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An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense: A Critical Edition
Thomas Reid's Inquiry has long been recognized as a classic philosophical text. Since its first publication in 1764, there have followed no less than forty editions. The proliferation of secondary literature further indicates that Reid's work is flourishing as never before. Yet Reid scholars have been acutely aware of proceeding without the full textual evidence. There exist thousands of unpublished manuscript pages in Reid's hand, many of which relate directly to the composition of Inquiry. Furthermore, no account has been taken of the successive alterations made to the four editions published in Reid's lifetime. The present edition, therefore, aims to present a complete, critically edited text of the Inquiry, accompanied by a judicious selection of manuscript evidence relating to its composition.
The volume contains an editor preface presenting the raison d'�tre for the edition followed by an introduction giving the central argument of the Inquiry by means of an historical and philosophical account of its formation; an account which also indicates the significance of the MSS contained in the section containing related documents. The critical text is based on the fourth life-time edition (1785), while the textual notes include bibliographical details and allusions, translations, references to secondary literature, and selected passages from Reid's MSS.
The volume contains an editor preface presenting the raison d'�tre for the edition followed by an introduction giving the central argument of the Inquiry by means of an historical and philosophical account of its formation; an account which also indicates the significance of the MSS contained in the section containing related documents. The critical text is based on the fourth life-time edition (1785), while the textual notes include bibliographical details and allusions, translations, references to secondary literature, and selected passages from Reid's MSS.
372 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1764
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543 people want to read
About the author
Thomas Reid
325 books35 followersThe Reverend Thomas Reid FRSE, a religiously trained Scottish philosopher and a contemporary of David Hume, was the founder of the Scottish School of Common Sense and played an integral role in the Scottish Enlightenment. The early part of his life was spent in Aberdeen, Scotland, where he created the 'Wise Club' (a literary-philosophical association) and graduated from the University of Aberdeen. He was given a professorship at King's College, Aberdeen in 1752, where he wrote An Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (published in 1764). Shortly afterwards he was given the prestigious Professorship of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow when he was called to replace Adam Smith. He resigned from this position in 1781.
Reid believed that common sense (in a special philosophical sense of sensus communis) is, or at least should be, at the foundation of all philosophical inquiry. He disagreed with Hume, who asserted that we can never know what an external world consists of as our knowledge is limited to the ideas in the mind, and George Berkeley, who asserted that the external world is merely ideas in the mind. By contrast, Reid claimed that the foundations upon which our sensus communis are built justify our belief that there is an external world.
Reid believed that common sense (in a special philosophical sense of sensus communis) is, or at least should be, at the foundation of all philosophical inquiry. He disagreed with Hume, who asserted that we can never know what an external world consists of as our knowledge is limited to the ideas in the mind, and George Berkeley, who asserted that the external world is merely ideas in the mind. By contrast, Reid claimed that the foundations upon which our sensus communis are built justify our belief that there is an external world.
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
February 4, 2016
Read this! This work, by Thomas Reid, is perspicuous and a refulgent example to the best of human intelligence and insight. How did Locke and Hume end up being read more than Reid? His "Geometry of Visibles" is a devastating critique of Hume's theory of mediated knowledge: Hume's best response apparently was to find it "obscure." Reid was known at the time to be, and is, very good on optics. Without some knowledge of optics, you also may find him "obscure." Some of his work is based on, and confirmed by, his own experiments with optics.
The seventh book I have finished this year.
This article (below) is very good on why should all be reading philosophy to guide our lives.
When Philosophy Lost Its Way
By ROBERT FRODEMAN and ADAM BRIGGLE JANUARY 11, 2016 3:21 AM
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/...
p. xii. According to Thomas Reid, many of the perplexing philosophical problems which surround the concept of empirical knowledge have arisen because of the failure of philosophers to distinguish adequately between sensing and perceiving.
Mr. Duggan's suggestion that Reid's characteristics of sensation are "inconsistent" is a confusion that results from his own (Mr. Duggan's) failure to distinguish between "belief" and "notice." Reid does not suggest that I have sensations that I do not believe, but rather that I have (similar to William James' principal of "selection") sensations that I do not "notice." See p. 163.
p. xxii. That is, Reid might have denied that not noticing a sensation is a sufficient condition for not believing that one has that sensation.
Might have? I would think so. Mr. Duggan seems to be working to hard to find something to comment on.
p. xxxiii. In the objective sense of "see," in Ayer's words, "from the fact that something is seen it follows that it exists."
p. 4. A just interpretation of nature is the only sound and orthodox philosophy: whatever we add of our own, is apocryphal, and of no authority.
p. 10. A man that disbelieves his own existence, is surely as unfit to be reasoned with, as a man hat believes he is made of glass.
Reid seems to be taking Descartes' epistemological statement as an ontological statement.
p. 18. I blush inwardly to think how I have been deluded.
p. 25. This is the doctrine of the ideal philosophy;
p. 35. for this philosophy is like a hobby -horse, which a man in bad health may ride in his closet, without hurting his reputation; but if he should take him abroad with him to church, or to the exchange, or to the play house, his heir would immediately call jury, and seize his estate.
p. 38. I beg leave to make use of the word suggestion, . . . .
p. 42. So ardently do we desire to find every thing the happens within our observation, thus connected with something else, as it cause or occasion, that we are apt to fancy connections upon the slightest grounds; and this weakness is most remarkable in the ignorant, who know least of the real connections established in nature.
p. 54. Section II - Of Natural Language
p. 55 - 56 reflects the Stoic argument that it is the acquisition of language that gives us rights.
p. 65. Section III - Of Natural Signs is very good on the universality of the intonation and body language that are ninety-five percent of communication.
p. 80. If any one of them can be shown to be an idea of sensation, or to have the least resemblance to any sensation, I lay my hand upon my mouth, and give up all presence to reconcile reason to common sense in the matter, and must suffer the ideal skepticism to triumph.
To me this is very much with Kant's "pure intuitions of space and time." Some things are outside of what we can acquire through experience or develop through reason.
p. 94. . . . and, overlooking the appearance, we immediately conceive the real figure, distance, and position of the body, of which its visible or perspective appearance is a sign and indication.
p. 122. Nor is the demonstration at all difficult, if the reader will have the patience to enter but a little into the mathematical consideration of visible figure, which we shall call the geometry of visibles.
Section IX
Of the Geometry of Visibles
p. 137. Another phenomenon which hath perplexed philosophers, is, your seeing object erect, when it is well known that their images or pictures upon the tunica retina of the eye are inverted.
p. 146. In a word, the manner and mechanism of the mind's perception is quite beyond our comprehension:
p. 157. I am therefore apt to look upon this law as a primary law of our constitution.
p. 168. Thus it appears, that the laws of vision in the human constitution are wisely adapted to the natural use of human eyes, but not to that use of them which is unnatural.
p. 173. So prone are men to invent hypotheses, and so backward to examine them by facts.
p. 198. It is enough to observe that it is a system of conjectures concerning things of which we are entirely ignorant; and that all such theories in philosophy deserves rather to be laughed at, than to be seriously refuted.
p. 198. Since therefore, a blind man may guess as well in the dark as one that sees, . . . .
p. 203 - 204. The conclusion from all that hath been said, in no less than seven sections, upon our seeing objects single with two eyes, is that, by an original property of human eyes, objects painted upon the centers of the two retinae, or upon points similarly situate with regard to the centers, appears in the same visible place; that the most plausible attempt to account of this property of the eyes, have been unsuccessful' and therefore, the it must be either a primary law of our constitution, or the consequence of some more general law which is not yet discovered.
p. 208. . . . and after twenty such wise and rational actions, I am taken up and clapped into a mad-house.
p. 231. These appearances had been long observed by the writers on optics; they tortured their invention to find the cause of them from optical principles; but in vain; they must be resolved into habits of perception, which are acquired by custom, but are part to be mistaken for original perceptions.
p. 234. We have distinguished our perceptions into original and acquired; and language, into natural and artificial.
p. 238. I might add, that this reliance upon the declaration and testimony of men, is found in children long before they know what a promise is. . . .
. . . .
The first of these principles is , a propensity to speak truth, and to use the signs of language, so as to convey our real sentiments.
p. 240. Another original principle implanted in us by the Supreme Being, is a disposition to confide in the veracity of others, and believe what they tell us.
p. 247. But nature never misleads us in this way; her language is always true; and it is only by misinterpreting it that we fall into error.
p. 251. Most men continue all their days to be just what nature and human education made them. Their manners, their opinions, their virtues, and their vices, are all got by habit, imitation, and instruction; and reason has little or no she in forming them.
p. 258. The Epicurean doctrine, as explained by Lucretius, thought widely different from the Peripatetic in many things, is almost the same in this.
Descartes on p. 259 - 263.
p. 268. Such original and natural judgments are therefore a part of that furniture which nature hath given to the human understanding.
The seventh book I have finished this year.
This article (below) is very good on why should all be reading philosophy to guide our lives.
When Philosophy Lost Its Way
By ROBERT FRODEMAN and ADAM BRIGGLE JANUARY 11, 2016 3:21 AM
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/...
p. xii. According to Thomas Reid, many of the perplexing philosophical problems which surround the concept of empirical knowledge have arisen because of the failure of philosophers to distinguish adequately between sensing and perceiving.
Mr. Duggan's suggestion that Reid's characteristics of sensation are "inconsistent" is a confusion that results from his own (Mr. Duggan's) failure to distinguish between "belief" and "notice." Reid does not suggest that I have sensations that I do not believe, but rather that I have (similar to William James' principal of "selection") sensations that I do not "notice." See p. 163.
p. xxii. That is, Reid might have denied that not noticing a sensation is a sufficient condition for not believing that one has that sensation.
Might have? I would think so. Mr. Duggan seems to be working to hard to find something to comment on.
p. xxxiii. In the objective sense of "see," in Ayer's words, "from the fact that something is seen it follows that it exists."
p. 4. A just interpretation of nature is the only sound and orthodox philosophy: whatever we add of our own, is apocryphal, and of no authority.
p. 10. A man that disbelieves his own existence, is surely as unfit to be reasoned with, as a man hat believes he is made of glass.
Reid seems to be taking Descartes' epistemological statement as an ontological statement.
p. 18. I blush inwardly to think how I have been deluded.
p. 25. This is the doctrine of the ideal philosophy;
p. 35. for this philosophy is like a hobby -horse, which a man in bad health may ride in his closet, without hurting his reputation; but if he should take him abroad with him to church, or to the exchange, or to the play house, his heir would immediately call jury, and seize his estate.
p. 38. I beg leave to make use of the word suggestion, . . . .
p. 42. So ardently do we desire to find every thing the happens within our observation, thus connected with something else, as it cause or occasion, that we are apt to fancy connections upon the slightest grounds; and this weakness is most remarkable in the ignorant, who know least of the real connections established in nature.
p. 54. Section II - Of Natural Language
p. 55 - 56 reflects the Stoic argument that it is the acquisition of language that gives us rights.
p. 65. Section III - Of Natural Signs is very good on the universality of the intonation and body language that are ninety-five percent of communication.
p. 80. If any one of them can be shown to be an idea of sensation, or to have the least resemblance to any sensation, I lay my hand upon my mouth, and give up all presence to reconcile reason to common sense in the matter, and must suffer the ideal skepticism to triumph.
To me this is very much with Kant's "pure intuitions of space and time." Some things are outside of what we can acquire through experience or develop through reason.
p. 94. . . . and, overlooking the appearance, we immediately conceive the real figure, distance, and position of the body, of which its visible or perspective appearance is a sign and indication.
p. 122. Nor is the demonstration at all difficult, if the reader will have the patience to enter but a little into the mathematical consideration of visible figure, which we shall call the geometry of visibles.
Section IX
Of the Geometry of Visibles
p. 137. Another phenomenon which hath perplexed philosophers, is, your seeing object erect, when it is well known that their images or pictures upon the tunica retina of the eye are inverted.
p. 146. In a word, the manner and mechanism of the mind's perception is quite beyond our comprehension:
p. 157. I am therefore apt to look upon this law as a primary law of our constitution.
p. 168. Thus it appears, that the laws of vision in the human constitution are wisely adapted to the natural use of human eyes, but not to that use of them which is unnatural.
p. 173. So prone are men to invent hypotheses, and so backward to examine them by facts.
p. 198. It is enough to observe that it is a system of conjectures concerning things of which we are entirely ignorant; and that all such theories in philosophy deserves rather to be laughed at, than to be seriously refuted.
p. 198. Since therefore, a blind man may guess as well in the dark as one that sees, . . . .
p. 203 - 204. The conclusion from all that hath been said, in no less than seven sections, upon our seeing objects single with two eyes, is that, by an original property of human eyes, objects painted upon the centers of the two retinae, or upon points similarly situate with regard to the centers, appears in the same visible place; that the most plausible attempt to account of this property of the eyes, have been unsuccessful' and therefore, the it must be either a primary law of our constitution, or the consequence of some more general law which is not yet discovered.
p. 208. . . . and after twenty such wise and rational actions, I am taken up and clapped into a mad-house.
p. 231. These appearances had been long observed by the writers on optics; they tortured their invention to find the cause of them from optical principles; but in vain; they must be resolved into habits of perception, which are acquired by custom, but are part to be mistaken for original perceptions.
p. 234. We have distinguished our perceptions into original and acquired; and language, into natural and artificial.
p. 238. I might add, that this reliance upon the declaration and testimony of men, is found in children long before they know what a promise is. . . .
. . . .
The first of these principles is , a propensity to speak truth, and to use the signs of language, so as to convey our real sentiments.
p. 240. Another original principle implanted in us by the Supreme Being, is a disposition to confide in the veracity of others, and believe what they tell us.
p. 247. But nature never misleads us in this way; her language is always true; and it is only by misinterpreting it that we fall into error.
p. 251. Most men continue all their days to be just what nature and human education made them. Their manners, their opinions, their virtues, and their vices, are all got by habit, imitation, and instruction; and reason has little or no she in forming them.
p. 258. The Epicurean doctrine, as explained by Lucretius, thought widely different from the Peripatetic in many things, is almost the same in this.
Descartes on p. 259 - 263.
p. 268. Such original and natural judgments are therefore a part of that furniture which nature hath given to the human understanding.
October 20, 2010
I don't know why Thomas Reid is not routinely read as a follow-up to Hume. His style is very entertaining (for an enlightenment philosopher), and his ideas are helpful.
December 29, 2020
If you've been enamored by the allure of skepticism or found Descartes or Locke's epistemology problematic, you will find immense solace in Reid. His "common sense" epistemology exposes the smoke and mirrors of skepticism by appealing to what you instinctively know to be true. Reid's epistemology is based on the human constitution. When you see a tree, you don't reason your way to the belief that it is there by means of rational arguments (Descartes). Nor do you compare the agreements and disagreements of the belief that the tree is there with other beliefs derived from experience (Locke). You simply find that you believe it exists and is in front of you--your constitution forces the belief on you. Reid points out that a skeptic who doubts that the tree is there is being dishonest. If he were to walk to it, he would stop before hitting it because he actually believes it's there. Reid points out that Descartes had the right idea by rooting epistemology in basic beliefs--beliefs that require no "reasons"--but Descartes limited himself to only one or two such beliefs and required reasons for all the rest. Reid thinks this is inconsistent with what Descartes's own constitution is telling him. Why do both Descartes and Hume believe that their ideas actually exist? They can only reply: "We can't help it." So Reid asks, "If that is your principle, why stop there? There are many other beliefs you can't help but believing, even though you have no arguments for them (like that there is a tree in front of you or that you ate toast for breakfast yesterday)." Reid is not entirely critical of these men, though. He points out some good things about them. For example, they raised really good questions and dismantled the excesses of Roman Catholic scholastics before them. But Reid successfully exposes the inconsistencies of their epistemological systems and provides a much more reasonable account of how we know what we know. So much of what he says just "clicks."
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April 17, 2018Though not as radical,
Thomas Reid was the higher (deeper) philosopher than David Hume..
In philosophy,
a Scottish Enlightenment exemplifies proto neurophilosophers.
For both Reid and Hume accords a dissection of cognitions, empowering our ratiocinations - thought more profound than what philosophy per se can philosophize.
In cognitive neuroscience,
current neuroscientists may aptly be defined as x-phi(s) experimental philosophers
(see experimental philosophy),
with extreme emphases on empiricism, experimentation and verification to the rigor of a science.
What a neuroscientist lack in keen ratiocinations,
a neurophilosopher can compensate for,
and vice versa,
a neuroscientist can compensate for to rigor a philosopher.
Neurophilosophers nowadays mostly used tools as data to observe what energizes as we philosophizes..
tools and data that are designed and discovered by neuroscientists respectively.
Thomas Reid was the higher (deeper) philosopher than David Hume..
In philosophy,
a Scottish Enlightenment exemplifies proto neurophilosophers.
For both Reid and Hume accords a dissection of cognitions, empowering our ratiocinations - thought more profound than what philosophy per se can philosophize.
In cognitive neuroscience,
current neuroscientists may aptly be defined as x-phi(s) experimental philosophers
(see experimental philosophy),
with extreme emphases on empiricism, experimentation and verification to the rigor of a science.
What a neuroscientist lack in keen ratiocinations,
a neurophilosopher can compensate for,
and vice versa,
a neuroscientist can compensate for to rigor a philosopher.
Neurophilosophers nowadays mostly used tools as data to observe what energizes as we philosophizes..
tools and data that are designed and discovered by neuroscientists respectively.
October 14, 2019
I discovered the work of Reid after he was mentioned in an online philosophy course I am enrolled on, offered by the University of Edinburgh, entitled "Introduction to Philosophy". Reid challenged Thomas Hume's argument in this book in a section entitled "Of the analogy between perception, and the credit we give human testimony".
March 1, 2020
Reid had a brilliant mind and gives Hume a run for his money.
November 6, 2021
Essa obra foi publicada em 1764, pelo filósofo e pastor cristão escocês Thomas Reid. O autor sucedeu, em dezembro de 1763, Adam Smith na cadeira de filosofia moral da Universidade de Glasgow.
Nessa obra, Reid rejeita a teoria das ideias que deriva de Descartes e influenciou filósofos modernos, como também rejeita o ceticismo de Hume. A teoria das ideias dizia que as ideias são os únicos objetos do pensamento e não têm existência, salvo quando estamos conscientes delas. Não há objeto contínuo e permanente no pensamento e as coisas não são coisas concretas em si.
Reid postula que Deus deu à natureza e à mente do homem um senso comum que lhe dá subsídio para dispor de um bom senso na compreensão da realidade. A premissa de Reid é que: há princípios primeiros que nos levam e dão base a crer na consciência de dor e prazer, crer no senso de certo e errado e crer na realidade do mundo exterior. Os primeiros princípios dados por Deus nos fazem conhecer a realidade.
Reid é um empirista à medida que entende que deve-se buscar as leis da natureza através de indução, a partir dos fenômenos naturais, a fim de alcançar os fatos gerais. Contudo, não é um cético. Por isso, ele investiga a experiência comum ou concreta humana com base no pressuposto do senso comum. A filosofia deve se apoiar no senso comum. A partir disso, nessa obra, Reid investiga os cinco sentidos humanos, olfato, paladar, audição, tato e visão, para identificar como o homem apreende e processa o conhecimento.
Alguns autores criticam a abordagem de Reid por ser um "realismo ingênuo", alegando-se que a mente não é tão objetiva em apreender a realidade concreta em si mesma, como Reid sugerira.
Ainda assim, essa é uma obra clássica da filosofia e indispensável para as discussões epistemológicas.
Nessa obra, Reid rejeita a teoria das ideias que deriva de Descartes e influenciou filósofos modernos, como também rejeita o ceticismo de Hume. A teoria das ideias dizia que as ideias são os únicos objetos do pensamento e não têm existência, salvo quando estamos conscientes delas. Não há objeto contínuo e permanente no pensamento e as coisas não são coisas concretas em si.
Reid postula que Deus deu à natureza e à mente do homem um senso comum que lhe dá subsídio para dispor de um bom senso na compreensão da realidade. A premissa de Reid é que: há princípios primeiros que nos levam e dão base a crer na consciência de dor e prazer, crer no senso de certo e errado e crer na realidade do mundo exterior. Os primeiros princípios dados por Deus nos fazem conhecer a realidade.
Reid é um empirista à medida que entende que deve-se buscar as leis da natureza através de indução, a partir dos fenômenos naturais, a fim de alcançar os fatos gerais. Contudo, não é um cético. Por isso, ele investiga a experiência comum ou concreta humana com base no pressuposto do senso comum. A filosofia deve se apoiar no senso comum. A partir disso, nessa obra, Reid investiga os cinco sentidos humanos, olfato, paladar, audição, tato e visão, para identificar como o homem apreende e processa o conhecimento.
Alguns autores criticam a abordagem de Reid por ser um "realismo ingênuo", alegando-se que a mente não é tão objetiva em apreender a realidade concreta em si mesma, como Reid sugerira.
Ainda assim, essa é uma obra clássica da filosofia e indispensável para as discussões epistemológicas.
December 19, 2021
Highly recommend to anyone interested in the Enlightenment. Read it after at least Berkeley and Hume, if not more, because he has a lot of interesting insight about their works. I think Reid’s commitment to common sense is a serious weakness - at times he asserts ideas while admitting to have no good reason in favor of, and many great arguments against, his ideas - but somehow he pairs it with great clarity, reasoning, and breadth of knowledge and understanding.
Oh, and he may have given the first ever example of non-Euclidean geometry. It’s pretty cool!
Oh, and he may have given the first ever example of non-Euclidean geometry. It’s pretty cool!
March 20, 2021
A Globe believing Christian became the founding father of common sense school of thought!
March 3, 2022
elegantly argued and witty, if unambitious. the 50-60 pages devoted to optics i found rather opaque.
February 6, 2024
Reid’s common sense or direct realism is basically Locke’s empiricism minus the theory of ideas, that in addition to the object we experience there is an idea we perceive which is what is primarily known and infer everything else. Locke divided properties into primary and secondary qualities, those which belonged to the actual object like shape and those which belong only to perception like color. This division led to Berkeley’s idealism and Hume’s skepticism, for they argued how could an idea or sense datum give us knowledge of any more than other ideas/sense data if that’s all we could know?
For Reid what we experience are the objects of experience including the operations of our minds which have or cause the qualities we perceive in them in some way which seems closest to an identity theory of mind. Experience is accompanied by belief and judgement not just passive impressions of an object, so that by intuition and reflection we obtain our most basic notions of things without which we could not reason but which precede the use of reason. From this Reid concludes that our notions are not solely the result of sense impressions of objects which to me sounds almost Platonist but Reid shared Berkeley’s skepticism of abstract ideas. I would say the distinction of primary/secondary ideas is cognitive rather than perceptual however, much like Locke’s account of substance. Primary qualities belong to the object by itself while secondary qualities are caused by the object to an observer.
The peripatetic or Aristotelian school according to Reid had treated the mind like wax that copies objects along with their form and had no use for ideas while the Cartesian philosophy began with the contents of consciousness and inferred the existence of what substances could cause these ideas. Reid thought that moderns like Bacon and Descartes were correct in building a new more scientific philosophy by applying parsimony and skepticism towards our intellectual notions of things but their forbears ended up going too far in rejecting common sense notions such as the existence of the self and the external world by relying on argumentation rather than experience.
For Reid what we experience are the objects of experience including the operations of our minds which have or cause the qualities we perceive in them in some way which seems closest to an identity theory of mind. Experience is accompanied by belief and judgement not just passive impressions of an object, so that by intuition and reflection we obtain our most basic notions of things without which we could not reason but which precede the use of reason. From this Reid concludes that our notions are not solely the result of sense impressions of objects which to me sounds almost Platonist but Reid shared Berkeley’s skepticism of abstract ideas. I would say the distinction of primary/secondary ideas is cognitive rather than perceptual however, much like Locke’s account of substance. Primary qualities belong to the object by itself while secondary qualities are caused by the object to an observer.
The peripatetic or Aristotelian school according to Reid had treated the mind like wax that copies objects along with their form and had no use for ideas while the Cartesian philosophy began with the contents of consciousness and inferred the existence of what substances could cause these ideas. Reid thought that moderns like Bacon and Descartes were correct in building a new more scientific philosophy by applying parsimony and skepticism towards our intellectual notions of things but their forbears ended up going too far in rejecting common sense notions such as the existence of the self and the external world by relying on argumentation rather than experience.
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September 23, 2010Inquiry Into The Human Mind by Thomas Reid (1999)
May 14, 2021
A nota 3 representa tão somente o pouco que consegui captar da leitura; tenho certeza de que, tivesse eu entendido mais, a nota seria maior. Para reler no futuro.
Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews