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Battleship: The Loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse
On Wednesday 10 December 1941, the third day of the war in the Pacific, two British capital ships were sunk off Malaya by Japanese air torpedo attack. They did not request the air support that could have saved them: 840 men died and the rest have never forgotten.
Whatever did happen in those confused hours, the sinking of the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" has been surrounded by controversy, uncertainty and strong emotions. Taking full advantage of the recently released British Second World War documents and of the Japanese Official History, the authors dispose of several myths, and recreate for the reader not only what happened on that sunny morning off Malaya but also what it was like for the men involved.
Whatever did happen in those confused hours, the sinking of the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" has been surrounded by controversy, uncertainty and strong emotions. Taking full advantage of the recently released British Second World War documents and of the Japanese Official History, the authors dispose of several myths, and recreate for the reader not only what happened on that sunny morning off Malaya but also what it was like for the men involved.
366 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1977
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About the author
Martin Middlebrook
42 books62 followersMartin Middlebrook was a British military historian and Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. Appointed Knight of the Order of the Belgian Crown in 2004.
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Displaying 1 - 23 of 23 reviews
June 27, 2022
Author Martin MIddlebrook has the unique ability to use lots of details in his books and still make it a page turner. The book contains all relevant historical, political and military details on how the HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse came to be in the unenviable position to be the example for the end of the age of the battleships. All the bad decision making by politicians and officers led to the unnecessary sacrifice of brave sailors, and was just the beginning of all blunders during the Malaya campaign and the fall of Singapore.
The battle scenes are also vividly described with lots of eye witness accounts of what happened and what went wrong during the sailing of these two battlewagons and their escorting destroyers. The author always stresses that all his opinions and findings are with the benefit of hindsight and nowhere does he try to put the blame on any one person. Highly recommended World War 2 naval reading.
The battle scenes are also vividly described with lots of eye witness accounts of what happened and what went wrong during the sailing of these two battlewagons and their escorting destroyers. The author always stresses that all his opinions and findings are with the benefit of hindsight and nowhere does he try to put the blame on any one person. Highly recommended World War 2 naval reading.
July 14, 2017
A decent enough retelling of the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse to Japanese air attack. The authors also make a solid case for why neither Churchill, the Admiralty, nor Admiral Sir Tom Phillips should have considered the deployment suicidal, given the track record of aircraft attacking capital ships underway in open waters to that time.
Which is why it is then quite confusing when the authors claim in the postscript that, rather than blaming Churchill, First Sea Lord Sir Dudley Pound, or Phillips for not realizing the capital ships would be useless sitting ducks without air cover, they blame Phillips for "not learning from his mistakes" concerning coordination of air cover with the RAF. Phillips no doubt made several crucial mistakes - continuing on with the mission for too long after it was evident they had been sighted, the lingering around Kuantan, and the ludicrous pursuit of a barge-carrier with his entire force rather than detailing a single destroyer or seaplane - but it's hard to see what Phillips should have learned about his vulnerability to Japanese aircraft in time to actually retrieve the situation (i.e., break radio silence to arrange fighter cover for December 10th prior to the arrival of Japanese bombers). The argument about the loss of the two ships being critical to Britain's "loss of face" and the unraveling of the empire in the Far East is also weak. British colonial troops were already fighting poorly and without motivation by 10 December, and given the two ships clearly had no chance of stemming the tide of Japanese conquests in the region, it stands to reason that had they survived (only possible if they had fled for Ceylon or Australia), that fact hardly would have helped preserve Britain's standing in the eyes of its Far East subjects and dominions. . .
The more interesting questions the book raise are really about deterrence and how strategic planners should consider economy of force operations. Prince of Wales and Repulse were sent to the Far East to deter Japan; as it became clear they were insufficient to do so, the question of what to do with them when hostilities broke out became a tricky one. As the authors (and, prior to them, Samuel Eliot Morrison) point out, with the RAF and Army in desperate fights throughout Malaya, there was no way the RN would be able to sit out the fight or withdraw to preserve critical naval assets from pointless sacrifice. The RN commanders clearly felt that way, and the reality was the two proud ships probably wouldn't have been of huge use if they had survived. (Unless they could have transferred to Australia and survived until the Solomons campaign. . .)
All in all, a decent book - it may not have provided insight to any question deeper than "was the deployment of 'Force Z' as suicidally stupid as it appeared in retrospect?" but it likely didn't intend to, either.
Which is why it is then quite confusing when the authors claim in the postscript that, rather than blaming Churchill, First Sea Lord Sir Dudley Pound, or Phillips for not realizing the capital ships would be useless sitting ducks without air cover, they blame Phillips for "not learning from his mistakes" concerning coordination of air cover with the RAF. Phillips no doubt made several crucial mistakes - continuing on with the mission for too long after it was evident they had been sighted, the lingering around Kuantan, and the ludicrous pursuit of a barge-carrier with his entire force rather than detailing a single destroyer or seaplane - but it's hard to see what Phillips should have learned about his vulnerability to Japanese aircraft in time to actually retrieve the situation (i.e., break radio silence to arrange fighter cover for December 10th prior to the arrival of Japanese bombers). The argument about the loss of the two ships being critical to Britain's "loss of face" and the unraveling of the empire in the Far East is also weak. British colonial troops were already fighting poorly and without motivation by 10 December, and given the two ships clearly had no chance of stemming the tide of Japanese conquests in the region, it stands to reason that had they survived (only possible if they had fled for Ceylon or Australia), that fact hardly would have helped preserve Britain's standing in the eyes of its Far East subjects and dominions. . .
The more interesting questions the book raise are really about deterrence and how strategic planners should consider economy of force operations. Prince of Wales and Repulse were sent to the Far East to deter Japan; as it became clear they were insufficient to do so, the question of what to do with them when hostilities broke out became a tricky one. As the authors (and, prior to them, Samuel Eliot Morrison) point out, with the RAF and Army in desperate fights throughout Malaya, there was no way the RN would be able to sit out the fight or withdraw to preserve critical naval assets from pointless sacrifice. The RN commanders clearly felt that way, and the reality was the two proud ships probably wouldn't have been of huge use if they had survived. (Unless they could have transferred to Australia and survived until the Solomons campaign. . .)
All in all, a decent book - it may not have provided insight to any question deeper than "was the deployment of 'Force Z' as suicidally stupid as it appeared in retrospect?" but it likely didn't intend to, either.
June 11, 2020
Fantastic read; well researched and does a great job of supporting the most logical chain of events with grounded findings, calling out hypotheticals where we just can't know for certain the order over events, and seeks to provide some commentary on the why behind key decisions to allow for history to be learned from. A must read for any military officer (particularly those in naval services) on the tragic consequences of pride, hubris, and assumption of the enemy.
July 10, 2019
Lesson of this story - Billy Mitchell was right!
July 9, 2024
Obviously I had heard about this battle, but had never read anything in detail about it. This book covers not only the battle in detail, being filled with eyewitness accounts, but also the history of both ships and the way the Royal Navy saw its future. It also covers the political and military implications of the role those ships played. Next to this all we get to understand why intercepting and sinking the ships was important to the Japanese and what could have happened if they didn't.
My first impression was, despite being quite familiar with WWII in many theaters, that two ships could not make much of a difference. Reading this book it showed me that their role could have had a large impact upon the early stages of the Pacific war. Difficulty is that we will never know for sure how much difference, but it could have played a significant role if some of the 'What if?' scenarios could have taken place. More than I had expected.
What it also shows, again, is how the West looked at its Asian adversary and what a mistake they made doing so. And airpower going through another leap in its development showed that it was there to stay. As the battles in the Pacific from 1942-45 would show. Underestimating its power and underestimating the Japanese would cost them dearly.
The many eyewitness accounts add a lot to understanding what took place and how this all impacted the way ahead. Many men lost their lives and the question remains if this could have been prevented. The main characters in this drama made decisions based on their training and experiences, but interservice rivalry did play a role as did the way the world's navies viewed airpower. It also shows that the Japanese airmen involved were not yet in the mindset that would charaterize the Pacific war.
A very good book on an important moment in history. Absolutely worth reading!
My first impression was, despite being quite familiar with WWII in many theaters, that two ships could not make much of a difference. Reading this book it showed me that their role could have had a large impact upon the early stages of the Pacific war. Difficulty is that we will never know for sure how much difference, but it could have played a significant role if some of the 'What if?' scenarios could have taken place. More than I had expected.
What it also shows, again, is how the West looked at its Asian adversary and what a mistake they made doing so. And airpower going through another leap in its development showed that it was there to stay. As the battles in the Pacific from 1942-45 would show. Underestimating its power and underestimating the Japanese would cost them dearly.
The many eyewitness accounts add a lot to understanding what took place and how this all impacted the way ahead. Many men lost their lives and the question remains if this could have been prevented. The main characters in this drama made decisions based on their training and experiences, but interservice rivalry did play a role as did the way the world's navies viewed airpower. It also shows that the Japanese airmen involved were not yet in the mindset that would charaterize the Pacific war.
A very good book on an important moment in history. Absolutely worth reading!
September 24, 2025
A very engaging book on a Royal Navy disaster from the opening days of the Pacific War. The authors do a thorough job explaining all the ins and outs surrounding the drama of the two doomed dreadnaughts, Prince of Wales and Repulse.
It's usually a dilemma for military historians who write of a campaign or, especially, a single operation such as this, to present their subject while sketching in the background of the theater of operations or the war in general. Coming as it did in the initial wave of Japanese attacks against Allied positions throughout the Pacific, the attack on these ships was hardly an isolated incident, and fits within the scheme of that offensive.
Given the global nature of the war by the end of 1941, the convergence of so many factors leading up to Task Force Z's sortie into the Gulf of Siam is a story in itself. The deterent effect of the Tirpitz, the U-boat threat, the Royal Navy commitments in the Mediterranean, not to mention the often conflicting views of the Admiralty, the Far East command at Singapore, and Churchill, meant that any decision made in London passed through a web of checks and balances.
That is to say, not only the War itself, but the history of the installations at Singapore, the dispositions and claims of the Army, the Royal Navy, the RAF, and the means available to meet them, are necessary topics, and covered here at both the big picture and nuts and bolts levels. Somewhat in the vein of the French government's reliance on the Maginot Line for defense, the coastal batteries protecting Singapore turn out to have been an elaborate and expensive preparation for the wrong war.
Back to the ships: along with everything else, the selection of these two capital ships for this mission was worthy of a subplot. Nonetheless, no one could be blamed for not considering the crucial role of air cover, since the carrier Indomitable was included with Force Z from the beginning. Only the freakish grounding of that ship in the Caribbean, and its subsequent repairs, kept it out of action; not many would've disputed that its presence in the Gulf of Siam might well have tilted the balance of forces in favor of the British.
To get to the heart of the matter and the book's theme: given that Force Z had no organic air cover, was it reckless to attempt to intercept the Japanese landings up the Malay peninsula? The goal was laudable: the Japanese troops and ships could've been as well as wiped out given their vulnerability during the landings. With no capital ships readily at hand, the Japanese Navy might've suffered a tremendous blow, even if no troopships were destroyed by the Prince of Wales and Repulse.
The key was timing. With hazy and contradictory intelligence on the various Japanese landings, the British missed the boat (sorry for that). Even so, the potential danger to the Japanese lighter craft, and their overmatched older dreadnoughts (even the Japanese admitted this), meant that the Royal Navy could have scored at least a nuisance and propaganda victory for the Allies.
As it was, of course, the victory here was all on the Japanese side. It's not as though air cover wasn't available; the Singapore-based Buffaloes, obsolete as they were as fighters, could more than match the slower Japanese torpedo bombers used in the deadly attacks. That brings up what the authors' consider as the ultimate bad decision: Force Z's commander, Admiral Phillips, from the bridge of the Prince of Wales, seemingly could not fathom the danger posed by Japanese torpedo bombers.
Once the Force was sighted by Japanese aircraft (they'd given an IJN submarine the slip earlier), "Force Z continued to maintain radio silence (after being sighted)...It was an incredible fifty-eight minutes later that Captain Tennant of Repulse finally got away the first signal. Prince of Wales never did signal, until she was virtually sinking, and even then all Phillip's signals asked..for purely *naval* answers...Never an appeal for aircraft!" (p. 249).
Absurdly, when actually under attack, the Admiral insisted that the planes were not in fact carrying torpedoes. "...two great ships were lost because one stubborn old seadog refused to acknowlege that he had been wrong" (p.249).
Of course, it was pure bad luck that the first torpedo hit on the Prince of Wales was so devastating. The authors convey, as on many other subjects, considerable technical and narrative skill describing what happens when a 240 ft. propeller shaft thrashes around in the hold of a ship.
In the Admiral's defense, one factor that is repeated, in different ways, was the unique outcome of this battle. Up until this time, no capital ship had been sunk by aircraft--unless they were boxed up in a port. When we consider, however, that about fifty torpedo bombers, and a like number of high level bombers were arrayed against the ships, opposed only by their AA guns, it begins to sound like a test case to prove that such sinkings were possible.
Exploring flaws in the design of the Prince of Wales, and the lack of effective AA weaponry on both ships, also stacked the deck against the British. Not to mention the nearly-unworkable command structure at Singapore. All of these factors are interrelated; the belated arrival of the Buffalos over the sinking ships, for example, was not entirely a result of Phillip's obstinacy.
A fascinating story told with a great deal of nuance and impact. The photos, charts, and diagrams are excellent; the number and depth of primary sources are astounding, as plenty of the sailors were still with us in the 1970s. A great read just as drama, and essential for anyone interested in Pacific Theatre WWII history.
It's usually a dilemma for military historians who write of a campaign or, especially, a single operation such as this, to present their subject while sketching in the background of the theater of operations or the war in general. Coming as it did in the initial wave of Japanese attacks against Allied positions throughout the Pacific, the attack on these ships was hardly an isolated incident, and fits within the scheme of that offensive.
Given the global nature of the war by the end of 1941, the convergence of so many factors leading up to Task Force Z's sortie into the Gulf of Siam is a story in itself. The deterent effect of the Tirpitz, the U-boat threat, the Royal Navy commitments in the Mediterranean, not to mention the often conflicting views of the Admiralty, the Far East command at Singapore, and Churchill, meant that any decision made in London passed through a web of checks and balances.
That is to say, not only the War itself, but the history of the installations at Singapore, the dispositions and claims of the Army, the Royal Navy, the RAF, and the means available to meet them, are necessary topics, and covered here at both the big picture and nuts and bolts levels. Somewhat in the vein of the French government's reliance on the Maginot Line for defense, the coastal batteries protecting Singapore turn out to have been an elaborate and expensive preparation for the wrong war.
Back to the ships: along with everything else, the selection of these two capital ships for this mission was worthy of a subplot. Nonetheless, no one could be blamed for not considering the crucial role of air cover, since the carrier Indomitable was included with Force Z from the beginning. Only the freakish grounding of that ship in the Caribbean, and its subsequent repairs, kept it out of action; not many would've disputed that its presence in the Gulf of Siam might well have tilted the balance of forces in favor of the British.
To get to the heart of the matter and the book's theme: given that Force Z had no organic air cover, was it reckless to attempt to intercept the Japanese landings up the Malay peninsula? The goal was laudable: the Japanese troops and ships could've been as well as wiped out given their vulnerability during the landings. With no capital ships readily at hand, the Japanese Navy might've suffered a tremendous blow, even if no troopships were destroyed by the Prince of Wales and Repulse.
The key was timing. With hazy and contradictory intelligence on the various Japanese landings, the British missed the boat (sorry for that). Even so, the potential danger to the Japanese lighter craft, and their overmatched older dreadnoughts (even the Japanese admitted this), meant that the Royal Navy could have scored at least a nuisance and propaganda victory for the Allies.
As it was, of course, the victory here was all on the Japanese side. It's not as though air cover wasn't available; the Singapore-based Buffaloes, obsolete as they were as fighters, could more than match the slower Japanese torpedo bombers used in the deadly attacks. That brings up what the authors' consider as the ultimate bad decision: Force Z's commander, Admiral Phillips, from the bridge of the Prince of Wales, seemingly could not fathom the danger posed by Japanese torpedo bombers.
Once the Force was sighted by Japanese aircraft (they'd given an IJN submarine the slip earlier), "Force Z continued to maintain radio silence (after being sighted)...It was an incredible fifty-eight minutes later that Captain Tennant of Repulse finally got away the first signal. Prince of Wales never did signal, until she was virtually sinking, and even then all Phillip's signals asked..for purely *naval* answers...Never an appeal for aircraft!" (p. 249).
Absurdly, when actually under attack, the Admiral insisted that the planes were not in fact carrying torpedoes. "...two great ships were lost because one stubborn old seadog refused to acknowlege that he had been wrong" (p.249).
Of course, it was pure bad luck that the first torpedo hit on the Prince of Wales was so devastating. The authors convey, as on many other subjects, considerable technical and narrative skill describing what happens when a 240 ft. propeller shaft thrashes around in the hold of a ship.
In the Admiral's defense, one factor that is repeated, in different ways, was the unique outcome of this battle. Up until this time, no capital ship had been sunk by aircraft--unless they were boxed up in a port. When we consider, however, that about fifty torpedo bombers, and a like number of high level bombers were arrayed against the ships, opposed only by their AA guns, it begins to sound like a test case to prove that such sinkings were possible.
Exploring flaws in the design of the Prince of Wales, and the lack of effective AA weaponry on both ships, also stacked the deck against the British. Not to mention the nearly-unworkable command structure at Singapore. All of these factors are interrelated; the belated arrival of the Buffalos over the sinking ships, for example, was not entirely a result of Phillip's obstinacy.
A fascinating story told with a great deal of nuance and impact. The photos, charts, and diagrams are excellent; the number and depth of primary sources are astounding, as plenty of the sailors were still with us in the 1970s. A great read just as drama, and essential for anyone interested in Pacific Theatre WWII history.
December 11, 2017
A prolonged discussion of the history behind and of the sinking of the HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. The authors do their best not just to give an account but explain why decisions were made.
June 3, 2021
I've never been a great consumer of military history. All too often I find that it is similar to listening to a retired officer standing in front of a series of maps outlining troop dispositions and manoeuvrings by pointing with a stick. It's all very dry and only interesting to those with an already established dedication to the subject. Battleship is different.
While the authors take care to explain the details of the background to the Japanese Empire's advance through what had been French Indo-China (Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia), its invasion of Thailand and British controlled Malaya and the threat to the British naval base at Singapore, and the British Empire's stuttering response of sending the modern battleship Prince of Wales and the ageing battle cruiser Repulse, they never lose sight of the overwhelming human tragedy that was imminent. The commander chosen to lead the fleet was Admiral Sir Thomas Phillips and here I have to assume that the details and opinions given in the book are correct and justified. He had last seen naval action during the First World War in 1917. Since the end of that war he had risen through a variety of senior staff positions. His views on the value of aerial attacks on large capital warships and an aerial defence basically assumed the ships could defend themselves; they needed only a destroyer escort to keep away submarines. The authors point out that the original plan had been to include an aircraft carrier, the Indomitable, in the fleet but this vessel had run aground on the coast of Jamaica and was delayed by repairs.
Admiral Phillips' views on the use of aircraft in naval actions had a vital and ultimately tragic result. One also has to consider the British Imperial racial opinions. Britain was fighting Japan after all, and could an Asian people really pose a threat to an Empire on which the sun would never set? The answer was yes it could. The Japanese navy had two of the largest battleships in the world, a fleet of aircraft carriers and Mitsubishi was producing warplanes that could rival the best of any nation. When Britain learned that a Japanese invasion force had landed on Malaya's northeastern coast the decision was made that the Prince of Wales and the Repulse with destroyer escort should leave Singapore to avoid being trapped in the harbour and sail north to drive the invasion force away.
What followed is described in the book in painful and moving detail as first the Repulse and then the Prince of Wales were attacked by squadrons of high level bombers and torpedo aircraft. Both ships were sunk, the Repulse losing over 39% of its crew and the Prince of Wales over 20%. Admiral Phillips did not survive and may have chosen his fate – but that is not clear.
The authors continue the story after the sinkings to consider what happened to the survivors. Many of the senior officers were flown out of Singapore to give their evidence in London. Most of the sailors and marines were left in the port to be assigned to other roles. Singapore fell to the Japanese ten weeks later.
I recommend it as a memorial to the incredible bravery of those who fought – and as a reminder of how deeply offensive to human dignity war can be.
While the authors take care to explain the details of the background to the Japanese Empire's advance through what had been French Indo-China (Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia), its invasion of Thailand and British controlled Malaya and the threat to the British naval base at Singapore, and the British Empire's stuttering response of sending the modern battleship Prince of Wales and the ageing battle cruiser Repulse, they never lose sight of the overwhelming human tragedy that was imminent. The commander chosen to lead the fleet was Admiral Sir Thomas Phillips and here I have to assume that the details and opinions given in the book are correct and justified. He had last seen naval action during the First World War in 1917. Since the end of that war he had risen through a variety of senior staff positions. His views on the value of aerial attacks on large capital warships and an aerial defence basically assumed the ships could defend themselves; they needed only a destroyer escort to keep away submarines. The authors point out that the original plan had been to include an aircraft carrier, the Indomitable, in the fleet but this vessel had run aground on the coast of Jamaica and was delayed by repairs.
Admiral Phillips' views on the use of aircraft in naval actions had a vital and ultimately tragic result. One also has to consider the British Imperial racial opinions. Britain was fighting Japan after all, and could an Asian people really pose a threat to an Empire on which the sun would never set? The answer was yes it could. The Japanese navy had two of the largest battleships in the world, a fleet of aircraft carriers and Mitsubishi was producing warplanes that could rival the best of any nation. When Britain learned that a Japanese invasion force had landed on Malaya's northeastern coast the decision was made that the Prince of Wales and the Repulse with destroyer escort should leave Singapore to avoid being trapped in the harbour and sail north to drive the invasion force away.
What followed is described in the book in painful and moving detail as first the Repulse and then the Prince of Wales were attacked by squadrons of high level bombers and torpedo aircraft. Both ships were sunk, the Repulse losing over 39% of its crew and the Prince of Wales over 20%. Admiral Phillips did not survive and may have chosen his fate – but that is not clear.
The authors continue the story after the sinkings to consider what happened to the survivors. Many of the senior officers were flown out of Singapore to give their evidence in London. Most of the sailors and marines were left in the port to be assigned to other roles. Singapore fell to the Japanese ten weeks later.
I recommend it as a memorial to the incredible bravery of those who fought – and as a reminder of how deeply offensive to human dignity war can be.
June 19, 2014
This is an outstanding account of the sinking of the battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse by Japanese torpedo carrying aircraft close to Singapore in December 1941.
The authors have gone to great trouble to seek out and interview survivors whose testimonies bring this tragic chapter in our sea history to life.
It's a book that can be read by those who are not technically minded (like me) and there are some excellent appendices for those who wish to know more. The book is also well illustrated and, since we know from the outset that the two ships were sunk, the fascination of the story rests in finding out how and why and what were the repercussions.
A very well-written book which I can recommend without hesitation.
David Lowther. Author of The Blue Pencil (the bluepencil.co.uk)
davidlowtherblog.wordpress.com
The authors have gone to great trouble to seek out and interview survivors whose testimonies bring this tragic chapter in our sea history to life.
It's a book that can be read by those who are not technically minded (like me) and there are some excellent appendices for those who wish to know more. The book is also well illustrated and, since we know from the outset that the two ships were sunk, the fascination of the story rests in finding out how and why and what were the repercussions.
A very well-written book which I can recommend without hesitation.
David Lowther. Author of The Blue Pencil (the bluepencil.co.uk)
davidlowtherblog.wordpress.com
November 24, 2022
Remarkable and Concise
As an avid reader of military history and naval history, it is amazing that this wonderful book only appeared recently in my Amazon recommendations.
It relates the sinking of Force Z in a brief but comprehensive matter, with a fast moving narrative style. I have purchased one of the authors’ other books on the Somme battle and anxious to see if it has a similar style.
Great book, highly recommend. What about the main takeaway? It seems the Fleet’s Admiral should have called in available air support earlier. There are several other bigger picture factors leading the loss of the ships. These are well analyzed and presented.
I believe this book is an older work and it will be interesting to fine also a newer account and compare. (In the future in another review.)
As an avid reader of military history and naval history, it is amazing that this wonderful book only appeared recently in my Amazon recommendations.
It relates the sinking of Force Z in a brief but comprehensive matter, with a fast moving narrative style. I have purchased one of the authors’ other books on the Somme battle and anxious to see if it has a similar style.
Great book, highly recommend. What about the main takeaway? It seems the Fleet’s Admiral should have called in available air support earlier. There are several other bigger picture factors leading the loss of the ships. These are well analyzed and presented.
I believe this book is an older work and it will be interesting to fine also a newer account and compare. (In the future in another review.)
October 8, 2017
Excellent account of an equally important loss to Britain and the US.
I was not aware, as an American, that the P.O.W. and the Repulse had been sunk so quickly in the first few days of the war in the Pacific Theatre. I can't remember any documentaries giving this disaster very much coverage. Instead, they go on to talk about how quickly the British garrisons were overwhelmed by the Japanese. This book gives a good description of how and why the Japanese were able to do their own 'blitz' in S.E. Asia. The author has done a fine job of gathering so much first-hand information, and then organizing it in a very readable manner.
I was not aware, as an American, that the P.O.W. and the Repulse had been sunk so quickly in the first few days of the war in the Pacific Theatre. I can't remember any documentaries giving this disaster very much coverage. Instead, they go on to talk about how quickly the British garrisons were overwhelmed by the Japanese. This book gives a good description of how and why the Japanese were able to do their own 'blitz' in S.E. Asia. The author has done a fine job of gathering so much first-hand information, and then organizing it in a very readable manner.
August 4, 2018
I bought a discount Kindle version, which is quite excellent, with pictures and maps both. The book itself is an excellent telling of the operation that doomed the two ships at the outbreak of WW2 in the Pacific. Plenty of detail as far as operations go, and a good deal of anecdotal evidence to make it a good human interest story. Unfortunately, due to the death of Admiral Phillips, we will never know the entire story. Sadly a good deal of both crews were left in Singapore and eventually fell into the hands of the Japanese. This is an excellent book and I would recommend it to anyone with an interest in this story.
December 12, 2016
Excellent read, even if a little out of date. It explains in great detail exactly how the two battleships were lost. How Admiral Phillips regarded air cover as unnecessary. It leaves unanswered how Phillips managed to gain command in the first place. On arrival in Singapore the Prince of Wales loaded thousands of bottles of champagne for a round of peacetime civic entertaining says it all.. Great good and informative read.
March 1, 2011
A fairly decent account of the tactical and operational mistakes that led to the loss of these two capital ships. The British were taught a valuable lesson on the use of airpower and the limited value of battleships deployed without aircover. The narrative was clear, but the background was thin and there was little indepth operational and strategic analysis on this episode.
April 22, 2015
A really interesting read. It was very good and loaded with details and the personal stories that bring it all to life.
Amazing to think that these ships were sent without any air cover into the teeth of the Japanese advance through Malaya. when so many recent events showed what happens to these types of ships when the are left undefended. They are sunk, and quickly.
Amazing to think that these ships were sent without any air cover into the teeth of the Japanese advance through Malaya. when so many recent events showed what happens to these types of ships when the are left undefended. They are sunk, and quickly.
February 6, 2017
Look at the timetable again...
There was a lot of the good info, but basic conclusion of the book is based on the timetable of what would have happened has air cover been called without delay. That timeline is 10 minutes off (wrong math), causing some of the central arguments in regard to analysis of Tom Phillips decisions to fall apart.
There was a lot of the good info, but basic conclusion of the book is based on the timetable of what would have happened has air cover been called without delay. That timeline is 10 minutes off (wrong math), causing some of the central arguments in regard to analysis of Tom Phillips decisions to fall apart.
September 10, 2017
A good, clear and detailed summary of the sinking of Force Z, 3 days after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Middlebrook doesn't hold back on criticising Admiral Tom Phillips but is also sympathetic in recognising that he was a product of his times.
The direct quotes from those involved adds colour to what is already an engaging 'story'.
Middlebrook doesn't hold back on criticising Admiral Tom Phillips but is also sympathetic in recognising that he was a product of his times.
The direct quotes from those involved adds colour to what is already an engaging 'story'.
November 23, 2020
An interesting look at a naval battle that most Americans are unaware of, but it took place only 3 days after the Pearl Harbor attack. The author goes into detail as to how the attack unfolded, and why 2 large Royal Navy ships were unable to successfully defend themselves against an attack by Japanese planes.
March 31, 2018
Well Researched
I felt that I was actually there as I read this book. It's difficult to see any other book on the subject being any better. It also as the title says documents the end of an era. Fascinating stuff.
I felt that I was actually there as I read this book. It's difficult to see any other book on the subject being any better. It also as the title says documents the end of an era. Fascinating stuff.
September 2, 2015
See review of Richard Hough's t\'The Hunting of Force Z."
July 7, 2017
Excellent read, have read this before a few years ago.
Nicely detailed although a little out of date. Have also found other books by Martin Middle brook good
Nicely detailed although a little out of date. Have also found other books by Martin Middle brook good
November 7, 2021
decent book on the Royal navy disaster of losing two whole capital ships to just some aircrafts
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