What do you think?
Rate this book
The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan
This collection of vignettes was written by Soviet junior officers describing their experiences fighting the Mujahideen guerillas. It is not a history of the Soviet-Afghan war, but snapshots of combat as seen by young platoon leaders, company commanders, battalion commanders and military advisers.
260 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1996
253 people are currently reading
1732 people want to read
About the author
Lester W. Grau
18 books22 followersLester W. Grau is a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel. He served as an infantry officer and a Soviet Foreign Area Officer (FAO) throughout his career. He fought in Vietnam. In 1981, he completed one year of Russian language training at the Defense Language Institute at Monterey, California and then graduated from the U.S. Army Russian Institute (USARI) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany in 1983. USARI was a two-year post-graduate school which dealt with all aspects of the then Soviet Union and all classes were taught in Russian. He has served in Moscow and traveled extensively in the former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet Union and continues that travel today. Since 1983, his work has exclusively been in the area of Russian and Soviet tactics and operations. As a combat infantryman, he finds it fascinating to compare and contrast how both the US and USSR fought and fight.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 40 reviews
June 7, 2021
I thought this was a great book about the Soviet-Afghan war. This is not an exhaustive study of the training and conduct of battle by Soviet battalions in Afghanistan. Rather it is a collection of material which describes and analyzes individual combat episodes.
The chapters include destroying guerrilla forces, offensive in populated areas/mountains, tactical air assault, defense and outpost security, convoy escort, and ambushes.
Each chapter has several vignettes with commentary by the Frunze Academy and the editor Lt Col Lester Grau (US Army, retired). This can be jargon heavy but there is a glossary and maps/diagrams description in the back. Good for anyone interested in Soviet and present-day coalition operations in Afghanistan. Thanks!
The chapters include destroying guerrilla forces, offensive in populated areas/mountains, tactical air assault, defense and outpost security, convoy escort, and ambushes.
Each chapter has several vignettes with commentary by the Frunze Academy and the editor Lt Col Lester Grau (US Army, retired). This can be jargon heavy but there is a glossary and maps/diagrams description in the back. Good for anyone interested in Soviet and present-day coalition operations in Afghanistan. Thanks!
June 25, 2019
The Bear Went Over The Mountain is about as niche as books get. It's an account of 49 tactical engagements by Soviet forces in Afghanistan, as collected by the Russian Frunze Military Academy, and then translated and commentary added by Dr. Grau.
Each of the vignettes is short, accompanies by a tactical map and stripped of irrelevant information by the multiple layers of translation. What's interesting is seeing what lessons the General Staff at Frunze drew, and Grau's commentary on those lessons. Soviet doctrine and equipment was oriented for maneuver warfare on the irradiated plains of Central Europe. Infantry was an adjunct to the armored arm, and tactics were stripped to simple plans that would enable higher commander to rapidly concentrate mass and fire against NATO forces as cities vanished under mushroom clouds. Afghanistan was a classic counter-insurgency nightmare, with mountain terrain restricting the use of armor, and years of bloody attritional warfare against agile mujaheddin fighters. Generally, small groups of Soviet infantry lacked initiative and aggression, especially in night fighting and patrolling. Cordons for sweep and clear operations were leaky, convoy security an ongoing problem, and even the poor Russian loadbearing gear worked against success, as troops were tied to road-bound infantry fighting vehicles for resupply.
Agressive helicopter insertions showed some success, but airpower cannot control the ground or protect the population. Expensive helicopters were always in short supply, and rarely worked at their best in the mountains. Grau criticize the Russians for inadequate reconnaissance, using reconnaissance troops as combat infantry, and ad hoc special units for missions, rather than establishing proper combined infantry and support units for the ongoing counter-insurgency warfare.
I grabbed this book and the sequel from the Afghan side for $3 apiece, which was a steal. I see they're back up to $40 now, which is a lot (unless you can get the DOD to buy it for you). Still a cool bit of history.
Each of the vignettes is short, accompanies by a tactical map and stripped of irrelevant information by the multiple layers of translation. What's interesting is seeing what lessons the General Staff at Frunze drew, and Grau's commentary on those lessons. Soviet doctrine and equipment was oriented for maneuver warfare on the irradiated plains of Central Europe. Infantry was an adjunct to the armored arm, and tactics were stripped to simple plans that would enable higher commander to rapidly concentrate mass and fire against NATO forces as cities vanished under mushroom clouds. Afghanistan was a classic counter-insurgency nightmare, with mountain terrain restricting the use of armor, and years of bloody attritional warfare against agile mujaheddin fighters. Generally, small groups of Soviet infantry lacked initiative and aggression, especially in night fighting and patrolling. Cordons for sweep and clear operations were leaky, convoy security an ongoing problem, and even the poor Russian loadbearing gear worked against success, as troops were tied to road-bound infantry fighting vehicles for resupply.
Agressive helicopter insertions showed some success, but airpower cannot control the ground or protect the population. Expensive helicopters were always in short supply, and rarely worked at their best in the mountains. Grau criticize the Russians for inadequate reconnaissance, using reconnaissance troops as combat infantry, and ad hoc special units for missions, rather than establishing proper combined infantry and support units for the ongoing counter-insurgency warfare.
I grabbed this book and the sequel from the Afghan side for $3 apiece, which was a steal. I see they're back up to $40 now, which is a lot (unless you can get the DOD to buy it for you). Still a cool bit of history.
April 27, 2013
Unless you are a student of counterinsurgency, of the former USSR and of Afghanistan, you are unlikely to enjoy The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. This book is didactic, a product of the famous Frunze Military Academy intended to teach the Soviet officers how to operate successfully in Afghanistan. It is not exciting, no famous swirling battles. Rather a series of vignettes highlighting good and bad planning and tactics. Still, you get a good picture of how the Soviets operated over their 10 year war. Some lessons are universal and some were particular to that force. I don't think we would adopt the Soviet requirement of providing a stirring progressive socialist session of political education before every operation...but you never know. There are excellent maps in this book and very easy to follow the combat events.
September 11, 2022
A collection of vignettes, written by Soviet company- and field grade- officers on their operational experiences in the Soviet-Afghan War. Based off of a book published by the Frunze Military Academy in 1991, titled Combat Actions of Soviet Forces in the Republic of Afghanistan: A Thematic Collection of Tactical Examples.
The book was not intended for a general audience, and it should not be mistaken for a narrative history of the war. The anecdotes are not ordered chronologically, but instead by type of operation (Blocking and Destroying Guerrilla Forces, the Offensive in Populated Areas and Mountains, the Application of Tactical Air Assaults, etc.) A brief description of a unit and its preparations is usually included, followed by a description of the operation, and then commentary by both Soviet sources and the American translators and editors. Maps are also included for each vignette, and there is an extensive glossary.
The impression here is of an army that was designed to oppose either NATO or the People's Liberation Army in a situation that it was completely unprepared for. While there was some tactical adaptation by some junior officers, this was a conflict where tanks were much less useful in the mountain terrain, where infantry frequently did not leave their vehicles, and the Soviets at times struggle with providing adequate security and achieving operational surprise. There are some cases of Soviets flattening an entire village to draw out a small number of militia.
Primarily for those interested in counterinsurgency, Afghanistan, or those inquiring on the state of the late Soviet military.
The book was not intended for a general audience, and it should not be mistaken for a narrative history of the war. The anecdotes are not ordered chronologically, but instead by type of operation (Blocking and Destroying Guerrilla Forces, the Offensive in Populated Areas and Mountains, the Application of Tactical Air Assaults, etc.) A brief description of a unit and its preparations is usually included, followed by a description of the operation, and then commentary by both Soviet sources and the American translators and editors. Maps are also included for each vignette, and there is an extensive glossary.
The impression here is of an army that was designed to oppose either NATO or the People's Liberation Army in a situation that it was completely unprepared for. While there was some tactical adaptation by some junior officers, this was a conflict where tanks were much less useful in the mountain terrain, where infantry frequently did not leave their vehicles, and the Soviets at times struggle with providing adequate security and achieving operational surprise. There are some cases of Soviets flattening an entire village to draw out a small number of militia.
Primarily for those interested in counterinsurgency, Afghanistan, or those inquiring on the state of the late Soviet military.
March 27, 2022
In US doctrine there are three levels of war; Startegic, operational, and tactical. It's possible to be successful in one and not the other, as the US and Russia experienced in Afghanistan.
What struck me was the general similarities in US and Soviet tactics in Afghanistan. This isn't to say that they are mirror images, there were plenty of differences, but generally speaking there are only so many ways to fight a guerrilla war in mountainous terrain.
The Russians clearly had a qualitative and quantitative advantage over the Mujahideen. The Russian's almost always won tactical engagements and killed more Muj then casualties they suffered. However, there was a definite learning curve in the 10 years.
Ambushes, light infantry, helicopters, and integrated fires won the day tactically. Having ambushes or blocking positions to foil the Mujahideen retrogrades really sealed the deal. Unfortunately the Soviets never had the troop numbers available to consolidate gains and the notorious Russian tactics of massing fires to destroy the enemy was counterproductive.
What struck me was the general similarities in US and Soviet tactics in Afghanistan. This isn't to say that they are mirror images, there were plenty of differences, but generally speaking there are only so many ways to fight a guerrilla war in mountainous terrain.
The Russians clearly had a qualitative and quantitative advantage over the Mujahideen. The Russian's almost always won tactical engagements and killed more Muj then casualties they suffered. However, there was a definite learning curve in the 10 years.
Ambushes, light infantry, helicopters, and integrated fires won the day tactically. Having ambushes or blocking positions to foil the Mujahideen retrogrades really sealed the deal. Unfortunately the Soviets never had the troop numbers available to consolidate gains and the notorious Russian tactics of massing fires to destroy the enemy was counterproductive.
December 27, 2019
Do you like reading After Action Reviews? Yes? Well you'll love this book. Originally written by a Russian military academy, then reviewed and translated by Lester Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain is a factual look into Russian tactics in the Soviet-Afghan war. It details battles and operations fought in vignettes, or short accounts. There are a few personal accounts and quotes, but as I said in the opening, it wouldn't be out of place in a military briefing room over a projector and instant coffee in canteen cups.
It's quite interesting how Russians planned and fought in Afghanistan. Owning some key terrain while foregoing obvious routes allowing the enemy complete freedom of movement. Lessons can and have been learned from their mistakes. As someone with a fairly deep interest in the planning and execution of warfare at the tactical and operational level, I enjoyed it, but don't go into this thinking you're going to get a dramatized account. The translation is fine, and the maps accompanying some battles are definitely appreciated.
It's quite interesting how Russians planned and fought in Afghanistan. Owning some key terrain while foregoing obvious routes allowing the enemy complete freedom of movement. Lessons can and have been learned from their mistakes. As someone with a fairly deep interest in the planning and execution of warfare at the tactical and operational level, I enjoyed it, but don't go into this thinking you're going to get a dramatized account. The translation is fine, and the maps accompanying some battles are definitely appreciated.
May 17, 2020
Soviet military power was seemingly an invincible pillar of the state but when it came to the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 to salvage the recent communist state, it didn’t prevail.
The Soviet Army was trained for a massive strategic operation, where tactics were kept simple so as to be adoptable by conscripts and reservists, and not upset high tempo choreographed operations. These tactics were inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the inhospitable terrain and mujahideen freedom fighters.
This book captures lessons learned in Afghanistan through accounts from various commanders, puts a human face on the experiences and a revealing portrait of how the Soviet Army had to restructure and retrain their force while in the combat zone.
This is a book very much focused on tactical analysis of individual combat episodes rather than an all encompassing narrative of the war. However, it is bookended neatly by a more general introduction and conclusion.
The Soviet Army was trained for a massive strategic operation, where tactics were kept simple so as to be adoptable by conscripts and reservists, and not upset high tempo choreographed operations. These tactics were inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the inhospitable terrain and mujahideen freedom fighters.
This book captures lessons learned in Afghanistan through accounts from various commanders, puts a human face on the experiences and a revealing portrait of how the Soviet Army had to restructure and retrain their force while in the combat zone.
This is a book very much focused on tactical analysis of individual combat episodes rather than an all encompassing narrative of the war. However, it is bookended neatly by a more general introduction and conclusion.
October 31, 2017
Combining the insights from the officers at the Frunze Military Academy with those of an US Army LTC, this book gives an unique glimpse into the challenges faced by the Soviet forces when fighting in a war that they were totally unprepared for.
It's a book about the challenges faced when an organization needs to change radically, with both positive and negative outcomes. It is also about the perils of doing things half-heartedly and about dogma and false paradigms. But above all, it is a book about the importance of leadership.
It's a book about the challenges faced when an organization needs to change radically, with both positive and negative outcomes. It is also about the perils of doing things half-heartedly and about dogma and false paradigms. But above all, it is a book about the importance of leadership.
April 2, 2020
A story for all those who want to learn more about trying to fight water with an iron clad fist. The Soviet army failed to realize the difficulty of a counter insurgency and paid the consequences. Multiple systematic problems are evident and rarely a remedy is made for it. Lester Grau’s documentation and commentary helps others to understand in greater detail what went wrong and how it could’ve been remedied.
An excellent ready for all those interested in leading combat forces in a challenging environment.
An excellent ready for all those interested in leading combat forces in a challenging environment.
June 3, 2020
A solid set of tactical vignettes on the Soviet-Afghan War. The book could use an update with additional commentary from American Army Officers who have since served in our own Afghan War and would probably replace the stilted “the Soviets needed an NCO Corps and Better Recon Elements” analysis that although very true gets repetitive while reading this book. Still since it was first released in 2000 I appreciate the difficult project Grau took translating the Russian lessons learned for us.
Read
October 1, 2023This is no book, rather it is someone who took the time to take Soviet military reports and translate them and cut down the unimportant parts. It’s a really tough read and doesn’t add any real history to the events that happen and why they happen. If you can read this sort of book, similar to the How ISIS Fights book I covered a while back, it will be an interesting read about Soviet tactics in Afghanistan and it’s subsequent successes and failures
November 29, 2018
Technical read that highlights interesting problems
The Soviet invasion and war in Afghanistan provided a training ground for small unit tactics in a unique way that is well documented throughout this study. Reading this should offer perspective to some of the similar issues facing us forces engaged there.
The Soviet invasion and war in Afghanistan provided a training ground for small unit tactics in a unique way that is well documented throughout this study. Reading this should offer perspective to some of the similar issues facing us forces engaged there.
December 13, 2022
Ok, for what it is. Do not read this expecting an overview of political context or grand strategy. The book is made up of largely tactical summaries from Soviet officers. The English translation is good, and this information is rather obscure. A good supplement to a proper historical-materialist treatment of the Afghan counterinsurgency.
September 2, 2023
قرات بالعربية " جانب اخر من الجبل تكتيكات المجاهدين في حرب الافغانية السوفيتية " كتاب يتحدث عن حرب العصابات جرت في افغانستات باللغة عسكرية وعن قتال وحدات العصابات، كذلك عن الموت، البقاء، والتكيف. الكتاب وفر معلومات عن الاسلحة القتالية، القادة حرب وتكتيكات المجاهدين استخدمت في فرض كمائن على السوفيت، كذلك سلط ادوار قام بها السوفيت في حربها علي المجاهدين افغان.
December 31, 2017
I would direct anyone being deployed to Afghanistan to read this book. It details Afghan tactics employed by the Taliban against the Soviets. It is a comprehensive look at their Tactical prowess. It’s an important read for sure.
January 28, 2019
Great distillation of lessons learned in Afghanistan (for the Soviets) with comparisons to Western doctrine. Vignette-style teaching is so much more effective than pure hypothetical doctrine, especially when accompanied by maps.
December 30, 2019
Interesting concept for a book. However, many war stories were terse and lacked adequate explanation. The biggest fault was the absolutely opaque graphics due to the author using Soviet symbology. A legend of what the symbology meant is desperately needed!
January 24, 2020
After two chapters I only read the analysis of each operation instead of the boring 2pages each time given for situationak awareness. The take-aways can really be summed up by the already well known principles of war.
January 8, 2023
El libro es un colección de combates contados por varios oficiales soviéticos en la guerra afgano soviética. Cada uno de estos incluye una valoración final tanto de la academia de oficiales soviética como del editor, un oficial norteamericano especialista en la tácticas de sus enemigos
December 9, 2024
Viniettes of battles during the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, as told from the perspective of the Soviet plan, then again from an outsider American perspective. The maintains and improves of tactics seen in the war
March 4, 2018
An excellent analysis of Soviet combat tactics, how they evolved, and what we can learn from them. A must for anyone interested in the Soviet era war for Afghanistan.
February 18, 2021
Informative but hard to read.
June 11, 2024
Fairly repetative slog, but the AARs were great.
December 6, 2018
If you're into at least two of the following:
a.) Russia
b.) Afghanistan
c.) Military tactics
Then this is an interesting and fun read.
a.) Russia
b.) Afghanistan
c.) Military tactics
Then this is an interesting and fun read.
Read
July 21, 2015I read a epub version that didn't have the greatest sized maps, but was an excellent read (although some time spent learning soviet military maps should be spent to get the most out of it)
The conclusion draws some significant parallels to Russia's actions today with Ukraine.
"The elements of their invasion plan included the establishment of an in-country Soviet military and KGB element to assist the invasion force and the production of a cover or deception operation to divert attention away from the future invasion. A General Staff group would tour the country in advance of the invasion, under some pretense, in order to assess and fine-tune invasion plans. When the invasion began, the in-country Soviet military and KGB element would disarm or disable the national military forces. Airborne and SPETSNAZ forces would spearhead the invasion and seize major airfields, transportation choke points, the capital city, key government buildings, and communications facilities. They would seize or execute the key government leaders. Soviet ground forces would cross into the country, seize the major cities and road networks, suppress any local military resistance, and occupy the key population centers. A new government would then be installed, supported by the armed might of the Soviet Armed Forces.
This invasion plan was also used in Afghanistan. Soviet military and KGB advisers permeated the structure of the Afghanistan Armed Forces. In April 1979, General of the Army Aleksiy A. Yepishev, the head of the Main Political Directorate, led a delegation of several generals in a visit to Afghanistan to assess the situation. General Yepishev made a similar visit to Czechoslovakia prior to the 1968 invasion. In August 1979, General of the Army Ivan G. Pavlovski, CINC Soviet Ground Forces, led a group of some 60 officers on a several-weeks-long reconnaissance tour of Afghanistan. General Pavlovski commanded the invasion force in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The invasion of Afghanistan was launched on Christmas Eve, certainly not a Muslim holiday, but a time when the Western governments were not prepared to react. Soviet advisers disabled equipment, blocked arms rooms and prevented a coordinated Afghan military response. Soviet airborne and SPETSNAZ forces seized the Salang tunnel, key airfields, and key government and communications sites in Kabul. Soviet SPETSNAZ soldiers killed President Amin. The Soviet ground invasion force crossed into the country, fought battles with pockets of Afghan military resistance and occupied the main cities while the Soviet government installed their Afghan puppet regime.
. . .
So, initially the press carried pictures of happy Soviet soldiers building orphanages-and did not mention that they were also engaged in combat and filling those very orphanages. By the end of 1983, the Soviet press had only reported six dead and wounded soldiers, although by that time, the 40th Army had suffered 6,262 dead and 9,880 combat wounded. "
The conclusion draws some significant parallels to Russia's actions today with Ukraine.
"The elements of their invasion plan included the establishment of an in-country Soviet military and KGB element to assist the invasion force and the production of a cover or deception operation to divert attention away from the future invasion. A General Staff group would tour the country in advance of the invasion, under some pretense, in order to assess and fine-tune invasion plans. When the invasion began, the in-country Soviet military and KGB element would disarm or disable the national military forces. Airborne and SPETSNAZ forces would spearhead the invasion and seize major airfields, transportation choke points, the capital city, key government buildings, and communications facilities. They would seize or execute the key government leaders. Soviet ground forces would cross into the country, seize the major cities and road networks, suppress any local military resistance, and occupy the key population centers. A new government would then be installed, supported by the armed might of the Soviet Armed Forces.
This invasion plan was also used in Afghanistan. Soviet military and KGB advisers permeated the structure of the Afghanistan Armed Forces. In April 1979, General of the Army Aleksiy A. Yepishev, the head of the Main Political Directorate, led a delegation of several generals in a visit to Afghanistan to assess the situation. General Yepishev made a similar visit to Czechoslovakia prior to the 1968 invasion. In August 1979, General of the Army Ivan G. Pavlovski, CINC Soviet Ground Forces, led a group of some 60 officers on a several-weeks-long reconnaissance tour of Afghanistan. General Pavlovski commanded the invasion force in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The invasion of Afghanistan was launched on Christmas Eve, certainly not a Muslim holiday, but a time when the Western governments were not prepared to react. Soviet advisers disabled equipment, blocked arms rooms and prevented a coordinated Afghan military response. Soviet airborne and SPETSNAZ forces seized the Salang tunnel, key airfields, and key government and communications sites in Kabul. Soviet SPETSNAZ soldiers killed President Amin. The Soviet ground invasion force crossed into the country, fought battles with pockets of Afghan military resistance and occupied the main cities while the Soviet government installed their Afghan puppet regime.
. . .
So, initially the press carried pictures of happy Soviet soldiers building orphanages-and did not mention that they were also engaged in combat and filling those very orphanages. By the end of 1983, the Soviet press had only reported six dead and wounded soldiers, although by that time, the 40th Army had suffered 6,262 dead and 9,880 combat wounded. "
February 25, 2017
This book is commonly recommended for military officers and students of counterinsurgency. This was how I ended up reading "The Bear Went Over the Mountain." Certainly the Soviet misadventures in Afghanistan are something we can learn from, but I'm afraid this book misses the mark by a wide margin.
"The Bear Went Over the Mountain" is delivered as a series of vignettes from Soviet officers, many of whom were company-grade officers at the time of the action. Following the vignettes, there is a short paragraph of analysis, both from a Soviet military institute (the Frunze Military Academy, similar to the U.S. Army Command and Staff College) and from the editor, LtCol Grau.
The problem with the analysis is there isn't enough detail in the vignettes to really bear out any of the observations. In some cases, either the Frunze Academy or LtCol Grau make observations that do not seem to have any basis in the exact text of the vignette (although perhaps there was some context they were aware of that the reader is not?) This is a general trend -- there is tactical-level analysis of small unit actions in Afghanistan, but very little context provided for anything that is happening. I'm afraid that the editor opted for primary sources -- firsthand accounts from Soviet officers -- in lieu of any significant analysis. This book would have been much, much better with summaries and detailed analysis from secondary sources and synthesized primary sources.
If you're a student of COIN, look elsewhere. I recommend "The Accidental Guerrilla" or "Street Without Joy."
"The Bear Went Over the Mountain" is delivered as a series of vignettes from Soviet officers, many of whom were company-grade officers at the time of the action. Following the vignettes, there is a short paragraph of analysis, both from a Soviet military institute (the Frunze Military Academy, similar to the U.S. Army Command and Staff College) and from the editor, LtCol Grau.
The problem with the analysis is there isn't enough detail in the vignettes to really bear out any of the observations. In some cases, either the Frunze Academy or LtCol Grau make observations that do not seem to have any basis in the exact text of the vignette (although perhaps there was some context they were aware of that the reader is not?) This is a general trend -- there is tactical-level analysis of small unit actions in Afghanistan, but very little context provided for anything that is happening. I'm afraid that the editor opted for primary sources -- firsthand accounts from Soviet officers -- in lieu of any significant analysis. This book would have been much, much better with summaries and detailed analysis from secondary sources and synthesized primary sources.
If you're a student of COIN, look elsewhere. I recommend "The Accidental Guerrilla" or "Street Without Joy."
December 29, 2024
I'm reading this because of a throw-away comment by a veteran who sited this book. I have very little knowledge of combat or military anything so I'm reading this with a map of Afghanistan and a Google dictionary.
(DNF)
(DNF)
February 27, 2013
Vignettes of past military actions collected by the Frunze Military Academy for the education of future Soviet military officers. Each vignette consists of an action as described by a participating officer, the "take-aways" according to the Frunze staff, and the commentary by the translator (himself a U.S. military man). The beauty of this is that (a) the reports of the action are unvarnished, as they were meant to improve the Soviet military, (b) the take-aways usually say what else could have been done, which is useful if the reader doesn't possess a military background, and (c) the final commentary tells you if something was strange or being left unsaid. One example: an operation to, among other things, find a mine-layer who was possibly hiding in a village and was being protected by two renegade Russian soldiers. There is a big operation at the end of which the mine-layer is caught. However, the final commentary wonders why one would commit a big operation for a mine-layer, and if the real targets were the renegades. Interestingly, their fate is never mentioned.
January 5, 2010
On first view I don't think you could find a book that is more relateable to what we're doing in Afghanistan. This is basically a book of vignettes of Soviet battles and therefore tactics from their war in Afghanistan. Whats interesting and maybe more surprising than it should be is how much the insurgents tactics are the same as they used to be. That being said this is an outrageously boring book. As much time is given to talking about who the writers are and how many medals they won as to the actual tactics and circumstances of the battles themselves. I wish this was a better ready something I'd enjoy studying, but its not.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 40 reviews