L'institution imaginaire de la société

by Cornelius Castoriadis

Dans cet essai, qui fut son maître livre, Cornélius Castoriadis s'attache à un réexamen fondamental des bases philosophiques de la pensée révolutionnaire. Il retrouve, chez Marx notamment, les préceptes de la " pensée héritée ", cette logique identitaire qui, depuis les Grecs, inspire la philosophie classique. Et il propose une " auto-institution " de la société qui laisserait cours, enfin, à l'imaginaire radical. Fruit d'une analyse précise de l'histoire et des luttes sociales à l'heure de l'effondrement des repères traditionnels de la révolution, ce livre, devenu un classique, propose un point de départ pour penser à neuf le projet de transformation de la société.

Genres: Philosophy, Politics, Sociology, Nonfiction, History, Theory, Psychology

538 pages, Pocket Book

First published January 1, 1975

About the author

Cornelius Castoriadis (Greek: Κορνήλιος Καστοριάδης) was a Greek philosopher, social critic, economist, psychoanalyst, author of The Imaginary Institution of Society, and co-founder of the Socialisme ou Barbarie group.

Edgar Morin proposed that Castoriadis' work will be remembered for its remarkable continuity and coherence as well as for its extraordinary breadth which was "encyclopaedic" in the original Greek sense, for it offered us a "paideia," or education, that brought full circle our cycle of otherwise compartmentalized knowledge in the arts and sciences. Castoriadis wrote essays on mathematics, physics, biology, anthropology, psychoanalysis, linguistics, society, economics, politics, philosophy, and art.

One of Castoriadis' many important contributions to social theory was the idea that social change involves radical discontinuities that cannot be understood in terms of any determinate causes or presented as a sequence of events. Change emerges through the social imaginary without determinations, but in order to be socially recognized must be instituted as revolution. Any knowledge of society and social change “can exist only by referring to, or by positing, singular entities…which figure and presentify social imaginary significations.”

Castoriadis used traditional terms as much as possible, though consistently redefining them. Further, some of his terminology changed throughout the later part of his career, with the terms gaining greater consistency but breaking from their traditional meaning (neologisms). When reading Castoriadis, it is helpful to understand what he means by the terms he uses, since he does not redefine the terms in every piece where he employs them.

Castoriadis has influenced European (especially continental) thought in important ways. His interventions in sociological and political theory have resulted in some of the most well-known writing to emerge from the continent (especially in the figure of Jürgen Habermas, who often can be seen to be writing against Castoriadis). Hans Joas published a number of articles in American journals in order to highlight the importance of Castoriadis' work to a North American sociological audience, and the enduring importance of Johann P. Arnason, both for his critical engagement with Castoriadis' thought, but also for his sustained efforts to introduce Castoriadis' thought to the English speaking public (especially during his editorship of the journal Thesis Eleven) must also be noted. In the last few years, there has been growing interest in Castoriadis’s thought, including the publication of two monographs authored by Arnason's former students: Jeff Klooger's Castoriadis: Psyche, Society, Autonomy (Brill), and Suzi Adams's Castoriadis's Ontology: Being and Creation (Fordham University Press).

Reviews

[Freddie · Rating 5 out of 5]

Cornelius Castoriadis, along with Henri Lefebvre and Andre Gorz, is one of the most under appreciated/acknowledged radical thinkers of the 20th century. For me the best parts of the book were the Castoriadis' exposition of alienation as 'social heteronomy', of which his notion of autonomy constitutes a central aspect, avoiding the pitfalls of more Marxist-humanist conceptions of alienation. Also enjoyed the aspects that insisted upon the fundamentally social orientation of autonomy. Bit too reliant on Freud and Psychoanalysis for my likings (his work could certainly be enriched by a dialogue with Schizoanalysis), but the five stars is earned from the humour and honesty throughout the book. For me, the most useful aspect of his work is the notion of the 'imaginary', in which he argues that social reality is but the implementation of "imaginary significations" (I.e. representations that mobilise feelings). At present, we have an 'imaginary' thoroughly 'colonised' by the irrationality/'logic' of the economy/economic growth, as posited by Serge Latouche, that we urgently need to break from are we to avoid further breaching planetary/ecological boundaries (See Latouche, S. 'Decolonisation of the Imaginary' in Degrowth: Vocabulary for a New Era 2015, ed D'Alisa et al, pp. 117-20).

My favourite section of the book was Castoriadis randomly, but refreshingly, making the case of autogestion (self-management) and autonomy amidst complex social ontology. Reminds me of the 'early' (philosophical) Marx - it resonates the tone of the 1844 manuscripts:

"I desire and I feel the need to live in a society other than the one surrounding me. Like most people, I can live in this one and adapt to it -- at any rate, I do live in it. However critically I may try to look at myself, neither my capacity for adaptation, nor my assimilation of reality seems to me to be inferior to the sociological average. I am not asking for immortality, ubiquity or omniscience. I am not asking society to 'give me happiness'; I know that this is not a ration that can be handed out by City Hall or my neighbourhood Workers' Council and that, if this thing exists, I have to make it for myself, tailored to my own needs, as this has happened to me already and as this will probably happen to me again. In life, however, as it comes to me and to others, I run up against a lot of unacceptable things; I say that they are not inevitable and that they stem from the organization of society. I desire, and I ask, first of all that my work be meaningful, that I may approve what it is used for and the way in which it is done, that it allow me genuinely to expend myself, to make use of my faculties and at the same time to enrich and develop myself. And I say that this is possible, with a different organization of society, possible for me and for everyone. I say that it would already be a basic change in this direction if I were allowed to decide, together with everyone else, what I had to do and, with my fellow workers, how to do it.
I should like, together with everyone else, to know what is going on in society, to control the extent and the quality of the information I receive. I ask to be able to participate directly in all the social decisions that may affect my existence, or the general course of the world in which I live. I do not accept the fact that my lot is decided, day after day, by people whose projects are hostile to me or simply unknown to me, and for whom we, that is I and everyone else, are only numbers in a general plan or pawns on a chess board, and that, ultimately, my life and my death are in the hands of people whom I know to be, necessarily, blind.
I know perfectly well that realizing another social organization, and the life it would imply, would by no means be simple, that difficult problems would arise at every step. But I prefer contending with real problems rather than with the consequences of de Gaulle's delirium, Johnson's schemes or Khrushchev's intrigues. Even if I and the others should fail along this path, I prefer failure in a meaningful attempt to a state that falls short of either failure or non-failure, and which is merely ridiculous.
I wish to be able to meet the other person as a being like myself and yet absolutely different, not like a number or a frog perched on another level (higher or lower, it matters little) of the hierarchy of revenues and powers. I wish to see the other, and for the other to see me, as another human being. I want our relationships to be something other than a field for the expression of aggressivity, our competition to remain within the limits of play, our conflicts -- to the extent that they cannot be resolved or overcome -- to concern real problems and real stakes, carrying with them the least amount of unconsciousness possible, and that they be as lightly loaded as possible with the imaginary. I want the other to be free, for my freedom begins where the other's freedom begins, and, all alone, I can at best be merely 'virtuous in misfortune'. I do not count on people changing into angels, nor on their souls becoming as pure as mountain lakes -- which, moreover, I have always found deeply boring. But I know how much present culture aggravates and exasperates their difficulty to be and to be with others, and I see that it multiplies to infinity the obstacles placed in the way of their freedom.
I know, of course, that this desire cannot be realized today; nor even were the revolution to take place tomorrow, could it be fully realized in my lifetime. I know that one day people will live, for whom the problems that cause us the most anguish today will no longer even exist. This is my fate, which I have to assume and which I do assume.
But this cannot reduce me to despair or to catatonic ruminations. Possessing this desire, which indeed is mine, I can only work to realize it. And already in the choice of my main interest in life, in the work I devote to it, which for me is meaningful (even when I encounter, and accept, partial failure, delays, detours and tasks that have no sense in themselves), in the participation in a group of revolutionaries which is attempting to go beyond the reified and alienated relations of current society -- I am in a position partially to realize this desire. If I had been born in a communist society, would happiness have been easier to attain -- I really do not know, and at any rate can do nothing about it. I am not, under this pretext, going to spend my free time watching television or reading detective novels.
Does my attitude amount to denying the reality principle? But what is the content of this principle? Is it that work is necessary -- or that it is necessary that work be meaningless, exploited, that it contradict the objectives for which it is allegedly done? Is this principle valid, in this form, for someone of independent means? Is it valid, in this form, for the natives of the Trobriand islands or Samoa? Is it still valid today for fishermen in a poor Mediterranean village? Up to what point does the reality principle reveal nature, and at what point does it begin to reveal society? Why not serfdom, slave galleys, concentration camps? Where does a philosophy get the right to tell me: here, on exactly this inch of existing institutions, I am going to show you the borderline between the phenomenon and the essence, between passing historical forms and the eternal being of society? I accept the reality principle, for I accept the necessity of work (as long, in any case, as it is real, for it is becoming less obvious every day) and the necessity of a social organization of work. But I do not accept the appeal to a false psychoanalysis and to a false metaphysics, which introduces the precise discussion of historical possibilities, gratuitous assertions about alleged impossibilities, about which this philosophy knows nothing at all.
Might my desire be infantile? But the infantile situation is that life is given to you and that the Law is given to you. In the infantile situation, life is given to you for nothing; and the Law is given to you without anything else, without anything more, without any possible discussion. What I want is just the opposite: I want to make my life and to give life if possible, and in any event to give something for my life. I want the Law not to be simply given, but for me to give it to myself at the same time. The person who remains constantly in the infantile situation is the conformist and the apolitical person, for they accept the Law without any discussion and do not want to participate in shaping it. Someone who lives in society without any will concerning the Law, without any political will, has merely replaced the private father with the anonymous social father. The infantile situation is first receiving without giving, and then doing or being in order to receive. What I want is a just exchange to begin with, passing beyond exchange afterwards. The infantile situation is the relation of duality, the phantasy of fusion -- and in this sense it is the present society that constantly infantilizes everyone, by the imaginary fusion with unreal entities: leaders, nations, cosmonauts or idols. What I want is for society to cease to be a family, moreover a false one and even a grotesque one; I want it to acquire its peculiar dimension as a society, a network of relationships among autonomous adults.
Is my desire a desire for power? But what I want is the abolition of power in the current sense; I want the power of each and every one. For current power, other people are things, and all that I want goes against this. The person for whom others are things is himself a thing, and I do not want to be a thing either for myself or for others. I do not want others to be things, I would have no use for this. If I may exist for others, be recognized by them, I do not want this to be in terms of the possession of something external to me -- power; nor to exist for them only in an imaginary realm. The recognition of others has value to me only inasmuch as I recognize them as well. Am I in danger of forgetting all this if ever events were to carry me close to 'power'? This seems more than improbable to me. If this were to happen, a battle would perhaps be lost but not the war, and am I to rule my entire life on the assumption that I might one day slip back into childhood?
Should I follow this chimera of wanting to eliminate the tragic side of human existence? It seems to me that instead I want to eliminate the melodramatic aspect, the false tragedy -- the one in which catastrophe arrives without necessity, in which everything could have been otherwise if only the characters had known this or had done that. That people should die of hunger in India, while in America or in Europe governments penalize farmers who 'over'-produce -- this is a macabre farce, this is Grand Guignol in which the cadavres and the suffering are real, but this is not tragedy, there is nothing ineluctable here. And if one day humanity perishes by hydrogen bombs, I refuse to call this a tragedy. I would call it stupidity. I would like an end to Guignol and to the transformation of people into puppets by other puppets who 'govern' them. When a neurotic repeats for the 14th time the same behaviour-pattern of failure, reproducing for himself and for those nearby the same type of misfortune, helping this person get out of such a situation is to rid his or her life of grotesque farce, not tragedy; it is to allow the person finally to see the real problems of life and the tragic element they may contain -- which the neurosis served in part to express but especially to mask.
When one of Buddha's disciples came to tell him, after a long voyage in the West, that miraculous things, instruments, medications, methods of thinking and institutions had transformed people's lives since the time the Master had retreated into the mountains, Buddha stopped him after a few words. Have they wiped out sadness, sickness, old age and death? he asked. No, replied the disciple. Then, they might as well have kept still, thought the Master. And he plunged back into his contemplation, without bothering to show his disciple that he was no longer listening to him."

[stephen · Rating 5 out of 5]

to really work with this you have to work Otherwise.


a fascinating and difficult work that i have spent far too much time with (or so it seems at moments). it remains a complete mystery to me why this is not very widely read.

the implications of castoriadis' social ontology are quite radical and have yet to be really explored: most of the work out there on him turns round and round at the level of traditional academic commentary, which is as it always is--sometimes useful, occasionally inspiring, mostly blah blah blah---but almost all of it (across the useful and otherwise) operates within registers of thinking and/or representation that are subjected to systematic critique within the work itself.
so perhaps the above is no surprise.



it seems particularly stupid to assign stuff like this these little stars. yay castoriadis! i like it! yay merleau-ponty! what fun! i like husserl and harry potter the same amount and in the same way!
blech.
blech blech blech.

[Alex Lee · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is probably as close as you can get to Deleuze and Guattari (D&G)'s books Thousand Plateaus or Anti-Oedipus without really invoking the same aesthetic. Castoriadis is able to present his ideas well, although he has a tendency to ramble. He carries on with a basis in psychoanalysis in order to present the "underbelly" of social arrangements, an understanding of the shadow construction of ideology founded on only teleological impetus.

Some of his text is perhaps not needed though, as he does ramble. Different from D&G Castoriadis seeks to illuminate the nature of reason and logic within our construction for social consistency in the manner of academics... which is fine in the sense that this is where the ideas are generated but by holding onto that academic position, he doesn't present a full synthesis of his ideas. The next step would be to adopt a platform in which the ideological basis for generation does not come from this privileged position of sublimation. He would have to have an aesthetic that reflects the differentials inherent within the discourses he seeks to illuminate... this doesn't mean that he could only write as D&G did, but it would mean that he would have to be radically aware of where he speaks from and the manner by which his process of elucidation comes to refy itself as part of this imaginary institution of society.

Part of his incomplete basis lies with his psychoanalytic insistence of imaginary. Since he has written there have been alternate positions of imaginary, besides Freud/Lacan... of which Le Doeuff shows ties in with the supplementary nature of what Castoriadis calls Legein -- namely Derrida deconstruction, Baudrillard simulacra's void -- so there are other positions other than psychoanalysis. In fact, Castoriadis adopts a supervenience view on the imaginary, grounding society within the "hook" of subjectivity so that what makes our identity would also create our own sense of social institutions' stability. This view is problematic for while Castoriadis notes that this is "grounded on nothing" being only for-itself (and therefore imaginary) he provides the generative mechanicism of this cyclical return through psychoanalytic drives... in that sense while identity may be grounded on nothing, it is generative on a drive that is also incomplete and missing. He is trading one lack for another lack, forming the groundwork of the petit object a from this, falling into the same binding logic of Zizek (although Zizek goes from Lacan and Althusser into critical studies in this manner). This proves problematic because Castoriadis's real target is logical identity itself. Society as an imaginary institution is only a secondary affect of the ungrounding of identity. What Castriadis has really shown is that our sense of being is not supplemented by what we think it is supplement; rather it is formulated by the latent content that has cohered around the formulation of our innate drive states.

Despite the fact that many other philosophers have walked this trail, Castoriadis presents this view as being imaginary -- without giving us a sense of what Real is (only as the excess of the imaginary). We are left in our Kantian bubble, a teleological explanation that calibrates our own subjectivity in the manner of Descartes (although Castoriadis takes Descartes down as well, as it is not a manner of thinking but what supplements thinking)... so that Castoriadis is left with a bubble that wraps in on itself, composed of meaningless phonemes. At once, he wishes to build our view from smaller logical parts (the supervenience) all the while insisting that this emerging logic is not real because it is not found from the smaller parts. In other words, Castoriadis challenges Descartes on the content of his "I think therefore I am" but insists on utilizing Descartes method as a modality of generating truth. He settles in on the unconscious as the logical container of this excessive supervenience analytic but then insists that it is imaginary because it is not consciously determinable. This is problematic word play of the worst kind... it is the same kind of problem Lacan solved with his moebial strip analogy and Derrida with his differance -- but Castoriadis does not seem able to jump to this next step, to either adopt a supervenience view only or to examine the for-itself as its own internal contradiction.

We are instead left with a weakly flickering structure, one that wishes to expand to a maximal explanation but instead is not a revelation of any kind. Not only because others have tread this path, but because Castoriadis is unable to resolve the immanent problems with his explanation. He does provide plenty of interesting insight, but misses the mathematical fit -- the modeling Descartes provided through his analytical geometry. This methodology provided the path not just for science and math but also characterizes the modality of philosophy as well. He cites Plato's analysis of phonemes as being the root of analysis (which is close but not quite). Because of this, Castoriadis misses the middle part of his thesis, focusing on the big picture "real institutions" and the small picture "analytical supervenience" but blindly participates in the same automatic theory generation because that theorizational model is natural to him, unnamed and therefore invisible.

His mismapping of institutions, one that uses the unconscious to fill in the void he cannot see, is the problem with this book. Additionally Castoriadis could have utilized a historic political/economic examination as well, in order to demonstrate how modern institutions arose, but this is not his method. He wishes to remain only examining universals, and for that reason, while he is able to point of some key points for society and philosophy he is also unable to tell us what to do with these ideas. In this sense, his book is less revelatory than it is merely library taxonomy in trying to draw the "longest consistency" available given the field of philosophical materialism.

I like his attempt, and applaud his effort but his work is deeply flawed for the reasons cited above.

[Chelsea Szendi · Rating 3 out of 5]

My basic take-away: However disenchanted and secular we imagine our world, the rituals and rites we base our rational and secular laws and institutions upon are as magical and mythical as those that came before. The *myth* that they are more rational and secular, however, makes their origins even more mysterious than if we just acknowledged their basis in the imaginary.

I feel that this work resonates with Horkheimer and Adorno's writing on the dialectic of enlightenment.

[Βρόσγος Άντυ · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ένας ιδιοφυης άνθρωπος στην καλύτερη στιγμή του. Πολύ απαιτητικο κείμενο.
Και σήμερα βολευόμαστε με τον Ραμφο...

[Alexandros · Rating 3 out of 5]

Δυστυχώς, η Φαντασιακή Θέσμιση του Κορνήλιου Καστοριάδη, παρά τον πλούτο των εννοιών της, εν τέλει δεν μας λέει κάτι καινούργιο. Ο Καστοριάδης ακολουθεί τάσεις που είχαν γίνει ήδη της μόδας (το βιβλίο δημοσιεύτηκε το 1975 στον απόηχο της μετακονστρουκτιβιστικής έξαρσης), προσφέροντάς μας ένα έργο που μάλλον συνιστά ένα δείγμα αναμασηματικής φιλοσοφίας παρά μία πρωτότυπη σύλληψη.

Το πρώτο μέρος, το οποίο είναι κατά τη γνώμη μου το πιο αξιόλογο, συνιστά μία κριτική στον παραδοσιακό μαρξισμό, ιδιαίτερα ως προς την κατάπτωση των θέσεων του Μαρξ σε ιδεολογική ορθοδοξία, μία ορθοδοξία που για τον Καστοριάδη έρχεται σε ευθεία αντίθεση με την υλιστική φύση της διαλεκτικής. Όπως χαρακτηριστικά αναφέρει, είναι άτοπο να προσπαθούμε να διασώσουμε τις μαρξιστικές θέσεις οι οποίες δεν έχουν επιβεβαιωθεί από την ιστορική εμπειρία (λ.χ. βελτίωση των συνθηκών διαβίωσης των εργαζομένων σε αντιδιαστολή με την προφητεία της 'αυξανόμενης αθλιότητας' - μία παρατήρηση που με τρόπο ειρωνικό σχεδόν ταυτίζεται με αυτή του φιλελεύθερου Πόππερ στην Ανοιχτή Κοινωνία). Σε αντίθετη περίπτωση, θα αντικαθιστούσαμε μία - υποτυπώδη έστω - ορθολογιστική προσέγγιση με την κενότητα του ιδεολογισμού. Κατά συνέπεια, πρέπει να δεχτούμε την μετατροπή ή την ανασκευή των επαναστατικών θέσεων, ώστε να προσαρμόζονται σε σύγχρονες προβληματικές, οι οποίες δεν περιορίζονται στο στενό πλαίσιο ενός οικονομικού ντετερμινισμού αλλά γεννούν περαιτέρω προβλήματα σχετικά με τη συμβολική και κυριαρχική φύση των ιστορικοκοινωνικών θεσμών (κάτι το οποίο διαφαίνεται ακόμη και σε κείμενα του ίδιου του Μαρξ, τα οποία προφανώς δεν περιορίζονται στο Κεφάλαιο ή στο Μανιφέστο). Γενικότερα, η κριτική του Καστοριάδη εντάσσεται στο ευρύτερο πλαίσιο του μετακονστρουκτιβισμού, ο οποίος αρνείται την ύπαρξη υπεραπλουστευτικών και ιστορικά εθελότυφλων δομικών αφηγήσεων (π.χ. όλη η ιστορία είναι η ιστορία ταξικών αγώνων) και προτάσσει την αβεβαιότητα, όπως και την ερμηνευτική πολλαπλότητα, ως απελευθερωτικό μεθοδολογικό εργαλείο.

Μέχρι εδώ όλα καλά. Στη συνέχεια, όμως, ο Καστοριάδης, στην προσπάθειά του να εξηγήσει τη φύση της ιστορικοκοινωνικής θέσμισης (η οποία βασίζεται στη δυϊκότητα μεταξύ του δικού του 'λέγειν και τεύχειν'), προβαίνει σε απίστευτα βερμπαλιστικές αναλύσεις, οι οποίες εκτείνονται από τη γλωσσολογία μέχρι και την ψυχανάλυση, καταλήγοντας σε anticlimactic συμπεράσματα που εν τέλει δεν δικαιολογούν όλη αυτή τη λογοδιάρροια. Οι κοινωνικοί θεσμοί βασίζονται στην τυχαιότητα του ανθρώπινου 'πράττειν,' η συμβολική τους όμως δύναμη διαπλάθει και καθορίζει την υποκειμενική κοσμοθεωρία, υποβιβάζοντάς την σε ένα επίπεδο παθητικής πεζότητας και καθιστώντας την κομφορμιστική ή απολίτικη, υποταγμένη στις ορέξεις του 'κοινωνικού φαντασιακού.' Οι αξίες αυτής της θέσμισης μπορούν να συνολοποιηθούν υπό τη μορφή ενός 'μάγματος,' μίας αβέβαιης δομής η οποία δεν μπορεί να καθοριστεί ορθολογικά, δηλαδή δεν μπορεί να λάβει μία ολοκληρωτική-ιδεατή μορφή - σαν να προσπαθούμε να σώσουμε το φουκωικό αρχείο από τον ίδιο του τον εαυτό. Ο αβέβαιος αυτός καθορισμός της ιστορικοκοινωνικής θέσμισης είναι και το σύμπαν μέσα στο οποίο κινείται η πολιτική αυτονομία, η ικανότητα δηλαδή για συλλογική αμφισβήτηση και για επαναδημιουργία, που μαζί συγκροτούν την ιδέα της επανάστασης. Οι θεσμιζόμενοι γίνονται θεσμίζοντες.

Όπως τόνισα στην αρχή, το πρόβλημά μου δεν έγκειται στη συμφωνία ή μη με τις θέσεις του συγγραφέα. Έγκειται στο ότι, στην προσπάθειά του να κρύψει την έλλειψη πρωτοτυπίας του, ο Καστοριάδης κατασκευάζει έναν ολόκληρο μακρόκοσμο λέξεων και εννοιών που θολώνουν τα νερά με στόχο να εντυπωσιάσουν τον αναγνώστη. Ο Καστοριάδης δεν είναι Χάιντεγκερ. Περισσότερο θεσμίζεται παρά θεσμίζει.

[Thai Divone · Rating 3 out of 5]

Some interesting insights, but I couldn't get along with the writing style.

[Healz · Rating 5 out of 5]

Un philosophe avec une pensée vraiment vertigineuse. L'analyse et la critique du rationalisme de notre pensée héritée est vraiment vertigineuse ! Je n'arrive pas à trouver d'autre adjectif pour décrire ce que la lecture de ce penseur m'a fait !

[Pierre-Olivier · Rating 3 out of 5]

Bonne critique du déterminisme, de l’évolutionnisme eurocentré , de la modernité et du matérialisme historique. Arrêté au début de la deuxième partie , trop d’emphase sur la psychologie freudienne. Lecture hardis.

[Dejan Basic · Rating 4 out of 5]

A Herculean meditation on the processes of interpretation, understanding, formation, definition, ascription and integration of the multitude of experiences we confront in the world, as individuals and as societies. Aside from the occasional diatribes against some vague marxist figures, it contains many points regarding materialism which are worthy of further thought.

A ponderous, winding and difficult work which ranges over many many topics... logic, set theory, ontology, psychoanalysis, anthropology, political philosophy

[Aliki Aggelou · Rating 5 out of 5]

πολύ εξειδικευμένη γραφή με πάρα πολλές επιστημονικές αναφορές, κάθε σελίδα μπορεί να πάρει και ολόκληρη μέρα μέχρι να την αποκωδικοποιήσεις πλήρως και να την συνδέσεις με τα προηγούμενα, σε τέτοιο βαθμό, που μπορεί να έχεις ξεχάσει τι κατάλαβες πριν και να πρέπει να τα ξαναπεράσεις. Απαιτείται σοβαρό υπόβαθρο στην Φιλοσοφία.

[Ummdt · Rating 4 out of 5]

Alors la lecture de ce livre a transformé ma perception des choses mais quel calvaire à lire, hyper compliqué, j’ai mis des mois pour avancer et j’avoue j’ai pas lu toutes les pages de ce livre mais j’ai compris le message

[Jean · Rating 3 out of 5]

got to read this for litrev and found this really hard to digest. Nevertheless, the concepts are profound and might be useful for readers who are interested in Marxism theory

[Jdamaskinos · Rating 2 out of 5]

Δυστυχώς δεν κατάλαβα τίποτε και το εγκατέλειψα. Ίσως, εάν ο εγκέφαλος μου εξελιχθεί στο μέλλον, να το ξαναπιάσω...

[David · Rating 2 out of 5]

?

[Alexander Theofanidis · Rating 5 out of 5]

Δεν ξέρω αν θα καταφέρω να γράψω μια αξιοπρεπή (πόσω μάλλον αξιόλογη) κριτική για τη Φαντασιακή θέσμιση της κοινωνίας, ακόμη χωνεύω... τον πονοκέφαλο που μου προκάλεσε και επιδιορθώνω τις καμμένες συνάψεις, αλλά θα κάνω μια συντηρητική απόπειρα:

Πενήντα ετών φέτος η "Φαντασιακή Θέσμιση της Κοινωνίας", συνδυάζει φιλοσοφία, ψυχανάλυση (αν και η σύνδεση ασυνειδήτου και συλλογικής φαντασίας είναι εύλογα από τις λιγότερο -εμπειρικά τουλάχιστον- τεκμηριωμένες θέσεις του), πολιτική θεωρία και κοινωνιολογία.

Η θέαση της κοινωνίας του Καστοριάδη βασίζεται στην έννοια του φαντασιακού μέσω του οποίου κατανοείται η κοινωνία, η ιστορία και η πολιτική. Το φαντασιακό είναι το θεμελιώδες κατά Κορνήλιο στοιχείο της ανθρώπινης δημιουργικότητας. Πολύ «μπακάλικα», πρώτα το φανταζόμαστε και μετά το βάζουμε σε εφαρμογή (κάτι που περιέργως, συνδέει τη θεωρία του με την εξελικτική βιολογία και το λόγο για τον οποίο εξαλείψαμε τους Νεάντερταλ, παρ’ ό,τι και μεγαλύτερο εγκέφαλο είχαν και πιο σωματώδεις ήταν, αλλά αυτό είναι «ετέρου ιερέως ευαγγέλιον» και δεν έχει θέση εδώ).

Με ένα όχι ιδιαίτερα τρυφερό κροσέ στον Μαρξ, ο Καστοριάδης απορρίπτει όχι μόνο την οικονομία ως καθοριστικό παράγοντα για τη δημιουργία κοινωνικών δομών, αλλά και τον ιστορικό ντετερμινισμό και επειδή όταν βγάζεις πριόνι δεν το βγάζεις για ψιλοδουλειές, μαζί του καίγονται και ο κοινωνικός, οικονομικός, βιολογικός και κάθε φύσεως ντετερμινισμός, καθώς σύμφωνα με τη θεώρησή του η κοινωνία έλκει τα σημαινόμενα και τους θεσμούς της μέσα από μια μη α πριόρι «αιτιασμένη» (sic) δημιουργική διαδικασία, ένα ριζικό φαντασιακό, χάρη (ή… εξ αιτίας) του οποίου η κοινωνία επινοεί νέες μορφές (οργάνωσης, σημασιών, αξιών, δομών). Οι άνθρωποι, λοιπόν και οι κοινωνίες, θεσμίζονται (οργανώνονται μέσω των θεσμών που παράγουν) με τις δεύτερες να διακρίνονται σε αυτόνομες (συνείδηση του ότι οι ίδιοι δημιουργούν τους θεσμούς και της δυνατότητας οι θεσμοί να αλλάξουν εξυπηρετώντας την κοινωνία) και ετερόνομες (όπου οι θεσμοί θεωρούνται δεδομένοι, ου μην πάγιοι και αναπόφευκτοι).

Οι αυτόνομες κοινωνίες, φέρνουν αμέσως στο νου τη Δημοκρατία, τουλάχιστον τον συμμετοχικό «δημοκρατικό ιδεότυπο» (αν έχει παρακμάσει η δημοκρατία σας φταίτε κι εσείς που γράψατε στα παπάρια σας τις όποιες διαδικασίες και τη συμμετοχή στα κοινά και αρκείστε να ρίπτετε ένα κουκί κάθε 4 χρόνια), όπου η αυτοθέσμιση είναι διαρκής χάρη στην ενεργό, εναργή και διαρκή συμμετοχή των πολιτών (βλ. κλασική Αθήνα, ακόμα και με τον Κλέωνα). Μπορούμε με ησυχία να ρίξουμε λίγο στάχτη πάνω σε μερικά σημεία του Λεβιάθαν του Χομπς εδώ, χωρίς τύψεις.

Ναι, ακούω ουρλιαχτά από το βάθος της αίθουσας ότι όλα αυτά καλά είναι αλλά μη εφαρμοστέα στην πράξη. Βέβαια, η φιλοσοφία, δεν υπάρχει για να βρίσκει άμεσες λύσεις και να κατασκευάζει τιρμπουσόν και ελβετικά σουγιαδάκια, αλλά για να ανοίγει δρόμους εκεί που οι άλλοι βλέπουν απροσπέλαστο δάσος (όποιος σχολιάσει ότι έτσι καταστρέφουμε τα δάση, να πάει να θεσμιστεί αυτός και όλο του το σόι).

Η αξία της φαντασιακής θέσμισης έγκειται στην ανατροπή των παραδοσιακών θεωριών με την τοποθέτηση της ανθρώπινης δημιουργικότητας και φαντασίας στη θέση του άξονα ή κινητήριου μοχλού της ιστορικής εξέλιξης, ακόμη κι αν η προτεινόμενη αυτονομία (όπως την εξηγήσαμε πιο πάνω) φαίνεται δύσκολο να υλοποιηθεί σε πολυπληθείς κοινωνίες (άλλωστε οι ουτοπίες ανέκαθεν είχαν ως πρότυπο ολιγομελή ρουσεϊκά σχήματα, μπορεί να υποστηρίξει κανείς), κάτι λογικό να το ασπάζεται κανείς ανάμεσα σε ανεγκέφαλους που ανεμίζουν πολιτικών σημαιάκια κομμάτων μπροστά στις κάλπες ή ωρύονται «και α και ου και ΔΑΠ νουδουφακγιού» σε φοιτικές εκλογές. Είπαμε: η ουτοπία δείχνει το δρόμο, είναι το ουράνιο τόξο που δε θα φτάσεις ποτέ, είναι το σημείο του ορίζοντα. Η δε διαρκής αυτοθέσμιση έχει ομολογουμένως κι αυτή τις δυσκολίες της, ιδίως σε μια κοινωνία που η ενασχόληση με τα κοινά και η ενημέρωση λαμβάνει χώρα σε περιορισμένα echo chambers ανθρώπων εθισμένων να αφήνουν την δημιουργία των θεσμών σε «ειδικούς» (το ότι συχνά οι ειδικοί είναι ποδοσφαιριστές, ηθοποιοί του πάλκου και θλιβερές περσόνες των σόσιαλ, πλέον καταδεικνύει περισσότερο την ανάγκη της αυτοθέσμισης, γνώμη μου).

Ουφ. Πάω να κάνω μασάζ σε υποθάλαμο, αμυγδαλή και μετωπικό φλοιό.

[Pietro · Rating 5 out of 5]

Normalmente non scrivo commenti sui libri:sia perché non possiedo armi di critica se non in maniera superficiale, sia perché ogni libro acquista una vita diversa a seconda del lettore che lo legge ( un libro morto è un libro che non viene più letto). Castoriadis è di sicuro un pensatore originale, perciò ricco di stimoli per il lettore,in un epoca dove si pensa sempre meno: abbiamo se-dicenti filosofi che dopo aver scoperto un concetto diventano psicologi o consulenti; oppure sociologi, antropologi, politici ed, infimamente, giornalisti, che diventano filosofi. Spesso e volentieri si dicono cose diverse per essere banalmente uguali. Questo signore, che non ha scordato la fatica del pensiero, sembra invece condannato alla "damnatio memoriae". E' il caso di questo libro, che pubblicato a metà (dovrò decidermi leggere la prima parte in lingua straniera), non viene ristampato dalla Bollati Boringhieri(anche in versione ridotta. La richiesta non manca, è stato in cima alle richieste della trasmissione radiofonica Farenheit qualche anno fa, soprattutto in campo accademico. Perciò non si capisce l'atteggiamento delle case editrici visto che pubblicano spesso e volentieri della vera e propria immondizia pompata dalla pubblicità. Il libro è pressoché introvabile: io l'ho preso in prestito da una biblioteca pubblica di Bologna. Non credo che molti abbiano la mia fortuna.

[Ma Maria · Rating 4 out of 5]

Η αμφισβήτηση αλλά και η άρνηση της ιστορικο-κοινωνικής συνέχειας διατυπώθηκε από πολλούς πριν και μετά τον Καστοριάδη.
Η παρον-ντοποίηση, η κοινωνική αλλοίωση των εννοιών, και η άμεση συσχέτιση σημασίας-θεσμού, ακυρώνουν το συνεχές κοινωνικο-ιστορικό. Με βάση τις τρέχουσες ερμηνείες της νευροεπιστήμης για το σημαίνον και το σημαινόμενο, αυτό πλέον δεν ισχύει.
Επιπλέον, ο Καστοριάδης αμφισβητεί και το φαινόμενο, την αρχική εμπειρία και το βίωμα και αποφεύγει να τη συνδέσει με την ιστορικότητα. Η σύγχρονη νευροεπιστήμη όχι.
Και προσεγγίζει ελάχιστα τη σχέση της φύσης (δηλ. το φυσικό περιβάλλον) με το κοινωνικό φαντασιακό. Ίσως τη θεωρεί μη αναγκαία. Είναι όμως έτσι;
Δίνοντας και ορισμούς σε αρκετές έννοιες (μάγμα, σημασία, παράσταση, αυτονομία, λιβιδώ κλπ) οι οποίοι ορισμοί λειτουργούν ως αξίωμα (με την μαθηματική έννοια του όρου) στο βιβλίο, ακυρώνει την έννοια του φαντασιακού διότι επιχειρηματολογεί με ορθολογική προσέγγιση ενώ δεν αποδέχεται την ορθολογικότητα.
Δυνατό περιεχόμενο, πάρα πολλά επίπεδα μελέτης, αλλά η αποδοχή των ισχυρισμών του συγγραφέα δεν είναι εύκολη διότι αμφισβητεί τα πάντα και αντιπροτείνει τη δική του (αναμφισβήτητη;) τεκμηρίωση.

[Nikos Pappas · Rating 5 out of 5]

το σωτήριο έτος 2025 θα κλείσουμε αμφότεροι, παρέα με τη "φαντασιακή θέσμιση" τα 50 μας χρόνια. επιστήμων, καλλιτέχνης, φιλόσοφος. ήταν ένα παλιά. ρωτήστε τον Leonardo. ο Κορνήλιος μιλά για την οικοδόμηση μιας κοινότητας, χωρίς απευθείας ανάθεση σε επαγγελματίες πολιτικούς. γλυκός, άμεσος, ήπιος, νοήμων, ανθρώπινος. διαβάστε τον και ακούστε τον, παρακαλώ. κατανοητός. το κατά δύναμιν, δηλαδή, και σε σχέση με τον Russell, για παράδειγμα. πρόκειται για μετριόφρον υψιπετές μυαλό. μια εξαίρεση στην αναγνωστική συνήθεια της μυθοπλασίας. σοσιαλισμός ή βαρβαρότητα. και αν το πρώτο είναι πολιτικά αρνητικά φορ��ισμένο, αντικαταστήστε το. ομορφιά, μόρφωση, τέχνη, φύση, νους.
τον αγαπώ. γιατί με βοηθά να χαθώ στη σκέψη.

[Gabriel Landi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Uma ótima crítica ao materialismo histórico e ao marxismo, vinda da boca de um socialista, o que por si só tornaria o livro peculiar, não fosse ainda a proposta da tricotomia Funcional/Simbólico/Imaginário, pela qual Castoriadis propões a visão da realidade institucional das sociedades humanas.