What do you think?
Rate this book
Together We Stand: Turning the Tide in the West: North Africa, 1942-1943
From the bestselling author of Fortress Malta this is the second book in the Mediterranean war trilogy. This book looks afresh at the conflict in Northern Africa, focusing for the first time on the involvement of the US and the way this early collaboration to defeat shaped the whole Anglo-American axis for the rest of the war in Europe.
880 pages, Paperback
First published May 3, 2005
73 people are currently reading
536 people want to read
About the author
James Holland
67 books1,028 followersLibrarian note:
There is more than one author in the GoodReads database with this name
James Holland was born in Salisbury, Wiltshire, and studied history at Durham University. He has worked for several London publishing houses and has also written for a number of national newspapers and magazines. Married with a son, he lives near Salisbury.
There is more than one author in the GoodReads database with this name
James Holland was born in Salisbury, Wiltshire, and studied history at Durham University. He has worked for several London publishing houses and has also written for a number of national newspapers and magazines. Married with a son, he lives near Salisbury.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 19 of 19 reviews
March 5, 2020
James Holland's book on the final year of the war in Africa is much more than just a description of the battles the Allied armies had to pass along on their road to victory.
For me, it was actually foremost the story, firstly, of the forging of effective fighting forces, the steep learning curves the British, initially, and then the Americans climbed as they began to effectively counter the German forces in Libya and Tunisia and ultimately liberate the countries from the occupying forces.
The most interesting part of the book for me was the way the two nations forces came together and forged an effective alliance which was ultimately to lead to the defeat of Germany. The differences in characters which lead to friction are documented (Montgomery is an egotistical pain in the butt, but then so is Patton) and the degrees of incompetancy in the leadership of both forces are laid bare in gratifying honesty. Even the diplomacy manages to remain interesting.
The degree to which the American forces (from the Air Force in Egypt in early 1942 to the ground forces in 1943) turn their enthusiasm into a willingness to learn is amazing and the degree of integration the armies achieve in such a short time is nothing short of miraculous.
Highly recommended to anyone wanting to learn about the end if the North African campaign or how the Anglo- American alliance was forged.
For me, it was actually foremost the story, firstly, of the forging of effective fighting forces, the steep learning curves the British, initially, and then the Americans climbed as they began to effectively counter the German forces in Libya and Tunisia and ultimately liberate the countries from the occupying forces.
The most interesting part of the book for me was the way the two nations forces came together and forged an effective alliance which was ultimately to lead to the defeat of Germany. The differences in characters which lead to friction are documented (Montgomery is an egotistical pain in the butt, but then so is Patton) and the degrees of incompetancy in the leadership of both forces are laid bare in gratifying honesty. Even the diplomacy manages to remain interesting.
The degree to which the American forces (from the Air Force in Egypt in early 1942 to the ground forces in 1943) turn their enthusiasm into a willingness to learn is amazing and the degree of integration the armies achieve in such a short time is nothing short of miraculous.
Highly recommended to anyone wanting to learn about the end if the North African campaign or how the Anglo- American alliance was forged.
June 25, 2025
There are several aspects of the North African campaign in the Second World War that make it a fascinating topic to study. One is that James Hollands' excellent book on the campaign could quite easily have been entitled "The Turning of the Tide," as that is what the war in North Africa captures in miniature. At the point where Holland's book begins, the Axis are in the ascendant and appear unbeatable; when his book closes, Allied victory, while still a long way off, is all but assured. Another is the specific features of the landscape and environment that made it unique among the land campaigns of the war. The relative lack of civilians meant that "The horrors of war touch only the fighters. That is why the desert war, so hard on the body, does not besmirch the soul." Last, and by no means least, is the fact that this was the first time that Britain and the USA would enter battle side by side, so cementing an alliance that has had a huge role in determining the history of the world for the last 75 years: "In the corridors and offices of Washington and London, and in the sand, mud and mountains of North Africa, one of the great political and military alliances was born, an alliance that has had a lasting and profound effect upon the history of the world."
Holland begins with a helpful and succinct summary of the events that preceded the war in North Africa. He outlines the three basic conclusions reached by the German command in the inter-war years, which had a direct bearing on the African campaign. The first was the primacy of purpose-built ground attack aircraft in a tactical role; second, the flexible 'mission command' ethos should continue; and third, the importance of technological advancement. In contrast, for the British, the inter-war years were marked by military apathy and stagnation, with a very few exceptions, such as the development of advanced fighter aircraft. This meant that, when the Germans entered the war in North Africa, their tactics and equipment outclassed what the British could offer. By May 1942, when Holland's narrative begins, these shortcomings had still not been put right, which goes some way towards explaining how the opportunity to destroy the Afrika Corps at Gazala was missed. Rommel launched his offensive on the 26th of May, and by the 30th had lost 200 tanks and was in danger of being surrounded and cut off. Holland is withering in his criticism of the British generalship at this point, commenting that "instead, there was dithering, hesitation, and far too much conferring...For three whole days his [Rommel's] Panzer Army had lain at the mercy of the British, yet time and time again the chances to go for the kill were passed over. That Ritchie and his commanders failed to make the most of this enormous opportunity must rank as one of the most inexcusable acts of British generalship in the whole war." Worse was to follow, as fighting around Knightsbridge in early to mid-June led to wholesale Allied retreat and the fall of Tobruk. Holland is very clear that this was a British failure as much as a German success and refuses to place Rommel on a pedestal: "For all his weaknesses - his rashness, his cavalier attitude to reconnaissance and intelligence, and his sometimes inexplicable tactical decisions - the German commander could never be accused lacking decisiveness or an ability to inspire." Unfortunately for the British, at this point, those qualities were vital as the Afrika Corps pursued the fleeing 8th Army back towards the Egyptian frontier. As Holland concludes bleakly, "A little over a month before, the Eighth Army had been dug into a highly prepared defensive position and had numerical superiority in both armour and infantry, and yet it had been utterly defeated and flung back nearly three hundred miles...Egypt and the Middle East appeared to be [Rommel's] for the taking." Allied fortunes in North Africa had reached their nadir.
All was not lost, however, as from this point things gradually began to change for the better. For all his success, Rommel's forces were running out of steam with hugely over-extended supply lines and shortages of all kinds of materiel and equipment taking their toll. He only had one chance (and a slim one at that) to smash through the Alamein line, and hope that captured Allied supplies would see him through to Cairo and the Suez Canal. A crucial tactical and strategic failure on Rommel's part also played an important role - he failed to appreciate both the importance of air support for his thrust and how effective a force the RAF remained. While Allied fortunes generally were at a low ebb, the performance of the leadership and men of the Desert Air Force comes in for special praise and admiration in Holland's account, and rightly so. In parallel to ongoing events in North Africa, Holland traces the development of the US armed forces, their entry into the war, and the development of their relationship with the British. Eisenhower is an obvious focal point for this analysis, and is portrayed as a driven and dedicated professional: "Ike himself expected to work seven days a week, and demanded the same of his staff. He also tended to work late and did not like any of his staff to leave before him. 'We're here to fight,' he told them, 'not to be wined and dined.'" He comes across as a thoroughly modern leader, having zero tolerance for defeatism and pessimism, encouraging informality, being friendly and easy-going, but also tough and ruthless when needed. He was also highly cognisant of the importance of his public image and effective PR. By mid-1942, Ike's focus was on planning for Operation Torch, the Allied seaborne invasion of North West Africa. This was a gargantuan undertaking, the largest amphibious operation ever attempted and requiring both international and inter-service coordination across thousands of miles, and the establishment of a battlefront hundreds of miles in depth. And it all had to be planned and executed in a matter of months. But what was even more difficult than the military planning would be "the task of making two nations work together and achieve a level of unity that had never been attempted before."
Meanwhile, Churchill made twin appointments in Egypt that were to define the future course of the war: Alexander was appointed C-in-C Egypt, and under him Montgomery was appointed to command of the 8th Army: "They made an unlikely couple, Alex and Monty, yet their backgrounds, experience and differing skills complemented one another perfectly. Together they made a team, as solid as Mary Coningham and Tommy Elmhirst, a team which, both Churchill and Brooke desperately hoped, would bring them victory and the prestige to give them a lasting equal partnership with the Americans." These hopes were quickly repaid, as any thought of further withdrawal was banished and a firm grip and clarity of purpose were imposed on 8th Army: "By the end of the Battle of Alam Halfa, the Middle East had been saved." This success was reinforced in October and November 1942, as the Allies won a decisive victory in the Second Battle of El Alamein. Coinciding with Operation Torch, the surrender at Stalingrad and the invasion of Guadalcanal, this was truly a turning point in Allied fortunes in the war. El Alamein is striking for several reasons, not least among them the exemplary way in which US forces were seamlessly absorbed into the Allied effort. Indeed, this formed a benchmark for future Anglo-US co-operation. As regards Torch, "The Second World War would see larger seaborne invasions than TORCH, but none, not even OVERLORD just under two years later, surpassed it for the distances covered or for its sheer daring. On 6 June 1944, the invasion force travelled no more than a hundred miles. For TORCH, the armada journeyed over 3500 miles from the USE and over 1500 miles from Britain. Nothing like it had ever been attempted before, and yet in a little over three months, an embryonic plan had evolved into an operation involving nearly 700 ships, 70000 troops, and over 1000 aircraft. Plenty had gone wrong, and there were many lessons to be learned. But it was nonetheless a monumental achievement by new allies working together in a way that two independent nations had never attempted before."
After TORCH, however, it was not all plain sailing. In my mind's eye, victory at Alamein and the TORCH landings proceeded directly to a decisive victory and the surrender of more German troops than at Stalingrad. I didn't appreciate just how hard-fought the Tunisian campaign was, and how much bitter fighting was required that is now largely forgotten. November and December 1942 were miserable for the Allies in Tunisia, but salvation was at hand. Alexander took over command, and "He was, after all, by some margin, the most experienced general in North Africa. He had witnessed war - both success and defeat, triumphant advances and ignominious retreats - at all levels...He had seen such chaos before and knew that here in Tunisia, their armies had lost confidence and were coming apart at the seams." Alexander's experience, confidence and firm grip were to prove decisive.
While history does not turn solely on the actions of great men, Alexander and Eisenhower are two individuals who stand out head and shoulders above the rest in Holland's narrative: "Under their direction, the Allied experiences gained in North Africa made the future invasions of Italy and Normandy possible, and made victory against Nazi Germany not only possible, but probable." Alex, in particular, comes in for some well-deserved praise: "The divisions and tensions in command that threatened to undermine this grand alliance were replaced by a sense of cohesion and singleness of purpose. His achievements have often been overshadowed by some of the glory-seekers who served under him. Alex was never one to blow his own trumpet, but he deserves greater recognition than he has often been given." Holland concludes that, "Many lessons were learned in North Africa. By the end of the campaign, Britain had shaken off many of the earlier mistakes. Equipment had improved considerably...The army was also beginning to employ the correct tactics to defeat the enemy: The final result was...an ideal example of how to use superior strength to devastating effect...Britain was learning how to win wars again. Of great significance was the development of air power, and in this the Allies were able to gain serious tactical advantage over the Axis for the first time."
This is an excellent book about an oft-neglected part of the Second World War. The North African campaign helped set the terms not only of the joint Anglo-USA effort throughout the rest of the war but in the decades since, and James Holland does justice to its significance. It is also striking that, although he wrote this book 15 years ago, it contains many of the emphases that have characterised his writing since: the human aspect of the war, the significance of the operational level, and the conviction that the Allied forces were much more competent than the traditional assessment would have us believe. On the former, I was delighted to encounter individuals (Stanley Christopherson, Bing Evans, and others) who feature in many of Holland's books. They are a timely reminder that, whatever the grand strategic and geo-political factors at play, war is still fought by individuals who have a value and significance that must not be forgotten.
Holland begins with a helpful and succinct summary of the events that preceded the war in North Africa. He outlines the three basic conclusions reached by the German command in the inter-war years, which had a direct bearing on the African campaign. The first was the primacy of purpose-built ground attack aircraft in a tactical role; second, the flexible 'mission command' ethos should continue; and third, the importance of technological advancement. In contrast, for the British, the inter-war years were marked by military apathy and stagnation, with a very few exceptions, such as the development of advanced fighter aircraft. This meant that, when the Germans entered the war in North Africa, their tactics and equipment outclassed what the British could offer. By May 1942, when Holland's narrative begins, these shortcomings had still not been put right, which goes some way towards explaining how the opportunity to destroy the Afrika Corps at Gazala was missed. Rommel launched his offensive on the 26th of May, and by the 30th had lost 200 tanks and was in danger of being surrounded and cut off. Holland is withering in his criticism of the British generalship at this point, commenting that "instead, there was dithering, hesitation, and far too much conferring...For three whole days his [Rommel's] Panzer Army had lain at the mercy of the British, yet time and time again the chances to go for the kill were passed over. That Ritchie and his commanders failed to make the most of this enormous opportunity must rank as one of the most inexcusable acts of British generalship in the whole war." Worse was to follow, as fighting around Knightsbridge in early to mid-June led to wholesale Allied retreat and the fall of Tobruk. Holland is very clear that this was a British failure as much as a German success and refuses to place Rommel on a pedestal: "For all his weaknesses - his rashness, his cavalier attitude to reconnaissance and intelligence, and his sometimes inexplicable tactical decisions - the German commander could never be accused lacking decisiveness or an ability to inspire." Unfortunately for the British, at this point, those qualities were vital as the Afrika Corps pursued the fleeing 8th Army back towards the Egyptian frontier. As Holland concludes bleakly, "A little over a month before, the Eighth Army had been dug into a highly prepared defensive position and had numerical superiority in both armour and infantry, and yet it had been utterly defeated and flung back nearly three hundred miles...Egypt and the Middle East appeared to be [Rommel's] for the taking." Allied fortunes in North Africa had reached their nadir.
All was not lost, however, as from this point things gradually began to change for the better. For all his success, Rommel's forces were running out of steam with hugely over-extended supply lines and shortages of all kinds of materiel and equipment taking their toll. He only had one chance (and a slim one at that) to smash through the Alamein line, and hope that captured Allied supplies would see him through to Cairo and the Suez Canal. A crucial tactical and strategic failure on Rommel's part also played an important role - he failed to appreciate both the importance of air support for his thrust and how effective a force the RAF remained. While Allied fortunes generally were at a low ebb, the performance of the leadership and men of the Desert Air Force comes in for special praise and admiration in Holland's account, and rightly so. In parallel to ongoing events in North Africa, Holland traces the development of the US armed forces, their entry into the war, and the development of their relationship with the British. Eisenhower is an obvious focal point for this analysis, and is portrayed as a driven and dedicated professional: "Ike himself expected to work seven days a week, and demanded the same of his staff. He also tended to work late and did not like any of his staff to leave before him. 'We're here to fight,' he told them, 'not to be wined and dined.'" He comes across as a thoroughly modern leader, having zero tolerance for defeatism and pessimism, encouraging informality, being friendly and easy-going, but also tough and ruthless when needed. He was also highly cognisant of the importance of his public image and effective PR. By mid-1942, Ike's focus was on planning for Operation Torch, the Allied seaborne invasion of North West Africa. This was a gargantuan undertaking, the largest amphibious operation ever attempted and requiring both international and inter-service coordination across thousands of miles, and the establishment of a battlefront hundreds of miles in depth. And it all had to be planned and executed in a matter of months. But what was even more difficult than the military planning would be "the task of making two nations work together and achieve a level of unity that had never been attempted before."
Meanwhile, Churchill made twin appointments in Egypt that were to define the future course of the war: Alexander was appointed C-in-C Egypt, and under him Montgomery was appointed to command of the 8th Army: "They made an unlikely couple, Alex and Monty, yet their backgrounds, experience and differing skills complemented one another perfectly. Together they made a team, as solid as Mary Coningham and Tommy Elmhirst, a team which, both Churchill and Brooke desperately hoped, would bring them victory and the prestige to give them a lasting equal partnership with the Americans." These hopes were quickly repaid, as any thought of further withdrawal was banished and a firm grip and clarity of purpose were imposed on 8th Army: "By the end of the Battle of Alam Halfa, the Middle East had been saved." This success was reinforced in October and November 1942, as the Allies won a decisive victory in the Second Battle of El Alamein. Coinciding with Operation Torch, the surrender at Stalingrad and the invasion of Guadalcanal, this was truly a turning point in Allied fortunes in the war. El Alamein is striking for several reasons, not least among them the exemplary way in which US forces were seamlessly absorbed into the Allied effort. Indeed, this formed a benchmark for future Anglo-US co-operation. As regards Torch, "The Second World War would see larger seaborne invasions than TORCH, but none, not even OVERLORD just under two years later, surpassed it for the distances covered or for its sheer daring. On 6 June 1944, the invasion force travelled no more than a hundred miles. For TORCH, the armada journeyed over 3500 miles from the USE and over 1500 miles from Britain. Nothing like it had ever been attempted before, and yet in a little over three months, an embryonic plan had evolved into an operation involving nearly 700 ships, 70000 troops, and over 1000 aircraft. Plenty had gone wrong, and there were many lessons to be learned. But it was nonetheless a monumental achievement by new allies working together in a way that two independent nations had never attempted before."
After TORCH, however, it was not all plain sailing. In my mind's eye, victory at Alamein and the TORCH landings proceeded directly to a decisive victory and the surrender of more German troops than at Stalingrad. I didn't appreciate just how hard-fought the Tunisian campaign was, and how much bitter fighting was required that is now largely forgotten. November and December 1942 were miserable for the Allies in Tunisia, but salvation was at hand. Alexander took over command, and "He was, after all, by some margin, the most experienced general in North Africa. He had witnessed war - both success and defeat, triumphant advances and ignominious retreats - at all levels...He had seen such chaos before and knew that here in Tunisia, their armies had lost confidence and were coming apart at the seams." Alexander's experience, confidence and firm grip were to prove decisive.
While history does not turn solely on the actions of great men, Alexander and Eisenhower are two individuals who stand out head and shoulders above the rest in Holland's narrative: "Under their direction, the Allied experiences gained in North Africa made the future invasions of Italy and Normandy possible, and made victory against Nazi Germany not only possible, but probable." Alex, in particular, comes in for some well-deserved praise: "The divisions and tensions in command that threatened to undermine this grand alliance were replaced by a sense of cohesion and singleness of purpose. His achievements have often been overshadowed by some of the glory-seekers who served under him. Alex was never one to blow his own trumpet, but he deserves greater recognition than he has often been given." Holland concludes that, "Many lessons were learned in North Africa. By the end of the campaign, Britain had shaken off many of the earlier mistakes. Equipment had improved considerably...The army was also beginning to employ the correct tactics to defeat the enemy: The final result was...an ideal example of how to use superior strength to devastating effect...Britain was learning how to win wars again. Of great significance was the development of air power, and in this the Allies were able to gain serious tactical advantage over the Axis for the first time."
This is an excellent book about an oft-neglected part of the Second World War. The North African campaign helped set the terms not only of the joint Anglo-USA effort throughout the rest of the war but in the decades since, and James Holland does justice to its significance. It is also striking that, although he wrote this book 15 years ago, it contains many of the emphases that have characterised his writing since: the human aspect of the war, the significance of the operational level, and the conviction that the Allied forces were much more competent than the traditional assessment would have us believe. On the former, I was delighted to encounter individuals (Stanley Christopherson, Bing Evans, and others) who feature in many of Holland's books. They are a timely reminder that, whatever the grand strategic and geo-political factors at play, war is still fought by individuals who have a value and significance that must not be forgotten.
November 15, 2025
As with any book I’ve read by James Holland it scores a very solid 5 stars. He just packs his books with so much information. He uses a ‘cast’ of characters, some he’s interviewed himself, and interweaves with the bigger picture. The political ramifications and how the chain of command fight it out are also well covered. Noting the frequent fighting amongst themselves as well! He explains vividly the brutality of the conflict, there’s no glorifying it, he states it for what it is. This is a brilliant book.
March 1, 2014
This book is more compromised as a work of history than flawed. Swinging between documented historical record and anecdotal remembrance, it at times read like a a piece of historical fiction.
The premise of the work regarding the beginning or 'forging' of the Alliance between the United States and Britain(Great Britain, England, or your choice of the moment) is never completely delivered to the reader. No new ground regarding the development of the relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt is explored. In places it swings between "The Yanks are Coming" and "overpaid, oversexed, and overhere!" even as the later is from a slightly later stage of WWII. Some of the historical references are at best only slightly explored or very select and even out of context information included. The relationship between the eventual leaders including Alexander for the British and Eisenhower for the US is not fully examined. Certainly a few sentences scattered throughout the later half of the work don't do justice to the books premise. Dismissal of Eisenhower as not being interested in the outcome of the North Africa campaign is one of the main reasons for the commentary about 'British History'.
Even as a British hagiography with cautionary tales thrown in for false modesty, the work in total misses the overall scope of the announced topic. There are great moments of heroism and valor detailed, but there is also a lot of dismissive and even jingoistic writing masquerading as commentary and historical analysis. In one phrase the enemy is admired for what they were able to achieve, but then before the end of the same paragraph they are painted as arrogant and possibly careless.
The book is plagued by major technical problems including the lack of a general index! Endnotes are not segmented by chapter. For over 600 notes in the main body of the work that is a difficult problem to overcome. Combined with references including 'conversations' that come from diaries and interviews that are not referenced by note in the text at all, the term sloppy comes to mind in the final production of this work.
Misjudgement of the character and behavior of several commanders is another limiting factor in the overall value of the work. From Patton and Rommel being painted from limited sources or information cherry picked to mythologize (pro or con) their activities and of other important figures, to the minimization of conflicts in command the work has major failings. Hero worship of one or two generals including the British Air Command leadership (not undeserved, but over played and fawning) is another miscue in this work.
Great sources (with a couple of curious inclusions) that are not fully used are intriguing. The International War Museum (U.K.) as an example has filmed interviews with several of the figures in this book about the North Africa Campaign. If the author had alone just watched more of these films and used that information a fuller picture of the "Alliance" would have emerged in this work.
Limited Recommendation as this is a readable work. Incomplete but where detailed as in certain battles (i.e. 'The Cauldron' among others) it is well written and accurate in comparison to the other works on North Africa. Not a primary or go to source except for 'color commentary.'
The premise of the work regarding the beginning or 'forging' of the Alliance between the United States and Britain(Great Britain, England, or your choice of the moment) is never completely delivered to the reader. No new ground regarding the development of the relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt is explored. In places it swings between "The Yanks are Coming" and "overpaid, oversexed, and overhere!" even as the later is from a slightly later stage of WWII. Some of the historical references are at best only slightly explored or very select and even out of context information included. The relationship between the eventual leaders including Alexander for the British and Eisenhower for the US is not fully examined. Certainly a few sentences scattered throughout the later half of the work don't do justice to the books premise. Dismissal of Eisenhower as not being interested in the outcome of the North Africa campaign is one of the main reasons for the commentary about 'British History'.
Even as a British hagiography with cautionary tales thrown in for false modesty, the work in total misses the overall scope of the announced topic. There are great moments of heroism and valor detailed, but there is also a lot of dismissive and even jingoistic writing masquerading as commentary and historical analysis. In one phrase the enemy is admired for what they were able to achieve, but then before the end of the same paragraph they are painted as arrogant and possibly careless.
The book is plagued by major technical problems including the lack of a general index! Endnotes are not segmented by chapter. For over 600 notes in the main body of the work that is a difficult problem to overcome. Combined with references including 'conversations' that come from diaries and interviews that are not referenced by note in the text at all, the term sloppy comes to mind in the final production of this work.
Misjudgement of the character and behavior of several commanders is another limiting factor in the overall value of the work. From Patton and Rommel being painted from limited sources or information cherry picked to mythologize (pro or con) their activities and of other important figures, to the minimization of conflicts in command the work has major failings. Hero worship of one or two generals including the British Air Command leadership (not undeserved, but over played and fawning) is another miscue in this work.
Great sources (with a couple of curious inclusions) that are not fully used are intriguing. The International War Museum (U.K.) as an example has filmed interviews with several of the figures in this book about the North Africa Campaign. If the author had alone just watched more of these films and used that information a fuller picture of the "Alliance" would have emerged in this work.
Limited Recommendation as this is a readable work. Incomplete but where detailed as in certain battles (i.e. 'The Cauldron' among others) it is well written and accurate in comparison to the other works on North Africa. Not a primary or go to source except for 'color commentary.'
April 21, 2023
Now that i've finished this book, i think i'm closer to understanding how and why the events described in it happened.
I found the space given to the politics and the reasoning behind the politics interesting. As an example, the conventional wisdom is that General Eisenhower was absolutely the right man to lead this operation and later, the liberation/invasion of Europe and so far i see no reason to disagree but i didn't realise that by making the top people American rather than British in this exercise the expectation, real or otherwise that the French, into whose territory the Allies would be landing would be more likely to cooperate. And this is what happened.
My copy, bought through a site specialising in second-hand or "pre-loved" books, is I think the first paperback edition. As such, the Afterword, giving details of what happened next to the cast of characters we follow in the book was written while some of them, mostly those who were in their early twenties in '42/43 were still alive. We're now twenty or so years on from that edition, it's nice to think that some of those brave men and women lived on to live what seemed to be happy lives after the horrors they experienced and even better to imagine, if only for a minute as far as my copy is concerned that they still live.
I found the space given to the politics and the reasoning behind the politics interesting. As an example, the conventional wisdom is that General Eisenhower was absolutely the right man to lead this operation and later, the liberation/invasion of Europe and so far i see no reason to disagree but i didn't realise that by making the top people American rather than British in this exercise the expectation, real or otherwise that the French, into whose territory the Allies would be landing would be more likely to cooperate. And this is what happened.
My copy, bought through a site specialising in second-hand or "pre-loved" books, is I think the first paperback edition. As such, the Afterword, giving details of what happened next to the cast of characters we follow in the book was written while some of them, mostly those who were in their early twenties in '42/43 were still alive. We're now twenty or so years on from that edition, it's nice to think that some of those brave men and women lived on to live what seemed to be happy lives after the horrors they experienced and even better to imagine, if only for a minute as far as my copy is concerned that they still live.
April 21, 2024
another very good book by Holland, well worth a read even if, like me, you think you knew all there was to know about the war in the Western Desert, The Desert Fox, Monty, and all that. The author still manages to make a very good point; the British needed to relearn how to fight, particularly against Rommel and the Afrika Korps in the desert, before they could win, and a lot of soldiers had to die for no good reason in the learning. Holland is very good on the personalities, and also on the multinational lineup on the Allied side, with contributions from British, American, Indian and Maori soldiers, as well as a number of female witnesses involved in the conflict in one way or the other. There is no attempt to sugar coat the actual cost of war, and death and mutilation are described in a straight forward manner. Oh, and it's the first military history I've read that features the word "dildo" (which is a minor astonishment, considering the number of books I've read where people like Montgomery and Patton feature)
June 4, 2017
The North African Campaign of WWII, from mid '42 to the fall of Tunis in May '43. Covers both the Commonwealth and American endeavours. Contains lots of first hand account and recollections from a range of participants.
But only from the Allied side. And while I understand that this was the purpose of the book - to show how the British and Americans came to work together effectively - it would have been nice to hear a few voices from the other side, to hear about their experiences.
Much like the campaign as a whole, the book finishes very abruptly ("and then three days later Tunis fell"). Given the depth of detail for some of the earlier events, this was a little off putting.
Rated M for pervasive battle violence and some nasty depictions thereof. 3/5
But only from the Allied side. And while I understand that this was the purpose of the book - to show how the British and Americans came to work together effectively - it would have been nice to hear a few voices from the other side, to hear about their experiences.
Much like the campaign as a whole, the book finishes very abruptly ("and then three days later Tunis fell"). Given the depth of detail for some of the earlier events, this was a little off putting.
Rated M for pervasive battle violence and some nasty depictions thereof. 3/5
March 8, 2025
Brilliant. While an early effort by Holland - and littered with typos any editor of any time should have caught - his genius and tact for history is clear.
Moreover, for me at least, this book stands in stark contrast to Rick Atkinson's 'An Army at Dawn'. The gulf between these two books - Holland's, sublime and honest, Atkinson's biased and deceitful - is immense, and time again Holland's research undercuts the false narrative portrayed by Atkinson.
For anyone wanting to understand North Africa in WWII, or Operation Torch, then turn to Holland's 'Together We Stand'.
Moreover, for me at least, this book stands in stark contrast to Rick Atkinson's 'An Army at Dawn'. The gulf between these two books - Holland's, sublime and honest, Atkinson's biased and deceitful - is immense, and time again Holland's research undercuts the false narrative portrayed by Atkinson.
For anyone wanting to understand North Africa in WWII, or Operation Torch, then turn to Holland's 'Together We Stand'.
July 20, 2024
James Holland is a fine writer with an engaging style, and this well researched history is very readable. The focus is on the building of the Anglo-American alliance in WWII’s North African campaign that led to the special relationship between the two nations that we know today. Holland’s method is to intercut various participants’ experience of the campaign with the chronological account. It’s all rather nicely done.
May 31, 2020
I appreciate that James Holland is very big on narrative history, that he is very kern on letting veterans who were there tell their story. Sometimes though he lets such interludes effect the flow of the wider story and this book is one such example. Not the worst book you will ever read on the subject but not the best either.
November 10, 2020
Very good account of this campaign
Very good account of the tide turning for the allies in north Africa. Recommended for students of ww2. The character of the commanders and soldiers involved are handled particularly well.
Very good account of the tide turning for the allies in north Africa. Recommended for students of ww2. The character of the commanders and soldiers involved are handled particularly well.
February 3, 2025
Brilliant account of the North African campaigns. It's a long book but whizzes by - excellently written, full of human detail and expert analysis. I'm belatedly beginning to read a James Holland WW2 book each year; whisper it, but I think he is a better writer than his brother...
December 8, 2025
Really well done especially for one of the earlier books. I enjoyed how it covered the broader strokes of the campaign. However having read a lot on the North Africa theatre this year I would say this is better as a starter for that phase of the war.
June 28, 2017
A good history of the North Africa campaign from Crusader to the fall of Tunis.
June 1, 2022
A brilliant read from start to finish. An eye-opener on the main commanders invoked.
June 12, 2022
I am not big into the North African campaign but did enjoy and find this one interesting. I am a fan of James Holland though
July 2, 2022
This was one of James Holland's best! Very well written and researched! It was both informative and a joy to read!
October 7, 2025
Masterful
Displaying 1 - 19 of 19 reviews