. Perhaps a wrong book title?

[Mick · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good exploration of the conflict in Syria and a contextualisation of the rise of some of the extremist groups. Some typos and occassional referencing errors make it annoying to read at times BUT there are also some excellent sections with very well written paragraphs. Worth a read.

[George Richard · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fantastic book that tries to cut the Gordian knot of ISIS Syria and Iraq. A must read if you want any understanding of what is transporting in the middle east.