Coffee-table-sized book, pics & text excellent, written by 2 British WW2 experts on the 4 critical months of July thru Oct. 1940, referred to by the Brits as the Battle of Britain, where 3,000 English fighter pilots, plus 7 Americans and 50 Poles, Czechs, Aussies, Canadians, etc. fought off 10,000 German bomber sorties w/ accompanying Bf 109 German fighters to thwart Hitler's plan to invade England right after the fall of Poland & France, and before the invasion of Russia.
A complex story of heroism against all odds combined with bungling bureaucracy & petty infighting, where the Luftwaffe outclassed the Royal Air Force in every category except determination. England couldn't win but was determined not to lose, much as was George Washington's strategy against the same Brits in the American Revolutionary War.
Learned much about British & German air technology & productive capacity: the Bf 109 was superior to the Spitfire & the Hurricane; Germany could never produce more than 400 aircraft (fighters and light bombers) per month; the factories in England were delivering nearly 500 fighters alone per month. Both England & Germany were outstanding craftsmen in both mechanical design and manufacturing of war machines, but never could figure out how to mass-produce anything, whereas the Americans who entered the war a year later would quickly ramp up production in all areas, producing a whopping 9,000 aircraft per month by March 1944. A prime example was the famous Merlin engine: designed and originally built by the Brits becoming the best aircraft engine of its day, but because every part was hand crafted to fit at assembly England could only produce 100 Merlins a month. The book highlights newspaper tycoon Lord Beaverbrook, the private citizen Churchill hired to ramp up war production, who quickly contacted Packard Motor Car Company in the U.S. to make the Merlin, where 6 months later the U.S. would ramp up to building 55,000 Merlins before the War's end. With this kind of war machine productive capacity, the Germans and the Japanese had no chance of winning, made even more obvious since neither Axis power built 4-engine strategic bombers that might destroy manufacturing facilities on U.S. soil.