What do you think?
Rate this book
The Last Hundred Yards: The NCO's Contribution to Warfare
Unique how-to manual on small unit tactics
399 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1996
9 people are currently reading
444 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
January 19, 2022
My friend Peter Nealen (whose books you should check out) had recommended H. John Poole's Tequila Junction: 4th-Generation Counterinsurgency for research on 4th generation warfare in Central and South America. Along the way, I saw several references to The Last Hundred Yards: The NCO's Contribution to Warfare. I had to dig to find a copy (Amazon does not carry them in stock), but I finally found my copy and I dug in.
What an informative read!
Some background: H. John Poole spent most of his adult life in the Marine Corps, starting as a rifle platoon leader in Vietnam. After twenty years as a commissioned officer, he reverted to the rank of Gunnery Sergeant (E-7) and spent the final years of his career as a training NCO. Poole is extremely well read and experienced (particularly in "maneuver warfare" and its Asian origins) and it shows.
The conclusion that Poole reaches is that attrition warfare (which is what the United States practices, by far and large) is only good for specific situations, and that maneuver warfare is overall the superior form of warfare. He differentiates the two by their objectives. Attrition warfare's objective is to destroy the enemy, while maneuver warfare seeks to utilize deception to bypass the enemy, exploit their weaknesses, and collapse their efforts by building offensive momentum. The latter results in less casualties for all categories (friendlies, hostiles, and non-combatants) and is quicker to break the enemy's will to fight.
The Last Hundred Yards: The NCO's Contribution to Warfare was penned in 1993. As a GWOT veteran, I was able to see where changes had been made during the war (the biggest ones being the shift from the company to the platoon as the primary maneuver element, and more gear being disseminated to lower enlisted than before) and where changes had not been made, by deficiencies in my own knowledge and training. Poole's writing is prescient, almost as if he predicted the next war would be more maneuver than attrition.
I especially found the test in the back helpful. I scored in the low 70s before reading and in the high 70s afterward. I have more learning to do (which makes sense, as I have not been a professional infantryman in roughly five years), and it is a comprehensive manual full of techniques to explore and experiment.
Highly recommended reading for warfighters and those who wish to study military science.
What an informative read!
Some background: H. John Poole spent most of his adult life in the Marine Corps, starting as a rifle platoon leader in Vietnam. After twenty years as a commissioned officer, he reverted to the rank of Gunnery Sergeant (E-7) and spent the final years of his career as a training NCO. Poole is extremely well read and experienced (particularly in "maneuver warfare" and its Asian origins) and it shows.
The conclusion that Poole reaches is that attrition warfare (which is what the United States practices, by far and large) is only good for specific situations, and that maneuver warfare is overall the superior form of warfare. He differentiates the two by their objectives. Attrition warfare's objective is to destroy the enemy, while maneuver warfare seeks to utilize deception to bypass the enemy, exploit their weaknesses, and collapse their efforts by building offensive momentum. The latter results in less casualties for all categories (friendlies, hostiles, and non-combatants) and is quicker to break the enemy's will to fight.
The Last Hundred Yards: The NCO's Contribution to Warfare was penned in 1993. As a GWOT veteran, I was able to see where changes had been made during the war (the biggest ones being the shift from the company to the platoon as the primary maneuver element, and more gear being disseminated to lower enlisted than before) and where changes had not been made, by deficiencies in my own knowledge and training. Poole's writing is prescient, almost as if he predicted the next war would be more maneuver than attrition.
I especially found the test in the back helpful. I scored in the low 70s before reading and in the high 70s afterward. I have more learning to do (which makes sense, as I have not been a professional infantryman in roughly five years), and it is a comprehensive manual full of techniques to explore and experiment.
Highly recommended reading for warfighters and those who wish to study military science.
November 19, 2011
Here is the link to my review http://lesc.net/blog/book-review-last...
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews