What do you think?
Rate this book


319 pages, Paperback
First published January 5, 2016
“As soon as a storm rises,” bankers behave like a “fair-weather sailor” who “abandons the boats which might carry him to safety by his haste to push his neighbor off and himself in.”--The core “economics” lesson of this book is the role of trade imbalances and private banks in causing financial crises on the global stage. Let’s walk through this:
The essence of his Warwick University lecture was, if America cannot recycle its surplus, having slipped back into a deficit position back in the mid-1960s, it must now recycle other people's surpluses! ... The trick for America to gain the power to recycle other countries' surpluses in the 1980s, Volcker believed, was to persuade foreign capitalists to voluntarily send their capital to Wall Street. Tricky but not impossible. The trick was to hit two usually contradictory targets at once: on the one hand, push American interest rates through the roof while on the other, ensuring that Wall Street offered a more lucrative for investors than its equivalents in {other cities}...
High interest rates are wonderful for those living on unearned income, the so-called rentiers, but not so good for manufacturers who see their investment costs skyrocket and the purchasing power of their customers plummet. For this reason, combining high returns to financial capital (requiring high interest rates) with high profit rates for American businesses (requiring low interest rates) was never going to be easy, and Volcker knew this. It was a combination that could only come about if another way of providing that profit could be found. And one way to do that would be to reduce wages. On the one hand, the Fed would push interest rates through the roof while, at once, the federal government would turn a blind eye, indeed promote, policies that crushed the real wage prospects of American workers.
This is the beauty and curse of the Eurozone. Once in, you lack a currency to cut loose of the euro; you have only the euro. To get out of Europe’s monetary union, Greece or Italy, for example, would have first to create a new drachma or a new lira and then unpeg it from the euro. But creating a new paper currency, distributing it around the country, recalibrating the banking and payment systems to function with it and doing everything else that would be required takes a minimum of twelve months. Given that the purpose of going through the palaver of re-creating a lost currency is to devalue it vis-à-vis the currency in people’s hip pockets, leaving the euro is tantamount to announcing a major devaluation a year before it happens. At the drop of a hint of a devaluation twelve years hence, a frightful race is on. Every Tom, Dick, and Harriet will rush to liquidate whatever wealth they have, convert it to euros, take their euros out of the banking system, and either stash them under the bed or carry them across the border to Germany or Switzerland for safekeeping. Before you can say ‘panic’, banks fail, the country is drained of all value, and the economy collapses.
In the 1980s and 1990s Europe’s social democrats and America’s democrats abandoned the idea that capitalism had to be civilised by driving a hard bargain with the captains of industry, supporting organised labour and containing the bankers natural instincts. They forgot that unregulated labour and financial and property markets are profoundly inefficient. They ignored inequality created as a by-product of that inefficiency. They lost sight of the fact that inequality destabilises financial markets and reinforces capitalism’s tendency to fall on its face.

